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 Abstract (English) 
Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes have been proposed in order to internalize the costs 
and benefits of nature conservation and ecosystem service provision, and as such create more positive 
incentives to landholders to safeguard certain ecosystems and the benefits they provide to people. In 
addition, PES are often considered as a tool to improve rural household income. However, there has been 
little empirical verification to what extent the two objectives of environmental conservation/restoration and 
rural development can be achieved simultaneously through PES.  
The aim of this PhD research is to analyse the (potential) impacts and trade-offs of PES contracts for the 
maintenance and improvement of ecosystem services and the provision of rural income to households in 
the buffer zone of Podocarpus National Park in Ecuador. As a second objective the use of these contracts 
is compared with other incentive schemes and with land uses implemented in the research area to increase 
understanding of the impacts.  
PES schemes, as analysed in this PhD, cover a range of arrangements, from small markets to (almost) 
complete hierarchical organisational arrangements. Our first analysis suggests that over time an increasing 
number of schemes have incorporated characteristics of a hierarchy to organise the users’ side. However, 
contractual agreements based on bilateral negotiation of payments or payments set by intermediaries, with 
mainly individual and communal landholders as providers, remain the core focus of most of the schemes 
analysed. Intermediaries are important actors in almost all schemes, mainly organising and/or representing 
ecosystem service users, and are most often national or local governments.  
The results of our second analysis, on the cost-effectiveness of implementing several programmes with the 
dual goal of improving conservation and rural livelihoods, show that purchasing land as done by the water 
fund of the research area has the highest additionality in ecosystem service provision. The PES scheme 
studied (Socio Bosque) is the most cost-effective both for current as for increased ecosystem service 
provision and for extra rural job creation. Finally, we found that organic coffee certification has the highest 
positive impact on rural income creation. 
In our third analysis we applied a portfolio analysis to study the impact of combining milk production with 
Socio Bosque contracts for forest conservation and the restoration of pastures to its natural vegetation, and 
an incentive programme for tree plantation. The results of this analysis suggest that most farmers would 
increase the area under conservation and/or restoration in a risk reduction strategy (minimum variance 
portfolio) and when maximizing profit per unit increase of risk (optimal portfolio), beyond what would be 
expected from decisions considering expected return only. However, none of the portfolios would increase 
all households’ income to above the poverty line due to small farm sizes and low payments. Moreover, a 
negative impact on household income was observed from adopting the land-use portfolios for milk 
producers without forest. For most producers without forest, there seemed to be a trade-off between 
 maximizing household income on the one hand, and risk reduction through a land-use combination of 
restoration payments and tree plantations, on the other.  
In our final analytical chapter we conclude that farmers in the area are interested in contracts for 
silvopastoral systems, but differ in their preferences regarding the additional requirements. The results 
suggest that farmland area, agricultural income, the share of this income in total income, and landowners’ 
perception of environmental problems provide a partial explanation for the heterogeneity observed in the 
preferences for specific contracts. Offering flexible contracts with varying additional requirements within 
the same scheme may contribute to enhance participation, and thus improve the provision of ecosystem 
services. Building of trust and combining PES with integrated conservation and development projects may 
further increase participation and thus the adoption silvopastoral systems within the research area.  
Overall we see a trade-off between maximizing conservation and improvement of ecosystem services and 
increasing household income in the PES schemes analysed. Within the research area rural poverty seems 
best to be addressed by the implementation of projects that aim at increasing productivity. These could be 
linked with environmentally friendly practices to ensure a certain level of ecosystem service provision. PES 
could only have that impact if payments would be increased substantially for poorer households. However, 
PES as a positive incentive (or reward) for forest conservation can provide an additional and stable income 
source of income for forest holders. For non-forest holders PES for productive actions could also provide 
an additional source of income, and could strengthen the assurance that the new land use practices continue 
to be implemented for the duration of the contract.  
To improve their impact the broader institutional, economic and social environment should be considered. 
PES is only one tool available to governments, conservation practitioners, and other actors interested in 
improving and sustaining ecosystem service provision. PES is influenced by a wide range of factors such 
as market prices for agricultural products and the national and local political situation. Within the research 
area, PES could be implemented as part of a policy mix and of different programmes to achieve the best 
outcome both in terms of ecosystem provision and rural development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract (Nederlands) 
Schema’s voor het organiseren van betalingen voor ecosysteemdiensten (PES, naar zijn Engelse afkorting) 
worden voorgesteld als een systeem om de kosten en baten van natuurbehoud en het leveren van 
ecosysteemdiensten te internaliseren. Deze schema`s zouden een sterkere economische drijfveer kunnen 
vormen die grondbezitters aanzet om bepaalde ecosystemen, en de baten die deze bieden aan mensen, te 
beschermen. Daarnaast worden PES vaak beschouwd als een instrument om het inkomen van rurale 
gezinnen te verbeteren. Er zijn echter relatief weinig empirische studies over de vraag in hoeverre twee 
doelstellingen van milieubehoud, namelijk restauratie en plattelandsontwikkeling, tegelijkertijd kunnen 
worden verwezenlijkt door middel van PES. 
Het eerste doel van dit doctoraatsonderzoek is een analyse van de (potentiële) effecten en de trade-offs van 
PES-contracten in de bufferzone van Podocarpus Nationaal Park in Ecuador uit te voeren. De effecten en 
trade-offs worden onderzocht in functie van het behoud en de verbetering van ecosysteemdiensten, en van 
het inkomen voor gezinnen. Ook wordt het gebruik van deze contracten vergeleken met enerzijds andere 
vormen van betaling of premies die natuurbehoud en het leveren van ecosysteemdiensten moeten 
stimuleren, en met anderzijds typisch landgebruik in het onderzoeksgebied. Het vergelijken van PES met 
ander landgebruik en programma’s heeft tot doel inzicht te verkrijgen in de effecten van PES ten opzichte 
van andere maatregelen. 
PES schema´s, zoals deze werden geanalyseerd in dit doctoraat, bestrijken een scala aan organisatievormen, 
van kleine markten tot (bijna) volledige hiërarchische bestuursvormen. Uit onze eerste analyse blijkt dat de 
schema´s die zijn bestudeerd met de tijd steeds meer gekenmerkt worden door een hiërarchie om gebruikers 
van ecosysteemdiensten te organiseren. Maar wederzijdse overeenkomsten op basis van bilaterale 
onderhandelingen over de betalingen, of betalingen bepaald door tussenpersonen, met voornamelijk 
individuele en gemeenschappelijke grondbezitters als aanbieders van ecosysteemdiensten, blijven de kern 
van de meeste van de geanalyseerde schema`s. Tussenpersonen zijn belangrijke actoren in bijna alle 
schema's, vooral voor het organiseren en/of vertegenwoordigen van gebruikers van ecosysteemdiensten,. 
Het zijn meestal nationale of lokale overheden. 
Het tweede object van het doctoraatsonderzoek is een analyse van de effectiviteit in termen van kosten van 
een aantal programma’s die  als tweevoudig  doel hebben het verbeteren van natuurbehoud en het verhogen 
van rurale inkomens. De resultaten tonen aan dat de aankoop van grond, zoals dit werd gedaan door het 
water-fonds in het onderzoeksgebied, de grootste additionaliteit heeft als het gaat over het leveren van 
ecosysteemdiensten. Het PES schema dat werd onderzocht (Socio Bosque) is het meest kosteneffectief, 
voor de huidige zowel als voor de verhoogde levering van ecosysteemdiensten, alsook voor  extra 
tewerkstelling in het onderzoeksgebied. Tot slot wordt aangetoond dat biologische koffiecertificering de 
hoogste positieve impact heeft op het creëren van het ruraal inkomen. 
 Het derde object van het doctoraatsonderzoek is een portfolio-analyse. Hierin werd de impact gemeten van 
het combineren van melkproductie met Socio Bosque contracten voor bosbehoud, het herstel van weiden 
naar hun natuurlijke vegetatie, en een programma dat premies geeft voor houtplantages. Uit de resultaten 
van deze analyse blijkt dat de meeste boeren in een risicobeperkingsstrategie (minimum variantie 
portefeuille) en bij het maximaliseren van de winst per eenheid van risico (optimale portefeuille), het gebied 
onder behoud en/of restauratie sterker zouden verhogen, dan wat zou worden verwacht van beslissingen 
die enkel kijken naar de hoogste verwachte opbrengst. Geen van de portefeuilles van landgebruiken slaagt 
er echter in om de inkomens van alle huishoudens tot boven de armoedegrens te verhogen. Dit is het  gevolg 
van de vaak kleine boerderijen en van te lage betalingen. Bovendien  werd er een een negatief effect op 
inkomen waargenomen voor huishoudens die geen bos bezitten, als deze groep de bekomen portefeuilles 
van landgebruiken zou toepassen. Voor de meeste melkproducenten zonder bos blijkt er een trade-off te 
zijn tussen het maximaliseren van het gezinsinkomen aan de ene kant, en het verminderen van 
inkomensrisico’s door middel van combinaties van landgebruiken met ecosysteemrestauratie en 
boomplantages, aan de andere kant. 
In het laatste analytische hoofdstuk wordt vastgesteld dat de boeren in het onderzoeksgebied interesse tonen 
voor contracten voor silvopastorale systemen. De ondervraagde boeren verschillen echter in hun 
voorkeuren met betrekking tot aanvullende milieueisen. De resultaten suggereren dat het areaal 
landbouwgrond, het landbouwinkomen, het aandeel van deze inkomsten in de totale gezinsinkomsten, en 
de perceptie van milieuproblemen een gedeeltelijke verklaring bieden voor de waargenomen heterogeniteit 
in de voorkeuren voor specifieke contracten. Het aanbieden van flexibele contracten met verschillende 
aanvullende eisen binnen eenzelfde schema zou dus een deelname in een PES schema kunnen verhogen en 
bijgevolg de levering van ecosysteemdiensten kunnen verbeteren. Het versterken van het vertrouwen en het 
combineren van PES met geïntegreerde projecten voor ontwikkeling en milieubehoud zouden deelname 
nog kunnen verhogen en daarmee dus de introductie van silvopastorale systemen binnen het 
onderzoeksgebied. 
In het algemeen zien we in dit onderzoek een trade-off tussen het maximaliseren van het behoud en 
verbetering van ecosysteemdiensten en het verhogen van gezinsinkomens in de geanalyseerde PES 
schema’s. Binnen het onderzoeksgebied lijkt rurale armoede het best te worden aangepakt door de 
uitvoering van projecten die gericht zijn op het verhogen van de landbouwproductiviteit. Deze kunnen 
worden gekoppeld aan milieuvriendelijke landbouwpraktijken om een bepaald niveau in de voorziening 
van ecosysteemdiensten te verzekeren. PES kan alleen een sterke invloed hebben op armoedevermindering 
indien de betalingen voor armere huishoudens substantieel zouden worden verhoogd. PES als een positieve 
stimulans (of vergoeding) voor bosbehoud, kan echter zorgen voor een extra en stabiele bron van inkomsten 
voor boseigenaars. Voor landeigenaars zonder bos, kan PES voor milieuvriendelijke productiesystemen 
 ook zorgen voor een extra bron van inkomsten, en kan het meer zekerheid bieden dat de nieuwe 
landgebruiken uitgevoerd worden, op zijn minst voor de duur van het PES contract. 
Ter verbetering van de impact moet er rekening worden gehouden met de bredere institutionele, 
economische en sociale omgeving. PES is slechts één van de instrumenten die beschikbaar zijn voor 
overheden, natuurbeschermingsorganisaties, en andere actoren die geïnteresseerd zijn in het verbeteren en 
onderhouden van de levering ecosysteemdiensten. PES wordt beïnvloed door een breed scala van factoren, 
zoals de marktprijzen voor landbouwproducten en de nationale en lokale politieke situatie. Binnen het 
onderzoeksgebied kan PES worden toegepast als onderdeel van een beleidsmix en van verschillende 
programma's om het beste resultaat te behalen, zowel in termen van ecosysteemdiensten als van rurale 
ontwikkeling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Abstrakt (Deutsch) 
Zur Internalisierung der Kosten und Nutzen von Maßnahmen des Naturschutzes und der 
Bereitstellung von Ökosystemleistungen wurde das Instrument der sog. Zahlungen für 
Ökosystemleistungen (engl. Payments for Environmental Services, PES) entwickelt. PES sollen 
Landnutzern positive Anreize für die Bereitstellung von Ökosystemleistungen setzen, dies dadurch 
befördern und somit einen Beitrag für das menschliche Wohlbefinden leisten. Darüber hinaus 
werden PES oft auch als Instrumente zur Verbesserung der Haushaltseinkommen ländlicher 
Bevölkerungsgruppen betrachtet. Bisher gibt es jedoch kaum empirische Erkenntnisse darüber, 
inwieweit diese beiden Ziele – Naturschutz und ländliche Entwicklung – gleichzeitig durch PES 
erreicht werden können. 
Das Ziel dieser Doktorarbeit ist es daher, die (potenziellen) Auswirkungen und Zielkonflikte der 
Umsetzung von PES für die Bereitstellung von Ökosystemleistungen und die Verbesserung der 
Einkommen privater Haushalte, in der Pufferzone des Podocarpus-Nationalpark in Ecuador, zu 
analysieren. Darüber hinaus wird der Einsatz von PES mit anderen Anreizsystemen und Formen 
der Landnutzung im Untersuchungsgebiet verglichen, um ein besseres Verständnis ihrer 
Auswirkungen zu ermöglichen. 
Die PES, die in dieser Doktorarbeit untersucht werden, weisen eine große institutionelle 
Spannbreite auf. Sie reicht von kleinen Märkten bis hin zu (fast) vollständig hierarchisch 
ausgestalteten Institutionen. Die Ergebnisse des ersten Teils der Analyse legt nahe, dass im Laufe 
der Zeit eine zunehmende Anzahl der untersuchten PES auf Nutzerseite Merkmale hierarchisch 
organisierter Institutionen aufweisen. Den Fokus der hier analysierten PES bilden jedoch bilaterale 
vertragliche Vereinbarungen sowie von Intermediären festgelegte Zahlungsvereinbarungen mit 
individuellen oder kollektiven Grundbesitzern auf der Anbieterseite. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
Intermediäre wichtige Akteure in fast allen hier untersuchten Systemen sind. Sie vertreten die 
Nutzer der bereitgestellten Ökosystemleistungen und übernehmen die Organisation. Meist sind die 
Intermediäre lokale oder nationale staatliche Institutionen. 
Der zweite Teil der Analyse untersucht die Kostenwirksamkeit der Durchführung verschiedener 
Programme, die sowohl das Ziel der Bereitstellung von Ökosystemleistungen als auch die 
Verbesserung der ländlichen Lebensgrundlagen verfolgen. Die Ergebnisse im 
Untersuchungsgebiet zeigen, dass der Erwerb von Grundeigentum durch einen Wasserfonds 
imVergleich zu den anderen untersuchten Programmen, das höchste Maß an „Zusätzlichkeit“ in 
 der Bereitstellung von Ökosystemleistungen aufweist. Das untersuchte PES (Socio Bosque) stellt 
sich hingegen als die kostenwirksamste Maßnahme sowohl im Hinblick auf die Bereitstellung von 
Ökosystemleistungen als auch die Schaffung zusätzlicher Arbeitsplätze im ländlichen Raum 
heraus. Die Zertifizierung von biologisch angebautem Kaffee wiederum erweist sich als die 
Maßnahme, die das höchste Maß an positiven Auswirkungen auf die Einkommensentwicklung in 
ländlichen Räumen erreichte. 
Im dritten analytischen Teil der Arbeit wurde eine Portfolio-Analyse angewendet, um die 
Auswirkungen einer Kombination verschiedener Einkommensmöglichkeiten zu untersuchen. 
Hierzu wurde Milchproduktion mit Verträgen des Socio Bosque Programms zum Waldschutz und 
der Renaturierung von Weideflächen und einem Anreizprogramm zur Aufforstung kombiniert. 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Analyse legen den Schluss nahe, dass die meisten Landnutzer, die 
geschützte oder renaturierte Fläche im Rahmen einer Risikobegrenzungsstrategie (Minimum-
Varianz-Portfolio) und einer Gewinnmaximierung pro Risikoerhöhungseinheit (optimales 
Portfolio) erhöhen würden. Dies würde sogar das Ausmaß übersteigen, das erwartet werden könnte 
wenn allein der erwartete Profit als Entscheidungsgrundlage zu Grunde gelegt würde. Aufgrund 
der geringen bewirtschafteten Fläche und der niedrigen Zahlungen ist es in keinem Portfolio 
möglich das Einkommen soweit zu erhöhen, dass dies zu einer Überschreitung der Armutsgrenze 
führt. Darüber hinaus konnten in den Landnutzungsportfolios für Milcherzeugung ohne 
Waldflächen negative Auswirkungen auf das Haushaltseinkommen beobachtet werden. Für die 
meisten (Milch)Produzenten ohne Waldfläche, schien es einen Zielkonflikt zu geben zwischen der 
Maximierung des Einkommens auf der einen Seite und einer Risikoreduzierung durch eine 
Kombination mit Zahlungen für Renaturierung und Aufforstung auf der anderen Seite. 
Das letzte analytische Kapitel legt den Schluss nahe, dass die Landwirte im Untersuchungsgebiet 
zwar ein Interesse an Verträgen für silvopastorale Systeme haben, sich aber in ihren Präferenzen 
hinsichtlich zusätzlicher Vertragsanforderungen unterscheiden. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, 
dass die Größe der bewirtschafteten Fläche, das Einkommen aus der Landwirtschaft, der Anteil 
dieser Einnahmen am Gesamteinkommen und die Wahrnehmung von Umweltproblemen eine 
Erklärung für die beobachtete Heterogenität der Präferenzen für unterschiedliche Vertragsinhalte 
darstellt. Das Anbieten flexibler Verträge mit unterschiedlichen Bedingungen könnte daher dazu 
beitragen, die Beteiligung der Landwirte zu erhöhen und damit letztlich zu einer verbesserten 
Bereitstellung von Ökosystemleistungen führen. Darüber hinaus könnte das Schaffen von 
 Vertrauen und die Kombination von PES mit integrierten Erhaltungs- und Entwicklungsprojekten 
zudem die Teilnahme und damit die Übernahme / Einführung silvopastoraler Systeme weiter 
erhöhen. 
Insgesamt lässt sich in den analysierten PES ein Zielkonflikt beobachten zwischen der 
Maximierung der Bereitstellung und qualitativen Verbesserung von Ökosystemleistungen auf der 
einen Seite und der Erhöhung des Haushaltseinkommens auf der anderen Seite. Im 
Untersuchungsgebiet lässt sich der ländlichen Armut am besten durch Projekte begegnen, deren 
Fokus auf der Steigerung der Produktivität liegt. Diese könnten mit umweltfreundlichen Praktiken 
verknüpft werden, um ein gewisses Maß an bereitgestellten Ökosystemleistungen zu 
gewährleisten. PES könnten dieses Ergebnis nur erreichen, wenn die Zahlungen für ärmere 
Haushalte wesentlich erhöht würden. PES-Zahlungen als positiver Anreiz (oder Honorierung) für 
Walderhalt können jedoch eine zusätzliche und stabile Einkommensquelle für Waldbesitzer 
darstellen. Für Landnutzer ohne Waldflächen könnte PES für Produktivsysteme eine zusätzliche 
Einnahmequelle darstellen, und eine Absicherung dafür bieten, dass neue Landnutzungspraktiken 
während der Vertragslaufzeit durchgeführt werden. 
Zur Verbesserung der Auswirkungen von PES sollte der breitere institutionelle, wirtschaftliche 
und soziale Kontext berücksichtigt werden. Denn PES stellen lediglich ein Instrument unter vielen 
dar, das staatlichen Institutionen, Praktikern im Naturschutz und anderen an der Bereitstellung von 
Ökosystemleitungen Interessierten Akteuren zur Verfügung steht. PES werden durch eine Vielzahl 
von Faktoren, wie z.B. Marktpreise für Agrarerzeugnisse und die nationale und lokale politische 
Ausgangslage beeinflusst. Im Untersuchungsgebiet könnte PES als Teil eines umfassenderen 
Politik-Mixes und verschiedener Programme umgesetzt werden, um das beste Ergebnis sowohl im 
Hinblick auf die Bereitstellung von Ökosystemleistungen als auch die Entwicklung des ländlichen 
Raums zu erreichen. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Problem statement  
1.1.1. Concept and definitions 
Ecosystem services (ES) are “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems”, and include a wide range of 
services (MA, 2005a). These services are classified by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment into four 
categories, whereby the first three categories directly impact human well-being, while the fourth category 
has an impact by supporting the other three categories. Table 1.1 summarizes the four categories.  
Table 1.1: Ecosystem Service Categories 
ES Category Examples 
Provisioning Services Food, timber 
Regulating Services Water quality regulation, climate regulation 
Cultural Services Cultural heritage, recreation 
Supporting Services (or Processes) Nutrient cycling, soil formation 
Source: Based on the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005a) 
Biodiversity, referring to “the number, abundance, and composition of the genotypes, populations, 
species, functional types, communities, and landscape units in a given system” (Dıaz et al., 2005, p. 300), 
can be understood both as an ecosystem service, and – similar to regulating services – as underpinning 
ecosystem service supply (Díaz et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2014; MA, 2005a). The difference between 
biodiversity and regulating services is that humans can directly impact biodiversity, and thus the supply of 
(other) ecosystem services. In most cases the relationship between biodiversity and the provision of 
ecosystem services is positive, especially when multiple ecosystem services are considered (Balvanera et 
al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2014; Hooper et al., 2005; Lavorel and Grigulis, 2012). Such a positive 
relationship has been reported for provisioning services, such as for fisheries (Heithaus et al., 2008; Ibelings 
et al., 2007; Palumbi et al., 2008; Rosenberg et al., 2000); regulating services such as pollination (Balvanera 
et al., 2005; Blanche and Cunningham, 2005; Hoehn et al., 2008; Klein et al., 2007), carbon storage 
(Balvanera et al., 2005; Conti and Díaz, 2013; Hatanaka et al., 2011), and water quality regulation and water 
flow regulation (Brauman et al., 2007; Buytaert et al., 2007; Hefting et al., 2003; Makarieva et al., 2006); 
and for cultural services, such as landscape beauty (Harrison et al., 2014; van den Berg et al., 1998). 
Healthy, biodiverse ecosystems and the ES these systems provide are presumed to be important for 
human well-being (Chavas, 2009; Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). The ability of ecosystems to provide 
goods and services to humans is seriously affected through human-inflicted damage to the environment 
(MA, 2005a). Important underlying causes of the degradation of ecosystems and ES are first that not all 
benefits they provide to people are taken into account in land-use decisions, and second, the public good 
characteristics of many ES, specifically those that provide indirect benefits (Farley, 2008; Kroeger and 
Casey, 2007; Norgaard, 2010; Pearce, 2007; Swallow et al., 2009; Tacconi, 2000).  
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The continuous supply of many ES is in most cases guaranteed through public sector provision 
(Libecap, 2005; OECD, 2004). The public good nature of ES has been used as a justification for 
(inter)governmental collective action and direct government regulation of resource use, such as through the 
establishment of protected areas (OECD, 2004; Swallow and Meinzen-Dick, 2009).  
Conversely, many governments - and other actors involved in conservation and sustainable 
ecosystem management - have implemented an increasing number of projects and programmes that provide 
positive incentives to private actors to stop ecosystem degradation. This is done by translating external, 
non-market values of the environment into financial and/or non-monetary incentives to adopt, maintain or 
reinforce land uses that provide ES (Engel et al., 2008; Gauvin et al., 2010; Morse et al., 2013; Turner and 
Daily, 2008; Wunder, 2005). The delivery of incentives should make conservation and ES provision more 
rewarding compared to alternative land uses, and thus more interesting for landholders (Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005). These incentives are often presented as effective mechanisms for the conservation and improvement 
of ES supply when existing laws, or other regulations and directives, are misunderstood, defied or not 
enforced (Wunder, 2007). In contrast to explicit government regulation, such direct monetary (or in-kind) 
incentives can supplement households’ income instead of solely restricting people. These incentives are 
also often considered an adequate alternative to coercive or prescriptive laws to achieve environmental 
outcomes (Jack et al., 2008; Pirard, 2012a).  
Payments for Environmental Service1 (PES) schemes provide such financial incentives to conserve 
or change specific land uses. They have been increasingly implemented over the last two decades (Engel et 
al., 2008; Le Coq et al., 2011). According to Matzdorf et al. (2013), Muradian and Rival (2012) and Vatn 
(2015) amongst others, PES can be seen as hybrid2 governance structures for the management of ES 
(Chapter 3 discusses PES as hybrid governance structures in more detail). These authors add that “core 
elements [of PES] are payments for good stewardship of well-defined ES (including payments for activities 
thought to yield well-defined ES) and where payments are aimed to be made conditional on goal 
achievement or implementation of the activity” (Matzdorf et al., 2013, p. 59). PES schemes offer financial 
or in-kind payments to landholders who are potential ES providers. These landholders in turn can agree to 
participate by setting aside farmland, conserving or regenerating ecosystems, or adopting specific farming 
techniques or new technology (Gauvin et al., 2010).  
                                                          
1 Throughout this PhD we use the terms ecosystem services and environmental services, and the use of these terms in 
PES, interchangeably. We exclude provisioning services such as agricultural products or timber, as these provisioning 
services are not the focus of PES. Shelley (2011) and Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann (2013) provide a detailed 
discussion on the use of these terms. 
2 Hybrid is here understood as the term for a ‘combination’ or ‘mix’ of modes of governance (Matzdorf et al., 2013; 
Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun, 2013; Vatn, 2015), whereas PES a mode of governance is not simply understood 
as ‘a transfer of resources’, but as how this transfer (payment) is put into practice (governed) – see also Chapter 3.  
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Different definitions and attempts to conceptualize PES exist in literature (Schomers and Matzdorf, 
2013). Wunder (2005, p. 3) defines PES as “a voluntary transaction where a well-defined environmental 
service (or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being bought by a (minimum of one) ES buyer from 
a (minimum of one) ES provider if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision conditionally”. This 
definition is rather market-oriented (Shapiro-Garza, 2013; Vatn, 2015), and a Coasean conceptualization of 
PES (Sattler et al., 2013). In the Coasean approach on PES, socially optimal levels of ES are obtained 
through private negotiations in markets, supported by the assignment of property rights (Gomez-Baggethun 
and Ruiz Perez, 2011; Muradian et al., 2010). However, this conceptualization of PES is seen as too narrow 
with only a few of the existing schemes complying with the criteria identified in this definition (e.g. Farley 
and Costanza, 2010; Kinzig et al., 2011; Tacconi, 2012; Vatn, 2010). Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1205) thus 
proposed that PES can be better defined as “a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to 
create incentives to align individual and/or collective land-use decisions with the social interest in the 
management of natural resources”. This definition does not exclude government payments, and can be 
understood as a Pigouvian vision on PES (Sattler et al., 2013). In ‘Pigouvian PES’ the existence of 
externalities is corrected through public intervention with taxes and subsidies (Gomez-Baggethun and Ruiz 
Perez, 2011). More recently Wunder (2015, p. 8) proposed a revised definition, and defined PES as 
“voluntary transactions between service users and service providers that are conditional on agreed rules of 
natural resource management for generating offsite services”. 
By using financial or in-kind incentives, practices that are socially desirable but privately 
unprofitable become rewarding to land users. PES offers thus the possibility to change land use decisions, 
and can as such be used to regulate the provision of ES (Engel et al., 2008; Sommerville et al., 2009). The 
ES that are most commonly considered in PES schemes are biodiversity, carbon sequestration and storage, 
watershed protection, and landscape beauty (Muñoz Escobar et al., 2013).  
Besides decreasing ecosystem degradation through the provision of positive incentives, the 
possibility for governments and other actors to tap into potential new sources of financing for conservation 
and sustainable ecosystem management is one of the promises of PES (Milne and Niesten, 2009). 
Conservation activities are underfunded almost everywhere, but the gap between current expenditure and 
what is needed, is particularly extreme in the tropics. Tropical countries contain the highest concentration 
of animal and plant biodiversity (Lewandrowski et al., 1999; Parker et al., 2012). Securing sufficient and 
continuous financing for conservation activities is a major problem. Many opportunities for conservation 
are lost due to inadequate funding, whereas new financing sources need to be continuously identified 
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(Balmford and Whitten, 2003; Turner et al., 2003). The identification of ES users3 could potentially be a 
first step towards new strategies to secure financing for conservation projects. ES users can finance PES to 
secure ES provision, whereas ES providers receive the payments (Milne and Niesten, 2009). 
PES can be understood as a coordination mechanism, in which the key element is a contractual 
agreement between users of ES or an entity representing them, and individual and/or communal landholders 
who are expected to provide ES (Kurttila et al., 2006; Milne and Niesten, 2009; van Noordwijk et al., 2007). 
A coordination mechanism is defined by Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun (2013, p. 1116) as “the means 
used by social agents to align their activities, in such a way that the potential benefits (for all the parties 
involved) of concerted actions can be realized” (additionally a coordination mechanism is an institutional 
arrangement, see Section 1.2.2.). 
According to Engel et al. (2008), PES were originally designed and implemented as a tool to 
increase the efficiency of natural resource management, and not to achieve poverty reduction. However, 
PES are often considered to have the potential to improve the income of rural households (Barham et al., 
2011; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Gauvin et al., 2010; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005a; Porras 
et al., 2008). This is especially valid for the tropics where areas with high biodiversity, threatened by high 
rates of ecosystem degradation, often suffer a high incidence of rural poverty (Milder et al., 2010). Hence, 
it is often aspired that PES can create a win–win situation through the combination of conservation 
objectives and livelihood improvements (Miles and Kapos, 2008). However, it is not established if these 
schemes benefit poorer rural households, and/or if a trade-off exists between achieving the highest levels 
of conservation and ES provision, and improving poverty alleviation (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005; Milder et al., 2010; Molnar et al., 2004; Pagiola et al., 2005b; Scherr et al., 2004). It has 
been suggested that PES are rather ineffective in involving poor (individual) land users, because the poor 
lack access to sufficient resources, such as land, to be devoted to ES provision, and because of higher 
transaction costs of participation in comparison to large landowners4 (Albán and Argüello, 2004; Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005; Porras, 2010; Swallow and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). However, even when PES schemes are 
not meant as a tool to reduce poverty, it is acknowledged that PES should not make participants in the 
scheme worse off than they were before (Corbera et al., 2009; Scheufele and Bennett, 2013).  
Against the above background, it remains unclear to what extent the two objectives of 
environmental conservation and poverty alleviation through income generation can be achieved 
                                                          
3 Often the term ‘ES beneficiaries’ is used, instead of ES users. However, the term beneficiary is also used to refer to 
those who ‘benefit’ from PES payments, i.e. the provider. In this PhD, similar to Wunder (2015), we thus use the term 
‘ES user’ or simply ‘users’. 
4 In the case of communities transaction costs for PES implementers can be lower, but the participating communities 
still have to organise themselves internally, creating new transaction costs for them. Krause et al. (2013) and Milne 
and Adams (2012) provide examples of problems that can occur with the organisation of communities to participation 
in PES schemes.  
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simultaneously through PES. There has been little empirical verification on how PES affect household 
income and ES provision at the same time (Engel et al., 2008; Gauvin et al., 2010; Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002; Smith and Scherr, 2002). In order to improve understanding of the impact of PES it is imperative to 
analyse if existing or potential schemes can improve ES provision, if these schemes impact positively on 
household income, and if conflicts arise when addressing these two goals concurrently.  
Ecuador is an ideal case study area, because there is urgent need to stop ecosystem degradation, 
while rural poverty is pervasive. At the time of writing this PhD, over 19% of the country is declared as 
officially protected through a network of conservation areas. However, ecosystem degradation continues 
both inside and outside protected areas. One way to halt ecosystem degradation is through the 
implementation of conservation actions in the buffer zones of protected areas. In Ecuador several PES and 
PES-like schemes have been implemented in these spots. Through national and local governments, and 
with the support of national and international NGOs, a series of programmes have been realised that aim to 
conserve and improve the provision of ES, while at the same time contributing to income of rural 
households (Camacho, 2008; de Koning et al., 2011; Goldman-Benner et al., 2012). Examples are the Socio 
Bosque Programme for conservation and restoration of forest and páramos (Andean grasslands) on private 
and communal lands (see details in Annex 1), and so-called water funds for watershed conservation (see 
example in Annex 2). In addition, other programmes such as incentives for timber plantations and projects 
to implement organic production systems and certification for coffee have been implemented. Hence, 
Ecuador serves as an excellent case to study the impact of these schemes on conservation and ES provision, 
as well as to analyse how they may impact household incomes. 
More in particular the zone of Podocarpus National Park is selected as the case study area. It hosts 
several PES and PES-like schemes, and is an important area for ES provision. Households living in the 
buffer zone are involved in land uses that are not all equally beneficial to ES provision and ecosystem 
protection, while poverty rates are significant.  
In this PhD, the PES (PES-like) schemes we study focus on biodiversity and watershed services. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity defines biodiversity as: "Biological diversity means the variability 
among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic 
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems” (UN, 1992). Watershed services are ES provided by watershed 
ecosystems, and include improved water quality and quantity, and regulation of (seasonal) water flows 
(Brauman et al., 2007; Fisher et al., 2010; Quintero et al., 2009).  
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1.1.2. Research aim 
Against the background presented above, the following research aims are presented, namely to: 
(1) analyse the (potential) impacts and trade-offs of PES contracts for the conservation and 
improvement of ES and the provision of rural income in the buffer zone of Podocarpus National 
Park in Ecuador; and 
(2) compare the PES contracts of the Socio Bosque programme with other programmes that use 
positive incentives to landholders, and with the current land uses implemented in the research area 
in order to increase understanding of the impact of PES relative to other systems and land uses.  
 
1.1.3. Study rationale 
According to Carpenter et al. (2009) and Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006) it is difficult to find causal evidence 
of the effectiveness of conservation instruments commonly used in developing countries. Research projects 
have analysed the impact of PES or other methods such as market incentives (e.g. organic labelling) or 
command-based conservation actions (e.g. the creation of protected areas). However, only a few studies 
compare these different approaches (Clements et al., 2013, 2010; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Le Coq et 
al., 2011), although this would improve the impact analyses, as it additionally provides evidence of the 
impact of PES compared to alternative approaches. In addition also the debate on possible trade-offs or 
synergies between conservation and rural development of PES is ongoing (Davies et al., 2014; Gauvin et 
al., 2010; Porras et al., 2008; Rodríguez et al., 2011). It is essential to evaluate both environmental and 
social outcomes of PES in order to guarantee long-term PES support and improve its effectiveness (Jack et 
al., 2008).   
The trade-offs between conservation and income generation have not yet been established for 
Ecuador nor were different programmes compared. At the start of this PhD research only a few analyses of 
the Ecuadorian programmes were available. Noteworthy exceptions are the studies by de Koning et al. 
(2011) and Farley et al. (2011) on Socio Bosque, while Redondo-Brenes (2009) analysed a water fund 
implemented in Southern Ecuador. In addition, some studies are available on the potential of implementing 
carbon payments to farmers in an area adjacent to the research area (Knoke et al., 2009a, 2009b). However, 
since the start of the PhD research, an increasing number of papers were published focusing on the 
programmes evaluated. For Socio Bosque, Krause and colleagues analysed legitimacy, safeguards, benefit 
distribution and equity, and the measurement of biodiversity with a main emphasis on the programme’s 
community contracts (Krause et al., 2013; Krause and Loft, 2013; Krause and Nielsen, 2014; Krause and 
Zambonino, 2013). Bremer and colleagues analysed Socio Páramo, a component of Socio Bosque that 
focuses on the conservation of páramos instead of forests. They studied which factors influenced 
participation in the programme, and the conservation and livelihood outcomes of the programme (Bremer 
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et al., 2014a, 2014b). Some general studies are available on the regional water fund (FORAGUA) that has 
been operating in the research area (Goldman-Benner et al., 2012; Kauffman, 2013). Yet, these analyses 
dealt with more than one water fund and did not measure impacts of the conservation/restoration actions 
implemented.  
Within Ecuador, studies have been carried out for some similar PES programmes (Albán and 
Argüello, 2004; Camacho, 2008; Echavarria et al., 2004; Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013; Wunder and 
Alban, 2008). These studies are, however, mostly descriptive and do not focus on environment-rural income 
trade-offs. In addition analyses have been carried out to assess payments to incentivize the adoption of 
coffee agroforestry systems, but not based on existing PES schemes in Ecuador (Benitez et al., 2006; Castro 
et al., 2013). It are these gaps in research that are addressed in this PhD thesis.  
 
1.2. Framework  
1.2.1. SES framework  
Many ES have characteristics of public goods and common-pool resources. The Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework, developed by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues, has been used for the analysis 
of public goods and common-pool resources (not to be confused with common-property regimes) at 
multiple levels (Ostrom and Cox, 2010; Rudd, 2004), as resource allocation problems arise in the context 
of common-pool resources and public goods (Lant et al., 2008). This framework is defined by Ostrom 
(2010a) as “a general language for analysing and testing hypotheses about behaviour in diverse situations 
at multiple levels of analysis, and studies how rules, physical and material conditions, and attributes of 
community affect the structure of action arenas, the incentives that individuals face, and the resulting 
outcomes”. A number of PES studies have used the IAD framework (e.g. Fisher et al., 2010; Muñoz Escobar 
et al., 2013), or an adaptation of this framework (e.g. Corbera et al., 2009; Hejnowicz et al., 2014; 
Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013; van Noordwijk et al., 2007). 
Based on the IAD framework, Ostrom and colleagues presented a Socio-Ecological Systems (SES) 
framework (Ostrom, 2009, 2007) (Figure 1.1), which enlarges the IAD framework by incorporating 
variables that better characterize the ecological dimensions of the system under analysis (Ostrom and Cox, 
2010; Schlüter and Madrigal, 2012). The SES framework was originally designed for the analysis of 
common-pool resources, and has increasingly been used to analyse resource management (Epstein et al., 
2013). Subsequently, as socio-ecological systems not only generate common-pool resources, but also public 
goods, McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) modified the original SES framework to generalize its applications. 
Yin et al. (2013) used the SES framework to study a large-scale PES programme in China.  
The SES framework focuses on the interactions and outcomes that are likely to result from using a 
specific set of rules for the governance and use of a resource system (Figure 1.1). It shows the relationships 
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between the four subsystems of a SES which interact with each other, as well as the interlinked social, 
economic, and political settings. These four subsystems are: the attributes of (a) resource system(s); the 
resource unit(s); the governance system(s); and the actors involved. Each subsystem is composed of 
multiple, second-level variables (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2009).  
The resource system, such as a designated protected area, is characterized by multiple attributes, 
such as specific land use systems shaped by farm household behaviour and bio-physical factors (Le et al., 
2008; Ostrom, 2009). The resource system itself also has an influence on the land uses adopted. For 
example, geography (slope, altitude, etc.) has an impact on the crops that farmers can choose to plant. There 
can be multiple resource systems within a SES (Ostrom and Cox, 2010). 
The resource units, such as trees, wildlife types and water flow, are generated by the resource 
system (Ostrom, 2009, 2007). These units are used, extracted, from the resource system by resource users. 
They are thus the users of the SES system, and are for example individuals who extract timber from a forest 
(McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2007).  
Although in its origin the SES framework only included resource users (e.g. Ostrom, 2007), also 
the behaviour of third parties who do not directly use the resource must be considered (McGinnis and 
Ostrom, 2014). As a result, the concept was broadened to include diverse actors. They are the ‘players of 
the game’ (North, 1990), and have the ability to act upon their interests (Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013). 
Groups of actors can be differentiated by the types of activities in which they are involved (McGinnis and 
Ostrom, 2014). The actors also manage the resource system according to rules and procedures established 
through a governance system (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2009, 2007). 
The governance system consists of the organisations and rules that govern the resource, and include 
government and non-government organisations, as well as the systems of property right and different choice 
rules’ levels (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2009).  
Linked to broader political, economic and social settings and to related ecosystems, these four 
subsystems interact within action situations and produce specific outcomes, which through feedback affect 
the subsystems, as well as other SESs (Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom and Cox, 2010). 
An action arena consists of an ‘action situation’ and the actors. An action situation is the social 
space where individuals or groups of individuals interact and exchange goods and services, and where 
outcomes are produced (Ostrom, 2010; Whaley and Weatherhead, 2014). The actors in the action situation 
refer to theories of the behaviour of actors (Whaley and Weatherhead, 2014). An action arena can be 
characterized by a group of actors, the positions they take, potential outcomes of different actions, sets of 
allowable actions for actors in each position, control actors have over actions, actors’ information, and costs 
and benefits of actions and outcomes (Ostrom, 2010; Ostrom and Cox, 2010). Actors make choices based 
on their preferences, objectives, the costs and benefits assigned to alternative actions and outcomes, and 
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strategic considerations (Rudd, 2004). The IAD and SES frameworks distinguish different choice levels, 
namely: the operational choice level; the collective choice level; and the constitutional choice level 
(McGinnis and Ostrom, 2010).  
Interactions occur when, within a given set of external ecological, social and institutional 
constraints, actors consider the costs and benefits of various actions, and act according to the incentives 
they perceive (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2010; Rudd, 2004). Within the action area actions (e.g. a farmer’s 
production decisions) lead to observable outcomes, such as land uses, that can be evaluated (e.g. hectares 
of forests cut down) (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2010; Rudd, 2004). 
The SES framework thus facilitates starting an analysis of how attributes of the four subsystems 
“jointly affect and are indirectly affected by interactions and resulting outcomes achieved at a particular 
time and place” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 15182). 
 
Figure 1.1: SES Framework (Source: adapted from McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2009) 
 
1.2.2. Research framework 
The SES framework provides an initial map to understand which variables and their links have to be 
considered when analysing a socio-ecological system. Yet, in principle, this framework was developed by 
Ostrom and colleagues to study resource extraction and to show how common-property regimes emerge 
over time. Because of important differences with respect to the main aim of our PhD research, which 
focuses on analysing the impact of a specific mode of governance (contracts) embedded within a broader 
governance system (e.g. environmental legislation, or the existing property rights’ regime), we modified 
and adapted the SES framework. Important to note is that our focus is not on resource extraction (e.g. 
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quantity of fish caught or litres of water consumed), but on the production and conservation activities within 
the buffer zone of a protected area.  
As alternatives to the extraction-oriented ‘resource units’, McGinnis and Ostrom (2014, 2012) 
proposed the terms ‘resource units and goods’, or ‘goods and services’, the last term with a “more explicit 
consideration of production, exchange, and other core concerns of the discipline of economics” (McGinnis 
and Ostrom, 2012, p. 15). In this PhD, the main focus of the analysis is a ‘specific land use system’. 
Although land is a resource, simply using the SES variable ‘resource units’ would not be accurate for our 
analysis, because the latter’s focus is not on the extraction of units of a resource or merely of the land itself, 
but on the production of agricultural and forestry goods and the provision of ES as a result of specific ways 
of using the land. Thus, guided by the proposals of McGinnis and Ostrom (2014, 2012) ‘resource units’ are 
translated into ‘land uses’ (Figure 1.2). This not only changes the content covered by this variable, but also 
influences the linkages between the different variables as will be discussed further. 
The main actors within the research area are households using land, in addition to governmental 
and non-governmental organisations. Following Hinkel et al. (2014), we place governmental and non-
governmental organisations among the actors, instead of considering them as being part of the governance 
system as suggested by Ostrom (2009), because organisations can be understood as a special kind of actors. 
According to McGinnis and Ostrom (2014), the focus should be on actors when an analysis looks at actions 
taken by agents of an organisation, such as a government or NGO.  
 A last modification to the SES framework adopted in this PhD research is related to the SES 
variable ‘governance systems’. The SES framework aims to understand how governance systems emerge 
and are designed. The focus in this PhD research is more explicitly on analysing the impact (outcomes) of 
one specific mode of governance, i.e. PES contracts, embedded within an existing broader governance 
system. The research such as that carried out here is termed by Hagedorn (2008) as taking an ‘ex-post 
institutional change perspective’, as the analysis starts at the point where the coordination mechanism is 
already agreed upon. Within the analysis of PES as a specific coordination mechanism, we can distinguish 
institutions, the institutional environment and the mechanism itself, i.e. the institutional arrangement. 
Institutions are the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990). Bromley (1989) defines institutions as the 
“rules and conventions of society that facilitate coordination among people regarding their behaviour”. 
They consist of formal rules and/or informal prescriptions, such as norms (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). 
The SES framework assigns norms to actors and rules to the governance system (Hinkel et al., 2014; 
Ostrom, 2009).  
The institutional environment refers to the collection of political, social and legal foundations that 
create the basis for production and distribution of goods and services (North, 1991). Laws and property 
rights are two attributes of the institutional environment (Fauzi and Anna, n.d.), which are part of the 
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broader social, economic and political setting within which the institutional arrangements - that are the 
focus of this research - operate (Figure 1.2). 
Institutional arrangements are “the arrangements between economic units that govern the ways in 
which these units can cooperate and/or compete” (Davis and North, 1971, p. 7). They are the contracts or 
arrangements created for a transaction or a set of related transactions, and are organisational solutions to 
make institutions effective (Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2009). Contracts thus provide ways of coordinating 
relationships among transactors (Chaddad, 2009; Ménard, 2004). They are also referred to as ‘modes of 
governance’ (Ménard, 2005), ‘mechanisms of governance’ (Ménard, 2012) or ‘governance structures’ 
(Williamson, 2000). 
The PES contracts that are the focus of this research (e.g. Socio Bosque contracts) are similar to 
agri-environmental contracts which are termed ‘contractual arrangements’ by Van Huylenbroeck et al. 
(2009). Hence, we consider the PES contracts in this PhD research as contractual arrangements because a 
state body (the Socio Bosque Secretariat) is the coordination centre, which makes individual contracts with 
private actors who provide ES to society.  
Finally, the other variables of the SES framework have remained unchanged in this PhD research.  
In our analysis, the focus of the action situation is on operational choice levels, i.e. the choices of individual 
households and, in a first analysis (Chapter 4) also the choices of organisations. The interpretation of the 
observed outcomes within the action arena is the final step of this analysis. Outcomes can be measured with 
outcome metrics (Hinkel et al., 2014). According to Corbera et al. (2009), institutional performance assesses 
how PES achieve their stated objectives (outcomes). To carry out an institutional performance analysis of 
PES, the focus should be on outcome evaluation criteria (Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013). Whether a specific 
outcome can be regarded as sustainable is evaluated based on ecological, social and economic indicators, 
such as economic performance (Hinkel et al., 2014). 
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1.2.3. Operationalizing the framework 
The framework (Figure 1.2) shows how PES as an institutional arrangement (coordination mechanism) 
operates within a broader environment, whereby it both influences and is influenced by the other variables 
of the framework. In this section, we operationalize the framework by defining the different variables used 
in this PhD research. 
PES as an institutional arrangement can be characterized by the actors who participate, the way these 
actors participate, the roles these actors perform, and the land uses (or ES) that are considered within this 
institutional arrangement (first analysis, Chapter 3). Organisations can offer specific institutional 
arrangements that - depending on their uptake - will impact on the costs and benefits for the different actors 
involved and the resulting land use choices they make. These impacts can be measured (second analysis, 
Chapter 4). The adoption of specific institutional arrangements (such as PES) will have an impact on 
households (actors) and on their land use choices. The decision-making process is influenced by 
characteristics of the households (actors) and the land uses they implement or potentially can implement 
(third analysis, Chapter 5). Finally, households (actors) can have preferences for specific PES contracts 
(institutional arrangements), based on their own situation and the characteristics of the different contracts. 
The differences in preferences for diverse contracts may thus be explained by specific households’ 
characteristics (fourth analysis, Chapter 6).  
The variables used in our analysis are now presented: 
 social, economic, legal and political setting in the country of Ecuador (see Chapter 2 on the 
research context) 
Figure 1.2: Research framework (Source: Raes adapted from McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 2009) 
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- Ecuador’s constitution, which determines the institutional environment, Ecuadorian legislation 
and municipal ordinances, and the laws on property rights. 
- The general level of economic development.  
- The economic setting includes Ecuador’s productive sectors, among them the agricultural 
sector as well as markets. While the price setting of agricultural products is not studied (because 
we assume that prices are not influenced by production changes occurring within the research 
area) they are an important determinant of benefits and costs and hence of the trade-offs that 
actors face.  
 resource system 
- Watersheds and land are important for biodiversity conservation in the buffer zone of 
Podocarpus National Park (see research context). The nature of the resource system has an 
influence on the choice for specific modes of governance to coordinate actions between people 
who own and/or use land in the buffer zone, inhabitants of the canton of Loja who use water, 
and the national and global users of biodiversity. 
 land uses 
- On an individual farm, several land cover types can be found or are implemented: agricultural 
land (crops, pasture), agricultural land under agroforestry (organic coffee and silvopastoral 
systems), natural forests (primary, secondary, recent growth), and tree plantations. 
- The different land uses considered in the analysis include: 
o Conservation, which refers to the protection of an ecosystem. In PES, this normally 
does not refer to more detailed measures of conservation such as those targeting 
specific species, but remains limited to the protection of a specific area.  
o Restoration, which constitutes the process of assisting recovery (Ormerod, 2003).  
o Plantations, which are understood as reforestation for timber production. These 
plantations can be of species with a rather negative impact on ES, e.g. pine (Pinus 
patula) (Farley et al., 2004; Hofstede et al., 2002), or less negative such as Andean 
alder (Alnus acuminata) (Castaño-Villa et al., 2014; Knoke et al., 2014; Murcia, 1997). 
o Agroforestry, which can be defined as “a form of sustainable land use that combines 
trees and shrubs with crops and/or livestock in ways that increase and diversify farm 
and forest production while also conserving natural resources” (Molua, 2005, p. 199). 
In this PhD thesis, we consider silvopastoral systems and coffee agroforestry. 
o Milk production and coffee production. 
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- The different land uses can be characterized by different levels of productivity and production 
of: 
o agricultural and forestry products; and 
o ES including biodiversity, with land uses as a proxy for ES. 
 actors 
- Local and (inter)national NGOs.  
- National and local governments implementing conservation actions: 
o Both are characterized by the conservation and/or rural development actions they 
undertake in the research area, and the costs they incur when implementing these 
actions. The costs of a PES scheme include direct implementation costs, transaction 
costs and opportunity costs (Jack et al., 2008) (see Chapter 4). 
- Local households that own and/or produce on land within the buffer zone. UNSTATS (2014) 
defines a household as one person living alone or a group of two or more persons living together 
and who have common arrangements for the provision of food and other essentials for living. 
When it is more than one person, “the group may pool their incomes and have a common budget 
to a greater or lesser extent; the persons in the household may be related or unrelated or consist 
of a combination of related and unrelated persons” (UNSTATS, 2014).  
- Households are characterized by: 
o socio-economic variables (educational status, size, labour, land endowment, income); 
o risk aversion (Chapter 5); 
o assessment of environmental problems related to watershed services (Chapter 6); and 
o preferences for specific PES contracts (Chapter 6). 
 institutional arrangements  
- The focus is on PES, understood as contractual arrangements between the government and 
individual landholders (see actors). These contracts define parties and stakeholders in the 
agreement, their roles and responsibilities, contract duration, payment levels, and systems of 
performance monitoring, payments and sanctions (see Annex 1 and Chapter 3). 
- Other institutional arrangements present in the research area and which will be compared to 
the PES schemes are: 
o incentives for timber plantations;  
o markets for agricultural and forestry products; 
o markets with price premium for organic coffee; and 
o government creation of protected areas within the buffer zone (hierarchies) through 
land purchases and land sales. 
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 action arena 
- In this study, the focus is on operational choice levels (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2010), i.e. the 
choices of either individual households or organisations (Chapter 4, 5 and 6). The decision-
making mechanism is represented by a decision-making procedure which is influenced by the 
characteristics of organisations and households. The decisions focus on how to allocate 
resources based on cost criteria (Chapter 4), how to allocate land based on farm household’s 
risk aversion (Antle, 1987; Gómez-Limón et al., 2003) (Chapter 5), and landholders’ 
preferences (Chapter 6). 
 interactions 
- Implementation of conservation and rural development actions. 
- Production of agricultural and forestry products. 
- Enhancement of non-market ES. 
 outcomes 
- The effects of the interactions based on the implementation of specific institutional 
arrangements generate outcomes in terms of costs made (Chapter 4), land use systems applied 
and income generated (Chapter 5), or in terms of PES preferences (Chapter 6). For all 
outcomes, specific time frames are considered.  
- Outcomes are measured through: 
o Concrete land use systems, following Engel et al. (2008) and Ferraro and Kiss (2002), 
these are used as a proxy for: 
 ES provided by specific land use systems; and 
 Conservation, such as hectares of forest conserved or deforested. 
o Rural income generation, which is understood here as the income generated by a 
household from the land it uses. 
o Poverty reduction, defined as a process by which people move above a notional poverty 
line (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). Absolute poverty means measuring poverty in 
relation to the amount of money necessary to meet basic needs, whereas relative 
poverty is defined in relation to the prevailing standards of living of other members of 
the society (Scheidel, 2013). 
o Cost-effectiveness.  
o Specific attributes of the contract, the institutional arrangement focus of this analysis. 
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1.2.4. Analytical blocks, research questions and linkage to framework 
Each chapter addresses different aspects and linkages among the subsystems of the framework (land uses, 
institutional arrangements and actors). This thesis builds on one chapter that introduces the research area 
and social and political setting and three groups of analytical chapters, which are introduced here. Each of 
the analytical chapters stands alone as an individual study. Overlaps between the different chapters have 
been kept to a minimum, but may occur due to the area description and explanation of the programmes 
analysed.  
 
A. Research area 
Chapter 2 introduces the research area. In addition this chapter describes the social, economic, legal and 
political setting (Figure 1.2) in which the research took place.  
 
B. First analytical block – Institutional arrangement of PES – Chapter 3 
The first analytical block of this PhD (Chapter 3) relates to characterizing the institutional arrangements 
(Figure 1.2). This chapter gives the broader picture of PES in Latin America, specifically the Andean and 
Mesoamerican region. It aims to analyse and discuss the design characteristics of PES and PES-like 
schemes found in several Andean and Meso-American countries. According to Prokofieva and Gorriz 
(2013), an institutional design specifically addresses the design aspects of PES, i.e. characteristics of the 
ES it targets, evaluating the users, providers, intermediaries, etc. This chapter allows to understand how 
schemes have changed over time, it helps introducing the literature on PES design, introduce Ecuadorian 
schemes, as well as schemes of several other Latin American countries for comparison. This chapter departs 
from the following question: 
 Do PES schemes, as hybrid forms of governance (“i.e. intermediary governance structures 
positioned between markets and hierarchies” (Muradian and Rival, 2012, p. 96)), evolve over time? 
If so, do they incorporate more market characteristics or more characteristics of hierarchies over 
time? 
The following aspects are analysed: 
- characteristics of ES involved (degree of commoditization); 
- participation mechanisms of the actors in the schemes; 
- the coordination and interaction mechanisms used by the actors in the schemes;  
- conditionality related to the payments; and 
- the existence and role of intermediaries. 
In addition the chapter analyses whether the following factors aid in explaining the results of the analysis? 
- size of the different groups of actors; 
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- type of ES; and/or 
- resistance against the PES concept. 
 The analysis uses qualitative data on initial and current PES design characteristics. For each design 
characteristic, different classes were defined based on whether the characteristic could be part of a market, 
a hierarchy or a hybrid mode of governance. Data on the design of the schemes were obtained through 
established scientific and grey literature, and through a survey with 17 PES experts carried out from April 
to August 2014. The analysis is based on the observation of the defined characteristics in the initial and 
current design.  
 
C. Second analytical block – Performance of PES contracts – Chapters 4 and 5 
In the second analytical block we analyse the impact of PES contracts (Socio Bosque programme), other 
programmes using incentives for landholders and the existing land uses on conservation and ES provision, 
and the creation of rural income. This chapter evaluates the performance (outcomes, Figure 1.2) of PES 
contracts (Socio Bosque programme) implemented in the research area. It analyses whether these contracts 
can contribute to the conservation or change in specific land use systems to secure ES flows. In addition, 
these chapters evaluate the impact of contractual payments on households. Performance is measured 
through an ES indicator, in units of land under specific management actions (e.g. area conserved) and in 
terms of household income generation of PES contracts. These performance parameters are compared with 
those obtained through other coordination mechanisms (markets and creation of a hierarchy).   
The first analysis of this second block (Chapter 4) focuses on both land use levels and national, regional 
and local actors. This chapter focuses on the costs organisations and households (actors) make through 
implementing (interactions) different modes of governance (institutional arrangements), and measures the 
outcomes in terms of cost-effectiveness of the ES provided by different land uses and of the income 
generated for households (Figure 1.2). According to Mönkkönen et al. (2011), cost-effectiveness is an 
important aspect of any successful conservation strategy. Specifically, in the buffer zone of Podocarpus 
National Park in the canton of Loja three programmes are implemented that aim at improving the 
conservation status of the area and the generation of rural income. In addition to the Socio Bosque 
Programme (the contractual arrangement), the other two programmes consist of a market-oriented mode of 
governance (organic coffee certification), and a hierarchical mode of governance (establishing conservation 
areas through land purchases by the municipal water company of Loja through FORAGUA). The latter two 
programmes serve as comparisons to Socio Bosque’s approach because of their distinct design. Chapter 4 
tries to answer the following question: 
 What is the cost-effectiveness of a PES contract with respect to ES provision, conservation and 
rural income generation?  
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 How does this compare with using a market mechanism for an environmentally friendly product, 
and the establishment of municipal reserves through the purchases of land (hierarchy)? This is 
analysed by comparing Socio Bosque contracts, FORAGUA’s land purchases and an organic coffee 
label. 
Implementers of the different programmes provided the data necessary for the cost calculations. In 
addition, quantitative socio-economic and land-use data were collected by surveying participants (and non-
participants) in the different programmes. Landowners were surveyed from August 2011 until January 2012 
in five parishes of the municipality of Loja. In total, 37 organic coffee farmers, 27 non-organic coffee 
farmers and seven participants of Socio Bosque were interviewed. In addition, a survey to grade ES 
provision of different land uses was carried out with 25 experts.  
 
The second analysis of this analytical block (Chapter 5) focuses on both land use and household level; and 
its objective is to analyse the effect of using per hectare payments for conservation and restoration, and 
incentives to promote timber plantation establishment. This chapter focuses on different institutional 
arrangements (contracts, incentives, markets, and land sales). It assumes that households (actors) are risk-
averse when making decisions (choices). Diversification of land uses (creating a portfolio of land uses) 
and/or choosing low risk land uses are strategies that can be used by farmers to reduce risk. Outcomes are 
measured in terms of the portfolio land use allocation, and change in household’ income and poverty levels 
(Figure 1.2). Specifically, through portfolio allocation this chapter deals with the potential impact on milk 
producers of participation in the Socio Bosque Programme for conservation and restoration, and in an 
incentive programme for timber plantations. It also looks at the effect on land use of farmers’ participation 
in the different PES programmes under study, and what the differences are in land use allocations between 
farmers with and those without forests on their land. Portfolio theory is used to model the household’s 
decisions-making process, which is assumed to be influenced by household’s initial land use and its 
productivity. Chapter 5 concerns the following research questions: 
  Would dairy farmers participate in the Socio Bosque Programme for conservation and restoration, 
and in an incentive programme for timber plantations? 
 What is the effect on land use of farmers’ adopting a portfolio (combination) of the different 
programmes under study? 
 Is there a difference in land use allocation on existing pastures between milk producers that have 
forest and those without forests on their land? 
 What is the effect on dairy farmers’ income and poverty levels of participation in the programmes 
studied? 
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For the analysis, farmers’ socio-economic household and farm data were collected in the research 
area in November-December 2011 and from March to July 2013. During the first stage, 19 detailed surveys 
were carried out. In the second stage, a survey was carried out with 95 farmers (also part of the choice 
experiment of Chapter 6). Additional data for production calculations were obtained through scientific 
literature and official statistics. 
 
D. Third analytical block – Household preferences for contractual arrangements – Chapter 6 
The third analytical block of this PhD (Chapter 6) also aims at understanding the (potential) impacts of PES 
contracts, yet it studies the possible uptake of PES contracts by looking at the preferences (choice outcome) 
of milk producers (actors) for these type of contacts (institutional arrangements) (Figure 1.2). The analysis 
in this part focuses on the household level and aims to study whether dairy farmers choose contracts for the 
adoption of silvopastoral production systems with and without additional management requirements, what 
the characteristics of the chosen contracts, and the main determinants of farmers’ preferences are. This 
chapter tries to answer the following questions:  
 Do dairy farmers prefer contracts for the adoption of silvopastoral systems over the current 
situation? 
 What are the characteristics of the preferred contracts? 
 What are key determinants of farmers’ choices? 
For this analysis, a choice experiment was carried out to analyse landholders’ preferences in terms 
of PES contracts for the adoption of silvopastoral systems. A test run was done with ten households in 
February 2013. The choice experiment survey with 120 milk producers was carried out from March to July 
2013. 
 
Finally, the research questions are reviewed in Chapter 7 to draw conclusions and to discuss their 
implications in relation to wider societal issues. 
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Chapter 2: Research Context 
2.1. Research Area  
The research was carried out in that part of the buffer zone of Podocarpus National Park that lies 
in the municipality of Loja (Figure 2.1.A and 2.1.B). Podocarpus National Park has a total area of 146,000 
ha. The total research area is 40,717 ha. The area of the buffer zone, excluding the national park, accounts 
for 27,834 ha (Figure 2.1.C). More details of the research area are given in Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 2.1: Research area and Podocarpus National Park (Source: Cevallos and Raes) 
2.2. Social, economic and political setting 
As indicated in our research framework, this chapter presents the social, economic and political setting in 
which the research took place. Figure 2.2 shows the different administrative levels ranging from national 
level (the country of Ecuador) to the level of individual households.  
C B A 
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Figure 2.2: Different administrative levels of the overall social, economic and political setting 
2.2.1. Political-administrative division 
Ecuador gained its independency in 1824. It has a political-administrative division that consists of provinces 
(24), cantons (221) and parishes (1,500). These make up the different levels of territorial organisation of 
the country (INEC, 2012a). 
The research took place in Southern Ecuador. Although not a legal entity, the three provinces of 
Southern Ecuador (i.e. El Oro, Loja and Zamora Chinchipe) are referred to as the Southern Region. This 
area is one of the nine Ecuadorian planning zones used by the National Planning and Development 
Secretariat (SENPLADES). The three provinces together make up 11% of Ecuador’s area and account for 
8% of the nation’s population (INEC, 2011a). 
Within this region, the research focuses on the province of Loja (Figure 2.3). This province consists 
of 16 cantons of which one is the canton of Loja, where the field research took place (INEC, 2012a). The 
canton of Loja consists of 4 urban parishes, including the city of Loja, and 13 rural parishes (Figure 2.3) 
(FORAGUA, 2014). 
 
2.2.2. Legal and institutional environment 
Contractual arrangements for the provision of ecosystem services (PES contracts) are in first instance 
regulated by the Ecuadorian constitution. Article 74 of the Ecuadorian constitution of 2008 specifies that: 
“Environmental services shall not be subject to appropriation; their production, delivery, use and 
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development shall be regulated by the State” (Republic of Ecuador, 2008). In principle, PES seem to 
contradict Ecuador’s constitution (Manzano Díaz, 2010), which creates a political and institutional grey 
area for PES.  
This can be observed from the way the Socio Bosque Programme was designed (Annex 1), the 
scheme that is the key focus case of this research. This programme signs contracts with individual and 
communal landholders to conserve or restore ecosystems in return for payments for doing so. The Socio 
Bosque Programme itself avoids the use of the term ‘pagos’ (payments), since that could be understood as 
acknowledging some form of private ownership over ecosystem services (Ministry of the Environment, 
Ecuador, 2012a). Instead, the term ‘incentivos’ (incentives) is used, which is less controversial and in line 
with the constitution. Article 71 of the constitution states that: “The State shall give incentives to natural 
persons, legal entities and communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements 
comprising an ecosystem” (Republic of Ecuador, 2008). In addition, according to the Ministry of the 
Environment, Ecuador (2012a), linking payments to conservation and restoration efforts (land uses) also 
avoids dealing with the issue of property rights over ecosystem services. To participate, the owner only 
needs to have the right of land ownership, and thus the right to implement specific land uses on her/his land, 
not the rights over ecosystem services.  
On water governance the Ecuadorian constitution states in Article 411 that “the State shall ensure 
the conservation, restoration and integrated management of water resources [....] Any activity that may 
affect water quality and quantity, and ecosystem’s balance, especially in springs and water recharge areas 
shall be regulated [....]”. Additionally, Article 264 of the constitution and Article 55 of the Code of Zoning, 
Autonomy and Decentralization state that it is the authority of the Municipal Decentralized Autonomous 
Governments to exercise control over land use within their respective territories. Moreover, Article 137 
states that “the competencies for the provision of public drinking water in all its phases shall be executed 
by the Municipal Decentralized Autonomous Governments” (Republic of Ecuador, 2008). 
 In addition to the general legislation, the municipality (canton) of Loja has a municipal ordinance 
that regulates land uses in its watersheds and establishes the declaration of municipal protected areas 
(Municipality of Loja, 2007). The agency responsible for implementing watershed conservation activities 
to assure watershed service provision is the ‘Empresa Pública Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado’ 
(the Municipal Public Company for Water Supply and Sewerage, known by its Spanish acronym EMAAL-
EP). 
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2.2.3. Environmental issues 
Ecuador has been identified as one of the 17 most ecologically diverse countries in the world (Mosandl et 
al., 2008; WCMC, 2000). The country has a total surface of 283,560 km2, of which between 113,076 to 
122,620 km2 is natural forest (FAO, 2003; Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2012b). These forests 
include primary as well as regenerated secondary forests. About 68,000 km2 of these forests are privately 
or collectively owned, the rest is State property. The deforestation rate is one of the highest in South 
America with an annual rate of 890 km2 between 1990-2000 and 776 km2 between 2000-2008 (Ministry of 
the Environment, Ecuador, 2012b; Mosandl et al., 2008). Several programmes have been implemented in 
Ecuador to halt this deforestation, among them Socio Bosque (see Annex 1). 
Our research focuses on programmes that have been implemented in the area surrounding 
Podocarpus National Park in Southern Ecuador (Figure 2.3). Podocarpus National Park lies in the provinces 
of Loja and Zamora Chinchipe, in the southern part of the Ecuadorian Andes and has an area of around 
1,463 km2. According to Keese et al. (2007), the tropical Andes is “the global epicentre of biodiversity, 
leading all other hot spots in virtually every category of species diversity and endemism”. The National 
Park has a very high diversity of tree species (Madsen and Øllgaard, 1994), vascular plants (Peters et al., 
2010), epiphytes (Bøgh, 1992), and páramo communities (Keating, 2008); and is the habitat for numerous 
animals, including many birds species (Rahbek et al., 1995), bat species (Rex et al., 2008) and the 
endangered Andean or spectacled bear (Tremarctos ornatus) (DeMay et al., 2014). Threats to the different 
Andean ecosystems include road building, mining, expansion of agricultural land, lack of government 
coordination, and inadequate funding for conservation (Clark et al., 2009a, 2009b; Keese et al., 2007). The 
reason to focus on the area neighbouring a state-owned national park is that protected areas do not exist in 
isolation but interact constantly with their surroundings. The development and activity on adjacent lands 
influences the protected area (MA, 2005a). Management of buffer zones is a key part of a strong 
conservation strategy for protected areas (DeFries et al., 2010; Martino, 2001; Prins and Wind, 1993). 
According to TEEB (2010a), people in buffer and transition zones should have secure incomes from 
environmentally friendly resource use to support conservation in a protected area. Table 2.1 summarizes 
the different conservation areas within the research area (Figure 2.3). 
Table 2.1: Area of all protected spaces in the research area 
Protected area Area (ha) 
Protected Forest Hoya de Loja Flanco Orientala 3,598  
Pizarros Watershed 734 
El Carmen Watershed 912 
Protected Forest El Bosque 2,192 
Protected Forest Rumi Wilco 39 
Podocarpus National Park (within research area)b 12,883 
Total Area Protected 20,358 
Total Research Area 40,717 
Total area not protected 20,359 
a  Total area: 7,326 hectares; b Total area: 146,300 hectares 
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Figure 2.3: Protected areas in research area (Source: Cevallos and Raes with data from Ministry of the 
Environment of Ecuador, 2013; GLM, 2013; SENPLADES, 2013; IGM , 2013) 
 
In the Andean Region of Ecuador, mountain forests and Andean grasslands (páramos) provide key 
watershed services. The most important services provided by these highland ecosystems are improved water 
quality through sediment retention (Brauman et al., 2007; Célleri and Feyen, 2009) and regulation of water 
flow (Bruijnzeel, 2004; Roa-García et al., 2011). In addition to providing drinking water for people, these 
ecosystems also provide a habitat for a multitude of plant and animal species (Josse, 2001; Mutke and 
Barthlott, 2005). 
The ability of these natural ecosystems to provide watershed services to people in up- and 
downstream areas of the watershed was reduced by their conversion to agricultural land. Livestock grazing, 
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periodic burning of pastures, and the use of pesticides have negative consequences for watershed services, 
such as reduced water retention capacity and contaminated water due to sediment, manure and pesticide 
effluence (FORAGUA, 2014; Webber, 2009; Zapata et al., 2012). Growing populations and subsequent 
increasing demand for water add to the problems of water provision. The latter problem is worsened by the 
periodic droughts of which the Southern Andean region suffers during a part of the year. These deficits 
partly result from naturally occurring drought periods, which can decrease water flow substantially. Another 
reason for these deficits is the loss of native ecosystems that function as water retention areas, thus 
increasing water run-off and subsequent loss of water retained within the watershed (Harden et al., 2013) 
(see also Annex 2).  
The city of Loja receives water from eight watersheds: Shucos, Jipiro, Mendieta, El Carmen, San 
Simon, Namanda, Monica and Curitroje (of which the last five are situated within the research area, see 
Figure 2.4). The creation of the Regional Water Fund (FORAGUA) was inspired by a predicted threat to 
water quality, following the degradation of upstream highland ecosystems that are crucial for the provision 
of watershed services (Gordillo, 2013; Webber, 2009; Zapata et al., 2012). The water fund uses an 
environmental tariff on water use to finance conservation and restoration activities in the watersheds of the 
Southern Region (see Annex 2). Land purchases within the watersheds by the municipal water company of 
Loja, EMAAL-EP, are one of the strategies for ES conservation to which PES contracts are compared. 
Figure 2.4 maps the locations in the research area where currently water captions occur (numbers 1,2, 3, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11 and 12) and where more are planned (numbers 4, 5, and 6).  
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Figure 2.4: Water captions in research area (Source: Cevallos and Raes with data from from Ministry of 
the Environment of Ecuador, 2013; GLM, 2013; SENPLADES, 2013; IGM , 2013) 
 
2.2.4. Socio-economical background 
Ecuador has a population of around 14.5 million people of whom around 450,000 live in the province of 
Loja and 215,000 in the canton of Loja, mainly in the urban area (INEC, 2011a). Around 29% of the 
country’s population live below the poverty line, which was set at US$ 73/month in 2011 (INEC, 2011b). 
Although agriculture accounts for only ten % of GDP it is an important source of foreign exchange 
income (INEC, 2011c). The country’s most important export products are banana, cocoa, palm oil and 
coffee (FAOSTAT, 2014). Within the research area, the most important agricultural activities are the 
production of coffee and sugar cane, and dairy cattle. This research includes coffee, dairy and timber 
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production. The province of Loja produces around 16 % of Ecuador’s coffee (INEC, 2014), and around 
four percent of the country’s milk (INEC, 2012b). Pastures and forests are the most important land uses in 
the research area (Figure 2.5). Although not an important source of export revenue, tree plantations for 
timber are important in some parts of the Ecuadorian landscape. There is around 167,000 hectares of forest 
plantations, mainly Pinus spp. and Eucalyptus spp. (around 75 % of total tree plantation area). 
Approximately 90 % of the tree plantations occur in the Andean Region of Ecuador, where also the research 
area is situated (FAO, 2003) (Figure 2.5). A more detailed description of the livelihoods of households in 
the research area is given in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
  
Figure 2.5: Main land uses in the research area (Source: Cevallos and Raes with data from from Ministry 
of the Environment of Ecuador, 2013; GLM, 2013; SENPLADES, 2013; IGM , 2013; NCI, 2013) 
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Chapter 3: Towards market-or command-based governance? Analysis of the 
evolution of PES design in Andean and Mesoamerican countries 
Based on: Raes L., Loft, L, Le Coq, J.F., Van Huylenbroeck, G and Van Damme, P. Towards market-or 
command-based governance? Evidence of the evolution of PES design in Andean and Mesoamerican 
countries. (Under review). 
Abstract 
PES are a hybrid mode of governance, situated between markets and hierarchies. However, market structure 
has been used as a theoretical model to inform PES design. In this paper we analyze whether 16 Andean  
and Mesoamerican PES schemes have, since their initial design and implementation, gradually incorporated 
more market characteristics or conversely whether and to what extent these schemes have changed towards 
more reliance on command-based mechanisms. The schemes analyzed cover a range of governance 
mechanisms, from small markets to (almost) complete hierarchical organization. Results suggest that over 
time an increasing number of the schemes have incorporated characteristics of a hierarchy to organize 
ecosystem service users. Mainly through the use of taxes/tariffs and by governments acting directly on 
users’ behalf. Contractual agreements, with payment levels bilaterally negotiated or set by intermediaries, 
with mainly individual and communal landholders as providers, remain at the core of most schemes studied. 
Intermediaries are important actors in almost all schemes analyzed. They mainly organize and/or represent 
users, and are usually national or local governments. Evolution of the schemes analyzed suggests that there 
is no convergence towards a market for ecosystem services, but an increasing complexity in the schemes’ 
design and a (fuzzy) diversity of schemes. 
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3.1. Introduction 
One way to provide incentives to improve or conserve ecosystem services (ES) provision, is through the 
establishment of so-called ‘Payment for Environmental Services’ (PES) schemes5 (Adhikari and Agrawal, 
2013). PES aim at influencing behaviour by providing (monetary) incentives instead of through direct 
regulation (Jack et al., 2008). PES are thus seen as different (even opposed) to more traditional policies 
such as government directives that aim to promote/enforce conservation (Adhikari and Agrawal, 2013).  
While some scholars still refer to the mechanism of market governance when explaining how PES 
schemes work (Alvarado-Quesada et al., 2014; Lurie et al., 2013; To et al., 2012), literature increasingly 
emphasizes that PES are not ‘real’ markets, but rather hybrids that lie between markets and command-based 
coordination mechanisms (hierarchies) (Muradian and Rival, 2012; Pirard and Lapeyre, 2014; Vatn, 2015; 
Wunder, 2008). However, markets are still used as the theoretical governance model by many institutes, 
government agencies and multilateral organisations to inform on the functioning of PES (e.g. FAO, 2011; 
UNEP, 2008). As Shapiro-Garza (2013, p. 6) states, “the ‘pure’ market mechanism remains the ideal type 
amongst the primary promoters and funders of PES in the global south”. Thus, for the latter, while initially 
PES should rely on state intervention, in order to be sustainable in the long run PES should evolve towards 
‘real’ market working (see e.g. FAO, 2014). 
To date, only limited information exists on how PES schemes have evolved over time (Pirard, 
2012b). In order to fill this gap, in this chapter we assess the evolution of PES design over time. Although 
an increasing number of papers present a comparative analysis of PES (Hejnowicz et al., 2014; Martin-
Ortega et al., 2013; Pirard and Lapeyre, 2014; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013), often the distinction between 
initial and subsequent governance mechanism of schemes is not clear. Thus, in this chapter we focus on the 
evolution of PES schemes to find out whether PES, as hybrid modes of governance, are evolving towards 
more market or more command-based governance. 
Following Vatn (2015), we consider PES using markets and hierarchies (command-based) as two 
opposing governance systems. . To assess the changes in PES design, we conduct a comparative qualitative 
study of 16 schemes, which were initiated between 1997 and 2009 in the Andean and Mesoamerican region 
of Latin America, known for its great variety of PES schemes (Balvanera et al., 2012; Schomers and 
Matzdorf, 2013). The schemes enable an evolution analysis from their initial design to their current status. 
Following this introduction, the chapter introduces the different schemes analysed. In Section 3.3 
we present the framework, and in 3.4 the methodology used. Section 3.5 describes the observed changes in 
the schemes. Section 3.6 provides a discussion. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes. 
                                                          
5 We use the terms ecosystem services and environmental services, and the use of these terms in PES, interchangeably. 
We exclude provisioning services such as agricultural products or timber, which are not the focus of PES. 
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3.2. Case studies and data collection 
The schemes studied deal with watershed services, carbon sequestration, preservation of biodiversity and 
landscape beauty, and are implemented in Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
and Peru (Table 3.1). With the exception of two (Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project (NK-CAP) 
and PROFAFOR6) all schemes are still operational today. 
The cases were developed as follows. In a first stage, we identified the Andean and Mesoamerican 
countries where PES have been implemented, and specific schemes through an ‘ISI Web of Knowledge’ 
search (see Supplementary Table 3.1). Only schemes for which sufficient information on their initial design 
characteristics was available, were included in this study. Similar to Martin-Ortega et al. (2013) schemes 
that were explicitly designed or planned as PES schemes, following Wunder's (2005) definition7, but that 
were relabelled or interpreted as PES in literature, were incorporated in the analysis8.  
In a second stage, 179 PES experts involved in the implementation and management of the schemes 
identified were surveyed by e-mail between April and August 2014. Their names and contact details were 
initially obtained through the websites of the respective schemes or the intermediary (NGO, government 
agency) funding and/or managing the scheme. The questionnaire included qualitative questions concerning 
the schemes’ original and current governance mechanisms, based on a series of characteristics of markets 
and hierarchies (see Section 3.3). The questionnaires were prefilled with information collected through 
literature and a review of official documents (see Annex 3). The PES experts were asked to verify the 
prefilled information and to clearly point out initial and current governance of the schemes. The information 
obtained through the surveys was then used in the analysis (Section 3.5). 
Several schemes studied provide watershed services10, a subcategory of hydrological services11. 
These schemes are systems that pay for implementing conservation practices in upper ranges of watersheds 
that deliver drinking and/or irrigation water to lower-located areas (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). Such 
schemes either operate on a local level, such as in the municipality of Pimampiro, Ecuador and the ESPH-
                                                          
6 We use the name of the company ‘PROFAFOR’ to refer to the carbon scheme that was analysed in the context of 
PES by Wunder and Alban (2008). It is this carbon scheme that no longer sells carbon credits, while the tree plantations 
continue to be managed, and the company ‘PROFAFOR S.A’ continues to operate. 
7 Although alternative definitions exist (see 1.1), this definition is the most widely used in both literature, and policy 
and project documents (Pirard, 2012b; Wunder, 2015). 
8 For example, Martin-Ortega et al. (2013) mention FONAG, which has been named a PES scheme (Goldman-Benner 
et al., 2012; Porras et al., 2008), PES-like (Southgate and Wunder, 2009), and not a PES (Wunder, 2012), while 
FONAG does not describe itself as a PES scheme (FONAG, 2014). On the other hand, the Municipality of San Pedro 
del Norte fits Wunder’s definition in the municipal ordinance regulating the local PES scheme (Municipality of San 
Pedro del Norte, 2011). 
9 In total 29 experts of the 16 schemes were contacted. For the Colombian scheme 2 people replied simultaneously. 
10 Watershed services are ecosystem services provided by watersheds, such as the provision of water, and the  
regulation of water quality and seasonal flows (Wang et al., 2010). 
11 Brauman et al. (2007) define hydrological services as ecosystem services that “encompass the benefits to people 
produced by terrestrial ecosystem effects on freshwater”.  
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PROCUENCAS scheme in Heredia, Costa Rica (Porras et al., 2008; Redondo-Brenes and Welsh, 2010), or 
on a regional level, such as the Ecuadorian Regional Water Fund - FORAGUA (Goldman-Benner et al., 
2012, see also Annex 2).  
Also three ‘pure’ carbon schemes figure among the cases analysed. These schemes sell carbon 
credits internationally, but are implemented locally or nationally. A local-level scheme is the NK-CAP 
which focused on reduced emissions from deforestation in a protected area in Bolivia (Pereira, 2010). This 
scheme is now being transformed into a new one, the nationwide Bolivian scheme called COMSERBO (see 
Bryner et al., 2012, for more details). On a national level, the PROFAFOR scheme in Ecuador sold carbon 
credits for reforestation through a company, while the landowners and communities participating in the 
scheme benefit from timber sales (Wunder and Alban, 2008). Currently, only the Mexican Scolel Té scheme 
is still actively selling carbon credits.   
Biodiversity as an ES is included in PES schemes bundled with the provision of watershed services 
and/or carbon sequestration, as in the national Mexican programme called PRONAFOR (previously Pro 
Árbol). At the start, there were two separate schemes, one focusing on watershed services (PSAH) and one 
focusing on carbon sequestration, biodiversity and agroforestry (PSA-CABSA) (Corbera and Brown, 
2008). The current programme has four components: forest development, commercial plantations, 
conservation and ES. With PES falling under the fourth component (Rodricks, 2013). The PES component 
of the programme aims at providing watershed services and conserving biodiversity (CONAFOR, 2013). 
The national Ecuadorian scheme, Socio Bosque, includes watershed services, carbon sequestration and 
biodiversity conservation (de Koning et al., 2011, see also Annex 1), while the nationwide Costa Rican PES 
programme called ‘Pagos por Servicios Ambientales’ (PSA) adds a fourth ES, landscape beauty, to these 
(Pagiola, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Table 3.1: Overview of the 16 study cases per country 
Country Case name ES considered in the scheme Starting 
year 
Name given by implementers 
to mechanism used 
Bolivia Noel Kempff Climate 
Action Project  
(NK-CAP)a,b 
Carbon sequestration 1997 Carbon credits  
RWA Los Negros Watershed services 2003 Reciprocal Watershed 
Agreement (RWA) 
Colombia Water Fund for Life 
and Sustainability 
Watershed services  2009 Water fund and Compensation 
for Ecosystem Services (CES) 
Costa Rica ESPH –
PROCUENCAS 
Watershed services 2002 PES 
PES La Esperanza 1997 PES 
PSA Carbon sequestration; watershed 
services; biodiversity and provision 
of scenic beauty 
1997 PES  
Ecuador FONAG Watershed Services 2000 Water Fund 
FORAGUA 2009 Water Fund and CES 
PES Pimampiro 2001 PES 
PROFAFORb Carbon sequestration 1993 Carbon credits 
Socio Bosque Program Biodiversity, carbon sequestration 
and watershed services 
2008 Conservation incentive 
Mexico Plan Vivo Scolel Té Carbon sequestration 1997 Carbon credits and PES 
PRONAFOR Watershed services and biodiversity 2003 PES 
Nicaragua PES San Pedro del 
Norte 
Watershed services 2000 PES 
 PHES Gil Gonzalez 2008 PES 
Peru Alto Mayo Water 
Initiative 
Watershed services 2009 Remuneration for 
Hydrological Ecosystem 
Services (RHES), CES and 
RWA 
a Now in transformation stage to participate in the COMSERBO programme (see Bryner et al., 2012) 
b No longer selling carbon credits 
3.3. Analysis framework and criteria 
We defined characteristics of markets and hierarchies that would allow us to portray the different 
governance structures and how these have evolved over time. Additionally, we categorized schemes 
according to group size, ecosystem service(s), and name used by the schemes’ implementers, to analyse 
whether these categories provide explanations for the schemes’ design and change over time. 
3.3.1. Characteristics of markets and hierarchies  
To characterize the difference in structure we follow Vatn (2015),  and consider markets and hierarchies as 
the two opposed modes of governance. These modes can be defined through a series of attributes that 
explain how actors engaged in a transaction interact and organise their activities (Muradian, 2013; 
Williamson, 2010). To carry out our analysis, we first define key characteristics of markets and hierarchies, 
and how these would translate to PES governance. Between markets and hierarchies there are numerous 
hybrids (Ménard, 1996a). By analysing a series of different characteristics separately, instead of two fully 
differentiated modes of governance, we can take into account the hybrid governance structure of PES, as 
hybrid modes of governance refer to arrangements that are a combination of market and hierarchical 
elements (Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun, 2013). While our analysis still allows for a dichotomous 
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analysis per characteristic (market vs. hierarchy), many variations based on the inclusion or exclusion of 
specific characteristics are possible.  
Despite lacking a clear definition of the term ‘market’, the latter can be understood as a set of 
arrangements through which actors (buyers and sellers) exchange goods and services (Begg et al., 2003; 
Bromley, 1997). According to Vatn (2015), interaction through trade is the defining characteristic of 
markets. Markets coordinate decisions between actors using information provided through the price system 
(Begg et al., 2003; Parkin et al., 2011). Participants use the price system to signal preferences and as such 
can adjust mutually through decentralized coordination (Aspers, 2007; Lindblom, 2001; Ménard, 2005).  
In addition to the pricing system, defining characteristics of markets include competition and 
voluntariness (Rosenbaum, 2000). The voluntariness criterion distinguishes markets from allocation 
mechanisms that use power and authority12. According to Vatn (2015), all trades are per definition 
voluntary. Competition is a necessary expression of the impersonal nature of market exchange (Rosenbaum, 
2000). A competitive market consists of many buyers and sellers. According to neo-classical economics, in 
the absence of any distortions, competitive equilibrium will provide efficient quantities of goods and 
services in the market (Begg et al., 2003; Parkin et al., 2011). However, complete and perfectly competitive 
markets are a theoretical construct (Vatn, 2015). Non-competitive markets loose much of the theoretical 
efficiency advantage that competitive markets are supposed to have over alternative resource allocation 
strategies (Kroeger and Casey, 2007).  
Hierarchies or vertical coordination (firms) are seen as opposed to market organisation 
(Williamson, 1991). A hierarchy consists of a system of command (Vatn, 2010). According to transaction 
cost economics theory markets are characterized by (1) high incentive intensity, as rewards for actors are 
directly related to their action, and (2) low administrative control to monitor and stimulate actors’ activities, 
whereas hierarchies show low incentive intensity and high administrative control (Ménard, 1996b; 
Williamson, 2002).  
For PES, when discussing hierarchies, the focus is more on governments, public bureaucracies 
rather than private ones. Coase (1960) states that governments in a sense can be considered ‘super-firms’ 
as they are able to influence the use of production factors by administrative decisions. The characteristic of 
command by one actor, normally a government, over the other (person or entity) is opposed to the idea that 
markets are based on self-regulation, characterized by voluntariness and competiveness, and a separated 
decision-making structure. However, also markets, especially efficient ones, require some form of 
government involvement e.g. to protect property rights (Rametsteiner, 2002), or in other words a broader 
                                                          
12 Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun (2013, p. 1117) define authority as “a coordination mechanisms by which certain 
actors are able to influence the action of others using hierarchical relations”. 
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institutional context that facilitates and constrains the behaviour of market participants (Bromley, 1997; 
Kroeger and Casey, 2007; Lindblom, 2001).   
According to Lurie et al. (2013), PES are often theorized within the economic concept of markets. 
Market governance of PES would require: (i) the definition of ES units subject to trade; (ii) the 
establishment of a monitoring system; (iii) a transaction that is voluntary; and (iv) using price signals to 
allocate resources towards the provision of ES (Engel et al., 2008; Farley and Costanza, 2010; Kosoy and 
Corbera, 2010; Kroeger and Casey, 2007). Although PES only rarely function through competitive markets 
(Wunder, 2013), in theory competition should also be taken into account when analysing PES as markets 
for ES. However, according to Vatn (2010, p. 1247), “a trade with only one (few) agent(s) as provider(s) 
and one (few) as buyer(s) is not a competitive market, but still a market”. Competitive markets should not 
be used as the basis for defining markets in ES (Vatn, 2015).  
A last issue to consider when analysing PES as a market mode of governance is the conditionality 
linked to payments in PES. As Goldman-Benner et al. (2012, p. 58) explain, “in a conventional market 
sellers receive payment only if they actually provide the contractually agreed goods or services”, i.e. an 
exchange must take place. In PES, this implies that payments are only made when the agreed-upon ES are 
delivered or when certain agreed-upon management actions are carried out (Tacconi, 2012; Wunder, 2005). 
According to Wunder (2013), conditionality has to be present to some extent in PES schemes.  
 Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun (2013, p. 1119) propose four key elements that should be 
considered when trying to classify PES, taking into account the complexity and diversity of governance 
structures. These elements are: “(1) the degree of voluntariness; (2) the degree of commoditization; (3) the 
social meaning of the monetary transfers involved; and (4) the role of the state (whether it is a regulator or 
also an actor engaged in transactions)”. These elements are taken into account in the characteristics analysed 
in this study, with the exception of the social meaning of payments (see Muradian, 2013). Muradian (2013) 
proposes additionality of the PES schemes among other characteristics to understand the social meaning of 
transfers. Yet, additionality is not a defining criterion of PES, but a measure of effectiveness (Wunder, 
2015). We, however, add to this PES analysis how payment levels are set between the different actors.  
To position these hybrids in the continuum between markets and hierarchies, we developed a set of 
parameters (characteristics):  
 The actors: who participates?  
 The degree of commoditization of ES, what is being paid for?  
 Voluntariness of participation: how do actors participate? 
 Coordination through the price system: how are payment levels determined?  
 Conditionality related to payments: is there trade? 
 What is the the role of the intermediaries? 
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3.3.2. The actors 
According to Vatn (2015), when analysing markets as a governance structure, classifications should be 
focused on the type of actors involved and the format of their interactions. In markets, the actors that 
participate are suppliers, consumers, government(s) and possibly intermediaries. The main role of 
intermediaries in a market should be to facilitate exchange (Ahn et al., 2011; Gabre-Madhin, 2001). In the 
case of PES, the different actors can be classified as providers, users and intermediaries (Figure 3.1).  
An ES provider is an entity whose management actions modify the quantity or quality of ES 
available to users (Corbera et al., 2007; Swallow et al., 2009). It is often mentioned that providers of ES in 
PES schemes should be private or communal landholders (Laurans et al., 2012; Pagiola, 2008; Wunder, 
2005), however, governments also own land, and are thus potential ES providers. PES programmes could 
thus partially or fully target public land, as in the case of protected areas (Engel et al., 2008; FAO, 2009a; 
GEF, 2010).  
ES users are individuals or groups of (un)organised people that make use of the targeted ES and 
are often those who will pay directly or indirectly for the provision of ES (Corbera et al., 2007; Swallow et 
al., 2009).  
Intermediaries are entities that directly or indirectly shape interactions among providers, users, and 
the ecosystem itself (Corbera et al., 2007; Swallow et al., 2009). Providers are often the ones that get paid 
for ES provision or the implementation of a land-use activity, while users can be the ones that pay for the 
provision of ES, but it can also be an intermediary that gets paid or pays for the provision of the ES.  
In addition, as mentioned before, we should consider the role of the state in PES classification (Muradian 
and Gómez-Baggethun, 2013). Following Vatn (2015), for the analysis we additionally distinguish between 
different types of actors: (i) local, national and international non-governmental organisations (type: NGO); 
(ii) households, households organised through associations, and communities13 (type: Household); (iii) 
private businesses and producer associations (type: Business); (iv) local, regional and national 
governments, and official international cooperation (type: Government). The latter category includes 
municipal water companies managed through municipal governments, with the exception of the Costa 
Rican water company ESPH, which is regulated through corporate law.  
3.3.3. Degree of commoditization  
A market needs a good or service that is traded (Begg et al., 2003; Ménard, 2005). In the case of PES, this 
requires the definition of ES units subject to trade, and implies measurable and quantifiable ES (Engel et 
al., 2008; Farley and Costanza, 2010). According to Muradian (2013), defining a clear ES and ‘exchanging’ 
                                                          
13 Vatn (2010) distinguishes between markets, communities and governments, as different forms of governance. Here, 
we put communities together with individual households. This does not imply that we are oblivious of community 
governance, but in this analysis communities can be clearly identified as being providers or users.  
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this ES are the two steps necessary in the process of ES commoditization. A pure market transaction in PES 
would require a clearly defined ES that buyers (and users) are able to evaluate and obtain in measurable 
quantities, while a low level of commoditization denotes an interaction between actors that is not based on 
transacting a clearly defined ES (Muradian et al., 2010). 
Earlier research observed that instead of being based on clearly measured ES, most PES schemes 
focus on land uses that are expected to provide ES (Farley and Costanza, 2010). As such, the 
commoditization of ES is incomplete, with payments tied to proxies (land uses) (Wynne-Jones, 2013).  
For our analysis we distinguish several categories: (1) PES schemes where users pay a certain 
amount for a clear quantity of delivered ES (ES units); (2) schemes where payments are directly linked to 
a specific (defined) ES, but not related to a precise amount of ES (direct ES); and (3) schemes where the 
connection with ES is more general and not clearly defined (indirect ES). Furthermore, we distinguish 
whether payments to providers are based on input or output performance. In an input-based PES approach, 
payments are normally made on a per-hectare basis for land or land management activities that are assumed 
to deliver the desired ES (Sattler et al., 2013). Whereas output-based PES focus on measured results of ES 
provision (Wynne-Jones, 2013). ES units and output-based PES show a high degree of ES commoditization. 
 
3.3.4. Voluntariness of participation 
In a market, participation should be voluntary (Vatn, 2015).  
User participation 
Voluntariness of user participation in theory implies that those who participate at the demand side are 
willing to buy a given quantity of a good or service at a certain price. According to neoclassical economics, 
the voluntary participation in markets will maximize social utility and welfare (Korff, 2008). In a command 
system on the other hand, participation is based on obligation. In order to differentiate between different 
levels of participation, we categorize them according to whether participation is (1) voluntary, (2) 
compulsory, or (3) if it is a government that acts directly in representation of ES users. 
 van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) state that voluntariness is based on the concept of free and 
informed choice at the level of the individual. However, it is very difficult to assess these assumptions on 
the basis of voluntariness. Thus, here we understand voluntariness in participation as no legal obligation 
(no legal system of command) to participate.  
Schemes with voluntary user participation are often referred to as ‘user-financed’. The other two 
participation mechanisms are known as ‘government-financed’ schemes (Engel et al., 2008). Firstly, user 
participation can be compulsory. Command-based methods are regularly used to organise users’ 
participation in PES schemes (Farley and Costanza, 2010). Secondly, although governments are never the 
final users of the schemes analysed, they participate as users’ representatives. Governments depend on their 
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ability to command to act as buyers in PES schemes (Vatn, 2015). In this case, users do not participate 
directly. We thus distinguish this participation mechanism from the previous compulsory participation.  
Provider participation  
Voluntary participation of providers is based on offering positive incentives to change land-use decisions 
and not to induce this change through regulations and administrative decisions. Voluntariness of provider’s 
participation as a market characteristic is considered important to ensure that products or services are 
supplied at a price that producers are willing to accept and would thus not create an undersupply of the 
good or service (Jack et al., 2008). Pagiola et al. (2008) and Tacconi (2012) state that voluntariness of 
providers’ participation is a key characteristic of PES. As with the user participation classification, classes 
are (1) voluntary, (2) compulsory, and (3) the government. 
Voluntariness should (in theory) differ from providers being the object of compulsory limitations 
on their land-use decisions (van Noordwijk and Leimona, 2010). It is argued that PES should only be used 
to pay for practices that are additional to the law (ten Brink, 2011), or conversely that PES are a more cost-
effective way of obtaining an environmental outcome than by regulatory approaches (Wunder, 2008). Yet, 
regulations already exist that directly or indirectly provide or conserve ES (Engel et al., 2008). Governments 
limit the ability of landholders to choose freely what they can do with their land. For cutting down trees it 
is often necessary to obtain a license, while in some areas with high biodiversity or in watersheds 
deforestation can be forbidden by law (Arriagada, 2009; Casas, 2008; Echavarria et al., 2004). Sommerville 
et al. (2009, p. 2) state “The one criterion that we believe is not crucial to all PES interventions is that they 
must be voluntary. Although we agree that PES are voluntary at the level of the transaction (i.e., service 
providers can decide whether or not to accept payment), service providers do not necessarily have the choice 
whether or not to provide the service, such as in cases where land-use change is illegal.”.  
It is thus difficult to separate regulations and the importance of administrative decisions from the 
incentive impact of payments. As both coincide, a hybrid mechanism emerges that combines both, but not 
one that solely relies on high incentive intensity. According to Laurans et al. (2012), in certain schemes 
payments are meant to persuade landholders to stop committing illegal acts, thereby countering, to a certain 
extent, any failures of regulatory approaches. This implies that landholders get paid for obeying the law 
(Engel et al., 2008). Wunder (2007) states that in many cases it may be rational to use the stick-and-carrot 
approach (i.e. to supplement weakly enforced laws with PES compensations), especially when top-down 
protection declarations had been unfair to local users in the first place. When compensation is the idea, then 
issues of fairness and equity come into play (Wunder, 2008). What you don’t have is a market mechanism 
that provides conservation incentives. It is then a compensation mechanism which aims at making the 
implementation of regulations more acceptable (Pagiola, 2008). Engel et al. (2008) and Wunder and Alban 
(2008) try to separate PES from environmental regulation by mentioning that there is an interaction between 
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PES and command-based measures. If the law had been effectively enforced from the beginning, there 
would have been no need for PES, at least not for environmental purposes. However they add that even 
modest law-enforcement efforts can stimulate greater participation of providers by decreasing expected 
return from alternative, illegal land uses, thus making PES participation more attractive. This makes a full 
separation between the positive incentive aspect of PES and the command part impossible, which is key to 
the distinction between participation in PES and regular markets, even when PES participation is voluntary. 
As Muradian (2013) notes, incentives are one of the numerous possible coordination mechanisms that can 
emerge in hybrid structures, exactly because they mix monetary signals and control elements. 
Here we focus on voluntary versus (command-based) compulsory participation in the scheme, not 
the existence of land-use (and other) regulations. As with users, even when participation in a PES scheme 
is voluntary, particular subgroups may be forced to participate (Sommerville et al., 2009).  
Following the above, we understand compulsory participation as the legal obligation to participate 
in a scheme. The latter should not be confused with the obligation to abide to existing environmental 
regulations. Finally, although there is an ongoing discussion whether public land should be eligible for PES 
(Sattler et al., 2013), governments could potentially participate as providers. Participation in the scheme 
can be voluntary, but what allows to distinguish governments from participation by the other actors, is the 
role governments play as intermediaries (see Section 3.4.5) and as implementers of land-use regulations.  
 
3.3.5. Payment setting mechanism 
Markets coordinate decisions between actors using information provided through the pricing system (Begg 
et al., 2003). For PES, this would imply that – ideally - payments should be determined through demand 
and supply interactions (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). 
Users’ payment mechanisms 
We distinguish between (i) possible voluntary means of establishing users’ payment levels (bilateral 
agreements and payment levels set by intermediaries); (ii) payments set and obtained through command 
(earmarked taxes/tariffs); (iii) and internal determination of payments (government budget allocation).  
We apply the category of bilateral agreements when payments are negotiated between users and 
providers or intermediaries. This could typify small markets from the users’ side. We understand that the 
price users pay is set by an intermediary when intermediaries offer an ES (product) for purchase at a specific 
price. Carbon credits are a typical example. This is a market mechanism based on a supply side offer, with 
no obligation behind the purchase of the ES14. Earmarked taxes/tariffs are obligatory payments that are set 
specifically to finance PES. They are based on command, and do thus not characterize a market from the 
                                                          
14 In this analysis the credits are (were) sold on the voluntary carbon market. 
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users’ side. These taxes/tariffs are however linked to the quantity of the good or service consumed. For 
example in Costa Rica’s PSA, the more gasoline one purchases, the more one will contribute to the PES 
scheme through an earmarked tax and thus the more one will contribute to financing the scheme, and to the 
provision of ES such as carbon sequestration. Similarly, for environmental tariffs used in watershed 
schemes: the more water consumed, the more one will contribute to the maintenance or improvement of 
watershed services; this works as a command-based mechanism directly related to demand. Government 
budget allocation is established internally and through administrative control, characterizing a hierarchy. 
Government budget allocation is a user payment mechanism when a government specifically assigns a 
budget to pay for ES provision through a scheme, but this is not directly linked with ES use levels. We did 
not include government budget used to cover management costs, or additional costs governments can bear 
by being intermediaries.  
Providers’ payment setting mechanism 
The underlying assumption of supplier price setting through the market is that markets can reveal hidden 
information, leading to the most efficient provider being chosen or setting the price for ES provision 
(Arriagada and Perrings, 2009). As no marketplace exists where providers can offer their ES for sale, market 
price setting in PES could entail the creation of auctions (Börner et al., 2010; Ferraro, 2008). However, in 
none of the cases studied the price paid to providers resulted from auctioning schemes.  
Similar as for users’ payment setting mechanisms, providers’ payment levels can be the result of 
bilateral agreements between providers and users or intermediaries. These negotiations can reflect the 
willingness to accept of providers to change land use(s). When payments are set top down by the 
intermediary/user, and participation is voluntary, prices again should reflect ES providers’ willingness to 
accept. However, as prices are set top down there is no coordination through the price system. Vatn (2010, 
p. 1247) writes about this as “cases where the intermediary is the only really active party in defining the 
price, and where the price is a flat rate it is still a payment mechanism, but not a standard market”. Finally, 
internal budget allocation is a hierarchical governance system (Vatn, 2015).  
 
3.3.6. Conditionality  
For an exchange to occur through an ES market, property rights could be established (e.g. carbon credits), 
this is however not a prerequisite. Markets of many services do not exchange property rights (Wunder, 
2015), but payment and service delivery should be conditional. Conditionality in PES is mostly related to 
the performance of providers. According to Wunder (2012, p. 2) “the arguably decisive PES criterion is 
whether providers receive conditional payments”. Payments should be conditional on whether ES are 
provided or not  (Martin-Ortega et al., 2013). If providers fail to deliver the ES as agreed then payments 
should be withdrawn or reduced (Milne and Niesten, 2009). It is this conditionality that is considered the 
40 
 
fundamental difference between direct payments and activities of another approach, still implemented, and 
referred to as the generic family of integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) (Engel et al., 
2008; Milne and Niesten, 2009; Wunder, 2012). In ICDPs incentives are delivered up-front with no further 
conditionality attached to them. There is thus no fixed mechanism to assure that exchange will take place. 
Because of conditionality, PES schemes are considered an improvement over the ICDP approach (Ferraro 
and Kiss, 2002). 
Payments can only be conditional on ES if these can be monitored, while also sanctions for non-
compliance should be implemented (Sommerville et al., 2011; Wunder et al., 2008). Input-based PES 
programmes normally divide monitoring on the one hand into monitoring whether the applied land use is 
actually generating the targeted ES ( see Section 3.5.1.), and on the other hand monitoring whether providers 
are complying with the contractually agreed upon land uses (Engel et al., 2008). As data on non-compliance 
and sanctions were not provided by the literature review or the experts, it was not possible to obtain 
sufficient answers on conditionality so as to assess to what degree conditionality was implemented and 
whether this changed over time. However, as a proxy for conditionality, we assess the use of contractual 
agreements with the providers, as contracts should stipulate under what conditions (e.g. implementing 
specific land uses) payments can be received, i.e. the conditions for exchange. Conversely the payments 
(monetary or in-kind) of the schemes can be non-conditional, ICDPs15 in this case. 
 
3.3.7. Role of intermediaries 
The main role of intermediaries in a market should be to facilitate exchange (Ahn et al., 2011). For PES, a 
distinction can be made between ‘financial intermediaries’ (buyers), who collect funds from various sources 
and allocate them to providers; and ‘management intermediaries’, which take care of a scheme’s 
implementation (Laurans et al., 2012).  
Intermediaries can consist of one single intermediary (e.g. a government agency), several 
constituents of the same intermediary organisation, or several levels of intermediaries (e.g. a local 
intermediary implementing the scheme and a national or international intermediary managing the scheme’s 
funding). In PROFAFOR the financial intermediary sold the carbon credits outside of Ecuador, while the 
management intermediary operates within Ecuador. In Scolel Té, credits are sold by an international 
organisation (Plan Vivo), while the project is administered by the Fondo Bioclimático (a non-profit trust 
fund) and coordinated by AMBIO, a Mexican NGO. In FORAGUA there is the water fund with its 
management, while the municipalities that are the fund’s constituents collect water charges and implement 
                                                          
15 Although ICDPs could be considered as characterizing non-PES mechanisms, they are still included in this analysis. 
This is only one of the multiple characteristics used to understand the diversity of hybrid governance structures found 
in schemes that have been discussed or interpreted as PES. The latter includes schemes that implement ICDPs (e.g. 
Goldman-Benner et al., 2012; Kauffman, 2013). 
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activities related to watershed conservation financed through the fund. The latter is similar to the Colombian 
water fund, where the fund manages the resources, but it are the fund’s members that implement activities. 
The other schemes do not have these two clearly separated intermediary levels. Although schemes such as 
PSA and Socio Bosque receive aid from NGOs to facilitate signing agreements with providers. 
Finally, intermediaries could potentially act as providers. In this case the role of the intermediary merges 
with that of a provider, i.e. it becomes a hierarchical characteristic.  
 
In summary, in a pure market set-up we would expect that ES trade would take place when a commoditized 
ES is voluntarily produced by private providers in return for a price negotiated with private users. The 
payment will be conditional on the level of ES production and intermediaries would only act to facilitate 
the interaction between users and providers. Conversely, in a set-up based on hierarchical coordination, in 
our case a government bureaucracy, the budget would come solely from government revenue not directly 
related to the level of ES use by users. The budget would be allocated based on internal budget distribution 
mechanisms to government-managed land and government-funded projects, whereby funding for projects 
is not conditional on ES delivery. Hybrids will include a mix of characteristics that will put them in between 
these two extremes.  
 
3.3.8. Different categories of schemes 
Key reasons for the hybrid structure of PES have previously been identified in the literature. We thus 
incorporated them to analyse to what extent they provide an explanation of the mode of governance and the 
observed changes in schemes’ configuration (Figure 3.1). These reasons are (1) the size of the user and 
provider groups; (2) the ES involved; and (3) resistance against PES based on the idea that it is a market-
based approach.  
Group Size: when only a small number of actors are involved in a scheme, transaction costs of coordination 
are relatively low (Engel et al., 2008). The more users and/or providers a scheme has, the higher the 
transaction costs of organising them and thus the higher the costs of using a market mechanism (Vatn, 
2010). The complexity of organising large numbers can often not be addressed through markets, so 
governments step in, using instruments such as taxes, or by acting directly on behalf of users and/or 
providers (Vatn, 2015, 2010). Hence, the larger the size of the user or provider group, the less market 
characteristics a scheme should have. We classify schemes in three categories of group sizes: (i) small 
(when there are only a few and clearly identifiable users or providers); (ii) medium (users or providers are 
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not easily identified individually, but can be found within a specific area within a country); (iii) large (users 
or providers are not easily identified, and can be found nation-wide16) (Table 3.2).  
Characteristics of ES as economic goods: ES are inherently difficult to commoditize (Muradian and 
Gómez-Baggethun, 2013). The logic behind market creation for ES is that the economic good aspects of 
rivalry and excludability are changed through the creation of new institutions (OECD, 2004). However, 
according to Farley and Costanza (2010), rivalry is a purely physical characteristic that depends on the 
service, and not a dynamic variable that can be changed, while excludability can be a dynamic policy 
variable, but some ES are inherently non-excludable. Only certain ES, such as carbon sequestration, have 
the possibility of being commoditized and sold through a market. Biodiversity and landscape beauty are 
public goods, while watershed services are often characterized as club goods (Engel et al., 2008) or as 
common-pool resources (Fisher et al., 2010), which can be considered as non-market goods (Hagedorn, 
2008). Moreover, the provision of ES has a high level of uncertainty and fluctuates over time (Ascough et 
al., 2008), while ES are often provided by ecological functions that have a high level of complexity 
(Cardinale et al., 2012; Norgaard, 2010). Schemes are classified according to the focal ES considered in the 
scheme (Table 3.1). Schemes that focus on more than one ES are grouped together and classified as schemes 
focusing on bundled ES (Table 3.2). We would expect that carbon schemes are closer to markets, whereas 
schemes that focus on biodiversity should rather be organised through governments. Watershed schemes 
should lie in between these two forms of organisation.  
Denomination: in Latin America, there exists an opposition to PES based on the belief that PES need 
monetary valuation of ES (although it does not e.g. Wunder, 2013). PES are considered a means to achieve 
the commoditization of nature, and are seen as mechanisms for indirect privatization (Balvanera et al., 
2012; Southgate and Wunder, 2009). Resistance against the PES concept can thus be a factor that influences 
PES (or PES-like) scheme’s design and how it evolved over time. As a proxy for resistance against PES, 
we classify schemes according to whether the schemes themselves use the term PES. We would expect that 
schemes that do not consider themselves PES are less market-oriented. 
 León et al. (2010, p. 9), when discussing the process of setting up the Alto Mayo scheme in Peru, 
mention that “the terminology used to describe the mechanism has changed as a result of the process, from 
PES to compensation for ecosystem services. The reason is the negative perception of the term 
‘payment’…” Also, the concept of reciprocal watershed agreements (RWA) creates a shift in 
conceptualization based on how the term PES is perceived. Although RWA schemes are not necessarily 
different from PES designs, according to Martinez et al. (2013, p. 43), “RWAs are based on Wunder's 
(2007) principles of PES , but with a focus on local norms of reciprocity amongst upstream and downstream 
                                                          
16 In addition, there can be global ES users. 
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communities”. This shift in discourse on schemes can be observed in literature about the well-known 
scheme in Los Negros, Bolivia. The scheme has been described as a market mechanism for watershed 
management (Asquith and Vargas, 2007) and as a PES scheme (Asquith et al., 2008), while now rather the 
differences between RWA and PES are highlighted (Asquith, 2011). Also Socio Bosque does not define 
itself as PES (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2012a). A number of water funds, which have been 
analysed in the context of PES (Balvanera et al., 2012; Goldman-Benner et al., 2012; Kauffman, 2013), use 
the term water fund as well as compensation for ecosystem services (CES), the latter referring to contractual 
agreements with individual providers. Finally, NK-CAP was originally conceptualized as a PES (Pereira, 
2010), but now undergoes changes following resistance against what is perceived as the commoditization 
of nature in Bolivia (Bryner et al., 2012). 
Other schemes, however, do (continue to) use the term PES to describe what they are. In the cases 
analysed in Andean countries, only the Pimampiro scheme uses the PES term (Municipality of Pimampiro, 
2013). In Mesoamerica on the other hand, all schemes use the PES denomination (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Categorization of the schemes according to size, ES and denomination  
Case name Users’ group size Providers’ group size ES Denomination 
Alto Mayo Water Initiative Medium Medium Watershed Alternative 
ESPH –PROCUENCAS Medium Medium Watershed PES 
FONAG Medium Medium Watershed Alternative 
FORAGUA Medium Medium Watershed Alternative 
NK-CAPa,b Small Few Carbon Alternative 
PES La Esperanza Small Few Watershed PES 
PES Pimampiro Medium Medium Watershed PES 
PES San Pedro del Norte Medium Medium Watershed PES 
PHES Gil Gonzalez Small Medium Watershed PES 
Plan Vivo Scolel Té Small Medium Carbon PES 
PROFAFORb Small Large Carbon PES 
PRONAFOR Large Large Bundled PES 
PSA Large Large Bundled  PES 
RWA Los Negros Medium Medium Watershed Alternative 
Socio Bosque Programme Large Large Bundled Alternative 
Water Fund for Life and Sustainability Medium Medium Watershed Alternative 
 
3.4. Method 
In our analysis, for each characteristic, the number of PES (or PES-like) schemes that include the specific 
class (as identified in 3.3.4 to 3.3.7) initially and/or currently were summed. A comparison could thus be 
made of the number of schemes that incorporated a specific class of one market, hybrid or hierarchy 
characteristic, and the overall evolution of the schemes’ design. One scheme can contain several classes, 
and thus be summed several times for each characteristic. Consequently, the sum of all classes can be higher 
than the total number of schemes analysed.  
As a first step we analysed the initial design and changes for all PES schemes and compared the 
number of schemes that incorporate specific classes of a characteristic. Cells in the tables below where 
changes occur are filled in grey. We analysed the significance of these changes using Pearson’s Chi-square 
44 
 
tests (Agresti, 2007). This was followed by an analysis of the number of schemes per category (see 3.3.8) 
and between categories that incorporate the different classes of each characteristic. The data on each scheme 
separately can be found back in the supplementary tables of Annex 4.  
 
3.5. Results  
3.5.1. Degree of commoditization 
Overall degree of ES commoditization 
In only a few schemes commoditized ES (ES units) can be purchased by users (Table 3.3). The number of 
schemes that include ES units has slightly decreased, as in two carbon credits are no longer sold. In one 
scheme ES units have now been incorporated. Overall, these changes are not statistically significant. Most 
schemes used, and continue to use direct ES, while one more scheme added direct ES to its scope. There is 
thus overall a low level of commoditization of users’ ES. 
If we look at the providers’ side, we can observe that in their initial design most schemes were 
input-based. This focus on inputs rather than outputs has not changed. Only one scheme (NK-CAP) changed 
from being output-based to input-based, decreasing its degree of commoditization. Also here changes are 
not significant.  
Table 3.3: Degree of ES commoditization for all schemes 
 Initially Currently 
Change 
Chi-
Square 
N % of 
schemes 
N % of 
schemes 
User side 
ES Units 4 25 3 19 
0.5780 Direct ES 10 63 11 69 
Indirect ES 3 19 3 19 
Provider 
side 
Output-based 3 19 2 13 
0.3199 
Input-based 13 81 14 88 
 
Degree of ES commoditization for users per category 
When the degree of commoditization of ES is analysed according to the categories of user group size, we 
observe changes in schemes with a small user group (two schemes less incorporate ES units - carbon 
credits). There are also changes in schemes with large groups of users, focusing on bundled ES, through 
the inclusion of direct ES and ES units. Finally, while ES units are no longer used in alternatively 
denominated schemes, they are still part of some PES-denominated schemes. The latter category also 
includes one additional scheme using direct ES (Table 3.4).  
In general, in the schemes with small user groups, users pay for ES units and direct ES. Schemes 
with medium-sized user groups focus specifically on direct ES. When the group of users is large, the scope 
are mostly indirect ES. The latter are the schemes considering bundled ES. Carbon schemes focus on ES 
units, while most watershed schemes incorporate direct ES. Finally, schemes with an alternative 
denomination do not use ES Units.  
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 Degree of ES commoditization for providers per category 
The only change that is observed when analysing providers’ ES, is a switch of a small (previously) carbon 
scheme that was denominated PES (NK-CAP), from output-based to input-based (Table 3.4). 
Most schemes focus on input-based schemes irrespective of the size of the provider group, the ES 
targeted, or their denomination. The only two schemes that are currently output-based are both termed 
‘PES’. One is a carbon scheme with a medium-sized group of providers, the other a watershed service 
scheme with a single provider.  
Table 3.4: Degree of ES commoditization per category of schemes 
  Users’ ES Providers’ ES 
ES Units Direct ES Indirect ES Output-based Input-based 
a I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch I. C Ch I C Ch 
Group size 
Small 4 2 1 1  0 0  2 1  0 1  
Medium 0 1 8 8  0 0  1 1  9 9  
Large 0 0 1 2  3 3  0 0  4 4  
ES 
Carbon 3 1  0 0  0 0  2 1  1 2  
Watershed 1 1  9 9  0 0  1 1  9 9  
Bundled 0 1  1 2  3 3  0 0  3 3  
Denomination 
PES 3 3  6 7  2 2  2 2  7 7  
Alternative 1 0  5 5  1 1  1 0  6 7  
a I: Initially; C: Currently; Ch: Change 
3.5.2. Voluntariness of participation 
Results user participation 
The changes observed in the voluntariness of user participation are statistically significant. There is a small 
decrease in voluntary user participation, through a decrease of NGOs acting as buyers17. Although two more 
schemes incorporated voluntary participation of businesses, in two other schemes voluntary participation 
of these actors disappeared (Table 3.5). Since their implementation five schemes already relied on non-
voluntary participation. This number has now doubled. The main source of funding for PES were and are 
governments. Overall, there has been a clear increase in command-based users’ participation mechanisms. 
Table 3.5: Voluntariness of users’ participation for all schemes 
 Initially Currently 
Change 
Chi-
Square N % of schemes N % of schemes 
Voluntary 
NGO 8 50 6 38 
0.0046*** 
Household 2 13 2 13 
Business 7 44 7 44 
Compulsory 
Household 5 31 10 63 
Business 5 31 10 63 
Government 10 63 12 75 
***Significant at 1% 
Some differences can be observed when looking at how users participate in the schemes categorized 
according to group size (Table 3.6). When the group of users is small, voluntary participation, especially 
                                                          
17 NGOs as voluntary buyers are only taken into account if they pay for ES provision, not management costs they 
can (additionally) bear. 
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of businesses, is most common. With the exception of two schemes that no longer receive financing through 
the sale of ES units, this has not changed. However, two schemes now also have the government directly 
participating. In medium-sized schemes, a slight decrease in the number of NGOs acting as buyers is 
observed. The biggest change here is the sharp increase in compulsory direct participation. In the three 
schemes with a large user group, national governments are the buyers. Additionally, in two of them 
compulsory user participation is used. In these schemes, an increase in the diversification of participation 
mechanisms, through an increase in voluntary mechanisms, can be observed. 
Schemes with large user groups are those which target bundled ES. Two of the carbon service 
schemes disappeared, but the one remaining is still mainly based on voluntary participation of private 
entities. However, this scheme has diversified the users’ participation mechanisms employed. The strong 
growth in compulsory participation is entirely due to an increase of command-based methods in schemes 
focusing on watershed services. The other important funding source in these schemes remain governments 
acting directly as buyers. In addition, in four of the schemes businesses continue to participate voluntarily.  
The schemes with an alternative denomination see the strongest increase in compulsory participation and 
almost all of them (six out of seven) have governments operating as buyers. This is slightly lower in the 
other category. In addition, households never participate voluntarily in the alternatively denominated 
schemes. 
Table 3.6: Voluntariness of users’ participation per category 
  Non-Government 
Government 
  Voluntary Compulsory 
 a I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch 
Group size 
Small 5 3  0 0  1 2  
Medium 6 4  3 8  6 7  
Large 1 2  2 2  3 3  
ES 
Carbon 3 1  0 0  0 1  
Watershed 8 6  3 8  7 8  
Bundled 1 2  2 2  3 3  
Denomination 
PES 7 4  4 5  5 6  
Alternative 5 5  1 5  5 6  
a I: Initially; C: Currently; Ch: Change 
Results provider participation  
The participation mechanisms of providers did only change slightly, and this change is not statistically 
significant (Table 3.7). Schemes are mainly based on voluntary participation of households (and 
communities). Governments and NGOs participate in some schemes as providers through protected areas, 
while two more schemes now incorporate businesses as providers. However, the latter are water users, part 
of the intermediary, and purchased land in watersheds (see also Section 3.4.5.).  
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Table 3.7: Voluntariness of providers’ participation for all schemes 
 Initially Currently 
Change 
Chi-
Square N % of schemes N % of schemes 
Voluntary 
NGO 3 19 2 13 
0.1868 
Household 15 94 15 94 
Business 2 13 4 25 
Compulsory 
Household 0 0 0 0 
Business 0 0 0 0 
Government 5 31 5 31 
 
Comparing schemes according to the different categories, we observe that an NGO is no longer a provider 
in a PES-denominated carbon scheme with a medium-sized provider group. In two medium-sized watershed 
service schemes (one PES and one alternatively denominated) businesses are now operating as providers. 
Moreover, there is one less watershed scheme and one more carbon scheme, both PES-denominated with 
medium-sized provider groups, where the government now acts as a provider (Table 3.8).  
There are currently only two schemes with a small group of providers. One has an NGO as a 
provider, the other a government. In schemes with large and medium-sized provider groups, providers are 
mostly households and communities. Governments participate as providers in schemes focusing on 
watershed services through municipal protected areas, and in two carbon schemes, also through protected 
areas. Governments never participate as providers in the schemes focusing on bundled services. Lastly, the 
biggest difference that can be observed between schemes when classifying them according to denomination, 
is that governments participate more as providers in schemes with an alternative denomination (four 
schemes), than in the PES-denominated schemes (only one).  
Table 3.8: Voluntariness of providers’ participation per category 
  Non-Government 
Government 
  Voluntary Compulsory 
 a I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch 
Group size 
Small 2 2  0 0  1 1  
Medium 10 10  0 0  4 4  
Large 4 4  0 0  0 0  
ES 
Carbon 3 3  0 0  1 2  
Watershed 10 10  0 0  4 3  
Bundled 3 3  0 0  0 0  
Denomination 
PES 9 9  0 0  1 1  
Alternative 7 7  0 0  4 4  
a I: Initially; C: Currently; Ch: Change 
3.5.3. Payment setting mechanisms 
Results users’ payment setting18 
The users’ payment setting mechanisms show results similar to those obtained when analysing users’ 
participation. Also here changes are statistically significant. There is a strong increase in the use of 
                                                          
18 Initially 10 schemes also received donations for ES provision, currently 9 schemes receive them directly. 
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earmarked taxes/tariffs to finance PES, and an increase in government budget allocation (Table 3.9). In 
addition, there is a small decrease in bilateral agreements, while one more scheme has incorporated the use 
of payment levels set by the intermediary. 
Table 3.9: Users’ payment setting mechanisms for all schemes 
 Initially Currently 
Change Chi-Square 
N % of schemes N % of schemes 
Bilateral agreements 10 63 7 44 
0.0017*** 
Price set by intermediary 1 6 2 13 
Earmarked Taxes/Tariffs 5 31 10 63 
Government budget allocation 10 63 12 75 
***Significant at 1% 
Schemes with a small number of users show a decrease in the use of bilateral agreements. In one scheme a 
payment setting mechanism no longer exists (PROFAFOR), while the other one (NK-CAP) now relies on 
government budget allocation. These are two (former) carbon schemes. Schemes with a medium-sized user 
group show a decrease in the use of bilateral agreements and payment levels set by the intermediary. 
However, four schemes, which focus on watershed services, now additionally use earmarked taxes. One 
more of these schemes currently also relies on government budget allocation. For the schemes with a large 
user group (focusing on bundled services), two have incorporated the use of bilateral agreements and one 
payment levels determined by the intermediary. Moreover, we see that three watershed service schemes no 
longer use bilateral agreements, and two no longer payment levels set by the intermediary. PES-
denominated schemes show a decrease in the use of bilateral agreements and of intermediaries determining 
payment levels, and a small increase in earmarked taxes and government budget allocation. Alternatively 
named schemes on the other hand show a small increase in the number of schemes using payment levels 
set by intermediaries, a strong increase in earmarked taxes, and a small increase in government budget 
allocation (Table 3.10). 
Overall, for user payment setting, when group size is small, payments are determined through 
bilateral agreements. However, additional payment setting mechanisms are used, with the exception of 
earmarked taxes. Conversely, in all schemes with medium-sized user groups focusing on watershed 
services, earmarked taxes are used, followed by government budget allocation. The latter payment setting 
mechanism is the most important for the schemes with a large user group (bundled ES). However, these 
schemes use a diverse set of payment mechanisms, including also bilateral agreements and earmarked 
taxes/tariffs. Furthermore, carbon schemes have never incorporated earmarked taxes as a financing 
mechanism. There are no big differences between schemes classified by denomination. Except, as was 
observed previously, an ‘ES product’ offered at a price set by the intermediary is sold by two schemes that 
use the PES term. 
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Table 3.10: Users’ payment setting mechanisms per category 
  Bilateral agreements Price set by 
intermediary 
Earmarked 
taxes/tariffs 
Government budget 
 a I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch 
Group size 
Small 5 3  2 2  0 0  1 2  
Medium 4 2  6 4  3 8  6 7  
Large 0 2  2 3  2 2  3 3  
ES 
Carbon 2 1  1 1  0 0  0 1  
Watershed 7 4  7 5  3 8  7 8  
Bundled 0 2  2 3  2 2  3 3  
Denomination 
PES 7 4  6 4  4 5  5 6  
Alternative 3 3  4 5  1 5  5 6  
a I: Initially; C: Currently; Ch: Change 
Results providers’ payment setting  
There is only a small change in how providers’ payments are set, due to the change in the structure of one 
scheme (NK-CAP), which shifted from relying on bilateral agreements to internal budget allocation. 
Overall, the observed change is not statistically significant. In general, most of the schemes analysed rely 
on bilateral agreements followed by top-down payment setting, while some schemes additionally use 
internal budget allocation (Table 3.11).  
Table 3.11: Providers’ payment setting mechanisms for all schemes 
 Initially Currently 
Change Chi-Square 
N % of schemes N % of schemes 
Bilateral agreements 10 63 9 56 
0.5418 Price set by intermediary 6 38 6 38 
Government budget allocation 3 19 4 25 
 
If we observe the different categories, we see small changes due to change in a carbon scheme with only 
one provider that is not named PES. This scheme switched from using bilateral agreement to internal budget 
allocation (Table 3.12). 
Overall, in schemes with large provider groups, only payment levels set by the intermediary are 
used. Whereas in the other two categories, bilateral agreements are the most important mechanism to set 
providers’ payment levels. Although some rely on internal budget allocation, bilateral agreements are by 
far the most important payment setting mechanism used in watershed service schemes. In carbon schemes 
intermediaries determine providers’ payments. The more hierarchical nature of many of the schemes that 
do not use the PES denomination can be observed by their exclusive use of internal budget allocation. 
However, while in these schemes bilateral agreements with providers are more important, for the PES-
denominated schemes it are payments set by the intermediary 
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Table 3.12: Providers’ payment setting mechanisms per category 
  Bilateral agreements Price set by intermediary Government budget 
 a I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch 
Group size 
Small 2 1  0 0  0 1  
Medium 8 8  2 2  3 3  
Large 0 0  4 4  0 0  
ES 
Carbon 1 0  2 2  0 1  
Watershed 9 9  1 1  3 3  
Bundled 0 0  3 3  0 0  
Denomination 
PES 4 4  5 5  0 0  
Alternative 6 5  1 1  3 4  
a I: Initially; C: Currently; Ch: Change 
3.5.4. Implementation of conditionality 
No changes in the use of contracts and/or ICDPs were found, so their use is given only once (Table 3.13). 
If a contractual agreement with providers (conditionality) is the key characteristic of PES schemes, than 
most schemes fulfil this criterion. Three schemes analysed can then not be considered PES, because they 
do not use contracts with providers. Three other schemes would then have a PES component (contracts) 
within their broader design (including also non-contractual payments, ICDPs).  
Schemes with a small or medium-sized group of providers use mostly contracts, although some 
implement ICDPs (Table 3.13). Schemes with large providers’ groups use only contracts. The category of 
schemes focusing on watershed services (and one carbon scheme) do include schemes that implement 
ICDPs. Schemes focusing on bundled services never implemented ICDPs. Finally, it are only those schemes 
that do not use the PES term that execute ICDPs.  
Table 3.13: Use of contracts and ICDPs by category 
 Total Contracts with providers ICDPs 
  N % of 
schemes 
N % of schemes 
per category 
N % of schemes 
per category 
All schemes 16 100 13 81 6 38 
Group 
size 
Small  2 12.5 1  50 1  50 
Medium  10 62.5 8  80 5  50 
Large  4 25 4  100 0  0 
ES Watershed services  10 62.5 8  80 5  50 
Carbon services  3 18.8 2  67 1  33 
Bundled Services  3 18.8 3  100 0  0 
Name PES  9 56 9  100 0  0 
Alternative  7 44 4 57 6 86 
 
3.5.5. Results role of intermediaries 
Overall, the change in intermediaries and their roles is statistically significant (Table 3.14). We observe a 
decrease in non-government financial and management intermediaries. One more scheme now has a 
government acting as a financial intermediary, and three more have governments operating as management 
intermediaries. Furthermore, three additional schemes now have the intermediary (or one of its constituents) 
as a provider. 
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Only one scheme has no intermediary (La Esperanza). In most schemes governments assume the 
role of intermediary or form part of the intermediary body. Additionally, in four schemes the intermediary 
or one of its constituents became a provider through land purchases (establishment of reserves). According 
to Rojas and Aylward (2003), buying land can be distinguished from PES based on its degree of 
permanency. The authors state that buying land is more an investment in ES than a payment. The purchase 
of land makes the intermediary the provider. It creates an internal organisation (hierarchy) as opposed to 
contracts with (external) providers. In addition, the intermediary may also be the buyer, creating an almost 
complete hierarchical structure.  
Table 3.14: The role of intermediaries in all schemes 
  Initially Currently 
Change Chi-Square  N % of 
schemes 
N % of 
schemes 
Non-Government 
Intermediary 
Financial 6 38 4 25 
0.0021*** 
Management 11 69 9 56 
Government 
Intermediary 
Financial 10 63 11 69 
Management 7 44 10 63 
Intermediary as: 
Buyer 11 69 11 69 
Provider 1 6 4 25 
***Significant at 1% 
When we compare the different categories, we observe that two schemes with small provider and user 
groups no longer have a non-governmental financial intermediary (Table 3.15). Two schemes with medium-
sized user groups no longer have a non-governmental management intermediary, while one more scheme 
of this category now has a government acting as financial intermediary. In addition, one more scheme with 
a small, and two more schemes with medium-sized groups of users now have a governmental management 
intermediary. Furthermore, in schemes with medium-sized user groups there is an increase of intermediaries 
acting as providers. When we look at the categories according to the size of the provider group, we observe 
the disappearance of the non-governmental financial intermediary in one scheme with a small, and one with 
a large number of providers. The other observed changes are all for schemes with medium-sized groups of 
providers, and are equal to those found for schemes with medium-sized user groups. The disappearance of 
the sale of carbon credits in two schemes is the reason for the disappearance of two non-governmental 
financial intermediaries in small sized schemes. The other observed differences are changes in the structure 
of medium-sized watershed schemes.  
In general, in schemes with a large group of users, governments are the main intermediary. In 
schemes with a small group this is the opposite, as there it are non-governmental intermediaries (businesses 
and NGOs). In schemes with a medium-sized user group, both government and non-government 
organisations are part of the intermediary body. Furthermore, only schemes with medium-sized user and 
provider groups have intermediaries as providers. These are schemes that focus on watershed services, and 
purchase or have purchased land in watersheds that are important for water provision and/or in seriously 
52 
 
degraded watersheds. In carbon schemes only non-government entities play a role as intermediaries, and 
never as buyer or provider. When services are bundled, then the intermediary, which for the three schemes 
analysed is a national government agency, always takes up the role of buyer. When comparing PES schemes 
and alternatively denominated schemes, no major differences are observed, although in the latter schemes 
governments act more as intermediaries, and intermediaries also operate more often as providers. The 
alternatively denominated schemes show thus more often a hierarchical structure.  
Table 3.15: The role of intermediaries per category 
  Non-Government 
intermediary 
Government intermediary Intermediary as 
  Financial Management Financial Management Buyer Provider 
 a I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch I C Ch 
User group size 
Small 3 1  4 4  1 1  1 1  1 1  0 0  
Medium 3 3  7 5  6 7  3 6  7 7  1 4  
Large 0 0  0 0  3 3  3 3  3 3  0 0  
Provider group 
size 
Small 1 0  1 1 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  
Medium 4 4  9 7 7 8  4 7  8 8  1 4  
Large 1 0 1 1 3 3  3 3  3 3  0 0  
ES 
Carbon 3 1  3 3  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  
Watershed 3 3  8 6  7 8  4 7  8 8  1 4  
Bundled 0 0  0 0  3 3  3 3  3 3  0 0  
Denomination 
PES 3 2 6 4  5 5  3 5  6 6  0 1  
Alternative 3 2  5 5  5 6  4 5  5 5  1 3  
a I: Initially; C: Currently; Ch: Change 
3.6. Discussion  
3.6.1. Overall change  
In line with Schomers and Matzdorf (2013), the schemes we analysed focus mostly on direct ES and are 
input-based. Over time there has been a strong increase in the use of command-based methods to organise 
users’ participation and set payment levels. From the providers’ side the initial, more market-oriented 
goevrnance, with voluntary participation and payments organised through bilateral agreements or set by the 
intermediary has remained. Governments were already an important actor, but their role has increased over 
time, not only from the users’ side, but also as management intermediaries, and in some cases even as 
providers. The schemes analysed thus rely even more on government involvement. Although more 
characteristics from a hierarchy are observed from the users’ side, and more characteristics of markets when 
analysing providers, additionally a wide variety of modes of governance are found back. Most schemes 
now have a more complex organisation compared to their initial design. Finally, those schemes using 
contractual arrangements with providers and those that implement ICDPs still do so today.   
Considering the ES, there have thus only been small changes in the low degree of commoditization. 
As measuring ES provision for users and of providers is costly, it is usually less expensive to focus on non-
commoditized ES and land uses, instead of on actual ES provision (Wunder, 2015). In addition, according 
to Engel et al. (2008), for providers it can be easier to focus on inputs as the level of ES provision can often 
not be perceived by them. Another reason for the continued focus on direct ES and input-based schemes is 
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the partial conservation orientation of most PES schemes. Schemes are often implemented (and managed) 
by conservation NGOs, and government departments with conservation goals. The main aim is to maintain 
or improve a specific land use (natural ecosystems), and not merely enhancing the provision of ES. As such 
also users continue to be linked with land uses through Direct ES, but normally not through ES Units.   
In line with Pirard et al. (2010), our analysis confirms that, over the long term neither markets nor 
governments alone can ensure financial sustainability of payments. Government budget allocation (and 
donations) is an indication that markets do not create enough funds to pay for ES provision. While 
negotiations with interested service users (businesses) can also be a way to improve financial sustainability 
(Engel et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008), it seems that Latin American  PES experiences are increasingly 
enhancing financial sustainability (and stability) through command-based participation and earmarked 
taxes/tariffs.  
Providers’ participation and payment level setting in the schemes analysed did not become more 
hierarchically organised. Although governments could use PES to finance protected areas (e.g. FAO, 2009) 
this is often not possible, due to legal restrictions and regulations on government financing.  
Finally intermediaries are involved in all schemes analysed, with the exception of one. This could 
be explained by the fact that intermediaries can decrease transaction costs by reducing the number of actors 
involved as it can be very costly when each user has to coordinate with the providers (Pirard et al., 2010; 
Vatn, 2015). As intermediaries in the analysed schemes are most often government, we can argue, following 
Vatn (2010), that PES are primary a reconfiguration of the role of public bodies who are transformed mostly 
in intermediaries or buyers.  
Additional explanations for the observed changes and differences of the schemes analysed can be 
found when analysing the schemes categorized according to group size, ES and denomination term used.  
 
3.6.2. Changes per class 
Group size 
Small group size: Although of the five schemes with a small group of users only three still remain (Gil 
Gonzalez, Esperanza, and Scolel Té schemes), it can be observed that they were more market-oriented, and 
that this hasn’t changed, except for NK-CAP. Small schemes also include two of the three schemes that 
focus on ES units, and one of the two remaining output-based schemes.  
Medium group size: As group size increases, command-based participation and direct participation of 
governments, and consequently the use of earmarked taxes and government budget allocation become more 
important. These mechanisms have strongly increased the use of command mechanisms since the initial 
stages. Furthermore, almost all schemes focus on direct ES, and are input-based.  
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Given their local scale, it can be relatively easy to identify users, but there are too many to negotiate 
how to link payments to ES units. In addition, according to Vatn (2015, 2010), if transaction costs are high 
using markets, a command system such as a tax may be preferable. So although in their initial stage some 
of the schemes did not rely on taxes, financial sustainability and lower transaction costs provide an 
explanation for the increased use of command-based approaches in the schemes analysed with medium-
sized user groups.  
Also from the providers’ side measuring ES on a large scale is not easily achieved, even when the 
relation between land use and ES is well understood. According to Kolinjivadi et al. (2014), as the number 
of land users that have an impact on ES provision increases, determining the provision of ES of individual 
land patches becomes increasingly difficult and costly. Thus focusing on input-based schemes is more 
economical from a measurement perspective. In the case of the Scolel Té scheme, ES measurement (and 
monitoring) is partially done by participating communities, decreasing the costs for the intermediary. 
Large group size: The national schemes analysed have focused on bundled ES since their implementation. 
These schemes have large groups of users and providers. They rely strongly on governments from the users’ 
side, but are more market-oriented from the providers’ side. Although ES are normally incorporated as 
indirect ES, while their provision is input-based.  
A large group makes linking users to specific ES more difficult. Moreover, when there is a large 
number of users, compulsory mechanisms for demand generation or government payments for provision 
will be necessary (Jack et al., 2008). However, the schemes have diversified the focal ES, and participation 
and users’ payment setting mechanisms. As these schemes focus on a large (and diverse) user group, it is 
possible to obtain additional funding by including more direct ES for specific users. As such these schemes 
use government budget allocation, earmarked tariffs for watershed services, and voluntary business 
participation for ES units among others.  
Although the large number of providers participate voluntarily, payments are not negotiated in 
these schemes, but set by the intermediary. Negotiating a price can be very costly when many providers 
participate. These high transaction costs influence payment setting, with intermediaries proposing the 
payment instead of using a market  (Ferraro, 2011). 
The schemes with small groups of actors remain more market-oriented (with the exception of NK-CAP), 
whereas schemes with medium-sized groups of users and providers evolved towards more hierarchical 
governance. The national schemes remain strongly government oriented.    
In addition to group size, also trust has an impact on transaction costs. If trust between actors is 
high, transaction costs can be decreased (Bromiley and Cummings, 1995). When trust is low, a hierarchy 
can reduce transaction costs compared to markets. Trust in providers (fear of exit) has been a key reason 
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for land purchases by the constituents of the water fund FORAGUA, as in the past some providers decided 
not to renew their contracts (Gordillo, 2013).  
Ecosystem services 
In addition, also ES have an impact on how schemes are organised.  
Carbon schemes: The ES for which commodities are most easily created are carbon services, as clear 
measurement protocols exist (Wunder et al., 2008). Moreover, carbon credits are sold internationally, and 
there is thus a long geographical distance between users and providers that tends to make the cost of 
bureaucracy (hierarchical organisation) extremely high (Muradian, 2013). As users (buyers) are found 
partially or totally outside of national boundaries within which schemes are implemented, there is no 
authority that is able to implement taxes/tariffs on this trans-boundary level, and payment levels with the 
few users are thus negotiated or offered at a specific price. However, from the providers’ side payments are 
not negotiated in the schemes analysed. Due to the international scale, negotiating payments with both users 
and providers can be very costly. Transaction costs can thus be lowered by setting the payments offered to 
providers. 
Watershed services: Most watershed schemes focus on direct ES without going further in the 
commoditization process. These schemes have seen a strong increase in command-based methods to 
organise users, while there is a diversity of mechanisms from the providers’ side. Some schemes (the water 
funds FONAG, FORAGUA and the Water Fund for Life and Sustainability) show a very strong hierarchical 
structure. In addition watershed schemes include most of the schemes that implement ICDPs. 
For watershed services it is possible to identify users, but quantification of the level of ES they use 
is normally not done as measuring these is costly. Also for the providers, even when a measurement 
methodology exists (through software such as INVEST or SWAT, Goldman et al., 2010; Quintero et al., 
2009), it can still be difficult for providers to actually manage land to obtain a certain level of ES (Engel et 
al., 2008). Focusing on inputs thus facilitates providers’ participation. In addition, according to Wunder 
(2013, p. 3), for land uses in watersheds “it could also be that water users choose to follow a precautionary 
principle of widely protecting the pre-existing land cover that has worked well in providing services in the 
past”.  
Furthermore, as it is possible to identify water users, they can be organised to pay for service 
provision (Engel et al., 2008). According to Farley and Costanza (2010), water infrastructure can facilitate 
the establishment of market-like payment schemes for ES by facilitating exchange. However, infrastructure 
can be used both to facilitate the identification of specific buyers, but also facilitates compulsory 
participation in most watershed schemes. When it is difficult to commoditize ES, governments can thus 
force their citizens to pay for their provision through an additional tax/tariff. According to Vatn (2015), 
compared to markets, this command-based system can greatly reduce transaction costs.  
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Intermediaries operate as providers in watershed services schemes through land purchases of 
deteriorated land. This can be an interesting option when paying a private landholder for restoration 
activities is more expensive. Land purchases could thus in some circumstances lower transaction (and 
production) costs, and therefore sometimes be a lower cost alternative to PES contracts (Wunder, 2005).  
The exception to the more hierarchical structure of watershed schemes (especially from the users’ side) is 
La Esperanza. In this scheme payment levels are set bilaterally, and ES units are used. Payments are 
calculated through a formula based on the water user’s ability to generate hydro-electrical power (Rojas 
and Aylward, 2002). An agreement that still continues to date. Here there is only one user-buyer and thus 
only one point where ES have to be measured (and only two actors to negotiate).  
Bundled services: These schemes rely mostly on government budget allocation (and an earmarked fuel tax 
for Costa Rica’s PSA) to organise users. In addition, these schemes can include specific payments for 
certain ES (in the cases analysed earmarked tariffs for watershed services). According to Engel et al. (2008), 
compulsory mechanisms or government payments will be required when incentives to free ride are high, as 
ES, such as water quality or biodiversity-related services, are often non-excludable (Wunder, 2015). 
Governments never participate as providers in the schemes analysed that focus on bundled services 
(national schemes), as financing and management of nationally protected areas is managed by different 
regulations than PES financing. 
Among the cases analysed water service schemes never evolve towards market governance. Most 
schemes have actually increased the use of command-based governance over time. Bundled services have 
seen an increased diversification in schemes, but these three national schemes are mostly organised by the 
state. The biggest change in the carbon schemes comes from the disappearance of carbon credits as a 
financing source in two of the schemes. Even when commoditization is possible, there exists a certain level 
of resistance against this concept, especially in South America. 
Denomination 
The alternatively denominated schemes show in general less market orientation than the schemes that use 
the PES term. This can partially be explained by the resistance against ES markets in the countries where 
these schemes were implemented. In Bolivia, the original NK-CAP sold carbon credits, but this 
commoditization actually lead to the disappearance of the scheme’s initial orientation. The Bolivian ‘Law 
of Mother Earth’ states that “All plans and programmes to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, will focus 
on the non-commoditization of the environmental functions of the components of Mother Earth, so it will 
not include funding mechanisms associated with carbon markets” (Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2012). In 
the case of Ecuador, it is the Constitution that puts limits to the sale of carbon credits, as it states that 
“Environmental services shall not be subject to appropriation; their production, delivery, use and 
development shall be regulated by the State”  (Art. 74 of the constitution, (Republic of Ecuador, 2008).  
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In addition, all ICDPs are implemented by those schemes analysed that do not use the PES term. 
As such the implementers of these schemes seem to agree with Wunder (2012) that implementing ICDPs 
should not be considered as PES. According to Kauffman (2013), in Ecuador ICDPs are used to overcome 
concerns about privatization and the commoditization of nature associated with PES schemes. In Bolivia it 
is the ‘Government Control Act’ that puts limits on many actions that could be included in PES, as it 
establishes that resources shall not be given directly to natural or juridical persons (Bryner et al., 2012).  
Overall, schemes that do not denominate themselves as PES have increased the use of command-
based governance and government involvement more than PES-denominated schemes.  
 
3.7. Conclusions 
Following Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1206) who consider that “a continuous classification is the most 
appropriate to describe the existing variety of PES schemes”, we used a multi-level framework based on 
market and command-based characteristics that was capable of incorporating the wide diversity of schemes 
implemented. The schemes analysed cover a range of hybrid arrangements going from small markets to 
almost complete hierarchical organisation. Over time schemes tend to incorporate command-based 
characteristics to organise users’ side, while voluntary contractual agreements with providers remain the 
core focus of the schemes. As such - within the existing land-use regulations - from the providers’ side in 
general a certain market orientation can be found back in the schemes analysed. From the users’ side we 
observed a diversification through the incorporation of a wide range of participation and payment setting 
mechanisms. Intermediaries are active in most schemes, with an increase in governments as intermediaries 
or as members of the intermediary body, and a decrease in the involvement of NGOs. Overall, since their 
initial implementation, schemes became more complex in their organisation, using a wider range of market 
and hierarchy mechanisms.  
The schemes analysed with small groups of users and/or providers incorporate more market 
characteristics, while as group size increases, more command-based characteristics are used. In this 
analysis, carbon services are normally organised through more market-oriented mechanisms, while for 
watershed services a broad diversity of governance forms can be found. Bundled services rely mostly on 
governments. The way the schemes analysed evolve is to a certain extent in line with what Wunder (2015) 
considers the key defining criterion of PES, namely addressing an environmental externality through a 
payment, that is voluntary for providers and with payments conditional on pre-agreed land uses. As such, 
the main factor that distinguishes PES schemes from schemes using an alternative denomination is the 
incorporation of ICDPs and intermediaries as providers in the latter. These schemes are in general more 
hierarchically organised and never incorporate commoditized ES.  
 
58 
 
Chapter 4: Analysis of the cost-effectiveness for ecosystem service provision 
and rural income generation: a comparison of three different programmes in 
Southern Ecuador 
Based on: Raes, L., Aguirre, N., D’Haese, M., Huylenbroeck, G.V., 2014. Analysis of the cost-effectiveness 
for ecosystem service provision and rural income generation: a comparison of three different programs in 
Southern Ecuador. Environ. Dev. Sustain. 16, 471–498. doi:10.1007/s10668-013-9489-2 
Abstract  
In recent years, new tools for funding nature conservation have been designed. Because poverty is often 
significant in areas with high biodiversity, the improvement of local livelihoods is frequently considered as 
a secondary goal of new financing mechanisms besides nature conservation. The buffer zone of the 
Podocarpus National Park in Ecuador is such a high biodiversity zone. In this chapter, we compare the cost-
effectiveness and development potential of three different mechanisms to finance nature conservation 
implemented in this buffer zone, namely (a) an organic coffee label, (b) the Socio Bosque Programme, a 
nationwide payment scheme for private forest conservation, and (c) FORAGUA, a regional water fund. 
This chapter describes the functioning and the scope of the mechanisms and analyses their environmental 
and socio-economic impacts which are compared to the total costs. Results show that the water fund has 
the highest additionality in ecosystem service provision, while the payment scheme is the most cost-
effective both for current as for increased ecosystem service provision and for extra rural job creation. 
Organic coffee certification has the highest positive impact on rural income creation. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Ecosystem services (ES) are benefits that people derive from nature. Some benefits are tangible, such as 
crop production, fish or fresh water, while others such as pollination, erosion control, climate regulation, 
and aesthetic and spiritual fulfilment are less tangible (MA, 2005b). Damage inflicted on the environment 
by man is reducing the ability of ecosystems to provide such tangible and intangible services for human 
populations (Chavas, 2009; MA, 2005b). Man’s impact on the environment is widely acknowledged and 
evidence exists to suggest that this may lead to a decrease in well-being in some areas. However, whether 
or not deterioration of the global biosphere might reduce collective well-being on a global scale and how 
this might occur is poorly understood (Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010). Yet, as suggested by, e.g., Rockström 
et al. (2009) and Norgaard (2010), future well-being may be at risk if the environment continues to degrade.  
One of the (many) institutional causes of ecosystem and ES degradation is that most (economic) 
decision makers have so far largely ignored the non-market benefits provided by nature (Farley, 2008). 
Markets normally favour the conversion of ecosystem structures to economic production, rather than 
conservation of ecosystems for the provision of ES, even when the non-monetary benefits of conservation 
are greater than the monetary benefits of conversion (Farley, 2008). Moreover, even when the conversion 
of ecological assets may be desirable, various forms of market failure (e.g., non-tangible benefits, public 
good nature of many ES, imperfect property rights) lead to more rapid depletion of natural capital than is 
socially optimal (Tietenberg, 2006). The concept of ES and an understanding of their presumed importance 
for human well-being (or inversely the potential impact of ES decline on well-being) has incited agents to 
design economic instruments for nature conservation that take ES into account. 
Two instruments that have increasingly been implemented in the last two decades for the promotion 
of ES conservation are eco-labelling (or eco-certification) of products and payments for environmental 
services (PES) schemes (Le Coq et al., 2011). Both PES and eco-labelling have attracted interest as 
mechanisms to translate the external, non-market value of the environment into real financial incentives for 
local actors to provide such services (Engel et al., 2008). According to Wunder (2006), both PES and eco-
labelling share two common characteristics: positive economic incentives and direct conservation 
orientation.  
Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1205) (supported by Vatn, 2010; and Farley and Costanza, 2010 among 
others) define PES schemes as ‘‘a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create 
incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the management 
of natural resources’’. PES programmes to secure ES provision, such as climate regulation through 
enhanced carbon dioxide fixation by forests, water quality provision through the maintenance of forest 
cover in critical watersheds, or species and genetic pool conservation through the protection of standing 
forests in key biodiversity hotspots, have been established in countries such as Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa 
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Rica, South Africa, and Indonesia (Corbera et al., 2009; Miranda et al., 2007; Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; 
Pagiola et al., 2005b; Pirard, 2012b; Rojas and Aylward, 2003; Turpie et al., 2008). 
The Global Ecolabelling Network (2012) defines an eco-label as ‘‘a label which identifies overall 
environmental preference of a product or service within a specific product/service category, based on life 
cycle considerations’’. An eco-label serves to differentiate the product from other products and to assure 
consumers that a product is produced in accordance with specific standards (Boström and Klintman, 2006; 
Jordan et al., 2005). Eco-labelling is a way to increase financial incentives for the provision of public goods. 
Hence, a labelled product is a private good sold on the market, but bundled with a jointly produced public 
good (Ferraro et al., 2005). The best-known example of such labelling is organic certification. 
Not all authors consider PES and labelling to be different instruments. According to some 
classifications specific PES tools include direct public payments, direct private payments, tax incentives, 
cap and trade markets, voluntary markets, as well as labelling programmes (FAO, 2012; Scherr et al., 2006). 
In this chapter, it is assumed that the difference is based on a payment per unit of land for specific 
management activities for PES, while eco-labelling is based on a payment per unit of product produced 
under specific practices. Eco-labels are subject to commodity chain governance, whereas PES mechanisms 
are based on territorial governance (Le Coq et al., 2011).  
One particular question is whether PES and eco-labelling also address equity issues in terms of the 
distribution of conservation costs and benefits. The conversion of natural resources benefits those who 
convert the resource, whereas the costs are shared by the rest of the world (Farley, 2008). The benefits of 
conservation are often widely dispersed and enjoyed to a large extent by non-local (often wealthier) users, 
while the costs of conservation are mainly borne by local authorities and local communities (Balmford and 
Whitten, 2003; GEF, 2006; Hein et al., 2006; Kremen et al., 2000). The main sources of local costs are 
those incurred due to restricted access to the resources in question, local opportunity costs of conservation, 
and costs due to wildlife damage (Gadd, 2005; Ghimire et al., 1997; Naughton-Treves et al., 2003; 
Newmark et al., 1993; Ninan et al., 2007; Schaafsma et al., 2011; Vedeld et al., 2007). 
Payments for environmental services (PES) and eco-labelling have the potential to redistribute the 
costs by providing income for nature conservation. Nonetheless, Pagiola et al. (2005b) emphasize that PES 
is not intended to be a mechanism for poverty reduction, although it is expected to have some impact on 
this issue. Because low-income households and communities throughout the developing world live in many 
of the most biodiverse and threatened lands, they potentially stand to gain from PES and eco-labelling 
(Milder et al., 2010; Molnar et al., 2004). 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the cost-effectiveness of PES and eco-labelling in delivering 
ES provision and in contributing to rural income creation. The chapter provides empirical evidence on the 
theoretical framework developed by Le Coq et al. (2011), who give an overview of the differences and 
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similarities between PES and eco-labelling. Ferraro and Simpson (2002) demonstrated that direct payments 
for ecosystem protection can be more cost-effective than promoting commercial activities that generate 
ecosystem protection indirectly. By comparing conservation contracts with organic certification and with 
land sales, this chapter also adds to the work of Clements et al. (2010) who compared community-based 
ecotourism, wildlife friendly products, and direct contracts for bird nest protection in Cambodia. The ES 
considered here are hydrological services, carbon stocking and sequestration, and biodiversity. In addition, 
the suitability of the different land uses in terms of connectivity is analysed. Rural income creation is 
assessed by the impact of PES and eco-labelling on household income, inclusion of smallholders, and job 
creation. 
The next section outlines our methodology. Section 4.3 describes the results of the different 
indicators for ES and rural livelihoods. Section 4.4 measures the costs of the mechanisms. Section 4.5 
studies the cost-effectiveness, the distribution of the costs and the origin of the revenues for the different 
mechanisms, and Section 4.6 provides some conclusions. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
4.2.1. Research area 
This research took place in the area surrounding Podocarpus National Park in the province of Loja in 
Ecuador (Figures. 4.1 and 4.2). This national park lies in the southern part of the Ecuadorian Andes and 
extends over 146,280 hectares of mainly mountain forests and several thousand hectares of Andean tundra 
ecosystem, páramo (Keating, 2000). Podocarpus National Park is part of the El Condor-Podocarpus 
Biosphere Reserve, which has one of the richest ecosystems on earth (Josse, 2001; Mutke and Barthlott, 
2005), and hence, its conservation should be a priority (Myers et al., 2000). 
The rationale behind focusing on the buffer zone of a national park is that protected areas constantly 
interact with their surroundings. Hence, within protected areas, the destiny of biodiversity is intricately 
linked to the wider landscape (Wallace et al., 2003). Landscapes located near to protected areas or within 
key biological corridors represent the areas where integration is most likely to be successful, because in 
these locations there is an overlap between conservation and rural development priorities (Harvey et al., 
2008). According to TEEB (2010b), people in buffer zones of protected areas should have secure incomes 
from environmentally friendly resource use to support conservation. 
 
4.2.2. PES and eco-labelling schemes 
Three different mechanisms for financing the provision of ES were identified within the study area. The 
implementation and management of the mechanisms are undertaken on a regional/national level. The 
mechanisms are all managed from offices in the city of Loja, but are implemented in different municipalities 
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and provinces within the Southern Region of Ecuador, which comprises the provinces of El Oro, Loja, and 
Zamora Chinchipe (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1: Implementation of the PES and eco-labelling schemes in the Southern Region of Ecuador 
(Source: Cevallos and Raes) 
 
Three projects are studied: one is an eco-labelling programme for coffee developed by the Agro-artisanal 
Association of Ecological Producers of Specialty Coffee from Loja (APECAEL). The PES schemes 
considered are Socio Bosque and FORAGUA. These comprise, respectively, a land conservation 
programme and a regional water fund that invests in land conservation. 
The members of APECAEL produce coffee in accordance with the principles of organic agriculture 
and they practice agroforestry. APECAEL is a member of the regional coffee-growers umbrella 
organisation FAPECAFES. FAPECAFES incorporates seven coffee-growers’ associations, with a total of 
2,000 members. APECAEL has 120 members, 43 of which have farms located within the buffer zone. So 
far only 37 farmers in the buffer zone have commercialized their coffee through FAPECAFES (Table 4.1). 
FAPECAFES has its own standards for organic production, but some of its members already have organic 
certification. APECAEL is currently in the process of obtaining international organic certification. The 
coffee farms of APECAEL members produce polyculture-shade-grown organic coffee. 
The Socio Bosque Programme is a state-funded, nationwide programme that at the time of this 
research provided participants with a financial reward for every hectare of land they conserve under the 
programme. Individuals receive US$ 30/ha annually for the first 20 ha enrolled in the programme. This 
amount reduces gradually to US$ 0.50/ha for land included in excess of 10,000 ha. For communities, it 
starts at US$ 35/ha for the first 100 ha and gradually reduces to US$ 0.70/ha for land exceeding 10,000 ha 
(the payment amount has since changed, see Chapter 5). Contracts last for a period of 20 years. If 
conservation is suspended before the expiry of this period, then the money received has to be repaid (for 
more information see de Koning et al., 2011, and Annex 1). In the Southern Region of Ecuador, 30,450 ha 
is conserved through 295 individual and six communal agreements. The participants jointly receive US$ 
607,411 per annum. Within the Municipality of Loja, 2,450 ha is conserved by 17 individuals (Table 4.1). 
Among them, eight participants have their property within the study area; this constitutes seven individuals 
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and one property that is part of a nature reserve (Figure 4.2). Socio Bosque describes itself as a system of 
compensation for ES as opposed to a PES scheme. Their reasoning is that payments are not based on the 
opportunity costs of the land, but on an equal payment per hectare for all participants, and therefore, they 
should not be considered a PES scheme (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2010). However, as ES 
provision is used to prioritize areas for programme implementation and as this is linked to a financial 
transfer, it still falls within the broader range of PES schemes. 
FORAGUA, the Regional Water Fund established in 2009, uses the revenue from an extra charge 
on the water tariff to purchase land in the watersheds that supply water for the municipalities in the Southern 
Region of Ecuador. The land purchased is then transferred to the municipality, and it becomes part of the 
municipal reserves. Currently, seven municipalities participate in the fund, with annual revenues of around 
US$ 500,000, covering over 33,000 ha of municipal reserves. In the municipality of Loja, US$ 350,000 is 
collected annually. EMAAL-EP, the municipal water company, ultimately decides how the money is to be 
spent, with approval by FORAGUA and the Municipal council. EMAAL-EP is also responsible for 
management of the protected areas, after the land purchase (Annex 2). Currently, 4,856 ha of land (52 % 
of the watersheds) is protected within the municipality of Loja. Of this area, 1,645 ha lies within the study 
area (Figure 4.2, Table 4.1). The concept of ES is used here as the rationale behind an increase in the water 
tariff for consumers of potable water. This is a payment by ES users to secure and improve the provision 
of hydrological ecosystem services, and could thus be considered a PES-like scheme (see also Chapter 3). 
The organic coffee project is implemented by a NGO, the Socio Bosque Programme by the national 
government, and FORAGUA by a NGO in conjunction with the municipal authorities. 
Table 4.1: Participants and area for the cases in the Municipality of Loja and area within the buffer zone 
 APECAEL –  
Coffee label 
Socio Bosque FORAGUA 
(EMAAL-EP) 
N° of participants in the municipal area of Loja 74 (120a) 17 1 
N° of participants in research area 37 (43a) 8 1 
Hectares in the municipal area of Loja 93 2,450 4,856 
Hectares in the buffer zone 51 991b (1,641b) 831 (1,565c) 
a According to FAPECAFES, APECAEL has 120 members, 43 of which are within the buffer zone. In 2010 and 2011 only 74 of 
the coffee producers of APECAEL, 37 in the buffer zone, sold coffee through FAPECAFES. 
b Given that there is a continuous interaction between a national park and its surroundings, i.e. a national park is not an area 
separated from the land it borders (DeFries et al., 2010; Hansen et al., 2011), we do include land incorporated in Socio Bosque that 
lies within the National Park that was privately owned before the park’s establishment. However, the area within the Park is not 
additional in terms of ES provision (see Table 4.3), but as a compensation mechanism for the earlier establishment of the park will 
have an economic impact on the (previous) owners of this land (see Table 4.5).  
b Total Socio Bosque area is 1,641 ha, but 650 ha are part of a privately owned reserve “El Bosque”. It forms part of the national 
system of protected areas and so differs from the rest of the land incorporated into the programme. Furthermore, its additionality 
would be zero, based on the criteria we used here. 
c The watershed of Pizarro (734 ha) is also a protected watershed, but since 1993 and so not through FORAGUA. In this chapter 
only the watershed of El Carmen is considered (total area: 912 ha, with 88 ha still to be purchased). 
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Figure 4.2: Study area and location of the PES and eco-labelling schemes (Source: Cevallos and 
Raes with data from Ministry of the Environment of Ecuador, 2013; GLM, 2013; SENPLADES, 2013; 
IGM , 2013) 
 
4.2.3. Research framework 
Two indicators for ES provision are used. The first indicator is the ecosystem service index (ESI) developed 
by the World Bank (Pagiola et al., 2007). The ESI was calculated based on the opinion of experts who 
ranked the various ES provided by different land uses. However, for the ESI indicator, only additional ES 
directly related to the programme are considered. Because the ESI does not distinguish between the 
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previous and the new conservation status of the land and does not indicate whether regeneration is taking 
place, a second indicator was developed, namely the increased conservation and ecosystem regeneration 
indicator (ICERI). This indicator comprises two parts. First, the increased conservation indicator captures 
how much protected area is created through the different mechanisms. Second, the ecosystem regeneration 
indicator accords one point to land that is in the process of regeneration and zero to an already existing 
mature habitat. 
Rural income creation is measured by the impacts of the programmes on both household income 
and the extra jobs created. These indicators were quantified using field data from survey results. 
The cost-effectiveness of the three mechanisms is calculated by taking into account the different 
indicators, the cost estimates, as well as the distribution of the costs between the different actors. Finally, 
the different sources of funding for the programmes are analysed. The research framework is illustrated in 
Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Research framework 
4.2.4. Data collection 
Although in most cases it is possible to list which services an ecosystem produces, it is difficult to quantify 
the level of service provision (Brauman et al., 2007). Few studies exist that quantify the ES provision by 
the different ecosystems within the study area. As indicated above, in this chapter, we followed the World 
Bank’s ESI methodology used for quantifying the ES provided by a silvopastoral project in Nicaragua 
(Pagiola et al., 2007). Experts were contacted and requested to assign points to the ES provided by different 
land uses. Under the ESI methodology developed to assess the Nicaragua project, indices for biodiversity 
conservation and carbon sequestration are aggregated. The biodiversity conservation index is normalized 
and results in a scale from the most biodiversity-poor land uses (zero) to the most biodiversity-rich land 
uses (one). Similarly, the carbon sequestration index assigns points to different land uses according to their 
capacity to sequester carbon. In this study, the ES taken into account are hydrological services (mainly 
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watershed services), erosion control, carbon stock, carbon sequestration, biodiversity, and connectivity. A 
panel of 15 experts19 was asked to assign points to each ES provided by the different land uses, on a scale 
from zero to one. The points for each ES provided were summed by specific land use. Only additional ES 
were taken into account. Of the total ESI for each programme, the ESI for land that was already conserved, 
but that is now incorporated into the programme, is subtracted from the total ESI, as well as the ESI for the 
alternative land uses for the newly incorporated land not previously protected (Table 4.3). 
To gain additional insights into the improved provision of ES and the increase in the conservation 
area, maps with the different ecosystems found in the FORAGUA watershed and surveys on the state of 
the forest conserved under Socio Bosque were used. These data were used to calculate the increased 
conservation and ecosystem regeneration indicator (ICERI). 
Landowners were surveyed from August 2011 until January 2012 in five parishes of the 
municipality of Loja. Respondents were selected on the basis of owning land inside the buffer zone and 
being involved in one of the three programmes investigated. In total, 43 landowners were interviewed, 
including 37 coffee farmers, and seven participants of Socio Bosque20. In addition, data from 27 non-
organic coffee farmers were used to analyse differences between organic and non-organic coffee farmers. 
As one of the aims of this chapter is to measure the impact that the mechanisms have on rural 
households, measuring household income and land productivity was crucial. Household income was 
computed by adding the income the respondents said they received from different sources (net income from 
agricultural, forest, and dairy production; livestock sales; and off-farm income). Farm production consumed 
by the household was valued using farm-gate prices. Using these data, the household income and 
participation indicator (HIPI) was developed. Data on additional labour input costs for coffee and additional 
hired labour for the other programmes were used to obtain the extra rural work indicator (ERWI). 
In-depth interviews were undertaken with five key individuals from FORAGUA (including people 
from the NGO Nature and Culture International), three informants from FAPECAFES, three informants 
from Socio Bosque, and three informants from Colinas Verdes (a local NGO working with APECAEL). 
The aim of these interviews was to gain additional insight into the mechanism design and to obtain data on 
start-up, management, and transaction costs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 A contact list of people working on ES in Ecuador was developed. It comprised 25 researchers from Ecuadorian 
universities and project managers working for NGOs and the government. Of the 25 researchers contacted, 10 
completed the ESI individually and five did it together. 
20 One coffee producer also participates in the Socio Bosque Programme. 
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4.3. Indicators of ecosystem service provision and rural income generation 
4.3.1. Ecosystem services provided 
As indicated above, the ES considered in the study are hydrological services, erosion control, carbon 
services, biodiversity, and connectivity. Hydrological services include improvements to water supply, 
mitigation of water damage, provision of water-related cultural services, and water-associated supporting 
services (Brauman et al., 2007). By protecting soils from wind and water erosion, forest ecosystems provide 
a soil erosion control service—one of the fundamental ES that could potentially contribute to well-being 
(Fu et al., 2011). Carbon stock and carbon sequestration are the two categories of ES provided by forests 
that can help to reduce atmospheric carbon (Montagnini and Nair, 2004). FAO (2004) defines a carbon 
stock as the quantity of carbon contained in a reservoir or system. Carbon sequestration refers to the process 
of removing gaseous carbon from the atmosphere and fixing it in soil or woody material on land. While 
carbon stocks are regarded as having the greatest potential for rapid mitigation of climate change, carbon 
sequestration takes place over a much longer period of time (Montagnini and Nair, 2004). Biodiversity 
provides both direct (provisioning, regulating, and cultural) and indirect (supporting) ES (Loreau and 
Hector, 2001; MA, 2005b; Naeem et al., 1994). The Podocarpus cloud forest has been identified as one of 
the most species-rich forest ecosystems in the world. The forests in this area are believed to contain the 
highest number of plant species of all the world’s tropical forests (CI, 1997). Finally, connectivity is not an 
ES, but habitat fragmentation is widely recognized as a major threat to biodiversity (Bennett et al., 2006; 
Gardner et al., 2009; Yerena et al., 2003). This implies that in a homogenous landscape, land uses that tend 
to improve connectivity are of importance in a buffer zone (Philpott et al., 2008). 
The literature concludes that mature forests will provide the highest values for hydrological 
services, biodiversity conservation, connectivity, and carbon stocks (Beck and Richter, 2008; Bruijnzeel, 
2004; Castelle and Johnson, 2000; Fehse et al., 2002; Harvey et al., 2006; Kessler and Kluge, 2008; Pan et 
al., 2011; Restrepo and Alvarez, 2006; Roa-García et al., 2011). It is generally such mature forests that are 
conserved through Socio Bosque and through some of the land purchased by FORAGUA (Table 4.3). 
Forest regeneration can help to re-establish the provision of some ES and will provide the highest 
carbon sequestration service (Bathurst et al., 2010; Chandler, 2006; Günter et al., 2009; Hernández-
Hernández et al., 2008; Olschewski and Benítez, 2005; Preece et al., 2012; Rhoades et al., 2000). Recently 
established forests are found on the land purchased by FORAGUA and some of the forests conserved under 
Socio Bosque (Table 4.3). 
Agroforestry systems, such as shade-grown coffee, can also provide important ES that resemble 
those provided by forests, including biodiversity, carbon sequestration, prevention of soil erosion and 
aquifer recharge (Blackman et al., 2007; Gómez-Delgado et al., 2011; Harvey et al., 2005; Harvey and 
Villalobos, 2007; Heidkamp et al., 2008; Philpott et al., 2008; Philpott and Bichier, 2012; Ponette-González 
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et al., 2010; Siles et al., 2010; Soto-Pinto et al., 2010). Nevertheless, these systems typically provide lower 
levels of ES compared to native forests (Ávalos-Sartorio and Blackman, 2010; Rappole et al., 2003). 
Ecosystem service index 
The average value of the rankings provided by the experts for ES provision by the different land uses is 
shown in Table 4.2 (Supplementary Table 5.1 provides an overview of the standard deviation of the 
rankings). The ESI estimation shows that experts believe that primary forests and páramo provide more ES 
compared to the other land uses. 
Table 4.2: Ecosystem Service Indicator (ESI) 
Ecosystem Hydrological 
Index 
Erosion 
Control 
 Index 
Carbon 
Stock 
Index 
Carbon 
Sequestration 
Index 
Biodiversity 
Index 
Connectivity 
Index 
Ecosystem 
Service 
Indicator 
Primary forest 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 1.0 1.0 5.2 
Páramo 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 1.0 1.0 5.2 
Mature 
secondary 
forest 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.8 4.6 
Young 
secondary 
forest 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.7 4.3 
Forestry 
plantation 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.6 3.3 
Organic coffee 
system 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.2 
Abandoned 
pasture  0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 2.2 
Unmanaged 
pine/eucalyptus 
plantation  0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.7 
Conventional 
coffee 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.7 
Pasturea 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 
Annual cropsa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
a Added for comparison 
To gain an overview of the quantity of ES provided by the different land uses in the buffer zone, the ESI 
should be multiplied by the number of hectares covered by each mechanism in Table 4.3. However, this 
figure does not provide insights into the additionality of the programme. For this, the ES provided by 
previously protected land has to be deducted from the ES provided by the total land area for each 
programme. This mainly constitutes land that lies within the Podocarpus National Park, as is the case with 
Socio Bosque, and land that was already owned by the municipality before the implementation of 
FORAGUA (see Figure 4.2). 
Socio Bosque works in part as a compensation mechanism for landowners who bought land in what 
is now the Podocarpus National Park prior to its establishment. Of the 991 ha analysed, 498 ha lies within 
the boundaries of the national park and so the ES provided by this land will be deducted from the total ESI. 
In the case of FORAGUA, 383 ha was already in the possession of the municipality. 
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The ES from the alternative land use also have to be deducted to obtain the indicator for additional 
ES. The alternative land use was obtained by asking Socio Bosque participants for what purpose they 
originally bought their land. In the case of FORAGUA, this is based on their previous use, while for organic 
coffee, it is conventional coffee production. For Socio Bosque, 85 ha is part of a private nature reserve, 
although this is not officially recognized as such, while another 100 ha is used for beekeeping. These 185 
ha would remain forest under the alternative land-use scenario without the programme. From the remaining 
307 ha of Socio Bosque land area, 93 ha would originally have been used for sustainable forestry. The 
remainder of the area could have been converted to pasture (Table 4.3). FORAGUA accounts for 448 ha of 
land which have been newly incorporated into the programme. This land was previously included within 
dairy farms. For coffee, the ESI looks at the additional ES provided by organic coffee versus conventional 
coffee. 
Table 4.3: ESI for the different land uses 
 Coffee label  Socio Bosque  FORAGUA  ESI/ha 
Primary forest (ha) 0 763 296 5.2 
Páramo (ha) 0 0 78 5.2 
Mature secondary forest (ha) 0 182 26 4.6 
Young secondary forest (ha) 0 20 302 4.3 
Unmanaged pine/eucalyptus plantation (ha) 0 25 0 2.7 
Organic coffee system (ha) 51 0 0 3.2 
Abandoned pasture (ha) 0 0 129 2.2 
ESI*ha 163 4,958 3,647  
 ES of land conserved prior to the programme 
Primary forest (ha) 0 498 111 5.2 
Páramo (ha) 0 0 63 5.2 
Young secondary forest (ha) 0 0 206 4.3 
Abandoned pasture (ha) 0 0 3 2.2 
ESI*ha conserved earlier 0 2,590 1,797  
ESI*ha additional land 163 2,369 1,850  
 Non-additional ES of the alternative land-uses 
Primary forest (ha)  185  5.2 
Conventional coffee (ha) 51   1.7 
Pasture (ha)  214 448 0.6 
Forestry plantation (ha)  93  3.3 
ESI*ha alternative land-uses 87 1,397 269  
 Additional ES of the land area 
Additional Total ESI  76 971 1,581  
Additional ESI/ha 1.5 1.0 1.9  
 
As the programme purchases land from dairy farmers to incorporate it within a municipal protected area, 
FORAGUA has the highest additional ESI in total and per hectare. The eco-label provides the lowest total 
ESI, due to a smaller land area. The lowest additional ESI per hectare is for Socio Bosque, as the programme 
incorporates a large area of forest that was already conserved within the national park, as well as forest that 
would not have been converted under the alternative scenario without the programme. As such, the ESI 
shows current ES provision. It does not take into account increased provision of ES in the future, nor the 
change in the legal status of the land. For this, a second indicator is used. 
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Increased conservation and ecosystem regeneration indicator (ICERI) 
The ICERI comprises two parts, namely protected/conserved area increase and area under regeneration. 
The increased conservation indicator has a score of one for each hectare that is declared a new 
reserve, as in the case of the El Carmen watershed where land is purchased by FORAGUA. The Socio 
Bosque compensation for previously established protected area does not increase the total area under 
conservation. The other land under Socio Bosque is currently only protected for the duration of the contract. 
A value of 0.5 is assigned to each of these hectares conserved under the programme. The area under organic 
coffee does not add any land to the area under conservation and so receives a score of zero, just as the land 
that lies within the national park and land that was already owned by the municipality. 
The regeneration indicator gives a value of one to each hectare that is being regenerated and zero 
to already mature ecosystems. One of the differences between Socio Bosque and FORAGUA is that the 
former focuses on existing forest, while the latter scheme purchases degraded land for regeneration and 
reforestation. Hence, FORAGUA has a higher proportion of young forest and land in regeneration within 
the municipal reserve. In the new organic coffee production systems, no pesticides are used and trees are 
planted. Yet because it is a productive system, full regeneration is not possible. Based on the calculated 
biodiversity index, organic coffee has been given a value of 0.5/ha for the regeneration indicator (Table 
4.4). 
The ICERI is the sum of the ecosystem regeneration indicator and the increased conservation 
indicator. 
Table 4.4: Increased Conservation and Ecosystem Regeneration Indicator (ICERI) 
 Total 
Area 
(ha) 
Increased 
Conservation 
Indicator 
Mature 
Habitat 
(ha) 
Land in 
Regeneration 
(ha) 
Organic 
coffee (ha) 
Ecosystem 
Regeneration 
Indicator  
ICERI ICERI/ha 
Coffee label  51 0 0 0 51 26 26 0.50 
Socio Bosque 991 246 946 45 0 45 291 0.29 
FORAGUA 831 448 400 431 0 431 879 1.06 
 
FORAGUA has the highest score for the ICERI, both in total and per hectare. The low score for Socio 
Bosque actually reflects the dual aim of the programme, namely to conserve existing forest as well as to 
compensate landowners who lost access to part of their land when the national park was created. The fact 
that the main aim of the organic coffee system is production, albeit with a conservation aspect, is reflected 
in its lower score. 
 
4.3.2. Socio-economic impact of the different mechanisms 
Household income and participation indicator (HIPI) 
The different mechanisms aim not only to finance nature conservation, but also to improve rural livelihoods. 
This is particularly so for the coffee project, which is aimed specifically at the improvement of 
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smallholders’ livelihoods. Although to a lesser extent, Socio Bosque also seeks to contribute to rural 
development as it incorporates a poverty alleviation component. The direct effects of the two projects are 
the additional income received by the participants through the mechanisms employed and the extent to 
which smallholders can participate. 
Coffee label. The mean land area for coffee producers in the buffer zone is 12 ha: cropland (2 ha), pasture 
(5 ha), and forest (5 ha). Households receive a mean income of US$ 609/year for coffee sold through 
FAPECAFES and a mean income of US$ 147/year for coffee sold to intermediaries. Apart from coffee 
production, farmers will diversify their agricultural production into other crops, either for consumption or 
for sale. Farmers produce a wide variety of crops ranging from lime and corn, mainly for subsistence, to 
passion fruit which they sell. Animal production includes chickens, eggs, and guinea pigs for subsistence 
as well as cattle and dairy products for sale. Pigs are kept both for subsistence and for sale. Mean non-
coffee household farm income is US$ 1,978/year. An important proportion of the coffee producer 
households’ income is generated off-farm21, with a mean income of US$ 3,262/year22.  
To calculate the additional income generated through eco-labelling, the profit farmers would make 
if they sold all their coffee as non-certified to an intermediary is subtracted from the profit they actually 
make23. The total additional profit generated by the 51 ha of certified coffee for the 37 households included 
in the programme is estimated at US$ 7,408 or US$ 146/ha per year. 
Socio Bosque. Participants of Socio Bosque tend to have more diverse, and highly variable, income patterns 
compared to the coffee producers. Their household incomes range from a minimum of US$ 2,951 to over 
US$ 25,000 per year. The contribution of the programme payments to the household income varies from 
less than 10 percent to more than 70 percent for one of the participants. The total profit generated through 
participation in Socio Bosque for the seven households in the study area is US$ 13,170 or US$ 13/ha per 
year. 
FORAGUA. The eight households that sold land to FORAGUA were already living outside the study area 
or moved when selling their land. Most of them currently live in Loja city. This implies that although it 
may have been profitable for the landowners to sell their land through FORAGUA, this income did not 
remain within the study area, and so the multiplier effects of the income on rural income are zero. 
The overall additional profit for the participants in Socio Bosque is greater, while on a per hectare 
basis, the greatest profit is generated through the organic coffee programme. It should, however, be noted 
that the benefits from the eco-labelling depend on world market prices and will only last as long as coffee 
is produced. The benefits from the Socio Bosque Programme will last for the duration of the project, namely 
                                                          
21 Off-farm income was calculated based on INEC (2012b) 
22 Standard deviations: income coffee association: 662; income coffee intermediary: 343; non-coffee household farm 
income: 2,222; households’ off-farm income: 4,417. 
23 Total current profit coffee: US$ 26,605; total coffee profit selling the total harvest to intermediaries: US$ 19,197. 
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20 years. Moreover, using profit per hectare as an indicator does not show the number of people in receipt 
of this profit, or whether smallholders have the opportunity to participate. The correction factor for inclusion 
used here is the number of families that participate per hectare of land under the mechanism. For the coffee 
system, this is 0.73 families/ha, and for Socio Bosque, this is 0.007 families/ha24. An overview of the value 
of the indicator for the different mechanisms is given in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Household Income and Participation Indicator (HIPI) 
 Profit US$/ha for 
participants 
Participation Correction 
Factor 
HIPI/ha 
Coffee label  146 0.73 106.58 
Socio Bosque 13 0.007 0.09 
FORAGUA 0 0 0 
 
The coffee production system clearly has the highest impact on rural income creation. This confirms that 
diverse agro-ecosystems can provide alternatives and more sustainable livelihoods for families (Blackman 
et al., 2003). Nonetheless, as the poor have limited endowments and poor access to key production factors, 
additional income from eco-labels is limited by the low level of coffee production due to restricted land 
access and/or production intensity (Le Coq et al., 2011; Valkila, 2009). While PES schemes are often not 
designed to include poverty alleviation strategies, they can contribute to more sustainable livelihoods 
through the provision of cash or in-kind benefits to participants (Pagiola et al., 2005b; Pagiola and Platais, 
2002). However, payments received by smallholders in PES schemes (particularly in areas such as the study 
area) are limited due to the relatively small landholdings and the low level of payments (Le Coq et al., 
2011). This can be observed in Socio Bosque, where a minimum amount of forest area is needed to make 
participation profitable. This explains why the difference between the coffee label and Socio Bosque is 
even greater when a correction is made for participation. A further difference is that to participate in Socio 
Bosque, one has to own the land. This is not a prerequisite in the coffee growing system, where renting land 
offers an alternative way to participate. Yet, given that, at the time of research, participants in the buffer 
zone only rent land for raising cattle and not for coffee, the property rights issue has not been taken into 
account in the indicator. 
Extra rural work indicator (ERWI) 
Indirect effects of the programmes are the additional jobs created within the study area. This includes the 
people employed by the participants, or by the programme itself, but inside the buffer zone. This does not 
include jobs created for those who work for the administration of the different programmes. Hence, a second 
indicator for rural income creation is the labour that is generated inside the study area. For organic coffee, 
this is the increased use of wage labour for weeding. To obtain the proxy for additional labour, the average 
labour cost per hectare for weeding on non-organic farms (US$ 89/ha) was subtracted from the individual 
                                                          
24 For coffee 37 families use 51 ha of land; for Socio Bosque seven families use 991 ha of land. 
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cost per hectare for the organic farmers25. In Socio Bosque, two participants pay someone to protect the 
forest. In the case of FORAGUA, one person is hired to protect the watershed against trespassers and fire 
(Table 4.6). 
The coffee label has the highest value for this indicator, as organic coffee seems to require a great 
deal of additional labour. 
Table 4.6: Extra Rural Work Indicator (ERWI) 
 Total US$ paid for work in 
buffer zone 
US$/ha paid for work ERWI/ha 
Coffee label  10,747 297 297 
Socio Bosque  3,474 3.5 3.5 
FORAGUA 3,598 4 4 
 
4.4. Costs of conservation actions 
In this section, we differentiate between several types of costs that were incurred during the design and 
implementation of the project. On the one hand, costs are necessarily incurred to (1) design and decide on 
specific conservation actions and (2) implement the agreed conservation actions, such as the financial cost 
of land purchase and land management. On the other hand, setting land aside for conservation or restricting 
specific activities invariably incurs opportunity costs for forgone production (Carwardine et al., 2008; 
Frazee et al., 2003). Hence, based on Wunder et al. (2008), the costs considered in this study are (a) start-
up costs, (b) recurrent costs (management and additional production costs; and ongoing transaction costs), 
and (c) opportunity costs. 
 The conservation costs are assessed to estimate the cost of supplying a range of ES on a per 
hectare basis. To quantify the cost of conserving rainforest or of implementing an agroforestry system, a 
cost analysis is based on a simple calculation of the current value of the costs. Costs incurred during 
previous years were compounded to 2011 values using the Ecuadorian annual inflation rate (IMF, 2011). 
Costs are based on the costs reported by several NGOs and by the different administrations. Costs for Socio 
Bosque and FORAGUA are often given/published as aggregates at regional or national level. To obtain 
cost estimates for the buffer zone for these two programmes, average costs per hectare were calculated, and 
these were then multiplied by the size of the area inside the buffer zone. One should note that although the 
procedure we followed implies that costs are probably not fully accurate, a per hectare estimate is more 
reliable than an estimate per participant, as costs differ according to the size of the different properties, at 
least for the FORAGUA and Socio Bosque Programme. The cost estimation for the coffee programme was 
based on the cost per participant as most start-up costs were based on a specific number of households 
                                                          
25 The difference between weeding costs for both groups is significant at the 1 % level (p value is 0.000 with 
Independent samples Mann–Whitney test).  
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participating in the project, independent of the size of their land, while recurrent costs were based on the 
costs per bag of coffee26. 
 
4.4.1. Start-up costs 
In this study, start-up costs are all costs that have been incurred to set up the different programmes. These 
costs are reported in financial statements of the conservation projects. They also include costs incurred to 
obtain the necessary information to establish the mechanisms, as well as the costs participants incur in 
fulfilling all the requirements necessary to participate in a programme. 
Coffee label. Although coffee has been produced in the region for a long time, many coffee-growers 
abandoned their plantations after the collapse of world coffee prices in the nineties. One of the strategies to 
generate a more sustainable income from coffee has been the establishment of organic and/or specialty 
coffee brands and coffee producer associations. In Loja, this was done through a local NGO, Colinas 
Verdes, with financial aid from GTZ, CORPEI, CORECAF, and Manos Unidas. The first project ran from 
2003 to 2005, and the second from 2009 to 2011. The aim of the projects was to establish a coffee 
association, install post-harvest infrastructure, renew the coffee plantations, and establish organic 
production systems27. The cost of the time spent applying for funding and the donors’ monitoring costs 
were not taken into account. Given that the infrastructure for coffee was donated, these costs are included 
as start-up costs and not as annual amortization under recurrent costs. 
Socio Bosque. This programme started paying incentives from 2009 onwards. The political costs for 
negotiating the establishment of Socio Bosque were difficult to quantify and have not been taken into 
account. As a proxy for start-up costs, the reported costs of the programme for the year 2008 were used, as 
well as annual costs for the diffusion of the incentive mechanisms on a national and regional level, and the 
administrative costs of incorporating land both for the secretariat and for the participants. 
FORAGUA. The initial idea to establish FORAGUA dates back to 2006. It officially started operating in 
2009. In this study, only cost data for setting up FORAGUA in the Municipality of Loja are included. These 
are the costs for establishing the secretariat, as outlined in the testimony of Attorney for the trust fund, the 
costs incurred by the NGO Nature and Culture International and by the Municipality of Loja in studies, 
consultancy, and the purchase of land. The costs incurred setting up the municipal regulations to collect the 
environmental charge on water, and for establishing the municipal protected watersheds, have not been 
                                                          
26 One bag of coffee weighs approximately 46 kg. 
27 Coffee farmers previously produced coffee following the dry processing system, where coffee beans are harvested 
and dried in the sun. To sell organic coffee, farmers had to switch to wet processing. In this system, coffee berries are 
pulped, fermented, washed and then dried in special infrastructure. Although this process is not specific to organic 
coffee (see e.g. specialty coffees), this shift was a necessary condition to be able to sell organically certified coffee. 
The (high) start-up costs thus include both the costs of changing from dry to wet processing as the shift from 
conventional to organic coffee. 
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taken into account (Table 4.7). Further details on the start-up costs can be found in Supplementary Tables 
5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. 
 
4.4.2. Recurrent costs 
Recurrent costs are divided into management and production costs and transaction costs. 
Management and production costs 
Carret and Loyer (2003), in their study on the cost of managing a network of protected areas, included 
operational costs for the head office, regional offices, site operation and daily activities, and investment 
costs associated with managing biodiversity, and environmental education. Production costs are the 
combined costs for raw materials and labour incurred in the production of goods and services. For this part, 
only the recurrent costs for 2011 are used, as obtained from the surveys and the financial statements of the 
different programmes. 
Coffee label. In the coffee system, the costs incurred are administrative costs for the presidency of 
APECAEL (US$ 1/bag) and additional production costs incurred by the farmers. These additional costs for 
farmers are the costs for quality control and additional weeding. To calculate the latter, we used a similar 
approach to that applied to the calculation of the HIPI. Costs for herbicides were added to the average 
weeding costs per hectare for non-organic farmers. These costs for non-organic farmers were subtracted 
from the weeding costs for organic farmers in order to obtain the additional organic production costs. 
Socio Bosque. The management costs for the programme are the administrative costs of the national 
secretariat in Quito. Costs incurred by the participants, such as monitoring their protected areas and 
managing their participation, are considered as transaction costs. Costs incurred by the programme to pay 
the participants are not taken into account in this study, as these were considered to be revenues from the 
point of view of participants. Even if these costs were included, Socio Bosque still has the lowest 
management costs and total overall costs (see also Sect. 4.4). 
FORAGUA. The management costs incurred by the Municipality for participating in FORAGUA include 
an annual payment of 10 percent of the environmental water tariff to cover running the secretariat, the 
administrative costs for the unit within the municipal water company responsible for the management of 
the watershed, as well as costs for managing the watershed itself and for the different reforestation and 
other activities undertaken within the watershed (Table 4.7). More details on these costs are provided in 
Supplementary Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. 
Recurrent transaction costs 
Numerous definitions of transaction costs (TC) are available, which makes TC often a vague concept. 
Holloway et al. (2000, p. 280) define TCs as ‘‘the costs of searching for a partner (or group) with whom to 
exchange, screening potential partners to ascertain their trustworthiness, bargaining with potential partners 
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and\or officials to reach an agreement, transferring the products, monitoring the agreement to see that its 
conditions are fulfilled, and enforcing the exchange agreement’’. From an environmental perspective, TCs 
are incurred to enforce specific conservation actions and to monitor compliance with specific rules 
implemented to conserve biodiversity. 
Coffee label. Bode (2007, p. 23) defines TCs in a study on FAPECAFES as ‘‘all the costs, generated by 
organisational and communicative actions’’. They include telephone and internet costs, as well as the costs 
of all meetings and assemblies held at different levels of the federation. In this study, TCs are those costs 
related to the transport costs for members to attend meetings, the opportunity cost for time spent 
participating in meetings of APECAEL, and local coffee groups, as well as the certification costs incurred 
by the farmers and by FAPECAFES. Data were obtained through the surveys. 
Socio Bosque. The following TCs are considered: costs incurred to establish the deforestation baseline as 
well as the cost of monitoring participants’ compliance with the regulations. Costs also include the costs 
participants incur to ensure no deforestation occurs on the land they have enrolled under the programme, 
as well as the costs they have incurred making a legal statement concerning their fulfilment of the 
programme’s requirements. 
FORAGUA. TCs incurred by FORAGUA and the Municipality of Loja are those associated with monitoring 
the watersheds and those that are incurred annually to approve the investment plan proposed by the 
watershed unit of the municipal water company. This plan has to be approved by the municipal council as 
well as by the secretariat and the board of FORAGUA (Table 4.7). Further details on the transaction costs 
can be found in Supplementary Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10. 
 
4.4.3. Opportunity costs 
Markandya et al. (2001) define the opportunity cost of an activity that uses scarce resources as the value of 
the next most economically productive use to which those resources could have been put. The opportunity 
costs of conservation typically relate to restrictions on development, land-use change, land management 
practices, exploitation of resources, and the ability to control species which can damage economic interests. 
For instance, in the case of a protected forest, the opportunity cost of preserving the forest may be the net 
income per hectare per year from deforestation and conversion of the land to agricultural uses (Olsen et al., 
2011). 
Coffee label. No opportunity costs have been calculated for the coffee label. As opposed to conservation, 
the land is used for productive activities. In addition, although restrictions apply for organic labelling and 
agroforestry, these can also provide multiple benefits for production, such as the control of specific pests, 
the potential for improved productivity at high altitudes, non-coffee products and improved pollination 
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(Ataroff and Monasterio, 1997; Borkhataria et al., 2006; Philpott et al., 2009; Ricketts et al., 2004; Torres-
Lezama et al., 2012). 
Socio Bosque. Under this programme the participants do incur opportunity costs by applying to conserve 
part of their land under the programme. This is only the case for land that does not lie within the national 
park, land that is a private protected area or forest used for beekeeping. Opportunity costs are calculated for 
307, 93 ha originally destined for sustainable forestry and 124 ha for pasture. Calculations of the opportunity 
costs are based on Knoke et al. (2009a). For pasture conversion, a rate of 1 ha/year/farmer was taken into 
account. One participant entered the programme at the end of 2009 and two at the end of 2011. Therefore, 
the total conversion since the start of the programme would have been four hectares—two hectares with 
revenue forgone over the following 19 years and two hectares with revenue forgone for the subsequent 20 
years. For forestry, the 93 ha was taken into account with revenue forgone for 1 year. The forgone revenue 
for cattle and dairy production is US$ 2,920, and for sustainable forestry, this amounts to US$ 3,146 (Table 
4.7). Annex 5 provides more detail on the opportunity cost calculations.  
FORAGUA. For FORAGUA, the opportunity costs are zero. As landowners are paid for their land, they do 
not necessarily suffer an economic loss. Including the opportunity costs for the land purchased would 
constitute double counting, as the cost of the land has already been included within the start-up costs. 
 
4.4.4. Total costs 
Table 4.7 gives an overview of the costs per category and costs per hectare, as well as total costs. 
FORAGUA clearly has the highest total costs. This is mainly due to the high cost of purchasing 
land. Compared to the other programmes, Socio Bosque has both the lowest start-up and recurrent costs. 
These low costs are a reflection of the benefit of economies of scale for a national programme that offers 
incentives for the private conservation of forests. This is in line with Clements et al. (2010) who, in their 
comparison of three PES schemes in Cambodia, found that the most direct, individual contracts had the 
lowest administrative costs. For the organic coffee label, costs on a per hectare basis are much higher 
compared to the other programmes. These high costs per hectare for coffee are due to the production 
orientation of the programme, because of which costs for implementing the coffee processing infrastructure, 
additional production costs, costs for capacity building, and costs for certifying the product are included. 
On a per hectare basis, the costs for Socio Bosque are very low. Even if the payments per hectare to 
participants (US$ 13/ha) were included as costs, the programme would still have the lowest costs both in 
total and in per hectare. 
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Table 4.7: Total costs for the different programmes 
 Total Cost inside study area (US$) Cost US$/ha 
Start-up Costs 
Coffee label 83,723 1,648 
Socio Bosque 7,676 8 
FORAGUA 297,880 358 
Management and Production Costs 
Coffee label 14,236 281 
Socio Bosque 277 0.3 
FORAGUA 53,413 64 
Recurrent Transaction Costs 
Coffee label  2,711 53 
Socio Bosque 4,742 5 
FORAGUA 8,049 10 
Opportunity Costs 
Socio Bosque 6,492 7 
Total Costs 
Coffee label  100,670 1,982 
Socio Bosque 19,187 19 
FORAGUA 359,343 432 
 
4.5. Cost-effectiveness, cost distribution, and revenue origin 
4.5.1. Cost-effectiveness of the mechanisms 
As indicated in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, FORAGUA generated the largest additional ES provision as well as the 
highest ICERI because it establishes newly protected areas and allows the regeneration of degraded land. 
The organic coffee system has the greatest impact on rural income because it generates profit per hectare 
with the widest inclusion, while also creating additional rural labour opportunities. Using the cost estimates, 
it is now possible to look at the cost-effectiveness of the different mechanisms. 
Cost-effectiveness to achieve ecosystem service provision and conservation 
Figure 4.4 shows the cost in US$ per point increase for the two environmental indicators (ESI and ICERI) 
(see also Supplementary Table 5.13). 
According to both indicators, Socio Bosque is relatively more cost-effective. This is mainly due to 
its low costs and to a lesser extent because of the programme’s contribution to ES provision. This is in line 
with Brauman et al. (2007), who compared eco-friendly subsidies with direct conservation payments and 
found that direct investment in conservation may be the most cost-effective mechanism for ensuring ES 
provision. Costs incurred in the FORAGUA programme include a high initial cost for land purchase. If 
only recurrent costs had been taken into account, Socio Bosque would still be slightly more cost-effective 
(US$ 12/ESI and US$ 40/ICERI versus US$ 39/ESI and US$ 70/ICERI for FORAGUA). 
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Figure 4.4: Cost-effectiveness of ecosystem service provision and increased conservation 
Cost-effectiveness for rural income creation 
Figure 4.5 compares the cost-effectiveness of the different programmes in achieving rural income creation 
(see also Supplementary Table 5.14). For the first indicator, the production of coffee is the most cost-
effective when compared to FORAGUA and Socio Bosque. This is due to the high score for the HIP 
indicator, as it creates higher additional revenue per hectare for the largest group of rural landowners. The 
lower cost-effectiveness for Socio Bosque with regard to the HIP indicator is more a reflection of the limited 
number of participating households within the buffer zone than of the costs incurred per dollar of revenue 
in terms of payments to the participants (costs of US$ 1.5 per dollar income versus US$ 14 for the coffee 
label). Socio Bosque is the most cost-effective for the second indicator. However, this no longer holds when 
only the recurrent costs are taken into account (US$ 2/ERWI for coffee, US$ 3/ERWI for Socio Bosque 
and US$ 17/ERWI for FORAGUA). FORAGUA is the least cost-effective in contributing to rural income, 
which is not surprising as the programme’s main aim is to increase the size of the municipal protected area. 
 
Figure 4.5: Cost-effectiveness for rural income creation 
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4.5.2. Distribution of the cost 
Apart from the cost-effectiveness, it is interesting to investigate the distribution of the costs for the different 
programmes (Figure 4.6) (see also Supplementary Table 5.15). 
Donors (NGOs and development cooperation) financed the start-up costs of the organic coffee 
system, while transaction and labelling costs are paid by FAPECAFES and the coffee producers. The 
producers obviously pay the additional production costs. In Socio Bosque, most of the costs are borne by 
the participants. These comprise the cost of applying for participation and the recurrent TCs. In FORAGUA, 
most costs are paid through money generated by the environmental tax on water. Most of the revenue is 
spent on purchasing land. Donors also funded land purchases and hydrological studies, while the local and 
national government pay part of the management costs.  
 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of the costs between different actors (%) 
4.5.3. Origin of the payments 
The final aspect considered in this study is sustainability in terms of funding. Figure 4.7 shows who directly 
or indirectly paid the costs (see also Supplementary Table 5.16). Donors fund most of the costs in the coffee 
system, yet these are start-up costs. Coffee consumers, who purchase coffee from the buffer zone, incur the 
other costs. Socio Bosque is fully government-funded through money that is allocated on an annual basis 
and that is not specifically earmarked for this purpose. Although the participants incur costs, these are 
completely covered by the payment they receive from the government. From 2012 onwards, the German 
Development Bank is to provide a total of 11.5 million Euros to Socio Bosque within the framework of a 
REDD initiative. For FORAGUA, the environmental charge on water provides the main revenues, but 
government funding is still needed to cover administrative costs, while donor funding was fundamental to 
cover start-up costs. 
Both the origin of the payments and Section 4.5.2. on the distribution of costs, illustrate the 
differences between considering all costs, as we did in the cost-effectiveness analysis, versus considering 
costs related to agents carrying the costs. In the latter case cost-effectiveness should be calculated separately 
for the users of ES (who can be directly involved or represented by the government as in Socio Bosque, see 
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Figure 4.7), the costs for providers of ES (the participants and FORAGUA’s mechanism in Figure 4.6), or 
only the costs for the national and local government or donors funding the programmes’ implementation 
(see Figures 4.6 and 4.7). In addition, a difference could be made between private costs, social costs and 
overall costs.  
 
Figure 4.7: Origin of the revenue to pay programme costs (%) 
As FORAGUA focuses on hydrological services with a compulsory payment part of the water bill, it has 
probably the most sustainable source of revenue. The environmental charge on water is set within municipal 
regulations, making it difficult to divert the money collected to other uses than watershed conservation 
programmes. Water users can easily be targeted and consumption of water is unlikely to cease. This makes 
continued funding very certain, both currently and over the longer term. 
It is the opinion of many experts that markets for specialty coffees will continue to expand at a 
much higher rate than regular coffee markets and that they will continue to attract a price premium (FAO, 
2009b; Lewin et al., 2004). Therefore, the coffee system has also found a relatively sustainable source of 
revenue. The price premium is, however, dependent on the quality of the coffee, the productivity, the coffee 
association, and on the world market prices. Nonetheless, the potential level of payment can still be 
increased as production volumes and quality are currently low. 
The sustainability of funding for Socio Bosque is less straightforward. This does not mean that this 
programme will disappear if the national government changes. However, unlike the national PES scheme 
in Costa Rica, where money is set aside by law to fund the scheme, Socio Bosque currently has no other 
specific sources of income and funds may therefore run out or be diverted to other uses. The results are in 
line with Le Coq et al. (2011) who mention that an eco-label is more likely to be efficient in capturing 
funding from distant areas to support difficult to measure ES provision, whereas PES mechanisms may be 
more efficient at capturing local funding for well-identifiable and measurable ES provision, because PES 
schemes are based on contractual agreements that should be honoured. 
If our findings here are added to the increased conservation indicator of the ICERI, it can be 
observed that both from a conservation perspective and from the funding side, FORAGUA creates the 
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highest certainty by adding legally protected land to the municipal protected areas that are funded through 
a municipal decree. In the case of Socio Bosque, conservation is weaker as a contract can be broken 
(although this implies a financial penalty for the participant), while funding depends on government budget 
allocation. Uncertainty in ES provision seems highest for organic coffee, since it is more tied to the world 
market price than the actual incentive payment (the additional income from labelled coffee sales). 
 
4.6. Final discussion and conclusions 
This chapter showed that designing an optimum strategy that allows for the maximization of nature 
conservation and the services it provides, as well as the income of poorer households, is very difficult. A 
trade-off is often necessary between increasing ES provision and improving rural livelihoods. Moreover, 
further trade-offs are required in terms of the scope and duration of the programmes. Purchasing land will 
increase the provision of ecosystem services. However, taking land out of production is expensive and can 
have negative effects on local development. Paying private landowners for conservation increases the total 
rural income, but poorer households will often be unable to participate, and when they do participate, 
payments will be low due to small land areas and the limited payments they receive per hectare. Mainly 
due to their lower access to land and higher opportunity costs, smallholders will find it difficult to participate 
in conservation schemes, and it will cost more to include them. Nonetheless, PES and PES-like schemes 
are cheaper to implement than a programme that aims to increase agricultural production. 
Hence, from a regional perspective, the combination of different instruments that address different 
areas which have different characteristics seems the best way forward. The mix of buying up land in 
degraded watersheds, or other key areas, paying landowners who have primary forest on their land and 
implementing agroforestry production systems for smallholders can create a balance between increasing 
conservation, ES provision, and rural livelihoods. Furthermore, targeting the right programme on specific 
areas and rural communities is the key to achieving such balance. Alternatively different aspects of the 
different programmes could be better integrated. A mixture of different instruments also permits access to 
different funding sources: funds from inside the region for local benefits, funds of national origin for 
protection of ES of national interest, and funds from international donors or international consumers for ES 
that have an international interest or that can be linked to private goods which are internationally marketed. 
Although PES schemes for private conservation can be successful in conserving forests, they could 
have a greater positive impact on rural areas and livelihoods if they include payments for a greater diversity 
of sustainable land uses. Some PES programmes, such as the Mexican PES scheme ‘‘Programa 
PRONAFOR’’ and the Costa Rican national PES scheme, pay agroforestry coffee farmers on a per hectare 
basis for ES provided. As such PES could serve the same aim as coffee price premiums in protecting 
agroforestry systems. 
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As indicated above, a price premium for coffee is highly dependent on international consumers’ 
willingness to pay and is strongly influenced by international coffee prices. Besides, organic coffee 
certification only targets ES provision indirectly and its effect on conservation will only last as long as 
farmers produce in an organic way. Given the low costs of per hectare payments one can argue that it is 
more effective to pay landowners to implement coffee agroforestry practices. This could provide them with 
a fixed income which is less dependent on niche markets, while foreign revenue would still enter the country 
from coffee exports. 
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Chapter 5: A portfolio analysis of incentive programmes for conservation, 
restoration and timber plantations 
Based on: Raes, L., D’Haese, M., Aguirre, N., Knoke, T., 2016. A portfolio analysis of incentive 
programmes for conservation, restoration and timber plantations in Southern Ecuador. Land Use Policy 51, 
244–259. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.11.019 
Abstract 
This paper uses portfolio analysis to study how the Ecuadorian incentive programme for forest conservation 
and restoration (Socio Bosque), and an incentive programme for timber plantations, may reduce income 
risk and/or maximise returns for a given level of risk for farmers in the municipality of Loja. The main 
existing land use in the research area is milk production on pasture, with some farmers having forest land. 
Our results suggest that most farmers would significantly increase the area under conservation and/or 
restoration through the incentive programmes as part of their risk reduction strategies, compared to a 
decision based solely on expected returns. However, the portfolios (land use combinations) including the 
incentive programmes would only lead to small areas of tree plantations being established. None of the land 
use combinations analysed would increase the income of all households to above the poverty line, as the 
monetary incentives are too low and many farms are too small. For forest holders all the land use 
combinations we studied would have a positive impact on income, but we observed a negative impact on 
household income for milk producers without forest. For producers without any forest, there seems to be a 
trade-off between maximising household income and risk reduction through combining incentives for 
restoration and tree plantations.  
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5. 1. Introduction 
The undervaluation of ecosystem services provided by forests and other natural ecosystems is considered 
one of the main causes of their ongoing degradation (Pearce, 2007; Swallow et al., 2009; Tacconi, 2000). 
One solution that has been proposed to address to this, is to pay private and communal landholders to 
maintain and restore forests and other ecosystems under their stewardship (Engel et al., 2008; Rodríguez 
de Francisco et al., 2013). These incentives, broadly categorised as payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
or PES-like schemes, aim to maintain the current level of ecosystem services, or to restore or increase them 
(Sommerville et al., 2009; Tacconi, 2012; Wunder, 2008).  
A recurrent question is how important the expected returns are in encouraging farmers to keep land 
under conservation management instead of converting it to other income-generating activities. Similarly, 
expected returns can play a role in a farmer’s decision to continue with existing land-use practices, or adopt 
land uses that could improve ecosystem service provision. When payment levels from PES schemes are at 
least as high as any alternative gains from the land, one would expect the scheme to be more successful in 
gaining and retaining participants (Farley et al., 2011; Secchi et al., 2009). However, in PES schemes 
payments are often lower than the opportunity costs faced by participants (Mahanty et al., 2013; Wunder 
and Alban, 2008). In addition, PES participation is also influenced by intangible factors (Kosoy et al., 
2007), such as the value participants place on ecosystem services (Bremer et al., 2014a) or their general 
concern for the environment (Zanella et al., 2014). 
A broad range of factors affect farmers’ land use decisions, including environmental and 
agricultural policies and regulations, markets, climatic conditions, the physical attributes of land and socio-
economic and personal factors (e.g. beliefs, values), demographics and gender (Gasson, 1973; Lambin et 
al., 2001; Malawska et al., 2014; Villamor et al., 2014). Farmers’ decisions about land allocation and land 
management are contingent upon multiple natural (e.g. variable climate) and financial uncertainties (e.g. 
crop or input price fluctuations) (Jakoby et al., 2014; Knoke et al., 2011). The resulting uncertainty in the 
expected profit from any given land use makes land use decisions risky (Engle Warnick et al., 2011). 
Land owners are generally considered to be risk-averse (Knoke et al., 2008), an observation widely 
supported both in developed  (Bocquého et al., 2014; Bond and Wonder, 1980; Just and Pope, 2002) and 
developing countries (Antle, 1987; Moscardi and Janvry, 1977; Tanaka and Munro, 2014). Risk-averse 
farmers tend to choose land uses with the least uncertainty, despite their lower potential rewards (Aimin, 
2010). Farmers often diversify their activities and land uses in order to spread risk (Engle Warnick et al., 
2011). Hence, in addition to differences in expected returns, comparing potential investments in different 
land uses requires analysing the trade-offs between the uncertainties and profitability associated with 
different activities. Similarly when analysing PES, the effect of the contracts on income uncertainty should 
be taken into account. 
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In addition to their primary aim of conserving or increasing ecosystem service provision, PES 
schemes are often implemented with an eye on poverty reduction (Ingram et al., 2014; Rodríguez de 
Francisco et al., 2013). Through their impact on income, consumption, labour and land markets, PES can 
have positive effects on livelihoods even if the programmes are not explicitly designed to reduce poverty 
(Kollmair and Rasul, 2010; Wunder, 2006). Yet, the success of PES programmes in reducing poverty 
depends on the equitable distribution of benefits and on the size of the compensation payments (Grieg-Gran 
et al., 2005; Jack et al., 2008). Wunder (2008) argued that PES could potentially trap poor landowners if 
payments are lower than actual or potential revenues from alternative income-generating land uses. 
However, PES can also be a stable income source and a valuable way to diversify income (Grieg-Gran et 
al., 2005). The balance of these effects depends on how land use restrictions impact on people’s livelihoods. 
Against this background, this chapter examines the extent to which PES schemes for conservation 
and restoration, and incentives for timber production could be desirable land uses compared to pasture for 
milk production. This chapter does so for farmers in an area of southern Ecuador important for hydrological 
services and biodiversity. The PES and PES-like programmes considered in the study are conservation and 
restoration incentive schemes which form part of the Ecuadorian Socio Bosque Programme, and the 
government’s Economic Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation programme, which encourages the 
establishment of timber plantations. The latter programme is not a PES per se, but has similar outcomes in 
terms of the provision of certain ecosystem services. Farmers can combine participation in these 
programmes with commercial milk production, which is an important agricultural activity in the study area. 
These land use combinations are compared to the current situation, and to combinations of potential land 
uses in the absence of the incentive programmes (i.e. milk production and tree plantations without 
incentives).  
In this chapter we use a portfolio approach to calculate the shares each land use should have, subject 
to economic return and uncertainties, while allowing for a mixture of different land uses. Following 
Markowitz (1952), the selection of a land use portfolio is a minimization or maximization problem based 
on two criteria, namely the activity’s expected return and the risk involved. After Knoke (2008), this study 
views specific land uses as single investments. As such, one area of land can be divided into sections with 
different uses, creating a combination of land uses that produce an optimum relation between revenue and 
risk. This chapter builds on the research of Knoke et al. (2011), who analysed an ‘Optimized Land-Use 
Diversification’ to study the effects of carbon payments as an instrument to reduce deforestation. Instead 
of using a portfolio approach to estimate payment levels for a PES scheme, we use it to analyse the potential 
impacts on income and uncertainty of individual farmers diversifying in several PES and PES-like 
programmes.  
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Following Knoke et al. (2011) we use the terms risk and uncertainty interchangeably; and agree 
that “the phenomenon of uncertainty was simply seen as our inability to predict something (market prices 
in our case) with certainty” (Knoke et al., 2011, p. 1142). In our portfolio analyses, ‘risk’ is (narrowly) 
defined by the standard deviation of the expected returns, and risk reduction is defined as the minimization 
of this standard deviation. Land uses for which the returns have high standard deviations are considered 
more risky or more uncertain. With risk avoidance, various combinations of expected returns and risk may 
generate an identical utility, because less uncertainty may compensate for a lower expected return and vice 
versa (Knoke et al., 2008). Following Castro et al. (2015), we understand that our analyses show how land 
should be allocated to achieve risk minimization or to maximize the expected return for a given level of 
risk. However, as Castro et al. (2015, p. 4) state “this does not necessarily mean that the model output is a 
proper prediction of future land allocation. […] It may just help risk averse land owners to achieve their 
economic objectives in a consistent way”. 
The chapter consists of the following analytical steps: (i) net present value calculations of the 
expected revenue of milk production, of forest conversion to pasture for milk production, of monetary 
incentives for conservation of forests and the restoration of native vegetation on pastures, and of the 
establishment of timber (pine and Andean alder) plantations with and without the incentives; (ii) portfolio 
analysis of the different land-use combinations; (iii) the impact on household income of adopting different 
land use portfolios. The methodology is detailed in the next section.  
This chapter contributes to both the PES and forest economics literature. Portfolio diversification 
and optimization has been increasingly used to analyse PES (e.g. Benitez et al., 2006; Castro et al., 2013; 
Knoke et al., 2011). However, as far as we know, it has not been used to analyse the potential impact of 
existing PES programmes, nor to study the impact of combining several programmes. In addition, empirical 
evidence of the potential contribution of PES to joint social and environmental goals remains limited 
(Bremer et al., 2014b; Ingram et al., 2014).  
 
5.2. Methodology 
5.2.1 Research area  
This research focuses on commercial milk producers who own land in the buffer zone of the Podocarpus 
National Park in Loja municipality in the province of Loja, Southern Ecuador (figure 5.1). The research 
area consists of patches of forest and pasture and covers 5,475 ha, excluding the area belonging to the 
National Park and two protected watersheds. In addition to its role as a buffer zone for the National Park, 
the area’s Andean ecosystems are important providers of hydrological services (Ataroff and Rada, 2000; 
Celleri et al., 2007). To improve the conservation of biodiversity and maintain and enhance hydrological 
services (water quality and dry season flow), Loja municipality is a member of the Regional Water Fund 
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(FORAGUA). The municipality has the power to protect areas of hydrological importance through land 
purchases, using funds obtained through the water fund, and by establishing municipal reserves 
(Municipality of Loja, 2007). In addition, the municipal water company of Loja has reforested the El 
Carmen watershed, mainly with native Andean alder species.  
Two watersheds in the area that provide water to the city of Loja (El Carmen and Pizarros) are now 
protected as municipal reserves, while the Curitroje watershed also provides drinking water to Loja city, 
but is currently not protected. Additional water catchments are planned, but not yet operational, in the 
Namanda, Monica and Santa Urco watersheds. Further measures to conserve and improve the ecosystem 
services provided by the lands of the buffer zone are thus needed. Iñiguez–Armijos et al. (2014) suggest 
that it is necessary to retain at least 70% native vegetation cover within the water catchments in order to 
conserve biodiversity and water quality in the Ecuadorian Andes. Other measures they propose include the 
exclusion of livestock and the restoration of riparian vegetation. 
While the purchase of land and the declaration of municipal reserves have been the most commonly 
implemented measures within the research area to date, several national PES and PES-like programmes 
exist that could potentially be used to engage landholders within the research area in the maintenance and 
improvement of ecosystem services. 
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Figure 5.1: Research area (Source: Castillo and Raes) 
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5.2.2 The programmes 
The Socio Bosque programme was established by the Ecuadorian Ministry of the Environment in 2008. It 
is a government-funded, nationwide programme which provides financial incentives for conservation of 
forest and/or páramo (Andean grasslands) on private and communal lands. The programme’s objectives 
include the conservation of biodiversity, carbon storage, the maintenance of hydrological services, and 
poverty alleviation. Participation in Socio Bosque is voluntary, but to receive payments landowners must 
comply with a number of terms and make a twenty-year commitment to so doing. These terms include the 
prohibition of logging, burning, and commercial hunting or fishing. Furthermore, any activity that could 
potentially alter the hydrological conditions, reduce carbon storage, or threaten the area’s capacity to 
harbour biodiversity is not allowed (de Koning et al. (2011) provide more details on the programme). 
In 2012 the programme added a new component, aiming at restoration instead of conservation. 
Incentives focus on areas with young forests and abandoned pasture and on increasing the connectivity 
between protected areas, municipal reserves and areas under Socio Bosque. The restoration programme 
aims to assist natural regeneration and enrichment with native species and has been actively implemented 
since 2014 (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2014a) (see Annex 6 for details).  
Whereas Socio Bosque aims at stimulating ecosystem restoration and halting degradation, the 
Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture provides incentives to establish plantations in formally forested areas 
through the programme Incentivo Económico para la Forestación y Reforestación (Economic Incentives 
for Afforestation and Reforestation). For private individuals, these incentives refund up to 75% of the costs 
of establishing plantations during the first four years, depending on the trees’ survival rate. These incentives 
are for single species plantations for timber production (Ministry of Agriculture, Ecuador, 2013a, 2013b). 
We consider pine (Pinus patula) and Andean alder (Alnus acuminata) plantations in our portfolio 
calculations. These are fast-growing species (Aguirre et al., 2011). Pine is non-native and is currently the 
dominant tree species in plantations in the Ecuadorian Andes (Chacón et al., 2009). Pine plantations have 
been criticised for their negative effect on hydrological services, such as water retention capacity (Farley et 
al., 2004; Harden et al., 2013). However, the impact on other hydrological services is not always clear 
(Hofstede et al., 2002), and the negative impacts can partially be explained by the already degraded state 
of land on which pine is often planted (Chacón et al., 2009). The native Andean alder is preferred by Loja’s 
watershed managers, because they consider this species better for the provision of hydrological services. 
Andean alder can improve water quality by decreasing erosion through soil improvement, whereas it also 
has a better water retention capacity than pine (Knoke et al., 2014). Plantations of this species do however 
decrease total water discharge compared to pine and pastures (Knoke et al., 2014; Windhorst et al., 2013). 
Andean alder plantations have furthermore been found to contain relatively high levels of biodiversity 
(Castaño-Villa et al., 2014). 
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In summary, landholders in our study faced the following land use options: (i) farmers without 
forest could continue their current milk production, or they could abandon milk production to participate in 
the Socio Bosque restoration component or use incentives to establish tree plantations; and (ii) farmers with 
forest have similar options for their pasture lands, but could additionally decide to fell trees and establish 
pasture28 for milk production or preserve forests under the Socio Bosque programme (Table 5.1). In our 
portfolio analysis these land uses could be combined. To be able to analyse the impact of the incentive 
programmes we compare these portfolios with land use combinations that also generate revenue, but 
exclude the incentive programmes. In this case the land use options are: (i) farmers without forest can 
continue to produce milk or establish tree plantations assuming all establishment costs; and (ii) farmers 
with forest can consider deforestation to expand their pasture29. While landholders participate in the Socio 
Bosque conservation programme in areas adjacent to our research area (see Chapter 4), at the time of 
research no landholders had participated started in the restoration component of the programme, and were 
not (yet) combining these programmes on their properties.  
Table 5.1: Land use choices for portfolio analysis 
 
 
 Milk producers 
Without forest With forest 
Incentives: Without With Without With 
Current land uses Portfolio options     
Pasture Continuing milk production X X X X 
Tree plantations X  X  
Incentive programme for tree plantations  X  X 
Socio Bosque restoration incentives  X  X 
Forest Deforestation for new pasture establishment   X X 
Socio Bosque conservation incentives    X 
 
5.2.3 Data collection 
Farmers’ household data were collected in the research area through two stages of fieldwork. During the 
first stage (November-December 2011) 19 farmers were interviewed about their production systems 
(production of milk, pigs, chicken, and crops). The data collected were used as input in the milk production 
and non-milk farm income calculations (see Annex 6). In the second stage (March to July 2013) 95 farmers 
(accounting for about 20% of the land in the research area) were interviewed to gather data on socio-
economic characteristics, land uses and milk production systems. The 19 farmers initially interviewed were 
also part of the second interview round. The portfolio analysis is based on the data from the 95 farmers and 
utilizes some extra income estimates derived from the first survey. 
                                                          
28 Under Ecuador’s Forestry Law (Law 74, 1981) the conversion of watershed vegetation into farmland and the 
extraction of timber for commercial purposes are prohibited. Landholders need a permit from the Ministry of the 
Environment to clear vegetation (possible up to a maximum of 20%). The application procedure is costly and 
prolonged (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013) and, until recently, this law was rarely enforced (Wunder and Alban, 
2008). 
29 In this scenario we did not consider just leaving the forest, as we only considered revenue-generating activities.  
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Because we lacked data on all the households owning land within the research area, random 
sampling was not possible. Furthermore, many of the milk producers surveyed lived on the fringes of Loja 
city. Instead, we used snowball sampling to find respondents. We first approached milk producers to whom 
we were introduced by watershed managers from Loja’s municipal water company. In turn, these farmers 
introduced us to new respondents, which also helped to gain respondents’ trust. Participation was voluntary 
and verbal prior consent was obtained after respondents were informed about the purpose of the research 
and use of collected information, and were assured individual anonymity. 
Data on government programmes were obtained by contacting government officials and tapping 
into on-line resources (Socio Bosque, Ministry of Agriculture, FORAGUA and EMALEP).  
Milk prices were provided by the Ministry of Agriculture. As data on cattle prices were unavailable 
we used prices from local cattle markets and data provided by the NGO Nature and Culture International 
who did a milk production survey in 200630. Historical data on pine and Andean alder prices were 
unavailable. We collected data on pine prices at 20 local sawmills from 1 to 14 October 2013. None of the 
sawmills were buying Andean alder wood at the time of research.  
 
5.2.4 Expected return in net present value 
As a first criterion to assess impact (Knoke et al., 2008), the expected return (ER) for each of the 95 farms, 
expressed in net present value (NPV) over 20 years,31 was calculated for the different land uses by summing 
the discounted future net revenues from land management:  
ERNPV = ∑ 𝑟𝑡(1 + 𝑖)
−𝑡𝑇
𝑡=0
                                                                                                         (1) 
With the expected return expressed as net present value (ERNPV), T as the total period, rt as the net revenues 
in time t, and i as the discount rate (Castro et al., 2013). Following Benitez et al. (2006), and Knoke et al. 
(2009a), a discount rate of 5% was used. From here on, the expected return will be expressed in net present 
value and presented per ha.  
Price volatility is frequently used to model the uncertainty associated with investments in 
agriculture, because farmers often take production decisions based on prices and their recent fluctuations 
(Aimin, 2010; Benitez et al., 2006). Hence, we calculated income uncertainty on the basis of price 
variability, cattle mortality rates and probability of fire damage in tree plantations (see Annex for details). 
Price variability was based on monthly milk prices from 2000 to 2013, provided by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Real prices were compounded using the monthly inflation rate (INEC, 2012d). Prices ranged 
                                                          
30 This NGO supports FORAGUA’s management. The survey was carried out to estimate milk producers’ opportunity 
costs.  
31 The duration of Socio Bosque contracts is 20 years, which is also the production cycle for pine and Andean alder 
plantations. 
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from US$ 0.29/l to US$ 0.45/l, with an average of US$ 0.36/l. We assume that the probability of occurrence 
of future prices is equal to the number of times they occurred in our data series (see Annex 6). For pine, the 
surveyed sawmills reported prices between US$ 1 and US$ 30/m3, with an average price of US$ 15/m3. 
Prices varied strongly between sawmills. We assumed equal probability of occurrence of these prices. No 
data on Andean alder were available. As Andean alder is seen as a potential substitute for pine plantations 
in the research area, we assumed that it would fetch the same prices as pine. Annex 6 gives more detail on 
data used and income calculations of milk production and tree plantations.  
The costs and benefits of deforestation and establishing new pasture were based on compounded 
data on pasture establishment in the buffer zone of Podocarpus National Park of Knoke et al. (2009b). The 
costs of having cows on new pastures were estimated from market prices for cattle. Alternatively, if a farmer 
abandons pasture for restoration or tree plantations, cows could simply be relocated on new pastures. Yet, 
it was difficult to predict in advance how many head of cattle would be available to move after pasture 
abandonment. Instead, we included sales income from cattle that were grazing on land that would be 
abandoned for restoration and tree plantations so as to avoid underestimation of the expected returns of 
portfolios with deforestation. Calculations of milk production on pasture established after deforestation 
were similar to those of continuing milk production for the subsequent 19 years.  
Dairy farmers with forest could decide to conserve forest through Socio Bosque. The conservation 
incentives were US$ 60/ha for farms of less than 20 ha. For farms of more than 20 ha, incentives were US$ 
30/ha for up to 50 ha of forest. The incentives per ha decreased as more forest was included (Ministry of 
the Environment, Ecuador, 2012c) (see Annex 1 and 6). One respondent owned 110 ha of forest, and would 
receive less for each additional hectare after the first 50 hectares. However, to simplify portfolio modelling, 
this reduced payment was not taken into account.  
Because Socio Bosque contracts were fixed for 20 years, the revenues resulting from participation 
in the scheme should remain constant. However, as the budget was mostly allocated by the government 
(see Chapter 4), the government could change the programme (for example if oil prices dropped) or even 
stop payments (for example after elections). These uncertainties are not easily quantifiable. We follow 
Knoke et al. (2011) who used a variation coefficient of 5% for carbon payments to take into account any 
fluctuations in  the programme payments, as carbon credits are part of the financial sustainability strategy 
of Socio Bosque (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2012). 
To calculate the expected revenue from milk production and tree plantations, and their standard 
deviations, simulation models were created in R (R Core Team, 2014). Sampling was based on probability 
of price occurrences, cattle mortality, and seedling survival and fire damage. The model was run 1,000 
times for each farmer. The expected return per farmer used in the further analyses was the sum of the 
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discounted means of the outcomes (net revenue per year) obtained per run. A similar approach was used to 
calculate the expected return for both types of tree plantation, but here we ran the model 10,000 times each.  
 
5.2.5 Portfolio theory 
Minimum variance portfolio 
We used portfolio analysis to compare and combine land use activities at different ratios based on their 
expected financial returns and standard deviations. The standard deviation of expected return indicates the 
degree of uncertainty of an investment (Knoke et al., 2005). It is reduced when investing in activities with 
a high covariance (Markowitz, 1952). A large variety of land use combinations are possible, giving different 
expected returns and standard deviations, creating the ‘achievable region’, which is delimited by the 
portfolio frontier curve (Figure 5.2). Following Brealey et al. (2011) the expected return of a portfolio p of 
land uses is given by: 
𝐸𝑅𝑝 = 𝑤1𝐸𝑅1 + ⋯ +  𝑤𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑖                                                              (2)                                                
With ER1 the expected return of land use 1, ERi the expected return of land use i, w1 weight of land use 1 in 
the portfolio, and wi weight of i-th land-use. 
The portfolio variance of a portfolio with two assets is given by: 
𝜎𝑝
2  =  𝑤1
2𝜎1
2 + 𝑤2
2𝜎2
2 +  2𝑤1𝑤2𝜎1,2               (3) 
Where 𝜎𝑝
2 is the portfolio variance, 𝜎1
2 and 𝜎2
2the variances of assets (land uses), and 𝜎1,2the covariance of 
the two assets. 
For multiple assets we use matrix annotation:  
𝜎𝑝
2 = [𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑖] [
𝜎1
2 ⋯ 𝜎𝑖,1
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜎1,𝑖 ⋯ 𝜎𝑖
2
] [
𝑤1
⋮
𝑤𝑖
] ; which can be written as 
𝜎𝑝
2 =  𝑊′𝛺 𝑊                   (4) 
Where W is an Nx1 vector of asset weights, and Ω is an NxN land use covariance matrix, and N is the 
number of assets considered. 
Covariances were estimated from 20-year simulations of yearly expected returns series (expressed 
in net present value), bootstrapped using the R package boot, to obtain correlation coefficients (Canty and 
Ripley, 2015; Davison and Hinkley, 1997). 
The covariance is defined as: 
𝜎𝑖𝑗 = 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗                   (5) 
Where 𝜌𝑖𝑗 is the correlation coefficient of two assets, and 𝜎𝑖 and 𝜎𝑗their standard deviations. 
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Assumptions were that a) expected returns were normally distributed, b) farmers cared only about 
mean return and variance, c) land uses were interchangeable32 before the start of the analysis, d) farmers’ 
milk production systems remained stable, and e) transaction costs were zero. 
The minimum variance portfolio combines land uses to obtain the lowest standard deviation and, 
therefore, lowest sensitivities to risk. Subject to covariance levels, it makes maximum use of diversification 
to achieve a risk level that can be lower than each of the individual land uses it contains. Specific portfolios 
will provide maximum reward (highest expected return) for a given risk, creating the efficient frontier of 
portfolios (Markowitz, 1952). This frontier is the part of the portfolio curve for which economic returns are 
larger (or equal) than those of the minimum variance portfolio (Figure 5.2). An investor would be expected 
to choose a portfolio on the efficient portfolio frontier (Brealey et al., 2011). 
Weights of different land uses in a minimum variance portfolio of two land uses are calculated as: 
𝑤1,𝑀𝑉𝑃 =
𝜎1
2 −𝜎1,2
σ1
2 + σ2 
2 −2𝜎1,2
                                          (6)                                              
 𝑤2,𝑀𝑉𝑃 = 1 −  𝑤1,𝑀𝑉𝑃                  (7) 
Subject to: 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 = 1 
Where 𝑤1,𝑀𝑉𝑃is the portfolio weight of the first asset, 𝑤2,𝑀𝑉𝑃 of the second asset. 
For more than two assets matrix annotations are used. The minimum variance objective function is a 
minimization of estimated portfolio risk: 
𝜎𝑝
2 =  𝑊′𝛺 𝑊                   (8) 
The minimum variance portfolio is the solution to the following minimization problem: 
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑃 = 𝜎𝑀𝑉𝑝 
2 𝛺−11̇                              (9) 
where 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑃 is a Nx1 vector of portfolio weight, 𝜎𝑀𝑉𝑝 
2  is the minimum variance, and 1̇ is an Nx1 vector 
of ones (Clarke et al., 2013). 
Sharpe ratio and the optimal portfolio  
The minimum variance portfolio has been used to analyse risk-reducing land-use combinations (e.g. Estrada 
et al., 2006; Reeves and Lilieholm, 1993). However, according to Knoke et al. (2011), modelling land use 
allocations under risk aversion should not only imply land use combinations that minimize variance, but 
should also consider the combination that gives the highest return per unit of risk. The latter is achieved 
through an optimal portfolio land use allocation. In this analysis we consider both the minimum variance 
and optimal portfolio land use combinations to illustrate how land should be allocated to the available 
                                                          
32 At the start of the analysis farmers can potentially choose any of the land uses, once the 20 year period starts, we 
considered that the land uses can no longer be changed.  
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practices to achieve absolute risk minimization or maximization of the return per unit of risk, and to analyse 
the impact of the incentive programmes on land use allocation.  
Calculating the portfolio that gives the highest return per unit of risk requires defining a risk-free 
asset. Following Knoke et al. (2011) we consider income from land sales as risk-free. The selling price is 
fixed at US$ 400/ha, which equals the compensation payment that Loja municipality disburses when 
negotiating land acquisition to establish protected watersheds33 (Cevallos J.C. personal communication, 
2013). Obviously, selling land also entails risk as farmers lose a source of future income. Moreover, it is 
drastically different from the land uses considered. However, even government programmes with long-term 
fixed payments are uncertain due to possible changes in government policies. Whereas, once land is paid 
for, the money is cashed and farmers face no uncertainty over future expected revenues, which is why we 
consider selling land as being without income risk.  
Figure 5.2 illustrates the capital allocation line which represents the combination of risk-free and 
risky activity in which the standard deviation only changes according to the weight of the risky activity in 
the combination (Bodie et al., 2008). The slope of the capital allocation line is the reward-to-variability 
ratio or Sharpe ratio. It represents a risk premium because it is the net return of the portfolio for one unit 
increase in variance/volatility (Sharpe, 1994).  
Mathematically, the Sharpe ratio is calculated by (McDonnell, 2008): 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒) = (𝐸𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑟)/𝜎𝑝                        (10)                                                         
With ERp the expected return of the risky portfolio, Rr the return on the risk-free activity, and 𝜎𝑝the 
volatility of the risky portfolio. The variance of the risk-free asset is zero. 
The optimal portfolio we considered here is the one on the efficient frontier with the highest Sharpe 
ratio (Prigent, 2007), and is the point where the portfolio frontier is tangent to the capital allocation line 
(Figure 5.2).  
The weight of 1 asset (𝑤1) in an optimal portfolio of two assets and a risk-free option is given as follows: 
𝑤1,𝑂𝑃 =
(𝐸𝑅1−Rr)𝜎2
2−(𝐸𝑅2−𝑅𝑟)𝜎1,2
(𝐸𝑅1−Rr)𝜎2
2+(𝐸𝑅2−Rr)𝜎1
2−(𝐸𝑅1−𝑅𝑟+𝐸𝑅2−𝑅𝑟)𝐶𝜎1,2
                       (11) 
 𝑤2,𝑂𝑃 = 1 −  𝑤1,𝑂𝑃 
Matrices and vectors are used when more than two land uses are to be included. Consider 𝐸𝑅 a vector of 
the expected returns of the assets (land uses), and 𝑊 a vector of allocations of the risky assets, the 
maximization problems is defined by (Campbell and Viceira, 2002): 
max
𝒘
𝑊′ (𝐸𝑅 − 𝑅𝑟 1̇) − 
1
2
𝑊′𝛺 𝑊                                         (12) 
                                                          
33 This official land price is relatively new. The price paid in 2009 and 2010 for properties in the El Carmen watershed 
by the municipality of Loja was on average US$ 435/ha (see also Chapter 4). 
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Where (𝐸𝑅 − 𝑅𝑟 1̇) is the vector of excess returns on the N risky assets over the return from the riskless 
asset. The variance of the portfolio return is 𝑊′𝛺 𝑊. 
The solution to this maximization problem is: 
𝑊 = 𝛺−1(𝐸𝑅 − 𝑅𝑟1̇)                            (13) 
The minimization and maximization problems were solved with the R package quadprog (Turlach and 
Weingessel, 2013). 
Portfolio constraints 
When analysing land use portfolios, a key requirement is that the portfolio weights are larger than, or equal 
to, zero, or mathematically that: 
𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁                  (14) 
An additional constraint added to the analysis was that a minimal area for each cow owned had to 
be available. As cows are indivisible, the area farmers could allocate to pasture for milk production was 
either zero, equal to the area each of them used per cow, or any multiple thereof.  
For each milk producer with forest we expressed the expected return, standard deviation and Sharpe 
ratios of continuing milk production on the existing pastures, as part of a portfolio that included the current 
forest (Section 5.4.2). The weight of continuing milk production was equal to the percentage of pasture in 
relation to the total area (forest and pasture). The calculations were carried out using equations 2, 3 and 10, 
where forest had an expected return and standard deviation of zero. Expressing current milk production as 
a portfolio facilitated comparing this activity with a portfolio combining several land uses on pasture and 
forest. 
 
Figure 5.2: Sharpe ratio, portfolio frontier, and minimum variance and optimal portfolio 
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Household income and poverty 
Three indicators were calculated to quantify the impact of the different portfolios on household income, 
namely: (1) total household income and income per household member; (2) the effect of the portfolio choice 
on households crossing the poverty line; and (3) change in household income. While the first indicator is 
straightforward, the second indicator is inspired by the potential contribution PES schemes could have on 
poverty reduction. While poverty is a multidimensional concept (Davies et al., 2014) that cannot be grasped 
only by income indicators (Scheidel, 2013), one potential contribution of PES schemes could be to reduce 
the number of people living below the poverty line. Here we used the 2011 Ecuadorian poverty line of US$ 
874 per household member (INEC, 2011b). Finally, we analysed the change in household incomes in each 
portfolio. For this we divided the milk producers without and with forest into quartiles according to 
percentage of income received from milk production. For calculating household income including land 
income from the different portfolios, the annuitized expected return of the different land uses was used and 
added to the other income sources. 
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1 Socio-economic data 
Of the 95 farmers interviewed in 2013, 58 did not have forest on their land, 37 did. The non-forest holders 
owned a total of 332 ha of pasture. The farmers with forest had a total of 430 ha pasture and 312 ha forest 
land. Over the total sample, 68% of land was pasture, 28% forest and 4% cropland, which is similar to the 
figures available for the municipality of Loja (60%; 33% and 7% respectively). The average farm size of 
our sample was 6.1 ha for milk producers without forest and 20.1 ha for those with forest (see also 
Supplementary Table 6.1), compared to an average farm size of 9.5 ha for the whole municipality (Ministry 
of Agriculture, Ecuador, 2012). Average cattle density was below the carrying capacity of 2.3 for native 
pastures and 3.4 for improved pastures in the Ecuadorian Andes (Barrera et al., 2010), but most farms 
should still be considered as high-input (Knoke et al., 2014). The daily average production of six litres of 
milk per cow is below the average for the Ecuadorian Andes (INEC, 2011c). The percentage of households 
in the sample below the poverty line is the same as the Ecuadorian average of 29% of the population (INEC, 
2011b).  
Households mainly derive their income from off-farm activities, with non-milk farm income, 
mainly production of pigs, vegetables, maize and potatoes (sale and subsistence) being second. Milk 
production accounted on average for around 20% of the income of forest owners and 18% for non-forest 
holders. On average, farmer households were to be found in the third decile of Ecuadorian household 
income categories (INEC, 2012c) (see also Supplementary Table 6.2). 
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Forest owners had on average34 more pasture, more cows, and a higher total income from milk 
production than non-forest owners. However, the latter group reported on average a higher milk production 
per cow, and more income per hectare. On average forest owners derived more farm income from non-
dairy sources than farmers with no forest. Off-farm income did not significantly differ between the two 
groups (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2: Production and household income characteristics 
 Milk producers 
Without forest (N=58) With forest (N=37) 
 Average Median Average Median 
Total land area (ha) 6.1 4.5 20.6 10.5 
Pasture area (ha) 5.7 4 11.6 8 
Crop area (ha) 0.4 0 0.6 0 
Forest area (ha) / / 8.4 3 
Number of cows  4 3 8 5 
Total heads of cattle 9 7 18 11 
Milk production (litres) 6.4 6.8 5.8 6.5 
Density units (cattle/ha) 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Off-farm income/household (US$/year) 4,307 3,552 3,749 3,504 
Non-milk farm income (US$/year) 628 200 1,700 370 
Milk income (US$/year) 617 544 1,003 491 
Total household income (US$/year) 5,552 4,489 6,453 4,299 
Income per household member (US$/year) 1,592 1,183 2,011 1,363 
 
5.3.2 Expected return on activities 
Non-forest owners had on average a higher total expected return per hectare from continuing milk 
production than forest owners, US$ 640/ha more (Table 5.3). For the latter group, the expected return from 
milk production on existing pastures did not differ much from that on newly established pastures after 
deforestation. There were no significant differences between the two groups when income from tree 
plantations (with and without incentives) and restoration incentives were compared.  
From the perspective of simply maximizing the expected return, a majority of milk producers 
without forest would continue with their current milk production, instead of establishing timber plantations 
when incentives are not included. For this group, without incentives establishing tree plantations on pasture 
would give an average loss of US$ 457/ha and US$ 311/ha for Andean alder and pine, respectively. 
However, when the incentives are included, the average loss would be only US$ 9/ha for Andean alder, 
whereas the establishment of pine plantations would give an average gain of US$ 268/ha. Furthermore, the 
majority of farmers without forest would not consider restoration incentives, as the average loss of 
abandoning pasture to receive the restoration payments would be US$ 408/ha. 
                                                          
34 All differences were analysed using statistical tests with the R software  (R Core Team, 2014). When differences 
are illustrated in the text, this is because they were statistically significant at least at the 10% confidence level.  
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For the majority of forest owners, the expected return from timber plantations with and without the 
additional incentives is higher than from continuing their current milk production. Without incentives they 
would gain on average US$ 138/ha from establishing Andean alder plantations on their pastures, and US$ 
285/ha from pine plantations. With incentive the average gain would increase to US$ 588/ha and US$ 
863/ha for Andean alder and pine plantations, respectively. Additionally, a large share of forest holders 
would gain from receiving restoration incentives instead of producing milk, on average US$ 121/ha. 
However, conservation incentives were lower than the expected return from milk production after 
deforestation for most forest holders, on average US$ 103/ha lower. 
Table 5.3: Average expected returns, average standard deviation of expected returns, and percentage of 
farmers with a higher expected return for non-milk production activity on pasture or forest 
 Milk producers 
 Without forest With forest Without forest 
(N=58) 
With forest 
(N=37) Average expected return in 
US$/ha  
(average standard deviation) 
 % farmers with higher expected 
return than milk production 
Milk production  1,542 (215) 902 (175) / / 
Andean alder plantationa 1,085 (652) 1,040 (652) 31 68 
Pine plantationa 1,231 (560) 1,187 (560) 36 73 
Andean alder plantationa with incentives 1,533 (672) 1,490 (672) 55 76 
Pine plantationa with incentives 1,810 (573) 1,765 (578) 66 86 
Restoration paymentsa  1,134 (137) 1,023 (136) 33 68 
Milk production after deforestation / 819 (225) / / 
Conservation payments  / 716 (47) / 41 
a Includes income from selling cattle (on average US$/ha 485) 
5.3.3 Portfolio analysis 
Pasture land use allocation for milk producers without forest 
A first set of portfolios was calculated for every milk producer without forest. In a first step we considered 
the portfolios with Andean alder (Figure 5.3 and Table 5.4), followed by a comparison of Andean alder and 
pine portfolios (Supplementary Table 6.11). 
Whereas in both minimum variance scenarios a statistically significant area of pasture was 
abandoned for alternative land uses (tree plantation and/or restoration), this shift was significantly larger 
when we considered the incentive programmes. In the latter case on average 75% more portfolio weight, 
or an average of 3.7 ha more pasture, was allocated to alternative land uses than in the scenario without the 
incentives. However, the majority of this shift went to restoration activities, as the portfolio weight and area 
dedicated to Andean alder was significantly lower in the minimum variance portfolio with incentives than 
without. In the minimum variance land use allocation with incentives, around 48% of farmers would not 
dedicate any land to milk production, but without incentives 66% would continue with existing milk 
production. The land use change was reflected in the difference in the expected return between both 
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minimum variance portfolios, which was significantly lower (on average US$/ha 355 less) in the allocation 
with the incentive programmes. 
Significant changes in portfolio weights and land area were observed in both optimal land use 
allocation scenarios. As in the previous observations, both the portfolio weight and area dedicated to milk 
production were significantly lower when taking the incentive programmes into account, respectively on 
average 39% less weight or 1.8 ha less pasture. This difference was due to the importance of land allocated 
to restoration, as the land dedicated to tree plantations was on average much higher (2.2 ha) in the optimal 
portfolio without incentives. In the optimal portfolio with incentives ten percent of farmers would continue 
current milk production, as opposed to 66% in the land allocation without the incentives. Furthermore, 
when incentives are considered around 36% of farmers would not allocate any land to milk production. 
However, the difference in expected return between both optimal portfolios was not significant.  
When we compared the weights, land areas and expected returns of the portfolios with Andean 
alder plantations with those including pine, we found no significant differences. The exception to this was 
the portfolio weight and area allocated to tree plantations in the minimum variance scenarios without the 
incentive programmes. In these scenarios on average more weight (5% more) and area (0.2 ha more) were 
allocated to pine plantations than to Andean alder plantations.   
 
Figure 5.3: Portfolio of land use allocations of non-forest holders with and without incentives 
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Table 5.4: Average output of portfolios with Andean alder for milk producers without forest 
  Current 
situation 
Change through minimum 
variance portfolio 
Change through optimal 
portfolio 
Incentives: Without Without With Without With 
Average area (ha) 
 
Pasture 5.7 - 0.4 - 4.1 - 2.3 - 4.0 
Plantation  / + 0.4 + 0.0 + 2.3 + 0.1 
Restoration  / / + 4.1 / + 3.9 
Average portfolio weights  Pasture 1.00 - 0.08 - 0.83 - 0.24 - 0.63 
Plantation  / + 0.08 + 0.00 + 0.24 + 0.01 
Restoration  / / + 0.82 / + 0.62 
Average expected return (US$/ha) 1,542 - 62 - 417 + 128 + 37 
Average standard deviation of ER/ha  215 - 7 - 84 + 91 - 51 
Average Sharpe ratio  4.4   + 1.2 + 3.0 
 
Pasture and forest land use allocation for milk producers with forest 
The different portfolio scenarios considered for every forest owner also created significant changes in land 
use allocation compared to continuing milk production on existing pastures (Figure 5.4, Table 5.5).  The 
weight and area of pasture for milk production under the minimum variance land use combination with the 
incentive programmes were significantly lower than in the minimum variance portfolio without incentives: 
on average 46% and 8.5 ha less, respectively. Similar to the scenarios for milk producers without forest, 
this difference is due to the significant weight and area allocated to restoration activities, as the weight and 
area allocated to Andean alder plantations were significantly higher in the minimum variance scenario 
without incentives; on average 10% (or 1.2 ha) higher. In the scenario with incentives around 24% of 
farmers would stop all milk production, whereas without incentives 14% would allocate all their land to 
milk production. The impact of the conservation payments can be observed through the difference in 
deforestation between both portfolios. This was significantly lower in the portfolio with incentives, with an 
average reduction in deforestation of 68% of the forest area. However, even with incentive payments, 24% 
of forest holders would not allocate any land to conservation. These observed differences did not, however, 
translate into significant differences in the expected return of both minimum variance land use 
combinations.  
The differences between both optimal land use scenarios were similar to those for the minimum 
variance portfolios. On average significantly more pasture was abandoned under the scenario with 
incentives (5.3 ha) than without, although a larger area was dedicated to tree plantations (3.2 ha more) in 
the portfolio without incentives. The optimal portfolio land use combination with incentives reduced 
deforestation, with an average of 52% of the forest land conserved. Moreover, around 41% of farmers 
would not allocate any land (pasture or forest) to milk production under the incentive scenario. By contrast, 
30% would not conserve any forest, and two farmers of this group would dedicate all their pasture and 
forest land to milk production. There were no significant differences between the expected return of the 
two optimal portfolios. 
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When we compared the weights, land areas and expected returns of the portfolios with Andean 
alder plantations with those including pine plantations (Supplementary Table 6.12), we found no significant 
differences. 
 
Figure 5.4: Land allocation for milk producers with forest, considering both current forest and pasture 
land 
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Table 5.5: Average portfolio output for milk producers with forest considering Andean alder plantations 
  Current 
situation 
Changes compared to current situation 
Minimum variance 
portfolio 
Optimal portfolio 
Incentives: Without Without With Without With 
Average area (ha) Pasture 11.6 - 1.3 - 9.8 - 3.2 - 8.6 
Plantation  / + 1.3 + 0.1 + 3.2 + 0.1 
Restoration  / / + 9.7 / + 8.4 
Deforestation  / + 8.4 + 2.7 + 8.4 + 4.0 
Conservation 8.4a - 8.4 - 2.7 - 8.4 - 4.0 
Average portfolio 
weights 
Pasture 0.68 - 0.10 - 0.56 - 0.27 - 0.55 
Plantation  / + 0.10 + 0.01 + 0.27 + 0.01 
Restoration  / / + 0.55 / + 0.54 
Deforestation  / + 0.32 + 0.10 + 0.32 + 0.13 
Conservation 0.32a - 0.32 - 0.10 - 0.32 - 0.13 
Average expected return (US$/ha) 613 (902b) + 285 + 300 + 442 + 473 
Average standard deviation of ER/ha 107 (159b) + 21 - 45 + 102 - 33 
Average Sharpe ratio 0.19 
(2.12b) 
  + 4.5 + 9.4 
a Current standing forest, not active conservation through Socio Bosque 
b Milk production data not taking into account forest area 
5.3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
As the calculation of the portfolio that maximizes the Sharpe ratio is sensitive to the value of the risk-free 
asset, we also carried out a sensitivity analysis. We increased the value of land to US$/ha 600. We only 
considered the portfolios with Andean alder.  
A few differences can be observed with respect to the previous optimal land use allocations (Tables 
5.4 and 5.5). For milk producers without forest a larger portfolio weight and area was dedicated to milk 
production under both optimal portfolio scenarios (Table 5.6). Under the optimal scenario without 
incentives less weight and area were, on average, dedicated to Andean alder plantations than in the previous 
analysis. However, for the optimal portfolio with incentives the weight and area of tree plantations were 
larger than in the previous optimal portfolio. The most significant differences that we observed were the 
decreases in the portfolio weight and area allocated to restoration.  
Under the scenario with higher valued risk-free asset, the optimal portfolio without incentives for 
forest holders included slightly more Andean alder plantations, although there were no changes in the 
number of farmers who would allocate all their pasture to Andean alder plantations. In the optimal portfolio 
with incentives, less pasture is abandoned, and significantly more weight and area is allocated to Andean 
alder plantations. There was further a decrease in the area under restoration and a slight decrease in the area 
under conservation.  
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Table 5.6: Output optimal portfolios with higher risk-free value, considering Andean alder plantations 
  Current 
situation 
Changes compared to 
current situation for non-
forest holders 
Current 
situation 
Changes compared to 
current situation for 
forest holders 
Incentives: Without Without With Without Without With 
Average area (ha) Pasture 5.7 - 2.1 - 3.6 11.6 - 3.3 - 8.1 
Plantation  / + 2.1 + 0.9 / + 3.3 + 1.5 
Restoration  / / + 2.7 / / + 6.6 
Deforestation  / / / / + 8.4 + 6.1 
Conservation  / / / 8.4 - 8.4 - 6.1 
Average portfolio 
weights 
Pasture 1.0 - 0.21 - 0.56 0.68 - 0.28 - 0.50 
Plantation  / + 0.21 + 0.03 / + 0.28 + 0.05 
Restoration  / / + 0.53 / / + 0.45 
Deforestation  / / / / + 0.32 + 0.15 
Conservation  / / / 0.32 - 0.32 - 0.15 
Average expected return (US$/ha) 1,542 + 143 + 117 613 + 454 + 554 
Average standard deviation of ER/ha 202 + 81 - 35 107 + 114 - 1 
Average Sharpe ratio 3.2 + 1.5 + 2.7 0.2 + 5.7 + 9.3 
 
5.3.5 Impact of land use allocations on household income 
We now turn our attention to the impact of different land use combinations on household income. On 
average, for farmers without and with forests, total household income and income per household member 
did not differ significantly between the different land use allocation scenarios studied (Table 5.7). However, 
land use, as predicted by the minimum variance portfolio with incentives, would push a number of milk 
producers without forest into poverty. By contrast, for milk producers with forest land, all the portfolios 
were found to have a positive impact on the number of households below the poverty line.  
Table 5.7: Total Income, income per household member, % households below the poverty line for 
different land use portfolios 
  Milk producers without forest  Milk Producers with forest 
N=58 N=37 
Incentives Without With Without With 
Minimum 
variance 
portfolio 
Total HH income (US$) 5,413 5,299 6,933 6,573 
Income/HH member (US$) 1,546 1,507 2,200 2,078 
% HH below poverty line 29 33 19 19 
Optimal 
portfolio 
Total HH income (US$) 5,638 5,480  7,134 6,803 
Income/HH member (US$) 1,622 1,572  2,265 2,145 
% HH below poverty line 28 29 19 19 
Continuing 
milk 
production 
Total HH income (US$) 5,419 6,224 
Income/HH member (US$) 1,547 1,930 
% HH below poverty line 29 30 
 
We also analysed how much the incomes of farmers would change if they were to adopt the land uses 
predicted by the minimum variance and optimal portfolios. Because these changes may have distributional 
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effects, they were calculated per quartile, according to percentage of income derived from milk production. 
These quartiles were calculated separately for milk producers with and without forest 35 (Table 5.8).  
For households without forest, land use combinations in the minimum variance portfolio with 
incentives would decrease their income, except for those in the first quartile. The change in household 
income was not significant under the minimum variance portfolio without incentives. Adoption of the 
optimal portfolio with incentives would only significantly increase the income of households in the first 
quartile. This increase would be even higher for this quartile when adopting the optimal portfolio without 
incentives. For milk producers with forest, positive income effects were found across all portfolios and 
quartiles and with no significant differences between the portfolios with and without incentives.  
Table 5.8: Average change in total household income and number of households below the poverty line 
per milk income quartile for the land use portfolios 
  Producers without forest Producers with forest 
Quartile 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  
N  14 15 14 15 10 9 9 9 
Change in total household income without incentives (%) 
Minimum variance portfolio + 0.0 + 0.1 - 0.2 - 0.3 + 5 + 10 + 12 + 27 
Optimal portfolio + 23 + 0.2 + 0.4 - 0.3 + 17 + 14 + 13 + 27 
Change in total household income with incentives (%) 
Minimum variance portfolio + 6 - 2 - 4 - 18 + 13 + 11 + 8 + 6 
Optimal portfolio + 13 - 1 - 1 - 4 + 16 + 13 + 10 + 11 
 
5.4. Discussion 
The results of the portfolio analysis provide insights into those land use allocations that could have risk 
reduction effects, and the impact of adopting these land use combinations on household income generation.  
First, although introducing risk reduction positively influenced the adoption of PES, opportunity 
costs had a strong impact on land use combinations maximizing returns per unit of risk. In the optimal 
portfolio allocation of milk producers without forest, the most productive farmers - with higher opportunity 
costs - would not consider restoration or tree plantations. Socio Bosque’s restoration incentives would be 
too low for them to contemplate abandoning pastures. Lower opportunity costs have been linked to 
increased participation in existing PES programmes (e.g. Zanella et al., 2014). Furthermore, we were not 
able to account for a possible intensification of milk production systems on pasture when part of land would 
be reallocated to restoration and tree plantations. Farmers could choose to increase production on remaining 
pasture if they abandoned land. This would affect the land use combinations we obtained through our 
portfolio approach. With intensification higher payments would be needed to achieve the same land use 
allocation (see also Carpentier et al., 2000; Knoke et al., 2011). 
                                                          
35 Quartiles for milk producers without forest were: (1) less than 6%, (2) between 6-12%, (3) between 12-23%, and 
(4) more than 23% of total income from milk production; and for milk producers with forests: (1) less than 6%, (2) 
between 6-14%, (3) between 14-24%, and (4) more than 24%. 
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Producers with forest would also restore a considerable area of pasture land according to the 
portfolios with incentives. Additionally, they would allocate more forest to conservation than to 
deforestation. The reduction in deforestation was large compared to the portfolios without incentives, where 
we assumed that farmers were allowed to deforest all their land. Similarly, Knoke et al. (2011) found that 
in a land allocation that maximized Sharpe ratios, landholders would cut down all their forests without 
incentives. However, it is generally only possible to fell about one hectare of forest per year (Knoke et al., 
2009b). Furthermore, according to Bremer et al. (2014a) legal restrictions on land use and biophysical 
constraints often limit the conversion of land conserved through Socio Bosque to other uses.  
Second, for milk producers with forest we found indications of a potential leakage effect of PES. 
Leakage occurs when the implementation of conservation/restoration measures in one area provokes 
ecosystem degradation elsewhere (Wunder, 2007). In our analysis this occurred within individual farms 
through the allocation of pasture land for restoration and thus the abandonment of milk production, while 
simultaneously allocating forest land to deforestation to start milk production on newly established pastures. 
This negative environmental impact should be considered when implementing both components of the 
Socio Bosque programme simultaneously.  
Third, the current incentive system may only promote pine plantations. In general, we did not find 
differences between the portfolio allocations of pine and Andean alder. Given that, to date, more pine has 
been planted and sawmills are currently only using pine, there may thus be no additional incentive to plant 
Andean alder plantations. Promotion of Andean alder among sawmills, and promotion of the incentive 
programme itself, could potentially change this situation. In addition, our results showed that the Socio 
Bosque incentives would have significantly more impact on shifting land uses than incentives for timber 
plantations. The latter land use had more uncertain expected returns. Moreover, land management that 
focuses on conservation and restoration through natural succession does not require such specialised 
technical knowledge as engaging in forestry enterprises (Pagiola et al., 2008; Zbinden and Lee, 2005).  
Fourth, the sales value of land and land use regulations influenced the portfolio allocations. 
Increasing the value of the risk-free asset resulted in less land being allocated to those activities with the 
lowest expected return. For most farmers this would mainly decrease the areas allocated to Socio Bosque. 
These observations are in line with Knoke et al., (2011) who found that an increase of the risk-free asset 
would require higher PES incentives. Although the value we attributed to land (US$/ha 400) may be quite 
low compared to the expected return from milk production for most farmers, other aspects have to be taken 
into account. We considered this as a minimum land value, compared to a potentially higher, but more 
uncertain market value. Additionally, this value has been established by Loja municipality, and is related 
to the implementation of a municipal ordinance regulating land uses in the watersheds and their surrounding 
areas (Municipality of Loja, 2007). This ordinance establishes restrictions on activities that can be carried 
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out in the research area and even allows for expropriation of land when deemed necessary. Although the 
municipality has, to date, always negotiated land sales, the value they put on land may discourage other 
potential buyers from offering a higher price. In addition, according to Wunder and Alban (2008), even 
modest law enforcement efforts can stimulate greater participation in a PES scheme by decreasing the 
expected returns from other land uses. As such, PES can also be understood as a potential compensation 
mechanism which aims to make the implementation of regulations more acceptable (Pagiola, 2008).  
Finally, in the last part of our analysis we investigated the impact on income and poverty of 
adopting the different portfolios. We found that Socio Bosque’s aim of reducing poverty through payments 
would not be achieved among the farmers we studied. The differential payments based on land size do not 
seem to be having the desired effect since those with a larger land area have more potential to diversify 
their land use, especially given our area-per-cow constraint. Milk producers with larger farms also tend to 
have (more) forest and, as such, receive comparatively larger payments for conservation. Increased farm 
size has been positively related with PES participation (Duke et al., 2014; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). In our 
study, the Socio Bosque payments made were not sufficiently high to lift all milk-producing households 
above the poverty line. This problem has been observed in other PES programmes (e.g. Mahanty et al., 
2013). It has been suggested that PES initiatives are often ineffective in involving poor landowners, who 
lack access to sufficient resources to devote to ecosystem provision (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005). In addition, 
we noted negative impacts on household income among farmers without forest if the portfolios with the 
incentive programmes would be adopted. The strongest impact was observed among households of the 
fourth quartile, whose income depended most on milk production.   
These results point towards a trade-off between increased income and the improved provision of 
ecosystem services within the current programmes. An additional problem with the Socio Bosque 
programme is that land use is fixed for 20 years, which blocks the option to sell land, and thus decreases 
the liquidity of this land. Without the programme, farmers could sell some of their land at times of financial 
stress.  Poverty might be addressed more effectively with direct transfers (Rodríguez et al., 2011), as already 
happens in Ecuador, or by improving productivity and off-farm labour options instead of participation in 
PES schemes. Additionally, PES schemes that focus on productive land uses may be more interesting for 
poor landholders (Cao et al., 2009). However, results from elsewhere suggest that PES programme 
participation may reduce the farm household resources committed to agricultural production (Börner and 
Wunder, 2012). Chang and Boisvert (2009) found statistical evidence that decisions to participate in 
conservation/restoration programmes and off-farm work were correlated. For many farm households, a 
decision to shift household labour from agricultural production to off-farm work may well combine with a 
decision to remove land from agricultural production.   
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5.5. Remarks 
In our portfolio analysis we considered farmers as investors who base their land use decisions on the 
expected return and the certainty of that return, influenced by risk aversion. There is however a broader 
range of aspects that influence such decision making, which also depends on the information farmers have 
and use (Engle Warnick et al., 2011) and the relative risk and expected utility farmers attach to the different 
land uses (Hildebrandt and Knoke, 2011). Time preferences of milk producers are another important aspect 
in this regard and these can be accounted for by using different discount rates:  Knoke et al. (2014) used a 
5% and 8% discount rate in their analysis of abandoned pasture restoration.  
In addition, there is a broad range of risk reduction strategies, such as insurance for forestry 
production, or contracts to assure a less volatile milk price. However these are currently not used in the 
research area. Furthermore, optimal portfolios could also be calculated using a different methodology such 
as minimax portfolio optimization, which uses a risk threshold (Polak et al., 2010), instead of absolute 
minimum risk or maximizing the Sharpe ratio; or semi-variance, mean absolute deviation and variance with 
skewness (Chang et al., 2009), instead of Markowitz’ mean variance as used in this analysis. Extending the 
analysis with these methodologies to optimize land use allocations or minimize risk in combination with 
PES type incentives could be an area of future research.  
The issue of land degradation and the current state of the pastures could strongly influence land use 
decisions. Although our analysis suggested that tree plantations were of little interest, Knoke et al. (2011) 
argue that reforestation could make economic sense when land degradation is considered. Moreover, the 
slope of the land could also affect land-use allocations.  
We did not take into account all the variability in the production of milk and wood, which can be 
greatly affected by climatic conditions (Jakoby et al., 2014). Additionally, we only considered the price 
variations of agricultural output, and left the input prices constant. We thus did not consider all potential 
sources of uncertainty. However, according to Knoke et al. (2011), increased risks only strengthen the 
diversification effect. This would further increase the portfolio weight and area allocated to receive Socio 
Bosque payments (under our assumed uncertainty).  
The reliability of our risk estimates depends heavily on the historical data provided by the 
government and collected by us. It is uncertain how these prices will evolve in the near future. Other 
methods for price and uncertainty estimation have been proposed and used, such as Monte Carlo 
simulations (see Hildebrandt and Knoke, 2011) for an overview of the different methodologies to estimate 
uncertainty). In addition we assumed a normal distribution of expected returns, an assumption that, 
especially in the case of forestry, may not hold true (Hildebrandt and Knoke, 2011). 
We also did not consider the transaction costs involved in participating in one or more of the 
government programmes. The municipal watershed management and FORAGUA could play a fundamental 
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role here, and act as intermediaries to reduce transaction costs (Hejnowicz et al., 2014). Whereas the three 
programmes analysed are all programmes of the national government, local government could operate as 
an intermediary, facilitating and supporting milk producers’ applications. This could lower transaction costs 
for producers, and allow them more possibilities for considering land use combinations.  
 
5.6. Conclusions 
This chapter showed how portfolio theory can be used to analyse different conservation, restoration and 
reforestation programmes. It used a case study of different government programmes in Southern Ecuador 
to demonstrate that conserving forest and restoring pastures to their natural vegetation increased risk 
minimization and optimized land use allocations. It was more effective in achieving these aims than 
portfolios that lack incentive payments. However, the results also illustrated that, under the optimal land 
use allocation, restoration payments would only have a limited influence on highly productive farmers 
without forests. We also found evidence of potential leakage effects in land allocation portfolios with 
incentives among forest owners. Where there are no incentives available, tree plantations played a 
significant part in land use portfolios. However, significantly less land would be allocated to tree plantations 
when the incentive programmes were available.  
Socio Bosque payments could have a positive impact on household income as they provide an extra 
source of income, yet we found that the effect of these payments on poverty reduction was limited. The size 
of the payments is not based on household income nor on the number of people in the household or 
community receiving the payment. So while Socio Bosque may be an important mechanism for 
conservation and, more recently, for restoration, there is a trade-off between the dual goals of protecting 
the largest area of land and reducing poverty. This is because the area that poor landholders can conserve 
and/or restore is too small to obtain a significantly higher income under the current payment levels. In 
addition, restoration payments generally would have a negative effect on expected household income, with 
the largest drop in income observed in those households that rely the most on income from milk production 
and did not own forest. 
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Chapter 6: Farmers’ preferences for contracts to adopt silvopastoral systems 
in Southern Ecuador 
Based on: Raes, L.; Speelman, S.; Aguirre, N. and Van Damme, P. Farmers’ preferences for PES contracts 
to adopt silvopastoral systems in Southern Ecuador. (Under review). 
Abstract 
The supply of ecosystem services with public good characteristics from private lands could be improved 
through the use of positive incentives for the adoption of specific land use practices. This study investigates 
farmers' willingness to participate in contracts with incentive payments for the adoption of silvopastoral 
systems, with or without additional management requirements. The research was carried out in the buffer 
zone of Podocarpus National Park in Southern Ecuador, an area important for ecosystem service provision, 
but with most land dedicated to raising cattle. A choice experiment was conducted to measure farmers’ 
interest in different types of contracts that varied with respect to the type of silvopastoral system, extra land 
use requirements, access of cattle to streams, level of payment and contract duration. A latent class model 
was used to determine how contract attributes, and farm and farmer characteristics influence choice for a 
certain type of contract. The majority of farmers in the area were interested in the proposed contracts, but 
they differed in their preferences regarding additional requirements and the importance of payment levels. 
Based on their preferences three classes of respondents were identified. The results suggest that farmland 
area, agricultural income, the share of this income in total income, and landowners’ perception of 
environmental problems provide a partial explanation for the heterogeneity observed in the choices for 
specific contracts. Offering flexible contracts with varying additional requirements within the same scheme 
may contribute to enhance participation. However, enforcing contract compliance through the threat of 
withholding payments may be problematic, as for a group of farmers payment levels did not significantly 
influence contract choice. In addition, one small group of farmers preferred the business as usual scenario. 
Building of trust and combining PES with integrated conservation and development projects may be better 
to convince these farmers to adopt silvopastoral systems.  
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6.1. Introduction 
Ecosystems provide a range of products and services such as timber, food, water purification and carbon 
sequestration on local, national and global scales (MA, 2005c). Land use changes such as deforestation to 
expand agricultural lands, often degrade soil, water and biological assets. This has affected the ability of 
ecosystems to supply ecosystem services beyond mere agricultural production (Foley et al., 2011; Power, 
2010). A primary reason for this degradation is the failure to internalize environmental costs and benefits 
associated with land use decisions (Lant et al., 2008). Agricultural producers do not consider all ecosystem 
services they generate in their production decisions (Dagang and Nair, 2003; Matta et al., 2007).  
Direct payment programmes that translate external, non-market ecosystem services into financial 
incentives, such as payments for ecosystem services (PES), are now commonly used policy instruments to 
encourage the continued provision of ecosystem services by private landowners (Layton and Siikamäki, 
2009; Wünscher et al., 2008). PES schemes offer incentive payments to individuals and communities for 
the conservation or production of non-market ecosystem services or the implementation of land use 
practices that would secure those services (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Greiner and Stanley, 2013). As such 
PES should thus internalize the value of ecosystem services in land use decisions (Ojea and Martin-Ortega, 
2015). 
According to Wunder (2012, p. 2), “the arguably decisive PES criterion is whether providers 
receive conditional payments”. Payments should be conditional on whether ecosystem services are indeed 
provided (or land management systems implemented) or not (Martin-Ortega et al., 2013). If providers fail 
to deliver as agreed, then payments should be withdrawn or reduced (Milne and Niesten, 2009). It is this 
conditionality factor that is considered the fundamental difference between direct payments and integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs) (Engel et al., 2008; Milne and Niesten, 2009; Wunder, 
2012). ICDPs deliver monetary and other benefits upfront through the implementation of concrete 
interventions. Yet, these projects do not include longer term conditionality to assure continuation of the 
actions once a project has ended. However, ICDPs and PES could potentially be combined (Petheram and 
Campbell, 2010). 
Making payments conditional to delivery of concrete terms is important to assure PES 
effectiveness. However, if payments are perceived to under-compensate landowners, PES may not conserve 
or improve ecosystem service provisioning due to low participation or high rates of non-compliance. On 
the other hand, if payments overcompensate landowners, conservation benefits may not be maximized from 
the given budget (Jack et al., 2009). Hence, the level of payments is also crucial for PES implementation. 
The opportunity costs resulting from the loss in revenue caused by the provision of additional or new 
ecosystem services are often proposed as a way to estimate the adequate payment level (Ojea and Martin-
Ortega, 2015; Robert and Stenger, 2013).  
113 
 
Apart from establishing payment levels, it is imperative to understand preferences of landowners 
for alternative configurations of a PES programme when adapting these incentives to particular 
circumstances (Layton and Siikamäki, 2009; Petheram and Campbell, 2010). The range of heterogeneity 
within these preferences and whether such heterogeneity is associated with particular farm and farmer 
characteristics are also important issues (Beharry-Borg et al., 2013).  
Although conservation of natural forests is generally considered to guarantee the highest levels of 
ecosystem services (e.g. Pan et al., 2011; Paul et al., 2008), other land management approaches, such as 
reforestation or the implementation of agroforestry systems, may also provide a wide range of services (e.g. 
Fehse et al., 2002; Haug et al., 2010; Philpott et al., 2008). “Agroforestry is a collective name for land use 
systems and practices where woody perennials are deliberately integrated with crops and/or animals on the 
same land management unit” (ICRAF, 1993) . When trees and livestock production are combined in an 
agroforestry system, often the term silvopastoral systems (SPS) is used (Calle et al., 2009).  
SPS generate a variety of ecosystem services such as protection of watersheds and biodiversity 
(Alavalapati et al., 2004; Harvey and Haber, 1998). In addition to their capacity to provide non-market 
ecosystem services, SPS may also increase livestock production and as such rural household income 
(Ibrahim et al., 2006; Murgueitio et al., 2006). However, in spite of both positive environmental and 
economic outcomes, the wider adoption of SPS has been hindered by a lack of capital for its implementation 
(Ibrahim et al., 2006; Pattanayak et al., 2003). According to Pagiola et al. (2007), a small payment can make 
SPS more profitable than many current agricultural practices. The World Bank’s Regional Integrated 
Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project used five-year PES contracts to encourage the adoption of 
SPS in degraded pastures in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua (Pagiola et al., 2010). Other examples of 
agroforestry practices as part of a PES scheme are Costa Rica’s national PES programme and the Mexican 
carbon PES scheme Scolel Té (FONAFIFO, 2015; Soto-Pinto et al., 2010). 
In this study, we use a choice experiment (CE) with farmers in the buffer zone of Podocarpus 
National Park in Southern Ecuador to analyse and quantify preferences for different components of PES 
contracts that try to incentivize farmers to adopt SPS. This study aims to quantify (1) farmers’ interest in 
contracts for the implementation of SPS that come with or without additional management requirements; 
(2) whether farmers’ preferences are affected by the payment level and/or contract duration; and (3) the 
extent of heterogeneity in preferences among farmers and investigate whether this heterogeneity can be 
attributed to particular farmer and/or farm characteristics.  
CEs are a stated preference valuation technique where subjects are asked to choose among different 
hypothetical goods or outcomes. They allow for the analysis of preferences for policies containing several 
components. Moreover, because of their hypothetical nature, CEs can be used to analyse preferences for 
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polices that have not yet been implemented (Rabotyagov and Lin, 2013). The application of CE to PES is 
limited, but a growing number of studies has been done to better inform PES design (Kaczan et al., 2013).  
 Horne (2006) examined factors that influence choices of private forest owners in Finland for 
conservation contracts. The results of the CE showed that payments had to be increased considerably when 
programme characteristics became stricter and contracts longer. Also Ruto and Garrod (2009) showed that 
payments had to increase for CE participants to choose longer contracts, or contracts with stronger 
conditionality or higher administrative costs. According to Matta et al. (2009), participation of private forest 
owners in a conservation programme is lowered as more restrictions on forest management are imposed. 
Broch and Vedel (2012) used a CE to analyse farmers’ preferences for afforestation contracts in Denmark. 
Contract flexibility and protection of biodiversity and groundwater decreased farmers’ need of 
compensation to participate, while monitoring increased payments. Rabotyagov and Lin (2013) used a CE 
to examine landowner preferences for the attributes of ongoing forest conservation contracts. In their study 
shorter contracts and partial enrolment of forests are preferred.  
Furthermore, heterogeneity among respondents and respondent characteristics play an important 
role in preferences. Matta et al. (2009) found that forest owner characteristics significantly influence 
participation. Broch and Vedel (2012) and Rabotyagov and Lin (2013) also observed high heterogeneity in 
farmers’ preferences. Siebert et al. (2010) found that one group of German farmers interested in the concept 
of conservation set-aside would accept a small to moderate loss in income to withdraw land from 
agricultural production. Putten et al. (2011) had similar findings for a conservation incentive programme in 
Australia.  
Several recent studies used CE to evaluate participation in conservation incentive programmes in 
developing countries. Tesfaye and Brouwer (2012) analysed the interest in contracts that stimulate soil 
conservation measures; contracts offering additional credit, land use security and extension services could 
be used to increase participation. Balderas Torres et al. (2013) examined preferences for PES in Mexico. 
They showed that local development interventions included in the PES design can result in a lower 
importance of monetary payments. Kaczan et al. (2013) assessed farmers’ preferences for participation in 
a PES programme with different types of payments in Tanzania. They found that an upfront, in-kind 
payment of fertilizer significantly motivated participation, whereas payments into the village fund did not. 
Marenya et al. (2014) examined smallholders’ preferences for incentives to adopt conservation practices in 
Malawi. Most farmers preferred cash payments to insurance contracts, even when the insurance contracts 
offered higher expected returns. Nordén (2014) used a CE in Costa Rica, and found that landowners with a 
higher dependence on on-farm income had stronger preferences for higher payments. 
In this chapter, the focus is on preferences for PES contracts to adopt SPS. For which, as far as we 
know, no CE studies have been carried out. While different monetary payment levels are included in the 
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CE, we add extra management requirements to some of the contract options to analyse landholders’ 
preferences, instead of focusing on different payment types. As such, we can find out what payment levels 
would incentivize farmers to adopt SPS, but also whether farmers choose contracts with extra requirements. 
Furthermore, such preferences may be highly heterogeneous.  
 
6.2. Methodology 
6.2.1. Research Area 
This research was carried out in the buffer zone of the Podocarpus National Park close to the city of Loja 
in Southern Ecuador (Figure 6.1). Excluding the national park itself (1,472 ha within the research area) and 
the El Carmen and Pizarros watersheds (912 and 734 ha respectively), the study area has a total surface of 
5,475 ha. This area is important for the supply of drinking water to the city of Loja. The municipality of 
Loja is a founding member of the Regional Water Fund (FORAGUA). This fund uses an environmental 
charge included in the water bill, to finance the protection and improvement of watershed services. The 
watersheds of El Carmen and Pizarros have been protected through land purchases and the declaration of 
municipal protected areas. However, in the other watersheds of the research area and the areas surrounding 
them, people continue to raise livestock, mainly dairy cows for milk production. SPS, forest conservation, 
pasture abandonment for restoration and tree plantations can decrease the negative impact of cattle raising 
on water quality and improve the soil’s water retention capacity (Iñiguez–Armijos et al., 2014; Knoke et 
al., 2014). 
In Ecuador, several programmes are currently implemented that try to incentivize the adoption of 
the above-mentioned land management systems. The largest of these programmes is the national, 
government-funded Socio Bosque Programme. Through this programme, private and communal 
landowners receive incentives (or rewards) for the conservation of forest and/or páramo (Andean 
grasslands) (de Koning et al., 2011 and Annex 1 and 6 provide more detail on Socio Bosque). 
The conservation component of Socio Bosque started in 2008. In 2014 the programme additionally 
started the implementation of a new module, focusing on restoration. In the programme restoration can 
focus on the recovery of natural ecosystems through reforestation or natural regeneration. In addition, the 
aim can be enrichment of lands with native species (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2014b). The 
latter includes planting hedges or trees in pastures, both of which can be part of SPS. The programme 
refunds establishment costs during the first three years, after which the participants can receive the Socio 
Bosque incentives.  
Furthermore, for the establishment of timber plantations, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture 
provides incentives through the Incentivo Económico para la Forestación y Reforestación programme 
(Economic Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation) (Ministry of Agriculture, Ecuador, 2013a, 
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2013b). This programme refunds part to all of the investment costs of tree plantations with productive 
purposes.  
The main land management system considered in our analysis is SPS. However, farmers could 
additionally prefer to implement conservation measures for their forests, restore degraded pastures to their 
natural state, or establish timber plantations as an additional (long-term) income source.  
 
Figure 6.1: Research Area (Source: Cevallos and Raes with data from from Ministry of the Environment 
of Ecuador, 2013; GLM, 2013; SENPLADES, 2013; IGM, 2013) 
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6.2.2. CE model design 
The basis of CEs is that “any good can be described in terms of its attributes or characteristics and the levels 
that these take” (Bateman et al., 2002). CEs combine consumer choice theory  (Lancaster, 1966), with 
random utility theory (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). The first theory postulates that utility from a good 
comes from the value of the different attributes of that good. Whereas, according to the second, the 
observation of utility can only be made imperfectly, so the utility of a good consists of deterministic and 
stochastic elements. CEs can be applied to situations wherein an individual selects one alternative from a 
set of different options. Each alternative is represented by a bundle of attributes, a series of characteristics. 
The set of alternatives contained in each question is known as a ‘choice set’ (Aizaki, 2012). In a CE, 
respondents are asked to select the most-preferred alternative from a choice set. In this study, the choice set 
consists of two different contract specifications and a ‘business as usual (BAU)’ situation. The BAU option 
is included to ensure that respondents are not forced to choose an unsatisfactory option (Jaeck and Lifran, 
2014) 
Attribute specification 
The good to be analysed in this study is a contract for the adoption of SPS. In this CE, we aimed to focus 
on these landscape elements that are important for the generation of watershed services and biodiversity 
conservation, and that can be provided by local landowners, specifically milk producers.  
A preliminary list of attributes that described land management practices was derived from a 
literature review and from semi-structured interviews with watershed managers and researchers, and was 
additionally based on existing programmes implemented in Ecuador (see 6.2.1).  
The proposed contracts consist of two parts: (1) the implementation of an SPS system with or 
without additional land management requirements, and with or without the obligation to implement 
additional protection measures for streams on the farmer’s property; and (2) payments conditional on the 
continuation of the contractually stipulated management measures for the duration of the contracts. 
Whereas the government programmes currently state that they will reimburse establishment costs, in the 
contracts we presented in the CE, we specified that inputs such as seedlings would be provided to the 
participants as part of the contract for the implementation of SPS. The provision of seedlings was also 
included in the reforestation option of the additional land management attribute. Further inputs provided 
were barbed wire and poles to fence areas for SPS, restoration (natural recovery), and to restrict access of 
cattle to streams. The supply of these materials can be considered the ICDP part of the contract, as the 
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monetary payments were additional to the supply of inputs. Early withdrawal from a contract, i.e. breaking 
contract conditions, would result in the termination of further payments36. 
The selected contract attributes and their levels are reported in Table 6.1 and can be presented as:  
-  SPS: (1) trees dispersed within pastures (silvo-pastures) and (2) living fences (Murgueitio et al., 
2006). The species to be used are fruit trees and the native Andean alder (Alnus acuminata) a fast 
growing species which can improve water quality and water retention capacity (Knoke et al., 2014), 
and is well-suited for agroforestry (Dunn et al., 1990). It was specified in the questionnaire that a 
minimum of 150 trees/ha had to be planted, based on the minimum necessary to receive credits for 
the implementation of agroforestry systems provided by the National Financial Corporation of 
Ecuador (CFN, 2015). 
- Additional land management requirements: (1) conservation and/or restoration of a minimum of 
15% of the land area37, (2) the establishment of Andean alder plantations, or (3) no additional land 
management system.  
- Access of cows to streams: protection of water sources from cattle can improve water quality (Chará 
and Murgueitio, 2005). Farmers can choose (1) to restrict access by fencing the land, or (2) not 
restricting access. 
- Payments: the payment vehicle was a per hectare annual cash payment ranging from US$ 30 to 
US$ 70 with three levels. The current Socio Bosque payments for conservation are 60 US$/ha per 
year for farmers with less than 20 hectares of overall property, and start at US$/ha 30 per year for 
landowners who own more than 20 hectares of property (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 
2012a).  
- Contract duration: contract duration ranged from five to 20 years. The latter coincides with the 
production cycle of Andean alder and the duration of Socio Bosque contracts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 The Socio Bosque programme is stricter by demanding pay back of a certain amount of money depending on the 
number of years of participation previous to breaking the contract rules (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 
2012d). 
37 The questionnaire specified that in first instance land with stronger slopes and riparian areas should be incorporated. 
These lands are most vulnerable to the impacts of cattle and hence more gains are to be foreseen.  
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Table 6.1: Attributes and attribute levels 
Attributes Dummy 
coding 
Levels 
Opt-Out Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Silvopastoral system Yes None Silvo-pastures Hedges / 
Additional land 
management requirement 
Yes Current state Conservation 
and/or 
restoration 
Andean alder 
plantation 
No extra 
requirement 
Access cows to streams Yes Current 
situation 
No access Access 
allowed 
/ 
Payment (US$/ha/year) No 0 30 50 70 
Contract duration (years) No 0 5 10 20 
 
Survey design and data collection 
Having identified the relevant attributes and levels to be used in the CE, an experimental design was created 
from which the choice sets were constructed.  
A fractional factorial design produced six blocks, each with eight choice sets. The questionnaire 
consisted of three parts. The first questions were on socio-economic characteristics of participating 
households and identified farm characteristics such as crops grown, milk production, and area of crop, 
pasture and forest land. The second part collected information on farmers’ assessment of environmental 
problems and knowledge of existing governmental incentive programmes. Finally, an information section 
explaining the upcoming CE procedure was followed by the CE exercise itself. The CE included visual aids 
for each of the land management attribute options. Questionnaires were filled in during face-to-face 
interviews.    
The questionnaire was tested in the research area with ten households in February 2013. Some 
clarifications had to be added to the CE, but no major changes were made. The CE survey with 120 milk 
producers was carried out from March to July 2013 by students from the National University of Loja. We 
lacked a list of all households owning land within the research area. These households were only listed as 
residents of Loja city, not specifically of the research area. Thus, random sampling was not possible. 
Instead, snowball sampling was used to find respondents (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981; Lavrakas, 2008). 
The watershed managers of Loja’s municipal water company introduced us to a few milk producers raising 
cattle in or around each of the watersheds. These milk producers in turn introduced us to new respondents. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the six survey versions. Participation in the CE was totally 
voluntary. Verbal prior consent was obtained after respondents were informed of the purpose of the survey, 
and were assured individual anonymity. 
Income calculation 
The survey collected information on farm production activities and off-farm income. Non-milk farm 
income (crops, pigs and chickens) was calculated using 2011 prices. Subsistence income was calculated 
with farm gate prices. The official minimum milk price in 2011 of US$/l 0.40, and production cost data 
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from Knoke et al. (2014) were used to calculate milk income. Off-farm income calculations were based on 
national data of income per job type in Ecuador (INEC, 2012c).  
 
6.2.3. CE model specification 
Conditional Logit Model 
In a CE, it is assumed that a farmer will choose a contract for which the net utility is higher than either the 
option of no contract or any of the other choices. The probability of a farmer making a particular choice is 
assumed to increase as the utility of that choice increases (Louviere et al., 2000). The conditional logit 
model (CLM) is the most commonly used discrete choice model for the analysis of CE results. The basic 
model is the standard random utility function (McFadden, 1974).  
In each choice occasion, a respondent faces a choice between j=2 alternatives and the BAU option. 
The vector of observed attributes for the option j in a choice occasion faced by respondent i is labelled as 
Xij. As it is difficult to completely describe a choice only in terms of its characteristics, the random-utility 
model accounts for unobservable elements by adding an error term (Bateman et al., 2002). The utility that 
an individual derives from choosing an alternative in a choice occasion is given by:  
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑈𝐵𝐴𝑈 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                                                                     (1) 
Where CBAU is a constant term that depict the impact that unobserved effects exert over the selection of the 
BAU scenario. It takes the value of 0 if one of the contract options is selected and 1 if the BAU scenario is 
selected. βi is the coefficient vector associated with the attributes and is deterministic and observable. The 
second term εij is the unobservable error term and is assumed to be independent and identically distributed, 
following a Gumbel distribution (Louviere et al., 2000; Swait, 1994). The analysis becomes one of 
probabilistic choice, as predictions cannot be made with certainty since there is an error term in the utility 
function  (Louviere et al., 2000). An individual i, will choose an alternative from a specific choice set, given 
that the utility of this alternative is greater than the utility of any other alternative in the choice set. 
Conditional on βi, he probability (P) that farmer i chooses alternative j in preference to any other alternative 
k can be expressed as:       
𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗)
∑𝑗
𝐽
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑗)
                                                                                                                                    (2) 
Although the relative simplicity of the CLM is an advantage, it has some important limitations. This model 
has only choice attributes included as explanatory variables. The conditional logit assumes that choices are 
consistent with the ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA) property. This property assumes that the 
relative probability of an option being chosen is unaffected by the introduction or removal of alternatives 
(Luce, 1959). This model furthermore assumes that preferences are homogeneous across respondents 
(Hausman and McFadden, 1984). Preferences however, may be heterogeneous and accounting for the 
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preference of heterogeneity enables computations of unbiased estimates of individual preferences. If a 
violation of the IIA assumption is found, then the assumption can be relaxed by employing latent class 
model (LCM) (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). 
Latent Class Model  
Survey data were analysed with a Latent Class Model (LCM) because preferences are expected to be 
heterogeneous. In LCM, heterogeneity follows a discrete distribution, a specification based on the concept 
of endogenous (or latent) preference segmentation. The latter means that each class c=(1,2,…C) is 
homogeneous with respect to attribute preferences, but there is heterogeneity across classes  (Boxall and 
Adamowicz, 2002). Except for the number of classes, LCM does not require any assumption on the 
distribution of the parameters. The detection of respondent classes can be of significant practical use in 
policy design compared to the identification of a continuous distribution of preferences like in random 
parameter models (Kaczan et al., 2013). 
The overall utility that individual i derives from alternative j in a LCM includes an additional term 
ɸ that seeks to capture random preferences among individuals. Preferences are assumed to be constant for 
a given individual across the choices made, but not across the whole sample. The utility function then 
becomes (Swait, 1994): 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 =  𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑈𝐵𝐴𝑈 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑈𝐵𝐴𝑈 +  𝑏𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑗 +  𝜙𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                              (3) 
Where βi has two terms: b represents the associate parameters of the contract attributes, and ɸ is a vector of 
deviation parameters representing individuals’ characteristics (Swait, 1994). Louviere et al. (2000) and 
Swait (1994) provide more details on the model specifications. 
Now, again conditional on βi, the probability (Pij) that farmer i chooses alternative j over any other 
alternative k can be expressed as (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002):      
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = ∑𝑐
𝐶 (𝑃′𝑖,𝑐 .
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑖𝑐𝑋𝑗)
∑𝑗
𝐽
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽𝑖𝑐𝑋𝑗)
)                                                                                                                      (4)                  
Where 𝑃𝑖,𝑐
′  is the probability that an individual i belongs to a latent class c; and βic are the estimates of the 
parameters for attribute preference within each class.  
These parameter estimates and the specific probabilities of class membership are adjusted 
iteratively by maximum likelihood methods to maximize the explanatory power of the LCM for a given 
number of discrete classes C (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). 
The models were estimated with LIMDEP Version 9 (Greene, 2007). Farm and farmer 
characteristics were introduced as interaction terms with the choice attributes. Through trial and error, the 
following covariates were introduced: (1) total forest area; (2) percentage income from milk; and (3) 
respondent’s perception of the quality of their drinking water.  
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Statistical tests 
To analyse differences between the classes of farmers we used several statistical tests. For normality we 
used the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, while we also applied the central limit theorem (Rice, 2007). For 
differences in variances we used F tests for two samples and Bartlett's tests for more than two samples. 
Depending on these analyses for comparing two classes we used either the Mann-Whitney or the two sample 
t-tests. For more classes ANOVA and Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests were used. Analyses were carried out with 
R software  (R Core Team, 2014). 
 
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Characterization of respondents 
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics of characteristics of our sample of 120 respondents. Male 
respondents outnumbered females. Respondents were on average 50 years old, and typically completed 
primary school. Eight respondents earned a university degree, while four received no formal education.  
The farmers of our sample managed around 22% of the land area within the research area, excluding 
the protected areas. The average farm size was 10 ha, although with a high standard deviation (18) within 
the sample. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of all sample farms according to size. For comparison we 
added the distribution of all farms in Loja Province to38. The latter were obtained from the Ministry of 
Agriculture of Ecuador (2012).  
Commercially some farmers produced pigs, whereas most crop production was for household 
consumption. The most important agricultural activity for the majority of farmers was milk production, 
which could be commercial or for subsistence39. The word subsistence may not properly describe all non-
commercial milk farms, some farms could rather be considered as ‘hobby’ farms since to these farm income 
was not an important source of income (or food). The utility they derived was difficult to assess. Hence, for 
some subsistence (non-commercial) farms profit could even be negative. A large part of the households of 
the sample did not depend on milk production for their livelihoods, but rather on off-farm income. 28% of 
households lived below the poverty line, similar to the Ecuadorian average of 29% of the total population 
(INEC, 2011b). Figure 6.3 shows how our sample of households was situated within the Ecuadorian income 
deciles (INEC, 2012c). 
                                                          
38 Farms smaller than 1 hectare are normally not dedicated to cattle and milk production.  
39 25 of the 120 milk farms of the sample were non-commercial. 
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Figure 6.2: Percentage of farms according to farm size for Loja Province and sample, respectively 
 
Figure 6.3: Distribution of sampled households according to Ecuadorian per capita income deciles 
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Table 6.2: Farm and farmer characteristics 
Characteristic Median Mean Standard 
deviation 
Age of respondent (years) 47 50 16 
Number of household members 3 4 1 
Total area (ha) 5 10 18 
Pasture area (ha) 4 6 8 
Crop area (ha) 0.1 0.5 1 
Forest area (ha) 0 3 11 
Off-farm income (US$/year) 3,500 4,310 4,030 
Crop income (US$/year) 90 330 500 
Non-cattle livestock income (US$/year) 0 550 2,040 
Non-milk farm income (US$/year) 200 880 2,280 
Heads of cattle 4 7 10 
Average milk production per cow (l/day) 6 6 2 
Total household milk income (US$/year) 310 510 690 
Milk income per ha (US$/year) 80 90 100 
Total household income (US$/year) 4,350 5,700 4,490 
Income per household member (US$/year) 1,260 1,640 1,190 
Percentage income from farm (%) 18 28 30 
Percentage income from milk (%) 8 14 21 
 
6.3.2. Outcomes of the choice modelling 
Model selection 
Table 6.3 provides a summary of the different test statistics (log likelihood, Bayesian Information Criterion 
- BIC, and Akaike Information Criterion - AIC) used for model selection (Hensher et al., 2005).  A model 
is preferred if it has a lower AIC or BIC (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). The fit of the CLM was low and 
therefore it is further discarded from our analysis. This low fit could be due to the considerable 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences. This was confirmed by the better test statistics for the LCMs.  
Following Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) and Louviere et al. (2000), we defined the number of 
classes based on the BIC, AIC and the credibility of results given the size of the classes. The four class 
model showed the highest BIC, the two class model the lowest. However, the three class model had an AIC 
lower than the two class model. In addition, the two class model had a segmentation that was less 
representative for individual farmers’ preferences than the other LCMs, with most respondents in one class. 
Whereas the four class model had very small numbers of individuals in three out of the four classes. Given 
its good fit and meaningful segmentation, the three class LCM was chosen as the most appropriate model.  
Table 6.3: Criteria for model selection 
Model CLM LCM 2 classes LCM 3 classes LCM 4 classes 
Log likelihood -769 -700 -678 -653 
Number of parameters 7 18 29 40 
AIC 2.154 1.997 1.965 1.924 
BIC 2.199 2.111 2.150 2.179 
Average class probability (%) / 97 91 94 
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Results of contract preferences 
The LCM demonstrated an uneven distribution of farmers’ preferences across the three classes (Table 6.4). 
Class 1 was strongly associated with 53% of the sampled farmers, class 2 with 17% of the sample and class 
3 with 30%. The LCM suggested that different preferences were present with regard to the BAU option. 
Class 2 showed a strong positive preference for the BAU, while class 1 had a negative preference. 
Class 1 contained the largest group of respondents. In addition to having a negative and significant 
BAU coefficient, indicating a preference for the proposed contracts, this class displayed a significant 
aversion towards the conservation/restoration attribute versus no additional land management requirements, 
and for putting fences to protect streams from cattle. However, higher payments increased the likelihood of 
a contract being chosen by this class. Class 2 had a positive BAU coefficient, indicating that its members 
were on the whole reluctant to opt for SPS contracts. When contracts were chosen, the additional 
requirement of restricting access for cattle was the only significant attribute of farmers’ contract 
preferences. Finally, respondents in class 3 displayed a significant preference for the 
conservation/restoration attribute over no additional land management requirement, and the implementation 
of fences for access restriction for cattle over a system where fences was not compulsory. This group stood 
out as the only group with a non-significant parameter estimate for the BAU.  
The type of SPS did not appear to be a significant influence in contract choice for any of the classes. 
The same held true for contract duration. Furthermore, also the establishment of plantations versus no 
additional land management requirements was not a significant attribute in guiding contract preference for 
any of the classes. 
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Table 6.4: Output LCM 
Class  
(probability) 
Attributes Coefficient SE (coef.) P-value  
Class 1  
(0.53)   
 
 
 
 
 
Silvo-pastures -0.1466        0.1742        0.3999         
Conservation/Restoration   -0.5963 0.2248   0.0080   *** 
Andean alder plantations   -0.2309 0.2200     0.2941  
Cows no access to streams   -0.3855 0.2195   0.0790   * 
Payment   0.0088 0.0051   0.0853   * 
Contract duration   0.0058 0.1340   0.6663    
BAU   -1.1308 0.3706   0.0023   *** 
ɸ (1) Forest area -0.1749        0.1004     0.0815 * 
Percentage income from milk -1.8572        1.3888      0.1811  
Water quality perception -1.1668       0.6825      0.0873 * 
Class 2  
(0.17)   
 
 
 
 
 
Silvo-pastures -0.2560        0.4723        0.5878         
Conservation/Restoration   0.4342   0.7256   0.5495  
Andean alder plantations   0.0827   0.8052   0.9182  
Cows no access to streams   1.5460   0.8076   0.0556 * 
Payment   -0.0115   0.0148   0.4360  
Contract duration   0.0072   0.0519   0.8899  
BAU   2.4536   1.0710   0.0220 ** 
ɸ (2) Forest area -0.1353        0.1256        0.2812         
Percentage income from milk  -5.8487          3.0393   0.0543 * 
Water quality perception 0.8771         1.2059   0.4670  
Class 3 
(0.30) 
Silvo-pastures -0.0746        0.3328        0.8225         
Conservation/Restoration   1.1881   0.5284   0.0245 ** 
Andean alder plantations   0.5891   0.4898   0.2291  
Cows no access to streams   2.1449 0.5464  0.0001  *** 
Payment   -0.0051   0.0092   0.5769  
Contract duration   -0.0220   0.0239   0.3580  
BAU -0.5755        0.7094        0.4173         
* Significant at 0.1 
**Significant at 0.05 
***Significant at 0.01 
Farm and farmer characteristics across classes 
Classes did not only differ in terms of contract preferences, but also in terms of farm and farmer 
characteristics of their members. LCM output showed that forest area and perception of water quality 
differed significantly between class 1 and 2. The model additionally revealed that farmers in class 2 received 
a significantly different percentage of their income from milk production than farmers of class 3 (Table 
6.4).  
Post hoc analysis of farm, respondent and household characteristics of the different classes showed 
that, on average, farmers in class 1 had significantly more pasture land area than farmers in class 2, but 
significantly less land than those in class 3 (Table 6.5). Class 1 was also characterized by receiving a 
significantly higher income share from farming than class 2, but lower than class 3. Farmers in Class 2 were 
the least dependent on farm income. The income share from both milk and crops was significantly lower in 
this class compared to that of the other two classes. Class 3 contained households that were more farm-
oriented. They obtained a significantly larger share of their income from farming, specifically from milk 
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production, and had on average more land, including larger pasture, crop and forest areas, and more cattle 
than the other two classes. On the other hand, this class received significantly less income from off-farm 
sources.  
Commercial or non-commercial farming nor the slope of the land provided additional insights into 
explaining differences between classes (Table 6.6). Also in terms of the educational level of the 
respondents, no significant differences between classes were found. 
Table 6.5: Average farmer and farm characteristics of the different classes  
Characteristic Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 p-value  
Age of respondent (years) 49  50  53  0.2020a  
Number of household members 4 4 3 0.2562a  
Total area (ha) 6.5  7  17  0.0480b ** 
Pasture area (ha) 5  5  9  0.0313b ** 
Crop area (ha) 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.1309b  
Forest area (ha) 1 1  7  0.1711b  
Off-farm income (US$/year) 4,590 4,800  3,560  0.1333b  
Crop Income (US$/year) 320 200 420 0.0647b * 
Animal Income (US$/year) 440 90 980 0.6129b  
Non-milk farm income (US$/year) 760  300  1,400  0.2269b  
Heads of cattle 5  5  13  0.0004b *** 
Total milk income (US$/year) 420  310  780  0.0350c ** 
Milk income per ha (US$/year) 90  80  100  0.7230a  
Total household income (US$/year) 5,770 5,400  5,730  0.9500a  
Income per household member (US$/year) 1,620  1,410  1,790  0.4108c  
Percentage income from farm 25 12 41 0.0000c *** 
Percentage income from milk 12  5  23  0.0671b * 
a One-way ANOVA with Tukey Honest Significant Differences Test  
b Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test and Wilcoxon rank sum tests with continuity correction 
c One-way analysis of means and (Welch) Two Sample t-tests 
* Significant at 0.1 
** Significant at 0.05 
*** Significant at 0.01 
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Table 6.6: Differences between classes in level of education, type of milk production activity and slope of 
the land 
 Class 1 
(N=64) 
Class 2 
(N=19) 
Class 3 
(N=37) 
p-valuea 
Percentage of class member  
Level of education      
  No formal education 3 0 5 
0.5090 
  Incomplete primary education 25 42 32 
  Complete primary education 31 21 27 
  Incomplete secondary education 20 21 14 
  Complete secondary education 16 16 8 
  Higher education (university)  5 0 14 
Type of milk production     
  Commercial  78 68 78 
0.6509 
  Non-commercial  22 32 22 
Slope      
  Regular/almost flat 14 0 8 
0.4273 
  Irregular with weak slope 45 42 51.5 
  Irregular with strong slope 25 37 32.5 
  Irregular with weak & strong slope 16 21 8 
a Pearson's χ2 test 
Respondents’ assessment of environmental problems 
Finally, there were a few significant differences between classes as to their respective assessments of several 
environmental problems (Table 6.7). Generally, members of class 1 did not consider the quality of their 
drinking water as good. This was opposed to the other two classes, where the majority considered the 
drinking water to be of good quality. Furthermore, in comparison to the other two classes, significantly 
more class 1 members did not consider that they had erosion problems on their land. Significantly more 
respondents in class 1 considered the stream water to be polluted compared to class 3. Moreover, the 
perception on the negative impact of cattle on water quality differed significantly between class 2 and 3, 
with more agreement on this negative impact in class 3. Also more members of the class 3 considered that 
cattle caused erosion compared to the other two classes.    
When considering awareness of existing environmental programmes, a majority of members of 
class 3 did know the Socio Bosque Programme, compared to only a minority in the other two classes. 
Finally, awareness of the PROFERESTAL40 programme in class 1 was significantly lower than in the other 
two classes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 Name of the previous programme of timber plantation subsidies. It was changed to the new programme during the 
CE. 
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Table 6.7: Farmers’ assessment of environmental problems and awareness of alternative government 
programmes (in % of class members) 
 Class 1 (N= 64) Class 2 (N= 19) Class 3 (N= 37) p-valuea 
Yes No NA Yes No NA Yes No NA 
Is the quality of drinking water good here? 30 70 0 74 26 0 59 41 0 0.0004*** 
Is the stream water polluted? 70 30 0 53 47 0 54 41 5 0.1144 
Erosion problems on your land? 37 52 11 21 37 42 38 38 24 0.0374** 
Erosion problems on neighbours’ lands? 33 42 25 32 26 42 46 22 32 0.1914 
Does cattle husbandry have a negative 
impact on water quality? 
75 17 8 53 37 10 76 11 13 0.1556 
Does cattle husbandry cause erosion? 50 47 3 37 58 5 65 24 11 0.0686* 
Do you know the Socio Bosque Programme 22 78 0 26 74 0 57 43 0 0.0013*** 
Do you know the PROFORESTAL 
Programme 
5 95 0 37 63 0 24 76 0 0.0008*** 
a Pearson's χ2 test of differences among the 3 classes 
* Significant at 0.1 
** Significant at 0.05 
*** Significant at 0.01 
6.4. Discussion  
This study showed that the preference for SPS contracts and the impact of additional environmental 
requirements varied among farmers, with a relatively large group of farmers preferring SPS contracts that 
guarantee higher payments. This observed heterogeneity in contract preferences is similar to what was 
found by Matta et al. (2009), Broch and Vedel (2012), Beharry-Borg et al. (2013) and Rabotyagov and Lin 
(2013).    
Class 1 consisted of households that, in terms of farm and household income characteristics 
analysed, were situated in between the other two classes. Members of this first class showed a clear aversion 
for the BAU. This group additionally disliked the option of forest conservation or taking land out of 
production for restoration, or adding water access requirements to the contract. They only showed a 
significant positive preference for the payment attribute of the proposed contracts. Members of this class, 
on average, owned no or only a small forest patch; so conservation may be of little interest. Whereas the 
lack of interest in abandonment of pastures for restoration could partially be explained by the fact that the 
majority of the members in class 1 did not consider erosion, and thus one aspect of pasture degradation, to 
be a problem on their land. In addition, class 1 members did not show any significant preference for one of 
the two productive land management attributes (timber plantations or no additional requirement beyond 
SPS). Rosa et al. (2004) note that smaller landowners are more likely to participate in PES schemes that 
incorporate land management systems with a productive orientation, such as agroforestry (SPS).  
That members of class 1 preferred contracts with higher payments, and without additional 
restrictions is not surprising. In a similar line, Horne (2006) and Ruto and Garrod (2009) found that 
payments increased with more conditionality, whereas Matta et al. (2009) found that more restrictions 
lowered participation in conservation programme. Bremer et al. (2014), in their analysis on participation in 
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the Socio Bosque programme for páramo conservation, found that for most participants payments were an 
important motivation to participate. However, they add that the maintenance or improvement of water 
supply and biodiversity were also important factors in explaining programme participation. 
Most class 1 members considered water and stream quality to be low, and were aware that cattle 
had negative effects, especially on water quality. However, a majority did not consider erosion to be a 
problem on their land. Vignola et al. (2010) in their analysis on the adoption of soil conservation in a Costa 
Rican watershed, found that although farmers can be aware of the impact of agriculture on soil stability, 
they may underestimate the impacts of their own activities on erosion. Furthermore, members of class 1 
could have thought that there was not much they could do to improve water quality and decrease stream 
pollution.  
Class 2 was the least interested in SPS contracts. Farmers in class 2 depended less on income from 
farming than farmers in the other classes, and would thus experience less of a potential impact on household 
income of participating in the PES contracts. Their preferences may thus depend less on how well payments 
would match their opportunity costs, and could be based more on their direct interest or trust in the 
programme. Mistrust in the government (or other PES implementers) and a fear that PES may lead to 
expropriation of land are essential factors in PES participation (e.g. Bremer et al., 2014; Southgate and 
Wunder, 2009; Zanella et al., 2014). The implementation of in-kind payments and extension services in the 
Bolivian PES scheme in Los Negros, was based on the observation that for participants “paying cash 
‘smells’ more like giving up property rights—whether that fear is rational or not” (Asquith et al., 2008, p. 
679).  
Class 2 preferred the BAU, but additionally showed willingness to improve environmental 
conditions by restricting access of cows to streams. Thus, an ICDP where farmers are provided with the 
necessary materials to decrease the negative impact of cattle on water quality could have been more 
interesting for this class. The preference for the BAU could also be related to the fact that the majority of 
the members in this group did not consider that cattle causes erosion, whereas a large group within this 
class did not know whether or not they had erosion problems on their land. Environmental education as part 
of an ICDP may better solve these issues than PES.  
Class 3 only showed a significant preference for the additional requirement of forest 
conservation/restoration (versus no additional land management system), and access restriction to streams. 
Class 3 had more forest, which could explain why in this class there was a strong interest in conservation. 
However, this does not explain the preference for stream access restriction. Just as class 1, class 3 members 
agreed that cattle husbandry had a negative impact on water quality, and more members than in the other 
two classes considered cattle to be a cause of erosion. Nevertheless, in line with class 2, they considered 
that water quality was good, while less of this class’ members considered there were no problems with 
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erosion on their land. This class may thus consists of farmers with some knowledge of problems and what 
to do about them, with an additional motivation to maintain the currently good water quality.  
It can, however, still be considered surprising that higher payments did not increase the likelihood 
of farmers in class 3 to choose contracts. However, some farmers may value conservation on its own, above 
the level of payment  (e.g. Juutinen et al., 2013; Siebert et al., 2010; Putten et al., 2011). Bremer et al. 
(2014) found that the majority of Socio Bosque participants they interviewed described incentives as a 
conservation ‘reward’. In general, many studies found that non-financial motivations, such as positive 
attitudes towards conservation influence participation in conservation-oriented programmes (Cranford and 
Mourato, 2011; Kosoy et al., 2007; Lienhoop and Brouwer, 2015). 
 That class 3 members showed a preference for conservation may also be due to their awareness of 
the Socio Bosque Programme (which was only focused on conservation at the time of field research). For 
example, Zanella et al. (2014) in their study on PES in Brazil found that access to information on PES 
programmes was the most important variable explaining higher likelihood of participation.  
As was already mentioned, farmers in class 3 on average had larger farm areas, not only forest, but 
also pasture land. Larger farm sizes have been related to a more pronounced participation in conservation 
PES programmes (e.g. Zbinden and Lee, 2005).  
Class 3 also contained more farm-oriented households, whereas class 2 was the least farm-oriented. 
Our results are thus in contrast to those of Nordén (2014), who found that landowners who did not 
participate in the Costa Rican PES programme were more dependent on farm income. Besides the larger 
land area and thus higher possibility of diversifying land uses, the choice of class 3 farmers for PES 
contracts could be due to the fact that households who depend on farm income for a larger share of their 
income could have a strong interest in additional ways to diversify farm-related income sources. PES 
contracts can have a risk reduction effect, as payments can be a more secure income source for households 
who want to diversify their income (Siebert et al., 2006; Wünscher et al., 2008). 
Overall, the analysis did reveal some problems with the implementation of the proposed PES 
contracts. Specifically for classes 2 and 3, (higher) payment were not a significant contract attribute. This 
complicates the implementation of conditionality based on withholding payment. As such, the 
differentiation between PES and ICDPs based on conditionality becomes weaker. In addition, according to 
Kauffman (2013), in Ecuador ICDPs are used by to overcome concerns about privatization and the 
commoditization of nature associated with strict PES schemes. It is argued that “individual cash payments 
fail to instil a sense of value in conservation among farmers living in watersheds” (Kauffman, 2013, p. 9). 
The inclusion of ICDP-type attributes in contracts has also been shown to positively impact participation 
(e.g. Kaczan et al., 2013) or decrease the importance of cash payments (e.g. Balderas Torres et al., 2013).  
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Conversely, for class 1 conditionality could be implemented, but then the problem may be that the 
implementation of SPS and additional actions stops, once the contract stops. Hayes (2012) in her analysis 
of a silvopastoral PES programme in Colombia, found that without payments less than half of the 
programme participants would continue with the implementation of the SPS. She adds that “for many 
farmers, the decision to participate in the silvopastoral programme was influenced by perceived immediate 
gains, not the illusive long-term benefits of the new management system”.  
According to Siebert et al. (2006), (financial) incentives are a necessary, although clearly not 
sufficient condition to support practices oriented towards biodiversity protection. As such, to increase 
support and sustainability of the proposed programme for the adoption of SPS, a hybridized scheme in 
which PES concepts are combined with ICDPs  may be better suited (e.g. Petheram and Campbell, 2010).  
The Socio Bosque programme is now providing a range of different modules within its programme, 
and our analysis showed an interest for specific parts of the programme. However, trust and sustainability 
beyond conditionality should still be tackled. According to Clements et al. (2010), strengthening local 
resource management rules and building local management organisations, in addition to payments or up-
front delivery of materials, may increase the sustainability of a PES programme, even beyond the duration 
of the programme. Cranford and Mourato (2011) state that community conservation can improve aspects 
such as environmental awareness and a social context encouraging conservation in a first stage of PES 
implementation. Afterwards, an incentive mechanism can be implemented to strengthen the new 
conservationist behaviour. 
Furthermore, our CE was still based on a top-down proposal of what experts considered the most-
suited actions for the improvement and conservation of watershed services and biodiversity. According to 
Hayes (2012), local resource users should be engaged from the start in the design and application of 
programmes. As such, even those who showed aversion to the contracts we proposed, could have suggested 
contract attributes that would have increased their choices for PES contracts. Engagement of local 
stakeholders in a hybridized ICDP-PES scheme may thus maximize participation, facilitate conditionality 
and increase the sustainability of a PES programme in our research area.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter used a CE to elucidate farmers’ preferences for alternative types of contracts for the adoption 
of SPS in the buffer zone of Podocarpus National Park. A three-class LCM was found to provide a good 
representation of observed choices, and a clear and relevant segmentation of farmers’ choice behaviour. 
Farmers were found to have heterogeneous preferences for different SPS contracts with and without 
additional environmental requirements.  
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Results confirmed that there is potential for the implementation of a PES-type scheme for the 
adoption of SPS, given the strong preferences of a small majority of farmers (53%) for some type of contract 
for the establishment of SPS. In addition, one group of farmers (30%) did not show positive nor negative 
preference for the BAU. Thus, a large group of farmers could be encouraged to adopt SPS and thereby 
enhance delivery of certain watershed services. However, those farmers that were least dependent on farm 
income, showed a strong preference for the BAU. Risk, uncertainty and trust may be reasons as to why 
some farmers would prefer not to change production systems.  
Results suggested that the best way forward for a maximum outreach is the provision of different 
types of PES contracts within the same incentive programme and to let farmers’ chose - as the Socio Bosque 
programme is increasingly doing. However, while most farmers could be motivated to participate by 
providing different contract types, some appear to be reluctant to participate in any type of PES scheme. 
Building of trust, allowing direct participation of farmers in contract and programme design, and the 
inclusion of ICDPs within the PES programme may be able to address these challenges.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 Summary of the empirical conclusions  
A PES contract is a coordination mechanism between those who provide ES and those who benefit from 
ES provision, or other actors, normally governments who represent ES users directly or indirectly. 
Following Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2009), these mechanisms are better understood as contractual 
arrangements, which is a hybrid mode of governance in contrast to other mechanisms such as markets 
(coordination through trade) or the strict use of environmental regulations (coordination through authority).  
In the research area of this PhD thesis, the land that lies in the buffer zone of Podocarpus National 
Park is partially used by households for productive purposes. The area hosts globally significant 
biodiversity and includes many watersheds that provide ES to downstream beneficiaries who mainly reside 
in the city of Loja. These beneficiaries are organised through a municipal water company. Through water 
infrastructure it is possible to identify and charge beneficiaries for the provision of watershed services. 
Furthermore, these services have characteristics of a common-pool-resource (creating the need to 
coordinate resource use). Biodiversity has public good characteristics and often needs public intervention 
to assure its conservation. Biodiversity as an ES is frequently linked or bundled with the provision of 
watershed services. In areas where ES provision is degraded due to farm households’ choices for specific 
land uses, where property rights over land are clear, and where funding mechanisms are available - as is the 
case in the research area - PES can be a mechanism to conserve and/or improve the provision of ES. 
This research provided causal evidence of the effectiveness and impacts of PES and compares 
different mechanisms aimed at maintaining and/or securing ES, while simultaneously contributing to 
household income. The study focused on the trade-offs and synergies between nature conservation and the 
maintenance and improvement of ES, and the provision of rural income in the buffer zone of Podocarpus 
National Park in Ecuador. Both environmental and social outcomes of PES were evaluated, and compared 
to other mechanisms in order to increase understanding of the impact of PES relative to other mechanisms.  
 
The first analytical block of this PhD (Chapter 3) introduced PES schemes’ design. In this chapter the 
design characteristics of different Andean and Mesoamerican PES and PES-type schemes were analysed to 
assess if these schemes, as hybrid forms of governance, over time incorporated more market characteristics, 
more characteristics of a hierarchy or remained unchanged.  
Findings show that the schemes analysed cover a range of hybrid arrangements; some resemble 
small markets and others are complete hierarchical organisations. Over time, more schemes have 
incorporated command-based methods to organise users, while most schemes are based on contracts with 
voluntary providers. Through the provision of positive incentives to providers that aim to increase or 
maintain the supply of ES there is a certain market orientation in PES. From the users’ side there is more 
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diversification, with schemes having incorporated a wide range of participation and payment setting 
mechanisms. Intermediaries remain the dominant actors in most schemes, and are predominantly national 
or local governments. Overall the organisation of PES (and PES-like) schemes studied became more 
complex over time.  
Currently, in the common conceptualization of PES, PES are mainly seen as contractual 
arrangements between ES users, or an entity representing them, and individual and/or communal 
landholders for the provision of ES. To study the effectiveness of this mode of governance was our main 
focus in the two chapters devoted to assessing the impact of the PES contracts studied in the second 
analytical block of this thesis.   
In Chapter 4 the cost-effectiveness in terms of ES provision, conservation and rural income 
generation of three incentive mechanisms were compared: A PES contract, Socio Bosque, was compared 
to buying-selling land through the FORAGUA programme, which is a hierarchical mode of governance, 
and the use of an organic coffee label as a case of the use of a market for an environmentally friendly 
product.  
It was found that purchasing land should strongly increase the provision of ES, and thus scores best 
in terms of additionality. However, taking land out of production is expensive and may have negative effects 
on local development. Paying private landowners through conservation contracts increased total (rural) 
income. However, poorer households were often excluded from these contracts, and when they do 
participate, payments were low due to small land areas and the limited amount of payments they received 
per hectare. Moreover, mainly due to their lower access to land and higher opportunity costs, it costs more 
to include smallholders in a PES scheme. Receiving income through price premiums for organic production 
has, in the area studied, the most positive impact on rural incomes. PES and PES-like schemes were 
however cheaper to implement than a programme that aims to increase agricultural production. Hence, we 
found a trade-off between increasing conservation and ES provision, and the generation of rural (household) 
income.  
Next, to gain more insights in the trade-offs between providing ES through the adoption or 
maintenance of specific land-use practices and income generation, a portfolio analysis was carried out to 
study the impact and combination of several programmes. The programmes studied were the Ecuadorian 
incentive programme for forest conservation and restoration on abandoned pastures (Socio Bosque), and 
an incentive programme for timber plantations. The current land use in the research area was milk 
production on existing pastures. Additionally one group of farmers had forests on their lands. Results 
suggest that most farmers would increase the area under conservation and/or restoration in a strategy that 
would decrease income risks the most in absolute terms (minimum variance portfolio), beyond what would 
be expected from decisions considering expected return only. In a risk-reduction strategy that aims at 
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maximizing the returns per unit of risk (optimal portfolio), milk producers without forest would also 
allocate most of their land to restoration, although a small group would continue milk production on most 
of their land. Milk producers with forest would shift milk production on existing pastures to milk production 
on pastures established after deforestation under both portfolio strategies, which evidenced a potential 
leakage effect. Moreover, in any of the portfolio land use allocations analysed that included inventive 
programmes, only a small area was dedicated to the establishment of tree plantations.  
None of the portfolios would increase all households’ income to above the poverty line due to small 
farm sizes and low payments. Moreover, a negative impact on household income was observed from 
adopting the land use portfolios for milk producers without forest, whereas for forest holders all land use 
combinations studied would have a positive impact. For those producers without forest, there seems to be 
a trade-off between maximizing household income on the one hand, and risk reduction through a 
combination of restoration payments and tree plantations, on the other.  
Conservation, and in certain situation restoration payments, can thus have a positive impact on 
household income when the payments are an extra source of income and/or where payments are higher than 
income from milk production. Yet, the effect on poverty reduction is limited. The size of Socio Bosque 
payments is not based on household income nor on the number of people in a household that received the 
payment, but uses only farm size as an (insufficient) proxy for poverty. So although it may be an important 
mechanism for conservation, and in the future maybe for restoration, there does exist a trade-off between 
the dual goals of protecting and restoring the largest area possible versus reducing poverty. This is mainly 
due to the limited area of land that poor landholders can conserve and/or restore, which results in limited 
income effects. For tree plantations the biggest issue is the long time span before income becomes available. 
As such it may be an interesting saving option, but it will not decrease poverty in the short term.  
The third analytical block of this PhD research focused on understanding the (potential) impacts of 
PES contracts by analysing the design and preference for different contracts. Chapter 6 studied the 
preferences of milk producers in terms of PES contracts for silvopastoral systems with and without 
additional environmental requirements, and assessed the determinants of these preferences.  
Results confirmed that there is potential for the implementation of a PES-type scheme for the 
adoption of silvopastoral systems in the research area, yet with high heterogeneity in these preferences. A 
large group of farmers could be encouraged to voluntarily adopt silvopastoral systems and thereby enhance 
delivery of watershed services and biodiversity. The results suggest that farmland area, income from 
agriculture - specifically from milk production, the percentage of farm income in total income, and 
landowners’ perception of environmental problems provide a partial explanation for the considerable 
heterogeneity observed in the preferences for specific contracts. Although offering contracts with varying 
additional management requirements within the same scheme may contribute to enhance participation, and 
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thus ES provision, enforcing contracts based on conditionality may be problematic as for one group of 
farmers payment levels did not significantly influence the choice of specific contracts. In addition, one 
small group of farmers is reluctant to change the way they farm and participate in PES contracts. Building 
of trust and combining PES with ICDPs may be better to target these farmers. 
 
7.2. Overall conclusions 
The main objective  of this research was to analyse the (potential) impacts and trade-offs of PES contracts 
for the conservation and improvement of ES and the provision of rural income; and to compare the use of 
PES contracts with other incentive mechanisms and land uses implemented in the research area. 
Designing an optimal strategy that maximizes both nature conservation and the services it provides, 
as well as income of poorer households is very difficult. Indeed, the analyses showed that it seems hard to 
reconcile both policy aims in a single PES scheme, as there is a trade-off between increasing ES provision 
and improving rural livelihoods.  
Socio Bosque’s PES contracts are more cost-effective for ES provision. Yet, more production 
oriented incentives such as the organic coffee label analysed or the potential of increased milk production, 
seem to be better tools to improve household income (Chapter 4 and 5). Increased milk production will, 
however, not have the same positive impact on ES provision as organic coffee unless there is a shift towards 
silvopastoral production systems, which could be supported through a PES mechanism (Chapter 6). 
Nonetheless, Socio Bosque’s contracts do have a strong risk-reduction effect compared to income from 
more productive land uses, such as milk production and the establishment of tree plantations (Chapter 5). 
The lower impact of the PES contracts analysed on household income for the poorer households is related 
to the double effect of low payments and the limited land resources available to many households (Chapter 
4 and 5). The and area available also influences the preferences for specific PES contracts, with those with 
more land being more likely to prefer contracts that include restoration/conservation measures, instead of 
only productive land uses (Chapter 6).  
Overall, the research area is particularly adapted and receptive to the possibility of extending the 
PES programme from what is currently in place. In order to achieve this, PES should not stand alone and 
be considered as part of several programmes and/or actions, to promote sustainable ecosystem management. 
The combination of several programmes operating within the research area could consist of acquiring land 
in the most severely degraded watersheds or key biodiversity areas (Chapter 3 and 4), paying landowners 
for forest conservation and restoration of natural vegetation on pastures (Chapter 4 and 5), establishing 
additional contracts for silvopastoral systems (Chapter 6), and implementing projects to support 
improvement and/or adoption of coffee or other agroforestry production systems for smallholders (Chapter 
4 and 6). This would facilitate balancing increasing conservation, ES provision, and rural livelihoods and 
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landholders’ preferences. To enhance the impacts of PES, the broader environment, the allocation of 
remaining resources such as through the intensification potentially occurring on the remaining land under 
production, as well as the combined effects when implementing several programmes need to be considered, 
as these may have a negative effect on the provision of particular ES.  
 
7.3. Theoretical conclusions 
The research defined PES as contractual arrangements. They are defined as a coordination mechanism or 
institutional arrangement that can provide a solution for governing resources with common-pool-resource 
and public good characteristics.  
This theoretical framework provided a tool to connect the actors with the land uses that are part of 
the resource system, i.e. the buffer zone. The framework was suitable for the analysis of outcomes of PES 
and other modes of governance used in ES governance, by distinguishing within an action arena the 
interactions of the different actors from the measured outcomes. The focus was on the operational situation, 
i.e. the day-to-day impacts of incentives for actors on land uses.  
The emphasis on individual households and contracts as a solution to problems of collective action 
is relevant in the research area, where over 50,000 households benefit from watershed services. In addition, 
land-use choice in terms of allocating land to different agricultural purposes is based partially on the income 
generating potential of these land uses. Comparing this potential with alternative income generating PES 
contracts makes is sensible from a households land allocation point of view.  
 However, the choice to focus on individual households does not imply that there is no room for 
community norms and regulation of behaviour in the research area. Community regulations may be 
implemented together with PES contracts and are not necessarily in conflict with PES. PES are not meant 
to replace social conventions for nature conservation by money. PES contracts are an additional tool to 
reward good stewardship that can go beyond the standards set in environmental regulations such as 
municipal ordinances, and as was previously discussed are closely related to the improved implementation 
of these regulations. In addition, for joint-PES contracts or for an organic certification to obtain a price 
premium, collective action through the formation of a producer association is necessary.  
 PES are not markets. However, theoretical market and hierarchy characteristics provide a tool to 
understand and better characterize different types of PES schemes. Hereby ES characteristics, user and 
provider group size and the perception of PES by policy implementers provide explanations of when and 
how contractual arrangements are used. Further research into the diversity of PES schemes could focus 
further on transaction costs economics theory (e.g. Williamson, 1985), specifically nature related 
transactions (Hagedorn, 2008), and understanding hybrid modes of governance not only as combinations 
of modes of governance, but as specific governance structures with their own defining characteristics.  
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 The resistance amongst certain environmental pressure groups to putting a price on nature is often 
based on doubts about using efficiency criteria to evaluate the suitability of policies or the ‘fear’ of the 
commoditisation of nature. We argue for more cost-effectiveness studies instead of focusing on efficiency 
because, as proven in Chapter 4, cost-effectiveness analysis enables comparing the impact of different 
conservation and income generating programmes without having to put a monetary value on ES. Given 
limited budgets for implementing conservation actions, such analyses provide the necessary information to 
make informed choices. This does not mean that this PhD research advocates a utilitarian vision on nature, 
but only takes into account that in places where humans interact with the environment, the productive 
function of land use is an important driver for human behaviour and hence needs to be taken into account 
when trying to stop degradation or to reverse the situation. However, in this PhD we focused on the costs 
of reaching a predefined ecological outcome.  
To improve the analysis the optimization of the outcome should also be included. Additionally, the 
cost-effectiveness analysis could further be improved by using quantitative data on measured ES provision 
of the different land uses analysed, instead of having to rely on a proxy such as the ESI used. Although the 
indicator provided a useful tool in Chapter 4 as actual data were not available, the indicator suffers from 
short-comings. The ESI does not take into account the potential trade-offs or synergies between different 
ES (Cordingley et al., 2015; Howe et al., 2014) and could raise problems of double counting of ES (Boyd 
and Banzhaf, 2007; Fu et al., 2010). An additional problem that was not considered when measuring ES 
provision with the ESI was the potential impact of scale. Scale can have a positive impact on the provision 
of ES, such as the positive impact of an increased forest area on water flow regulation (Farley et al., 2005; 
Thomas and Nisbet, 2007). 
 Portfolio theory was used to analyse income generation and risk reduction when adopting 
diversification strategies, while a choice experiment was used to analyse landholders’ preferences for PES 
contracts for the adoption of silvopastoral systems. Such modelling and ex ante simulation exercises can be 
useful to predict behaviour of the local actors and to optimize the impact of proposed PES schemes as they 
operationalize the trade-offs between improving ES provision and income generation/risk reduction, and 
thus predict expected behaviour of potential stakeholders.  
 In this research poverty was understood from a monetary point of view and not from the broader 
vision of capabilities, livelihoods and well-being. This choice was inspired by the nature of PES, being a 
monetary transfer to ES providers impacting directly on income. The impact on well-being could be an area 
of future research.  
A weakness of many PES is that they are externally designed and proposed and often do not take 
the opinion of the local stakeholders into account, while these stakeholders may have other possible 
solutions in mind. We therefore think that the analytical approaches proposed in this PhD may also be 
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useful from this point of view as they can help to fill the gap between external and internal objectives and 
viewpoints. An additional step could be to link our research methodology to participative policy or planning 
tools. This could increase the fairness feeling about proposed solutions and thus also the acceptance and 
approval rate by local inhabitants.  
  A last theoretical remark is that, although this research started from a broad perspective on the 
provision of environmental goods and of ES, our analysis was limited to land uses that provide ES. The 
PES analysed intervene in the way land is used and do not concentrate on the commoditisation of 
environmental goods produced or on ES that stand apart from complex ecosystems.  
 
7.4. Conclusions and recommendations 
7.4.1. PES as a mechanism for nature conservation and the improvement of ES provision 
It is widely acknowledged that PES are not a (or the) silver bullet that will halt or even reverse 
environmental degradation in the tropics. However, in areas where there is a clear link between land use 
and the ES provided, and between these ES and the benefits for their users, PES can improve ES delivery 
and provide a clear framework to justify the collection and spending of PES resources. These resources can 
be taxes or tariffs (as in the research area), but can also be provided through private financing in addition 
to government resources.   
Some criticize PES because they are a way to create markets and put a price on nature, while they 
do not necessarily put a halt on ecosystem degradation. The focus on nature conservation/restoration and 
land use is in our view a way to go beyond this debate and not fall in the pitfall of commoditization of ES 
as such. Markets for ES and commoditized ES are actually an exception (Chapter 3), whereas putting a 
price on nature is not a prerequisite for PES (e.g. Wunder, 2013).  
Land use decisions are often based on production choices, which impact on ES provision. If PES 
can alter this choice, they can make a positive contribution to nature conservation and ES provision. From 
an expected revenue perspective, the payments currently offered by the Socio Bosque programme are for 
most farmers lower than the income gained from alternative land uses; as such, the contracts do not fully 
compensate farmers for land use changes. This could decrease the impact of these contracts on improvement 
in ES provision. However, the (potential) impact on opportunity costs of improved application of land use 
regulations, and the risk reduction effect of contracts makes PES an interesting option for diversification 
strategies (Chapter 5). Furthermore, in the research area we found that households in general did express 
preferences for such contracts. Although households revealed these preferences in different ways, for 
different management requirements with diverse levels of ES provision (Chapter 6). 
Payments included in PES contracts can however still be too low to improve ES provision in areas 
where higher value commodities are produced, or where there is high potential for land use intensification. 
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In both cases payments would have to be higher. Therefore PES are mainly a tool in areas where the trade-
offs between ES provision and exploitive land uses are limited, but important, as is the case for most milk 
farms analysed in the research area (Chapter 4 and 5). PES can thus help to achieve conservation outcomes, 
but not everywhere, and not with every individual landholder. Their impact on nature conservation is much 
lower than the impact international commodities’ markets and the implementation of protected areas have 
on land use decisions.  
Protected area implementation is linked to land use regulations, and PES contracts are not 
independent from these regulations (Chapter 3 and 5). As good water quality is a necessity, and as a 
sufficient number of landholders need to participate in a scheme to make PES effective, the implementation 
of PES contracts is strongly related to the implementation of regulative approaches. Within the research 
area this relates specifically to the implementation of municipal ordinances to govern land uses (Chapter 5 
and 6). As was mentioned earlier, regulations can decrease the opportunity costs of land uses with a (more) 
negative impact on ES provision, and as such make PES more attractive. Additionally, the combined use 
of regulations and PES can assure that a sufficient number of landholders participate to make the scheme 
effective.  
This observation may go against the perception that PES participation should be completely 
voluntary (see Chapter 3). However, as was also observed in Chapter 3, legislation exists, also in Ecuador, 
that regulates land uses such as forest conversion (see also Chapter 2). The improved implementation of 
the law can go in hand with PES initiatives, even when this may decrease the efficiency of PES schemes. 
This joint implementation has been observed in Costa Rica’s national scheme, where both the scheme and 
new forestry legislation were introduced simultaneously (Arriagada et al., 2012; Calvo-Alvarado et al., 
2009; Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007). Furthermore, compulsory participation in PES schemes exists (see 
for example China’s sloping land programme, (Kelly and Huo, 2013)). Mandatory participation has been 
linked to improved positive environmental effects of PES schemes (Brouwer et al., 2011). PES are not a 
tool that is additional to the law, but a part of it. As such PES contracts should be seen as a set of institutional 
arrangements that have the potential to reinforce the law in its implementation and impact.  
However, whether it is ‘fair’ to pay landholders to abide the existing laws is an ongoing discussion. 
In areas such as the research area it may be considered that it is fair to pay landholders through PES for 
income losses due to investment in conservation/restoration activities, as the majority of households are not 
part of the richest segments of society (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Moreover, including landholders as ES 
stewards may improve the protection status of the buffer zone, and thus also of the protected area, by 
increasing the number of people involved in conservation. 
Besides PES for conservation and restoration of natural ecosystems, the research also showed the 
potential of including productive land uses in PES (Chapter 6). In the analysis productive land uses were 
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mainly considered from the perspective of household income generation (Chapter 4 and 5), and less as a 
system to provide ES (Chapter 4 and 6). Yet, when no natural ecosystems have to be degraded for their 
establishment, certain productive systems can have a positive impact on ES provision. There is increasing 
evidence that biologically diversified farming systems can provide a much wider range of ES additional to 
food or fibre (Gomiero et al., 2011; Kremen and Miles, 2012). Diversified farming systems can achieve 
this provision of ES producing less externalities than conventional farming systems (Gomiero et al., 2011; 
Tilman et al., 2002). These systems can additionally take advantage of specific ES such as pollination or 
pest control (Hajjar et al., 2008; Letourneau et al., 2009; Morandin and Winston, 2006; Vandermeer et al., 
2010), although they are not always as productive as conventional farming systems (de Ponti et al., 2012; 
Seufert et al., 2012).   
Finally, the potential of PES impacting positively on ES provision and biodiversity conservation is 
not only linked to the use of positive incentives to influence landholders land use decisions, but also to the 
sanctions for non-compliance with the agreed contractual obligations (conditionality, as discussed in 
Chapter 3). This conditionality is important to ensure compliance for the duration of the PES contract. In 
order to further strengthen the conditionality linked to PES, an additional important aspect that should be 
addressed is the lack of sanctioning mechanisms for non-compliance for the entity that signs the contracts 
with ES providers (such as the Socio Bosque Secretariat). Providers can be sanctioned in most PES 
schemes, for example through withholding or stopping payments (as for example proposed in Chapter 6). 
PES contracts, however, normally do not stipulate sanctioning mechanisms in case a government or other 
actors involved in PES implementation decide to no longer pay providers, in a situation where providers 
are complying with the contract. There is often little accountability and external control for implementers. 
This asymmetry can be a source of distrust of landholders towards PES, hence potentially complicating 
PES participation (see e.g. preferences of some milk producers for the BAU scenario in Chapter 6). The 
lack of conditionality for users (and/or buyers) can furthermore decrease environmental effectiveness and 
PES sustainability. There is thus a need to develop PES with contractual obligations from both sides.  
 
7.4.2. PES as a mechanism to reduce poverty and empower rural households 
Despite some uncertainty linked with PES conditionality, it is much more complicated to use PES as a way 
to reduce poverty than it is to decrease environmental degradation. This was observed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
A significant positive impact on household income is unlikely in the current Socio Bosque Programme. 
Under the existing system poorer households will not be lifted out of poverty unless they own larger tracks 
of forests. Hence, to contribute more to poverty alleviation, payment levels should either increase or poorer 
households could be targeted by programmes focusing more on environmentally-friendly production 
systems that increase land productivity and/or agricultural income (Chapters 4 and 6). The latter is 
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especially relevant if we consider that increasing PES payments could decrease environmental 
effectiveness, if increased payments are not covered through an increase in the budget available. With 
increased payments and a fixed budget, less households and thus a lower land area would be targeted. PES, 
as a contract for ES provision, can only do as much as to pay a correct remuneration for the delivery of ES 
or for the implementation of specific land use systems. However, PES are not the right policy option to 
address issues such as land inequality, real poverty reduction or income generation. Other actions such as 
land reform, improvement of infrastructure, education and off-farm job opportunities will probably have a 
much larger impact than any land-based policy, because poorer households are restricted in the land they 
own. PES can thus only be considered an additional tool for poverty reduction. Yet, it can be a choice to 
only pay poorer landholders for conservation even if that would decrease environmental effectiveness. This 
may however conflict with the initial objective of PES, which is to reduce environmental degradation.  
Moreover, only paying poorer households for conservation and not the relatively richer households may 
create conflicts in the programme area a and within communities. PES as a tool for poverty alleviation is 
thus probably more effective in areas with large numbers of poorer households and/or poor communities, 
where conflict between those who receive PES (poorer households) and those who don’t (richer 
households) is less likely, as all or most households will benefit. 
 One aspect that may not directly impact household income, but that can increase social capital and 
decision-making power for poorer households, is taking into account preferences of households for specific 
land uses within a PES scheme, as in Chapter 6. This implies that ideally landholders should be included in 
PES design and implementation from the start.  
FORAGUA (or its constituent, the municipality of Loja) does not implement PES within the 
research area, because all power is with the municipal water company that does not want to pay landholders 
for ES provision out of fear of being blackmailed by them (Chapter 3). As such, all decision-making power 
lies with one actor, who does not seem to trust the local landholders and who assumes to have the best 
knowledge on how to manage watersheds. PES implementation can spread the decision-making power as 
also landholders can then decide which land uses they prefer to implement. However, this will only work 
if the implementation of a PES scheme goes together with actively building trust between landholders and 
the watershed management, as was discussed in Chapter 6. Implementing a PES scheme goes hand in hand 
with strengthening local institutions, even if this would require more time to implement. PES schemes may 
then be more sustainable over time (e.g. Clements et al., 2010). 
The absence of a shared decision-making process was not only observed when analysing 
FORAGUA and landholders within the watershed, but also occurs on a national level (Chapter 3). Making 
the state the sole ‘owner’ of ES, as in Ecuador, basically implies that a single actor can decide when, where 
and how PES should be implemented. However, to improve targeting it would be better if states coordinate 
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certain actions, regional governments others, and local businesses and households even others, i.e. if there 
are different levels of governance.  
  
7.4.3. PES and multiple levels of governance  
Payments to improve or conserve the provision of specific ES can be part of a rural development scheme, 
which is designed on a local scale as this facilitates targeting. Although the Socio Bosque programme is 
more differentiated than it was originally, it remains a nationally designed and implemented programme. It 
is still a rather homogeneous solution to a diversity of contexts found within Ecuador. In a PES scheme 
linked to a rural development scheme, water funds and municipal water managers could be used to connect 
the nationally coordinated and financed programmes with the locally implemented and financed provision 
of watershed services (see e.g. Chapter 4). A broader diversity of mechanisms could be used, based on their 
importance for ES provision (e.g. acquiring key areas, offering higher payments for conservation actions, 
and implementing PES with projects for sustainable production systems – Chapters 4, 5 and 6), and based 
on giving households the choice among different land-use options to improve ES provision on their land 
(Chapter 6). Ideally, PES should thus be operating at different levels.  
From a financing perspective additional levels of governance can include local actors and 
authorities responsible for funding the provision of services with local benefits (typically watershed 
services), supplemented by national and international resources for biodiversity, which provides global 
benefits. Furthermore, local actors (landholders and communities and local PES implementers) should then 
be responsible for the direct implementation of the agreed upon land uses. This local orientation could 
assure that land uses included in the PES scheme not only assure ES provision, but are also of interest to 
landholders in a specific area and adapted to local circumstances. At this level voluntary and compulsory 
payments (monetary or even in-kind) for local ES can be collected and managed. However, to assure that 
money is correctly collected and used, and to assure that not all resources are absorbed by one actor (for 
example a powerful landholder or a municipal agency that does not trust local landholders) on a second 
level a national (government) agency could be responsible, not for PES implementation, but for the control 
of how resources are spent and how the local PES scheme is managed. As such PES implementation would 
be more closely linked with how municipalities and the national government relate to one another. On a 
national level resources could be collected and redistributed to ensure the provision of ES such as 
biodiversity, but these could also be used to ensure that also poorer municipalities have access to PES 
resources (similar to the inter-municipal solidarity mechanism of FORAGUA as explained in Annex 2). 
Finally international users (buyers) of ES can additionally sign contracts with local or national PES 
implementers to finance a PES scheme. These multiple levels would also assure that schemes are not only 
financed locally. As Van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010b) pointed out, it could be unfair to make only local 
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users in poorer countries pay for ES that provide global benefits. PES, and specifically PES financing, 
should operate in multiple governance levels. The international payments should however not be charitable 
donations, but payment levels and duration should be based on specific goals (hectares of forest replanted, 
area conserved, etc.). This adds an additional layer of control, while also assuring extra income.   
    
Finally, PES contracts can address the immediate cause of resource degradation, but not its broader causes, 
such as population growth and the increasing demand for resources, climate change due to the use of certain 
resources, etc. PES is not a tool to address these global issues and they are not capable of coordinating such 
complex relations.  
PES should be understood as one tool, to be applied in specific circumstances among all different 
mechanisms and policies to address the complexities of achieving sustainable development.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
References 
 
Adhikari, B., Agrawal, A., 2013. Understanding the social and ecological outcomes of PES projects: A 
review and an analysis. Conserv. Soc. 11, 359. doi:10.4103/0972-4923.125748 
Agresti, A., 2007. An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis, 2nd ed, Wiley Series in Probability and 
Statistics. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New Jersey, USA. 
Aguirre, N., Palomeque, X., Weber, M., Stimm, B., Günter, S., 2011. Reforestation and Natural 
Succession as Tools for Restoration on Abandoned Pastures in the Andes of South Ecuador, in: 
Günter, S., Weber, M., Stimm, B., Mosandl, R. (Eds.), Silviculture in the Tropics, Tropical 
Forestry. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 513–524. 
Ahn, J., Khandelwal, A.K., Wei, S.-J., 2011. The role of intermediaries in facilitating trade. J. Int. Econ. 
84, 73–85. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.12.003 
Aimin, H., 2010. Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and Risk Management in Agriculture. Agric. Agric. Sci. 
Procedia 1, 152–156. doi:10.1016/j.aaspro.2010.09.018 
Aizaki, H., 2012. Basic functions for supporting an implementation of choice experiments in R. J. Stat. 
Softw. Code Snippets 50, 1–24. 
Alavalapati, J.R.R., Shrestha, R.K., Stainback, G.A., Matta, J.R., 2004. Agroforestry development: An 
environmental economic perspective. Agrofor. Syst. 61-62, 299–310. 
doi:10.1023/B:AGFO.0000029006.64395.72 
Albán, M., Argüello, M., 2004. Un análisis de los impactos sociales y económicos de los proyectos de 
fijación de carbono en el Ecuador. El caso de PROFAFOR-FACE (No. 07), Markets for 
Environmental Services. Internal Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK. 
Alvarado-Quesada, I., Hein, L., Weikard, H.-P., 2014. Market-based mechanisms for biodiversity 
conservation: a review of existing schemes and an outline for a global mechanism. Biodivers. 
Conserv. 23, 1–21. doi:10.1007/s10531-013-0598-x 
Angelsen, A., Wunder, S., 2003. Exploring the forest--poverty link: key concepts, issues and research 
implications (No. 40), CIFOR Occasional Paper. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Antle, J.M., 1987. Econometric Estimation of Producers’ Risk Attitudes. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 69, 509–
522. doi:10.2307/1241687 
Arriagada, R., 2009. Payments for environmental services and their impact on forest transition in Costa 
Rica (Working Paper No. 200907). Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics 
Program. 
Arriagada, R.A., Ferraro, P.J., Sills, E.O., Pattanayak, S.K., Cordero-Sancho, S., 2012. Do payments for 
environmental services affect forest cover? A farm-level evaluation from Costa Rica. Land Econ. 
88, 382–399. 
Arriagada, R., Perrings, C., 2009. Making Payments for Ecosystem Services Work (Working Paper), 
Ecosystem Services Economics. UNEP, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Ascough, J.C., Maier, H.R., Ravalico, J.K., Strudley, M.W., 2008. Future research challenges for 
incorporation of uncertainty in environmental and ecological decision-making. Ecol. Model. 219, 
383–399. doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2008.07.015 
Aspers, P., 2007. The Practice of Defining Markets: A Comment on Charles W. Smith. Can. J. Sociol. 32, 
477–486. 
Asquith, N., 2011. Pagos por servicios ambientales hidricos (PSA-H) en Bolivia. 
Asquith, N.M., Vargas, M.T., Wunder, S., 2008. Selling two environmental services: In-kind payments 
for bird habitat and watershed protection in Los Negros, Bolivia. Ecol. Econ. 65, 675–684. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.12.014 
Asquith, N., Vargas, M.T., 2007. Fair deals for watershed services in Bolivia. Natural Resource Issues 
No. 7. International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK. 
147 
 
Ataroff, M., Monasterio, M., 1997. Soil erosion under different management of coffee plantations in the 
Venezuelan Andes. Soil Technol., Soil Erosion Processes on Steep Lands 11, 95–108. 
doi:10.1016/S0933-3630(96)00118-3 
Ataroff, M., Rada, F., 2000. Deforestation Impact on Water Dynamics in a Venezuelan Andean Cloud 
Forest. AMBIO J. Hum. Environ. 29, 440–444. doi:10.1579/0044-7447-29.7.440 
Ávalos-Sartorio, B., Blackman, A., 2010. Agroforestry price supports as a conservation tool: Mexican 
shade coffee. Agrofor. Syst. 78, 169–183. doi:10.1007/s10457-009-9248-4 
Balderas Torres, A., MacMillan, D.C., Skutsch, M., Lovett, J.C., 2013. Payments for ecosystem services 
and rural development: Landowners’ preferences and potential participation in western Mexico. 
Ecosyst. Serv., Payments for Ecosystem Services and Their Institutional Dimensions: Analyzing 
the Diversity of Existing PES Approaches in Developing and Industrialized Countries 6, 72–81. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.03.002 
Balmford, A., Whitten, T., 2003. Who should pay for tropical conservation, and how could the costs be 
met? Oryx 37, 238–250. doi:10.1017/S0030605303000413 
Balvanera, P., Kremen, C., Martínez-Ramos, M., 2005. Applying Community Structure Analysis to 
Ecosystem Function: Examples from Pollination and Carbon Storage. Ecol. Appl. 15, 360–375. 
Balvanera, P., Pfisterer, A.B., Buchmann, N., He, J.-S., Nakashizuka, T., Raffaelli, D., Schmid, B., 2006. 
Quantifying the evidence for biodiversity effects on ecosystem functioning and services. Ecol. 
Lett. 9, 1146–1156. doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2006.00963.x 
Balvanera, P., Uriarte, M., Almeida-Leñero, L., Altesor, A., DeClerck, F., Gardner, T., Hall, J., Lara, A., 
Laterra, P., Peña-Claros, M., Silva Matos, D.M., Vogl, A.L., Romero-Duque, L.P., Arreola, L.F., 
Caro-Borrero, Á.P., Gallego, F., Jain, M., Little, C., de Oliveira Xavier, R., Paruelo, J.M., 
Peinado, J.E., Poorter, L., Ascarrunz, N., Correa, F., Cunha-Santino, M.B., Hernández-Sánchez, 
A.P., Vallejos, M., 2012. Ecosystem services research in Latin America: The state of the art. 
Ecosyst. Serv. 2, 56–70. doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2012.09.006 
Barham, B.L., Callenes, M., Gitter, S., Lewis, J., Weber, J., 2011. Fair Trade/Organic Coffee, Rural 
Livelihoods, and the “Agrarian Question”: Southern Mexican Coffee Families in Transition. 
World Dev. 39, 134–145. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.08.005 
Barrera, V.H., Alwang, J., Cruz Collaguazo, E. del P., 2010. Análisis de la viabilidad socio-económica y 
ambiental del sistema de producción papa-leche en la microcuenca del río Illangama-Ecuador. 
Arch. Latinoam. Prod. Anim. 18, 57–67. 
Bateman, I.J., Carson, R.T., Day, B., Hanemann, M., Hanleys, N., Hett, T., Jones-Lee, M., Loomes, G., 
Mourato, S., Ozdemiroglu, E., Pearce, D., Sugden, R., Swanson, J., 2002. Economic valuation 
with stated preference techniques: a manual. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Bathurst, J.C., Bovolo, C.I., Cisneros, F., 2010. Modelling the effect of forest cover on shallow landslides 
at the river basin scale. Ecol. Eng., Special Issue: Vegetation and Slope Stability 36, 317–327. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoleng.2009.05.001 
Beck, E., Richter, M., 2008. Ecological aspects of a biodiversity hotspot in the Andes of southern 
Ecuador, in: Gradstein, S.R., Homeier, J., Gansert, D. (Eds.), The Tropical Mountain Forest - 
Patterns and Processes in a Biodiversity Hotspot, Biodiversity and Ecology Series. Göttingen 
Centre for Biodiversity and Ecology, Univ. Verlag Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany, pp. 195–217. 
Begg, D.K.H., Fischer, S., Dornbusch, R., 2003. Economics, 7th ed. McGraw-Hill, London, UK. 
Beharry-Borg, N., Smart, J.C.R., Termansen, M., Hubacek, K., 2013. Evaluating farmers’ likely 
participation in a payment programme for water quality protection in the UK uplands. Reg. 
Environ. Change 13, 633–647. doi:10.1007/s10113-012-0282-9 
Ben-Akiva, M., Lerman, S.R., 1985. Discrete Choice Analysis. Theory and Application to Travel 
Demand, MIT Press Series in Transportation Studies. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
Benitez, P.C., Kuosmanen, T., Olschewski, R., van Kooten, G.C., 2006. Conservation payments under 
risk: A stochastic dominance approach. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 88, 1–15. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8276.2006.00835.x 
148 
 
Bennett, A.F., Radford, J.Q., Haslem, A., 2006. Properties of land mosaics: Implications for nature 
conservation in agricultural environments. Biol. Conserv. 133, 250–264. 
doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2006.06.008 
Beuchelt, T.D., Zeller, M., 2011. Profits and poverty: Certification’s troubled link for Nicaragua’s organic 
and fairtrade coffee producers. Ecol. Econ. 70, 1316–1324. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.005 
Biernacki, P., Waldorf, D., 1981. Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral 
Sampling. Sociol. Methods Res. 10, 141–163. doi:10.1177/004912418101000205 
Blackman, A., Albers, H.J., Ávalos-Sartorio, B., Crooks, L., 2003. Land cover in a managed forest 
ecosystem: Mexican shade coffee (Discussion Paper No. 03-60). Resources for the Future, 
Washington DC, USA. 
Blackman, A., Ávalos-Sartorio, B., Chow, J., 2007. Shade Coffee & Tree Cover Loss: Lessons from El 
Salvador. Environ. Sci. Policy Sustain. Dev. 49, 22–33. doi:10.3200/ENVT.49.7.22-33 
Blanche, R., Cunningham, S.A., 2005. Rain Forest Provides Pollinating Beetles for Atemoya Crops. J. 
Econ. Entomol. 98, 1193–1201. doi:10.1603/0022-0493-98.4.1193 
Bocquého, G., Jacquet, F., Reynaud, A., 2014. Expected utility or prospect theory maximisers? Assessing 
farmers’ risk behaviour from field-experiment data. Eur. Rev. Agric. Econ. 41, 135–172. 
doi:10.1093/erae/jbt006 
Bode, R., 2007. Knowledge management, learning and communication in value chains. A case analysis of 
the speciality coffee value chain of FAPECAFES, Ecuador. CIAT, Cali, Colombia. 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A., Marcus, A., Perrakis, S., Ryan, P., 2008. Investments, 6th Cdn edition, Canadian 
edition. ed. McGraw-Hill Ryerson Higher Education, Toronto. 
Bøgh, A., 1992. Composition and distribution of the vascular epiphyte flora of an Ecuadorian montane 
rain forest. Selbyana 13, 25–34. 
Bond, G., Wonder, B., 1980. Risk attitudes amongst Australian farmers. Aust. J. Agric. Econ. 24, 16–34. 
Borkhataria, R.R., Collazo, J.A., Groom, M.J., 2006. Additive Effects Of Vertebrate Predators On Insects 
In A Puerto Rican Coffee Plantation. Ecol. Appl. 16, 696–703. doi:10.1890/1051-
0761(2006)016[0696:AEOVPO]2.0.CO;2 
Börner, J., Wunder, S., 2012. The Scope for Reducing Emissions from Forestry and Agriculture in the 
Brazilian Amazon. Forests 3, 546–572. doi:10.3390/f3030546 
Börner, J., Wunder, S., Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S., Tito, M.R., Pereira, L., Nascimento, N., 2010. Direct 
conservation payments in the Brazilian Amazon: Scope and equity implications. Ecol. Econ. 69, 
1272–1282. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.003 
Boström, M., Klintman, M., 2006. State-centered versus Nonstate-driven Organic Food Standardization: 
A Comparison of the US and Sweden. Agric. Hum. Values 23, 163–180. doi:10.1007/s10460-
005-6099-0 
Boxall, P.C., Adamowicz, W.L., 2002. Understanding Heterogeneous Preferences in Random Utility 
Models: A Latent Class Approach. Environ. Resour. Econ. 23, 421–446. 
doi:10.1023/A:1021351721619 
Boyd, J., Banzhaf, S., 2007. What are ecosystem services? The need for standardized environmental 
accounting units. Ecol. Econ., Ecological Economics of Coastal DisastersCoastal Disasters 
Special Section 63, 616–626. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.01.002 
Brauman, K.A., Daily, G.C., Duarte, T.K., Mooney, H.A., 2007. The Nature and Value of Ecosystem 
Services: An Overview Highlighting Hydrologic Services. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 32, 67–
98. doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.32.031306.102758 
Brealey, R.A., Myers, S.C., Allen, F., 2011. Principles of Corporate Finance, 10th ed. McGraw-Hill 
Education, Columbus, USA. 
Bremer, L.L., Farley, K.A., Lopez-Carr, D., 2014a. What factors influence participation in payment for 
ecosystem services programs? An evaluation of Ecuador’s SocioPáramo program. Land Use 
Policy 36, 122–133. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.08.002 
149 
 
Bremer, L.L., Farley, K.A., Lopez-Carr, D., Romero, J., 2014b. Conservation and livelihood outcomes of 
payment for ecosystem services in the Ecuadorian Andes: What is the potential for “win–win”? 
Ecosyst. Serv. doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2014.03.007 
Broch, S.W., Vedel, S.E., 2012. Using Choice Experiments to Investigate the Policy Relevance of 
Heterogeneity in Farmer Agri-environmental Contract Preferences. Environ. Resour. Econ. 51, 
561–581. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9512-8 
Bromiley, P., Cummings, L.L., 1995. Transactions Costs in Organizations with Trust, in: Bies, R.J., 
Lewicki, R.J., Sheppard, B.H. (Eds.), Research on Negotiation in Organizations. JAI Press Inc., 
Greenwich CT, USA, pp. 219–247. 
Bromley, D., 1989. Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy. 
Basil Blackwell, New York and Oxford. 
Bromley, D.W., 1997. Rethinking markets. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 79, 1383–1393. 
Brouwer, R., Tesfaye, A., Pauw, P., 2011. Meta-analysis of institutional-economic factors explaining the 
environmental performance of payments for watershed services. Environ. Conserv. 38, 380–392. 
doi:10.1017/S0376892911000543 
Bruijnzeel, L.A., 2004. Hydrological functions of tropical forests: not seeing the soil for the trees? Agric. 
Ecosyst. Environ. 104, 185–228. doi:10.1016/j.agee.2004.01.015 
Bryner, N., Fierst, S., Ludwig, J., Stackhouse, T., 2012. COMSERBO: A Case Study of Community-
Based Forest Conservation in the Bolivian Amazon, Latin American and Hemispheric Studies 
Program. Master of Arts Capstone Research Project. Elliott School of International Affairs. The 
George Washington University. 
Buytaert, W., Iñiguez, V., Bièvre, B.D., 2007. The effects of afforestation and cultivation on water yield 
in the Andean páramo. For. Ecol. Manag., Planted Forests and Water Including selected papers 
from a special session of the World Congress of the International Union of Forest Research 
Organisations, Brisbane 8-13 August 2005 251, 22–30. doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2007.06.035 
Calle, A., Montagnini, F., Felipe Zuluaga, A., 2009. Farmer’s perceptions of silvopastoral system 
promotion in Quindio, Colombia. Bois Forets Trop. 79–94. 
Calvo-Alvarado, J., McLennan, B., Sánchez-Azofeifa, A., Garvin, T., 2009. Deforestation and forest 
restoration in Guanacaste, Costa Rica: Putting conservation policies in context. For. Ecol. 
Manag., Ecology and regeneration of tropical dry forests in the Americas: Implications for 
management 258, 931–940. doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2008.10.035 
Camacho, D.C., 2008. Payment schemes for environmental services in watersheds in Ecuador. Investig. 
Agrar.-Sist. Recur. For. 17, 54–66. 
Campbell, P.J.Y., Viceira, P.L.M., 2002. Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long-Term 
Investors, Clarendon Lectures in Economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Canty, A., Ripley, B., 2015. boot: Bootstrap R (S-Plus) Functions. R package version 1.3-15. 
Cao, S., Zhong, B., Yue, H., Zeng, H., Zeng, J., 2009. Development and testing of a sustainable 
environmental restoration policy on eradicating the poverty trap in China’s Changting County. 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 106, 10712–10716. doi:10.1073/pnas.0900197106 
Cardinale, B.J., Duffy, J.E., Gonzalez, A., Hooper, D.U., Perrings, C., Venail, P., Narwani, A., Mace, 
G.M., Tilman, D., Wardle, D.A., Kinzig, A.P., Daily, G.C., Loreau, M., Grace, J.B., Larigauderie, 
A., Srivastava, D.S., Naeem, S., 2012. Biodiversity loss and its impact on humanity. Nature 486, 
59–67. doi:10.1038/nature11148 
Carpenter, S.R., Mooney, H.A., Agard, J., Capistrano, D., DeFries, R.S., Díaz, S., Dietz, T., Duraiappah, 
A.K., Oteng-Yeboah, A., Pereira, H.M., Perrings, C., Reid, W.V., Sarukhan, J., Scholes, R.J., 
Whyte, A., 2009. Science for managing ecosystem services: Beyond the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106, 1305–1312. doi:10.1073/pnas.0808772106 
Carpentier, C.L., Vosti, S.A., Witcover, J., 2000. Intensified production systems on western Brazilian 
Amazon settlement farms: could they save the forest? Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 82, 73–88. 
doi:10.1016/S0167-8809(00)00217-6 
150 
 
Carret, J.C., Loyer, D., 2003. Madagascar protected area network sustainable financing economic analysis 
perspective. Presented at the 5th World Parks Conference, Durban, South Africa. 
Carwardine, J., Wilson, K.A., Ceballos, G., Ehrlich, P.R., Naidoo, R., Iwamura, T., Hajkowicz, S.A., 
Possingham, H.P., 2008. Cost-effective priorities for global mammal conservation. Proc. Natl. 
Acad. Sci. 105, 11446–11450. doi:10.1073/pnas.0707157105 
Casas, A., 2008. Marcos legales para el pago por servicios ambientales en America Latina y el Caribe: 
Análisis de Ocho Países. Organization of American States, Washington DC, USA. 
Castaño-Villa, G.J., Estevez, J.V., Fontúrbel, F.E., 2014. The role of native forest plantations in the 
conservation of Neotropical birds: the case of the Andean alder. J. Nat. Conserv. 22, 547–551. 
doi:10.1016/j.jnc.2014.08.010 
Castelle, A.J., Johnson, A.W., 2000. Riparian Vegetation Effectiveness (No. 799), Tech. Bull. National 
Council for Air and Stream Improvement, Research Triangle Park, NC, USA. 
Castro, L.M., Calvas, B., Hildebrandt, P., Knoke, T., 2013. Avoiding the loss of shade coffee plantations: 
how to derive conservation payments for risk-averse land-users. Agrofor. Syst. 87, 331–347. 
doi:10.1007/s10457-012-9554-0 
Castro, L.M., Calvas, B., Knoke, T., 2015. Ecuadorian Banana Farms Should Consider Organic Banana 
with Low Price Risks in Their Land-Use Portfolios. PLoS ONE 10, e0120384. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120384 
Célleri, R., Feyen, J., 2009. The Hydrology of Tropical Andean Ecosystems: Importance, Knowledge 
Status, and Perspectives. Mt. Res. Dev. 29, 350–355. doi:10.1659/mrd.00007 
Celleri, R., Willems, P., Buytaert, W., Feyen, J., 2007. Space–time rainfall variability in the Paute basin, 
Ecuadorian Andes. Hydrol. Process. 21, 3316–3327. doi:10.1002/hyp.6575 
CFN, 2015. Programa de Agroforestería [WWW Document]. Corp. Financ. Nac. URL 
http://www.cfn.fin.ec/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1245&Itemid=785 
(accessed 6.29.15). 
Chacón, G., Gagnon, D., Paré, D., 2009. Comparison of soil properties of native forests, Pinus patula 
plantations and adjacent pastures in the Andean highlands of southern Ecuador: land use history 
or recent vegetation effects? Soil Use Manag. 25, 427–433. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
2743.2009.00233.x 
Chaddad, F., 2009. Both Market and Hierarchy: Understanding the Hybrid Nature of Cooperatives. 
Presented at the International Workshop “Rural Cooperation in the 21st Century: Lessons from 
the Past, Pathways to the Future,” Rehovot, Israel. 
Chandler, D.G., 2006. Reversibility of forest conversion impacts on water budgets in tropical karst 
terrain. For. Ecol. Manag., Catchment Processes in Southeast Asia 224, 95–103. 
doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2005.12.010 
Chang, H.-H., Boisvert, R.N., 2009. Are farmers’ decisions to work off the farm related to their decisions 
to participate in the conservation reserve program? Appl. Econ. 41, 71–85. 
doi:10.1080/00036840701720861 
Chang, T.-J., Yang, S.-C., Chang, K.-J., 2009. Portfolio optimization problems in different risk measures 
using genetic algorithm. Expert Syst. Appl. 36, 10529–10537. doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2009.02.062 
Chará, J., Murgueitio, E., 2005. The role of silvopastoral systems in the rehabilitation of Andean stream 
habitats. Livest. Res. Rural Dev. 17, Article 20. 
Chavas, J.-P., 2009. On the Productive Value of Biodiversity. Environ. Resour. Econ. 42, 109–131. 
doi:10.1007/s10640-008-9206-z 
CI, 1997. The Cordillera del Cóndor Region of Ecuador and Peru: A biological assessment. (Working 
Paper No. 7), RAP. Conservation International, Arlington, VA, USA. 
Clarke, R., Silva, H. de, Thorley, S., 2013. Risk Parity, Maximum Diversification,and Minimum 
Variance: An Analytic Perspective. J. Portf. Manag. 39, 39–53. doi:10.3905/jpm.2013.39.3.039 
Clark, S.G., Cherney, D.N., Angulo, I., Bernardi De Leon, R., Moran-Cahusac, C., 2009a. A Problem-
Oriented Overview of Management Policy for Podocarpus National Park, Ecuador. J. Sustain. 
For. 28, 663–679. doi:10.1080/10549810902936243 
151 
 
Clark, S.G., Cherney, D.N., Ashton, M.S., 2009b. Development and Environmental Challenges, 
Podocarpus National Park, Ecuador. J. Sustain. For. 28, 597–613. 
doi:10.1080/10549810902922268 
Clements, T., John, A., Nielsen, K., An, D., Tan, S., Milner-Gulland, E.J., 2010. Payments for 
biodiversity conservation in the context of weak institutions: Comparison of three programs from 
Cambodia. Ecol. Econ. 69, 1283–1291. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.010 
Clements, T., Rainey, H., An, D., Rours, V., Tan, S., Thong, S., Sutherland, W.J., Milner-Gulland, E.J., 
2013. An evaluation of the effectiveness of a direct payment for biodiversity conservation: The 
Bird Nest Protection Program in the Northern Plains of Cambodia. Biol. Conserv. 157, 50–59. 
doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2012.07.020 
Coase, R.H., 1960. Problem of Social Cost, The. JL Econ 3, 1. 
CONAFOR, 2013. Reglas de Operación del Programa Nacional Forestal 2013 [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.conafor.gob.mx/apoyos/index.php/inicio/todos/2013 (accessed 11.24.13). 
Conti, G., Díaz, S., 2013. Plant functional diversity and carbon storage – an empirical test in semi-arid 
forest ecosystems. J. Ecol. 101, 18–28. doi:10.1111/1365-2745.12012 
Corbera, E., Brown, K., 2008. Building Institutions to Trade Ecosystem Services: Marketing Forest 
Carbon in Mexico. World Dev. 36, 1956–1979. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.09.010 
Corbera, E., Kosoy, N., Tuna, M.M., 2007. Equity implications of marketing ecosystem services in 
protected areas and rural communities: Case studies from Meso-America. Glob. Environ. 
Change-Hum. Policy Dimens. 17, 365–380. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.12.005 
Corbera, E., Soberanis, C.G., Brown, K., 2009. Institutional dimensions of Payments for Ecosystem 
Services: An analysis of Mexico’s carbon forestry programme. Ecol. Econ. 68, 743–761. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.06.008 
Cordingley, J.E., Newton, A.C., Rose, R.J., Clarke, R.T., Bullock, J.M., 2015. Habitat Fragmentation 
Intensifies Trade-Offs between Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in a Heathland Ecosystem in 
Southern England. PLoS ONE 10, e0130004. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130004 
Cranford, M., Mourato, S., 2011. Community conservation and a two-stage approach to payments for 
ecosystem services. Ecol. Econ. 71, 89–98. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.08.007 
Crawford, S.E.S., Ostrom, E., 1995. A Grammar of Institutions. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 89, 582–600. 
doi:10.2307/2082975 
Dagang, A.B.K., Nair, P.K.R., 2003. Silvopastoral research and adoption in Central America: recent 
findings and recommendations for future directions. Agrofor. Syst. 59, 149–155. 
doi:10.1023/A:1026394019808 
Davies, T.E., Fazey, I.R.A., Cresswell, W., Pettorelli, N., 2014. Missing the trees for the wood: Why we 
are failing to see success in pro-poor conservation. Anim. Conserv. 17, 303–312. 
doi:10.1111/acv.12094 
Davis, L.E., North, D.C., 1971. Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Davison, A.C., Hinkley, D.V., 1997. Bootstrap Methods and Their Applications, Cambridge Series in 
Statistical and Probabilistic Mathematics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
DeFries, R., Karanth, K.K., Pareeth, S., 2010. Interactions between protected areas and their surroundings 
in human-dominated tropical landscapes. Biol. Conserv., Conservation and management in 
human-dominated landscapes: Case studies from India 143, 2870–2880. 
doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2010.02.010 
de Koning, F., Aguiñaga, M., Bravo, M., Chiu, M., Lascano, M., Lozada, T., Suarez, L., 2011. Bridging 
the gap between forest conservation and poverty alleviation: the Ecuadorian Socio Bosque 
program. Environ. Sci. Policy 14, 531–542. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.04.007 
DeMay, S.M., Roon, D.A., Rachlow, J.L., Cisneros, R., 2014. Selective foraging on bromeliads by 
Andean bears in the Ecuadorian páramo. Ursus 25, 139–147. doi:10.2192/URSUS-D-14-00022.1 
de Ponti, T., Rijk, B., van Ittersum, M.K., 2012. The crop yield gap between organic and conventional 
agriculture. Agric. Syst. 108, 1–9. doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2011.12.004 
152 
 
Derissen, S., Latacz-Lohmann, U., 2013. What are PES? A review of definitions and an extension. 
Ecosyst. Serv., Payments for Ecosystem Services and Their Institutional Dimensions: Analyzing 
the Diversity of Existing PES Approaches in Developing and Industrialized Countries 6, 12–15. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.02.002 
Díaz, S., Fargione, J., Chapin, F.S., III, Tilman, D., 2006. Biodiversity Loss Threatens Human Well-
Being. PLoS Biol 4, e277. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0040277 
Dıaz, S., Tilman, D., Fargione, J., Chapin III, F.S., Dirzo, R., Ktzberber, T., others, 2005. Biodiversity 
regulation of ecosystem services, in: Hassan, R., Scholes, R., Ash, N. (Eds.), Ecosystems and 
Human Well-Being: Current State and Trends, Volume 1, The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment Series. Island Press, Washington DC, USA, pp. 297–329. 
Duke, E.A., Goldstein, J.H., Teel, T.L., Finchum, R., Huber-Stearns, H., Pitty, J., Rodríguez P., G.B., 
Rodríguez, S., Sánchez, L.O., 2014. Payments for ecosystem services and landowner interest: 
Informing program design trade-offs in Western Panama. Ecol. Econ. 103, 44–55. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.04.013 
Dunn, W.W., Lynch, A.M., Morgan, P., 1990. Benefit-cost analysis of fuelwood management using 
native alder in Ecuador. Agrofor. Syst. 11, 125–139. doi:10.1007/BF00838725 
Echavarria, M., Vogel, J., Albán, M., Meneses, F., 2004. The impacts of payments for watershed services 
in Ecuador. Emerging lessons from Pimampiro and Cuenca (Working Paper), Environmental 
Economics Programme. International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK. 
Engel, S., Pagiola, S., Wunder, S., 2008. Designing payments for environmental services in theory and 
practice: An overview of the issues. Ecol. Econ. 65, 663–674. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.03.011 
Engle Warnick, J.C., Escobal, J., Laszlo, S.C., 2011. Ambiguity Aversion and Portfolio Choice in Small-
Scale Peruvian Farming. BE J. Econ. Anal. Policy 11, 1–56. 
Epstein, G., Vogt, J.M., Mincey, S.K., Cox, M., Fischer, B., 2013. Missing ecology: integrating 
ecological perspectives with the social-ecological system framework. Int. J. Commons 7, 432–
453. 
Estrada, A.G., Damián, M.A.M., Cano, M.A., 2006. Análisis de riesgo, portafolios óptimos y 
diversificación en la agricultura. Agrociencia 40, 409–417. 
FAO, 2014. Payment for ecosystem services for forests (PES) and forest financing. Twenty-second 
session of the FAO Commitee on Forestry. 
FAO, 2012. Payments for environmental services (PES). PES: One tool in the box. [WWW Document]. 
URL http://www.fao.org/es/esa/PESAL/aboutPES5.html (accessed 4.26.12). 
FAO, 2011. Payments for ecosystem services and food security. Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Rome, Italy. 
FAO, 2009a. Pago por servicios ambientales en áreas protegidas en América Latina: programa 
FAO/OAPN; fortalecimiento del manejo sostenible de los recursos naturales en las áreas 
protegidas de América Latina. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 
Italy. 
FAO, 2009b. The market for organic and fair-trade coffee. Study prepared in the framework of FAO 
project GCP/RAF/404/GER. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 
Italy. 
FAO, 2004. Global forest resources assessment update 2005. Terms and definitions (Final version) 
(Working Paper No. 83/E), Forest Resources Assessment Programme. FAO, Forestestry 
Department, Rome, Italy. 
FAO, 2003. Forests and the forestry sector: Ecuador [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.fao.org/forestry/country/57478/en/ecu/ (accessed 7.6.13). 
FAOSTAT, 2014. Trade data [WWW Document]. URL 
http://faostat.fao.org/desktopdefault.aspx?pageid=342&lang=en&country=58 (accessed 5.11.14). 
Farley, J., 2008. The role of prices in conserving critical natural capital. Conserv. Biol. J. Soc. Conserv. 
Biol. 22, 1399–1408. doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2008.01090.x 
153 
 
Farley, J., Costanza, R., 2010. Payments for ecosystem services: From local to global. Ecol. Econ. 69, 
2060–2068. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.06.010 
Farley, K.A., Anderson, W.G., Bremer, L.L., Harden, C.P., 2011. Compensation for ecosystem services: 
an evaluation of efforts to achieve conservation and development in Ecuadorian páramo 
grasslands. Environ. Conserv. 38, 393–405. doi:10.1017/S037689291100049X 
Farley, K.A., Jobbágy, E.G., Jackson, R.B., 2005. Effects of afforestation on water yield: a global 
synthesis with implications for policy. Glob. Change Biol. 11, 1565–1576. doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2486.2005.01011.x 
Farley, K.A., Kelly, E.F., Hofstede, R.G., 2004. Soil Organic Carbon and Water Retention after 
Conversion of Grasslands to Pine Plantations in the Ecuadorian Andes. Ecosystems 7, 729–739. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10021-004-0047-5 
Fauzi, A., Anna, Z., n.d. The complexity of the institution of payment for environmental services: A case 
study of two Indonesian PES schemes. Ecosyst. Serv. doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.07.003 
Fehse, J., Hofstede, R., Aguirre, N., Paladines, C., Kooijman, A., Sevink, J., 2002. High altitude tropical 
secondary forests: a competitive carbon sink? For. Ecol. Manag. 163, 9–25. doi:10.1016/S0378-
1127(01)00535-7 
Ferraro, P.J., 2011. The Future of Payments for Environmental Services. Conserv. Biol. 25, 1134–1138. 
doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2011.01791.x 
Ferraro, P.J., 2008. Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services. 
Ecol. Econ. 65, 810–821. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029 
Ferraro, P.J., Kiss, A., 2002. Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity. Science 298, 1718–1719. 
doi:10.1126/science.1078104 
Ferraro, P.J., Pattanayak, S.K., 2006. Money for Nothing? A Call for Empirical Evaluation of 
Biodiversity Conservation Investments. PLoS Biol 4, e105. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0040105 
Ferraro, P.J., Simpson, R.D., 2002. The Cost-Effectiveness of Conservation Payments. Land Econ. 78, 
339–353. doi:10.2307/3146894 
Ferraro, P.J., Uchida, T., Conrad, J.M., 2005. Price Premiums for Eco-friendly Commodities: Are 
“Green” Markets the Best Way to Protect Endangered Ecosystems? Environ. Resour. Econ. 32, 
419–438. doi:10.1007/s10640-005-7962-6 
Fisher, B., Kulindwa, K., Mwanyoka, I., Turner, R.K., Burgess, N.D., 2010. Common pool resource 
management and PES: Lessons and constraints for water PES in Tanzania. Ecol. Econ., Special 
Section - Payments for Environmental Services: Reconciling Theory and Practice 69, 1253–1261. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.008 
Foley, J.A., Ramankutty, N., Brauman, K.A., Cassidy, E.S., Gerber, J.S., Johnston, M., Mueller, N.D., 
O’Connell, C., Ray, D.K., West, P.C., Balzer, C., Bennett, E.M., Carpenter, S.R., Hill, J., 
Monfreda, C., Polasky, S., Rockström, J., Sheehan, J., Siebert, S., Tilman, D., Zaks, D.P.M., 
2011. Solutions for a cultivated planet. Nature 478, 337–342. doi:10.1038/nature10452 
FONAFIFO, 2015. Modalidades Pago de Servicios Ambientales [WWW Document]. FONAFIFO. URL 
http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/psa/modalidades_psa.html (accessed 6.29.15). 
FONAG, 2014. FONAG [WWW Document]. URL http://www.fonag.org.ec/ (accessed 10.24.14). 
FORAGUA, 2014. G.A.D. Municipal Loja [WWW Document]. FORAGUA. URL 
http://www.foragua.org/?q=node/81 (accessed 11.14.14). 
Frazee, S.R., Cowling, R.M., Pressey, R.L., Turpie, J.K., Lindenberg, N., 2003. Estimating the costs of 
conserving a biodiversity hotspot: a case-study of the Cape Floristic Region, South Africa. Biol. 
Conserv., Conservation Planning in the Cape Floristic Region 112, 275–290. doi:10.1016/S0006-
3207(02)00400-7 
Fu, B.-J., Su, C.-H., Wei, Y.-P., Willett, I.R., Lü, Y.-H., Liu, G.-H., 2010. Double counting in ecosystem 
services valuation: causes and countermeasures. Ecol. Res. 26, 1–14. doi:10.1007/s11284-010-
0766-3 
154 
 
Fu, B., Liu, Y., Lü, Y., He, C., Zeng, Y., Wu, B., 2011. Assessing the soil erosion control service of 
ecosystems change in the Loess Plateau of China. Ecol. Complex., Special Section: Complexity 
of Coupled Human and Natural Systems 8, 284–293. doi:10.1016/j.ecocom.2011.07.003 
Gabre-Madhin, E.Z., 2001. The role of intermediaries in enhancing market efficiency in the Ethiopian 
grain market. Agric. Econ. 25, 311–320. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2001.tb00211.x 
Gadd, M.E., 2005. Conservation outside of parks: attitudes of local people in Laikipia, Kenya. Environ. 
Conserv. null, 50–63. doi:10.1017/S0376892905001918 
Gardner, T.A., Barlow, J., Chazdon, R., Ewers, R.M., Harvey, C.A., Peres, C.A., Sodhi, N.S., 2009. 
Prospects for tropical forest biodiversity in a human-modified world. Ecol. Lett. 12, 561–582. 
doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2009.01294.x 
Gasson, R., 1973. Goals and Values of Farmers. J. Agric. Econ. 24, 521–542. doi:10.1111/j.1477-
9552.1973.tb00952.x 
Gauvin, C., Uchida, E., Rozelle, S., Xu, J., Zhan, J., 2010. Cost-Effectiveness of Payments for Ecosystem 
Services with Dual Goals of Environment and Poverty Alleviation. Environ. Manage. 45, 488–
501. doi:10.1007/s00267-009-9321-9 
GEF, 2010. Payment for Ecosystem Services. Global Environmental Facility, Washington DC, USA. 
GEF, 2006. The role of local benefits in global environmental programs (No. 30), Evaluation Report. 
Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office, Washington DC, USA. 
Ghimire, K.B., Ghimire, K.B., Pimbert, M.P., 1997. Social Change and Conservation: Environmental 
Politics and Impacts of National Parks and Protected Areas. Earthscan, London, UK. 
Global Ecolabelling Network, 2012. What is ecolabelling? [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.globalecolabelling.net/what_is_ecolabelling/index.htm (accessed 4.15.12). 
Goldman-Benner, R.L., Benitez, S., Boucher, T., Calvache, A., Daily, G., Kareiva, P., Kroeger, T., 
Ramos, A., 2012. Water funds and payments for ecosystem services: practice learns from theory 
and theory can learn from practice. Oryx 46, 55–63. doi:10.1017/S0030605311001050 
Goldman, R.L., Benitez, S., Calvache, A., Davidson, S., Ennaanay, D., McKenzie, E., Tallis, H., 2010. 
Linking People and Nature through Watershed Conservation in the East Cauca Valley, Colombia. 
TEEB case study. Available at: TEEBweb.org. 
Gomez-Baggethun, E., Ruiz Perez, M., 2011. Economic valuation and the commodification of ecosystem 
services. Prog. Phys. Geogr. 35, 613–628. doi:10.1177/0309133311421708 
Gómez-Delgado, F., Roupsard, O., le Maire, G., Taugourdeau, S., Pérez, A., van Oijen, M., Vaast, P., 
Rapidel, B., Harmand, J.M., Voltz, M., Bonnefond, J.M., Imbach, P., Moussa, R., 2011. 
Modelling the hydrological behaviour of a coffee agroforestry basin in Costa Rica. Hydrol Earth 
Syst Sci 15, 369–392. doi:10.5194/hess-15-369-2011 
Gómez-Limón, J.A., Arriaza, M., Riesgo, L., 2003. An MCDM analysis of agricultural risk aversion. Eur. 
J. Oper. Res. 151, 569–585. doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00625-2 
Gomiero, T., Pimentel, D., Paoletti, M.G., 2011. Environmental Impact of Different Agricultural 
Management Practices: Conventional vs. Organic Agriculture. Crit. Rev. Plant Sci. 30, 95–124. 
doi:10.1080/07352689.2011.554355 
Gordillo, F., 2013. Mecanismo financiero de los GAD´s Municipales de la Región 7 del Sur del Ecuador 
para la conservación de las fuentes de agua. 
Greene, W.H., 2007. LIMDEP Version 9. Student Reference Guide. Econometric Software, Inc., New 
York, USA. 
Greiner, R., Stanley, O., 2013. More than money for conservation: Exploring social co-benefits from PES 
schemes. Land Use Policy 31, 4–10. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.11.012 
Grieg-Gran, M., Porras, I., Wunder, S., 2005. How can market mechanisms for forest environmental 
services help the poor? Preliminary lessons from Latin America. World Dev. 33, 1511–1527. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.05.002 
Günter, S., Gonzalez, P., Álvarez, G., Aguirre, N., Palomeque, X., Haubrich, F., Weber, M., 2009. 
Determinants for successful reforestation of abandoned pastures in the Andes: Soil conditions and 
vegetation cover. For. Ecol. Manag. 258, 81–91. doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2009.03.042 
155 
 
Hagedorn, K., 2008. Particular requirements for institutional analysis in nature-related sectors. Eur. Rev. 
Agric. Econ. 35, 357–384. doi:10.1093/erae/jbn019 
Hajjar, R., Jarvis, D.I., Gemmill-Herren, B., 2008. The utility of crop genetic diversity in maintaining 
ecosystem services. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 123, 261–270. doi:10.1016/j.agee.2007.08.003 
Hansen, A.J., Davis, C.R., Piekielek, N., Gross, J., Theobald, D.M., Goetz, S., Melton, F., DeFries, R., 
2011. Delineating the Ecosystems Containing Protected Areas for Monitoring and Management. 
BioScience 61, 363–373. doi:10.1525/bio.2011.61.5.5 
Harden, C.P., Hartsig, J., Farley, K.A., Lee, J., Bremer, L.L., 2013. Effects of Land-Use Change on Water 
in Andean Páramo Grassland Soils. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 103, 375–384. 
doi:10.1080/00045608.2013.754655 
Harrison, P.A., Berry, P.M., Simpson, G., Haslett, J.R., Blicharska, M., Bucur, M., Dunford, R., Egoh, B., 
Garcia-Llorente, M., Geamănă, N., Geertsema, W., Lommelen, E., Meiresonne, L., Turkelboom, 
F., 2014. Linkages between biodiversity attributes and ecosystem services: A systematic review. 
Ecosyst. Serv. 9, 191–203. doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2014.05.006 
Harvey, C.A., Haber, W.A., 1998. Remnant trees and the conservation of biodiversity in Costa Rican 
pastures. Agrofor. Syst. 44, 37–68. doi:10.1023/A:1006122211692 
Harvey, C.A., Komar, O., Chazdon, R., Ferguson, B.G., Finegan, B., Griffith, D.M., Martínez-Ramos, 
M., Morales, H., Nigh, R., Soto-Pinto, L., Van Breugel, M., Wishnie, M., 2008. Integrating 
Agricultural Landscapes with Biodiversity Conservation in the Mesoamerican Hotspot. Conserv. 
Biol. 22, 8–15. doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2007.00863.x 
Harvey, C.A., Medina, A., Sánchez, D.M., Vílchez, S., Hernández, B., Saenz, J.C., Maes, J.M., 
Casanoves, F., Sinclair, F.L., 2006. Patterns of Animal Diversity in Different Forms of Tree 
Cover in Agricultural Landscapes. Ecol. Appl. 16, 1986–1999. doi:10.2307/40061768 
Harvey, C.A., Villalobos, J.A.G., 2007. Agroforestry systems conserve species-rich but modified 
assemblages of tropical birds and bats. Biodivers. Conserv. 16, 2257–2292. doi:10.1007/s10531-
007-9194-2 
Harvey, C.A., Villanueva, C., Villacís, J., Chacón, M., Muñoz, D., López, M., Ibrahim, M., Gómez, R., 
Taylor, R., Martinez, J., Navas, A., Saenz, J., Sánchez, D., Medina, A., Vilchez, S., Hernández, 
B., Perez, A., Ruiz, F., López, F., Lang, I., Sinclair, F.L., 2005. Contribution of live fences to the 
ecological integrity of agricultural landscapes. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 111, 200–230. 
doi:10.1016/j.agee.2005.06.011 
Hatanaka, N., Wright, W., Loyn, R.H., Mac Nally, R., 2011. “Ecologically complex carbon”– linking 
biodiversity values, carbon storage and habitat structure in some austral temperate forests. Glob. 
Ecol. Biogeogr. 20, 260–271. doi:10.1111/j.1466-8238.2010.00591.x 
Haug, I., Wubet, T., Weiß, M., Aguirre, N., Weber, M., Günter, S., Kottke, I., 2010. Species-rich but 
distinct arbuscular mycorrhizal communities in reforestation plots on degraded pastures and in 
neighboring pristine tropical mountain rain forest. Trop. Ecol. 51, 125–148. 
Hausman, J., McFadden, D., 1984. Specification tests for the multinomial logit model. Econometrica 52, 
1219–1240. 
Hayes, T.M., 2012. Payment for ecosystem services, sustained behavioural change, and adaptive 
management: peasant perspectives in the Colombian Andes. Environ. Conserv. 39, 144–153. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0376892912000045 
Hefting, M.M., Bobbink, R., de Caluwe, H., 2003. Nitrous oxide emission and denitrification in 
chronically nitrate-loaded riparian buffer zones. J. Environ. Qual. 32, 1194–1203. 
Heidkamp, P., Hanink, D.M., Cromley, R.G., 2008. A land use model of the effects of eco-labeling in 
coffee markets. Ann. Reg. Sci. 42, 725–746. doi:10.1007/s00168-007-0176-9 
Hein, L., van Koppen, K., de Groot, R.S., van Ierland, E.C., 2006. Spatial scales, stakeholders and the 
valuation of ecosystem services. Ecol. Econ. 57, 209–228. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.04.005 
Heithaus, M.R., Frid, A., Wirsing, A.J., Worm, B., 2008. Predicting ecological consequences of marine 
top predator declines. Trends Ecol. Evol. 23, 202–210. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2008.01.003 
156 
 
Hejnowicz, A.P., Raffaelli, D.G., Rudd, M.A., White, P.C.L., 2014. Evaluating the outcomes of payments 
for ecosystem services programmes using a capital asset framework. Ecosyst. Serv. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2014.05.001 
Hensher, D.A., Rose, J.M., Greene, W.H., 2005. Applied Choice Analysis. A Primer. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Hernández-Hernández, R.M., Ramírez, E., Castro, I., Cano, S., 2008. Cambios en indicadores de calidad 
de suelos de ladera reforestados con pinos (Pinus caribaea) y eucaliptos (Eucalyptus robusta). 
Agrociencia 42, 253–266. 
Hildebrandt, P., Knoke, T., 2011. Investment decisions under uncertainty—A methodological review on 
forest science studies. For. Policy Econ. 13, 1–15. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2010.09.001 
Hinkel, J., Bots, P.W.G., Schlüter, M., 2014. Enhancing the Ostrom social-ecological system framework 
through formalization. Ecol. Soc. 19. doi:10.5751/ES-06475-190351 
Hoehn, P., Tscharntke, T., Tylianakis, J.M., Steffan-Dewenter, I., 2008. Functional group diversity of bee 
pollinators increases crop yield. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 275, 2283–2291. 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0405 
Hofstede, R.G.M., Groenendijk, J.P., Coppus, R., Fehse, J.C., Sevink, J., 2002. Impact of Pine Plantations 
on Soils and Vegetation in the Ecuadorian High Andes. Mt. Res. Dev. 22, 159–167. 
doi:10.1659/0276-4741(2002)022[0159:IOPPOS]2.0.CO;2 
Holloway, G., Nicholson, C., Delgado, C., Staal, S., Ehui, S., 2000. Agroindustrialization through 
institutional innovation Transaction costs, cooperatives and milk-market development in the east-
African highlands. Agric. Econ. 23, 279–288. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2000.tb00279.x 
Hooper, D.U., Chapin, F.S., Ewel, J.J., Hector, A., Inchausti, P., Lavorel, S., Lawton, J.H., Lodge, D.M., 
Loreau, M., Naeem, S., Schmid, B., Setälä, H., Symstad, A.J., Vandermeer, J., Wardle, D.A., 
2005. Effects of biodiversity on ecosystem functioning: a consensus of current knowledge. Ecol. 
Monogr. 75, 3–35. doi:10.1890/04-0922 
Horne, P., 2006. Forest owners’ acceptance of incentive based policy instruments in forest biodiversity 
conservation-A choice experiment based approach. Silva Fenn. 40, 169. 
Howe, C., Suich, H., Vira, B., Mace, G.M., 2014. Creating win-wins from trade-offs? Ecosystem services 
for human well-being: A meta-analysis of ecosystem service trade-offs and synergies in the real 
world. Glob. Environ. Change 28, 263–275. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.005 
Ibelings, B.W., Portielje, R., Lammens, E.H.R.R., Noordhuis, R., Berg, M.S. van den, Joosse, W., Meijer, 
M.L., 2007. Resilience of Alternative Stable States during the Recovery of Shallow Lakes from 
Eutrophication: Lake Veluwe as a Case Study. Ecosystems 10, 4–16. doi:10.1007/s10021-006-
9009-4 
Ibrahim, M., Villanueva, C., Casasola, F., Rojas, J., 2006. Sistemas silvopastoriles como una herramienta 
para el mejoramiento de la productividad y restauración de la integridad ecológica de paisajes 
ganaderos [WWW Document]. Pastos Forrajes. URL 
http://www.redalyc.org/resumen.oa?id=269121676004 (accessed 7.16.14). 
ICRAF, 1993. Report of the First External Programme and Management Review of the International 
Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF). TAC SECRETARIAT and FAO. 
IMF, 2011. World Economic Outlook September 2011. Slowing Growth, Rising Risks, World Economic 
and Financial Surveys. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, USA. 
INEC, 2014. Visualizador de Estadísticas Agropecuarias del Ecuador [WWW Document]. Inst. Nac. 
Estad. URL 
http://www.inec.gob.ec/estadisticas/?option=com_content&view=article&id=103&Itemid=75 
(accessed 2.11.14). 
INEC, 2012a. Provincias por Cantones (PDF) Actualizada al 31-12-2012 [WWW Document]. Inst. Nac. 
Estad. URL http://www.inec.gob.ec/estadisticas/?option=com_content&view=article&id=358 
(accessed 11.13.14). 
INEC, 2012b. Encuesta de Superficie y Producción Agropecuaria Continua ESPAC-2012. 
157 
 
INEC, 2012c. Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares Urbanos y Rurales [WWW 
Document]. Inst. Nac. Estad. Censos. URL http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/encuesta-nacional-
de-ingresos-y-gastos-de-los-hogares-urbanos-y-rurales/ (accessed 4.6.15). 
INEC, 2012d. Ecuador - Índice de Precios al Consumidor 2012, Base [WWW Document]. URL 
http://anda.inec.gob.ec/anda/index.php/catalog/152/reports (accessed 5.10.14). 
INEC, 2011a. Ecuador en Cifras [WWW Document]. Inst. Nac. Estad. URL 
http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/resultados/ (accessed 10.28.14). 
INEC, 2011b. Últimos resultados  de pobreza,  desigualdad  y mercado  laboral en el  Ecuador. 
INEC, 2011c. Datos Estadísticos Agropecuarios. Resumen Ejecutivo. 
Ingram, J.C., Wilkie, D., Clements, T., McNab, R.B., Nelson, F., Baur, E.H., Sachedina, H.T., Peterson, 
D.D., Foley, C.A.H., 2014. Evidence of Payments for Ecosystem Services as a mechanism for 
supporting biodiversity conservation and rural livelihoods. Ecosyst. Serv. 7, 10–21. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.12.003 
Iñiguez–Armijos, C., Leiva, A., Frede, H., Hampel, H., Breuer, L., 2014. Deforestation and Benthic 
Indicators: How Much Vegetation Cover Is Needed to Sustain Healthy Andean Streams? PLoS 
ONE 9, e105869. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105869 
Jack, B.K., Kousky, C., Sims, K.R.E., 2008. Designing payments for ecosystem services: Lessons from 
previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 105, 9465–
9470. doi:10.1073/pnas.0705503104 
Jack, B.K., Leimona, B., Ferraro, P.J., 2009. A Revealed Preference Approach to Estimating Supply 
Curves for Ecosystem Services: Use of Auctions to Set Payments for Soil Erosion Control in 
Indonesia. Conserv. Biol. 23, 359–367. doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2008.01086.x 
Jaeck, M., Lifran, R., 2014. Farmers’ Preferences for Production Practices: A Choice Experiment Study 
in the Rhone River Delta. J. Agric. Econ. 65, 112–130. doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12018 
Jakoby, O., Quaas, M.F., Müller, B., Baumgärtner, S., Frank, K., 2014. How do individual farmers’ 
objectives influence the evaluation of rangeland management strategies under a variable climate? 
J. Appl. Ecol. 51, 483–493. doi:10.1111/1365-2664.12216 
Jordan, A., Wurzel, R.K.W., Zito, A., 2005. The Rise of “New” Policy Instruments in Comparative 
Perspective: Has Governance Eclipsed Government? Polit. Stud. 53, 477–496. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00540.x 
Josse, C., 2001. La biodiversidad del Ecuador : informe 2000. Ministry of the Environment of Ecuador; 
EcoCiencia and UICN, Quito, Ecuador. 
Just, R.E., Pope, R.D. (Eds.), 2002. A Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in U.S. 
Agriculture. Springer US, Boston, MA. 
Juutinen, A., Mantymaa, E., Ollikainen, M., 2013. Landowners’ conservation motives and the size of 
information rents in environmental bidding systems. J. For. Econ. 19, 128–148. 
doi:10.1016/j.jfe.2012.12.001 
Kaczan, D., Swallow, B.M., Adamowicz, W.L. (Vic), 2013. Designing a payments for ecosystem services 
(PES) program to reduce deforestation in Tanzania: An assessment of payment approaches. Ecol. 
Econ. 95, 20–30. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.07.011 
Kauffman, C.M., 2013. Financing watershed conservation: Lessons from Ecuador’s evolving water trust 
funds. Agric. Water Manag. doi:10.1016/j.agwat.2013.09.013 
Keating, P.L., 2008. The Floristic Composition and Biogeographical Significance of a Megadiverse 
Páramo Site in the Southern Ecuadorian Andes. J. Torrey Bot. Soc. 135, 554–570. 
Keating, P.L., 2000. Chronically Disturbed Páramo Vegetation at a Site in Southern Ecuador. J. Torrey 
Bot. Soc. 127, 162–171. doi:10.2307/3088693 
Keese, J., Mastin, T., Yun, D., 2007. Identifying and Assessing Tropical Montane Forests on the Eastern 
Flank of the Ecuadorian Andes. J. Lat. Am. Geogr. 6, 63–84. 
Kelly, P., Huo, X., 2013. Do farmers or governments make better land conservation choices? Evidence 
from China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program. J. For. Econ. 19, 32–60. 
doi:10.1016/j.jfe.2012.08.002 
158 
 
Kessler, M., Kluge, J., 2008. Diversity and endemism in tropical montane forests—from patterns to 
processes, in: Gradstein, S.R., Homeier, J., Gansert, D. (Eds.), The Tropical Mountain Forest - 
Patterns and Processes in a Biodiversity Hotspot, Biodiversity and Ecology Series. Göttingen 
Centre for Biodiversity and Ecology, Univ. Verlag Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany, pp. 35–50. 
Kinzig, A.P., Perrings, C., Chapin, F.S., Polasky, S., Smith, V.K., Tilman, D., Turner, B.L., 2011. Paying 
for Ecosystem Services-Promise and Peril. Science 334, 603–604. doi:10.1126/science.1210297 
Klein, A.-M., Vaissière, B.E., Cane, J.H., Steffan-Dewenter, I., Cunningham, S.A., Kremen, C., 
Tscharntke, T., 2007. Importance of pollinators in changing landscapes for world crops. Proc. R. 
Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 274, 303–313. doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.3721 
Knoke, T., 2008. Mixed forests and finance — Methodological approaches. Ecol. Econ. 65, 590–601. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.08.009 
Knoke, T., Bendix, J., Pohle, P., Hamer, U., Hildebrandt, P., Roos, K., Gerique, A., Sandoval, M.L., 
Breuer, L., Tischer, A., Silva, B., Calvas, B., Aguirre, N., Castro, L.M., Windhorst, D., Weber, 
M., Stimm, B., Günter, S., Palomeque, X., Mora, J., Mosandl, R., Beck, E., 2014. Afforestation 
or intense pasturing improve the ecological and economic value of abandoned tropical farmlands. 
Nat. Commun. 5, 5612. doi:10.1038/ncomms6612 
Knoke, T., Calvas, B., Aguirre, N., Román-Cuesta, R.M., Günter, S., Stimm, B., Weber, M., Mosandl, R., 
2009a. Can tropical farmers reconcile subsistence needs with forest conservation? Front. Ecol. 
Environ. 7, 548–554. doi:10.1890/080131 
Knoke, T., Hildebrandt, P., Klein, D., Mujica, R., Moog, M., Mosandl, R., 2008. Financial compensation 
and uncertainty: using mean-variance rule and stochastic dominance to derive conservation 
payments for secondary forests. Can. J. For. Res. 38, 3033–3046. doi:10.1139/X08-137 
Knoke, T., Steinbeis, O.-E., Bösch, M., Román-Cuesta, R.M., Burkhardt, T., 2011. Cost-effective 
compensation to avoid carbon emissions from forest loss: An approach to consider price–quantity 
effects and risk-aversion. Ecol. Econ. 70, 1139–1153. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.007 
Knoke, T., Stimm, B., Ammer, C., Moog, M., 2005. Mixed forests reconsidered: A forest economics 
contribution on an ecological concept. For. Ecol. Manag. 213, 102–116. 
doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2005.03.043 
Knoke, T., Weber, M., Barkmann, J., Pohle, P., Calvas, B., Medina, C., Aguirre, N., Günter, S., Stimm, 
B., Mosandl, R., von Walter, F., Maza, B., Gerique, A., 2009b. Effectiveness and distributional 
impacts of payments for reduced carbon emissions from. ERDKUNDE 63, 365–384. 
doi:10.3112/erdkunde.2009.04.06 
Kolinjivadi, V., Adamowski, J., Kosoy, N., 2014. Recasting payments for ecosystem services (PES) in 
water resource management: A novel institutional approach. Ecosyst. Serv. 10, 144–154. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2014.08.008 
Kollmair, M., Rasul, G., 2010. Addressing equity and poverty concerns in payments for environmental 
services. Mt. Forum Bull. 10, 12–14. 
Korff, G.D., 2008. Reviving the Forgotten American Dream. Penn State Law Rev. 113, 417–460. 
Kosoy, N., Corbera, E., 2010. Payments for ecosystem services as commodity fetishism. Ecol. Econ. 69, 
1228–1236. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.002 
Kosoy, N., Martinez-Tuna, M., Muradian, R., Martinez-Alier, J., 2007. Payments for environmental 
services in watersheds: Insights from a comparative study of three cases in Central America. 
Ecol. Econ. 61, 446–455. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.03.016 
Krause, T., Collen, W., Nicholas, K.A., 2013. Evaluating Safeguards in a Conservation Incentive 
Program: Participation, Consent, and Benefit Sharing in Indigenous Communities of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon. Ecol. Soc. 18. doi:10.5751/ES-05733-180401 
Krause, T., Loft, L., 2013. Benefit Distribution and Equity in Ecuador’s Socio Bosque Program. Soc. Nat. 
Resour. 26, 1170–1184. doi:10.1080/08941920.2013.797529 
Krause, T., Nielsen, T.D., 2014. The legitimacy of incentive-based conservation and a critical account of 
social safeguards. Environ. Sci. Policy 41, 44–51. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2014.04.015 
159 
 
Krause, T., Zambonino, H., 2013. More than just trees – animal species diversity and participatory forest 
monitoring in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Int. J. Biodivers. Sci. Ecosyst. Serv. Manag. 9, 225–238. 
doi:10.1080/21513732.2013.822930 
Kremen, C., Miles, A., 2012. Ecosystem Services in Biologically Diversified versus Conventional 
Farming Systems: Benefits, Externalities, and Trade-Offs. Ecol. Soc. 17. doi:10.5751/ES-05035-
170440 
Kremen, C., Niles, J.O., Dalton, M.G., Daily, G.C., Ehrlich, P.R., Fay, J.P., Grewal, D., Guillery, R.P., 
2000. Economic Incentives for Rain Forest Conservation Across Scales. Science 288, 1828–1832. 
doi:10.1126/science.288.5472.1828 
Kroeger, T., Casey, F., 2007a. An assessment of market-based approaches to providing ecosystem 
services on agricultural lands. Ecol. Econ., Special Section - Ecosystem Services and Agriculture 
Ecosystem Services and Agriculture 64, 321–332. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.021 
Kroeger, T., Casey, F., 2007b. An assessment of market-based approaches to providing ecosystem 
services on agricultural lands. Ecol. Econ. 64, 321–332. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.021 
Kurttila, M., Pykäläinen, J., Leskinen, P., 2006. Defining the forest landowner’s utility-loss compensative 
subsidy level for a biodiversity object. Eur. J. For. Res. 125, 67–78. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10342-005-0079-1 
Lambin, E.F., Turner, B.L., Geist, H.J., Agbola, S.B., Angelsen, A., Bruce, J.W., Coomes, O.T., Dirzo, 
R., Fischer, G., Folke, C., George, P.S., Homewwod, K., Imbernon, J., Leemans, R., Li, X., 
Moran, E.F., Mortimore, M., Ramakrishnan, P.S., Richards, J.F., Skanes, H., Steffen, W., Stone, 
G.D., Svedin, U., Veldkamp, T.A., Vogel, C., Xu, J., 2001. The causes of land-use and land-cover 
change : Moving beyond the myths. Glob. Environ. Change 11, 261–269. 
Lancaster, K.J., 1966. A new approach to consumer theory. J. Polit. Econ. 74, 132–157. 
Landell-Mills, N., Porras, I.T., 2002. Silver bullet  or fools’ gold? A global review of markets for forest 
environmental services and their impact on the poor. International Institute for Environment and 
Development, London, UK. 
Lant, C.L., Ruhl, J.B., Kraft, S.E., 2008. The Tragedy of Ecosystem Services. BioScience 58, 969–974. 
doi:10.1641/B581010 
Laurans, Y., Lemenager, T., Aoubid, S., 2012. Payments for Ecosystem Services. From Theory to 
Practice – What are the Prospects for Developping Countries? AFD, Paris, France. 
Lavorel, S., Grigulis, K., 2012. How fundamental plant functional trait relationships scale-up to trade-offs 
and synergies in ecosystem services. J. Ecol. 100, 128–140. doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2745.2011.01914.x 
Lavrakas, P., 2008. Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods. SAGE Publications, Inc., 2455 Teller 
Road,  Thousand Oaks  California  91320  United States. 
Layton, D.F., Siikamäki, J., 2009. Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs: Predicting Landowner 
Enrollment and Opportunity Cost Using a Beta-Binomial Model. Environ. Resour. Econ. 44, 
415–439. doi:10.1007/s10640-009-9293-5 
Le Coq, J.-F., Soto, G., González Hernández, C., 2011. PES and Eco-Label. A comparative analysis of 
their limits and opportunities to foster environmental services provision, in: Rapidel, B., Le Coq, 
J.F., Beer, J., DeClerck, F. (Eds.), Ecosystem Services from Agriculture and Agroforestry : 
Measurement and Payment. Earthscan Publications, London, UK, pp. 237–264. 
León, F., Moncayo, M.C., Renner, I., Prem, I., 2010. Compensación por servicios ecosistémicos: Guía de 
monitoreo de impactos. Las microcuencas Mishiquiyacu, Rumiyacu y Almendra de San Martín, 
Perú. 
Le, Q.B., Park, S.J., Vlek, P.L.G., Cremers, A.B., 2008. Land-Use Dynamic Simulator (LUDAS): A 
multi-agent system model for simulating spatio-temporal dynamics of coupled human–landscape 
system. I. Structure and theoretical specification. Ecol. Inform. 3, 135–153. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoinf.2008.04.003 
160 
 
Letourneau, D.K., Jedlicka, J.A., Bothwell, S.G., Moreno, C.R., 2009. Effects of Natural Enemy 
Biodiversity on the Suppression of Arthropod Herbivores in Terrestrial Ecosystems. Annu. Rev. 
Ecol. Evol. Syst. 40, 573–592. doi:10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.110308.120320 
Lewandrowski, J., Darwin, R.., Tsigas, M., Raneses, A., 1999. Estimating costs of protecting global 
ecosystem diversity. Ecol. Econ. 29, 111–125. doi:10.1016/S0921-8009(98)00058-5 
Lewin, B., Giovannucci, D., Varangis, P., 2004. Coffee markets : New paradigms in global supply and 
demand (Working Paper No. 3), Agriculture and Rural Development discussion paper. World 
Bank, Washington DC, USA. 
Libecap, G.D., 2005. State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool Resources, in: Ménard, C., 
Shirley, M.M. (Eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer US, pp. 545–572. 
Lienhoop, N., Brouwer, R., 2015. Agri-environmental policy valuation: Farmers’ contract design 
preferences for afforestation schemes. Land Use Policy 42, 568–577. 
doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.09.017 
Lindblom, C.E., 2001. The Market System. What It Is, How It Works, and What To Make of It. Yale 
University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, USA. 
Loreau, M., Hector, A., 2001. Partitioning selection and complementarity in biodiversity experiments. 
Nature 412, 72–76. doi:10.1038/35083573 
Louviere, J.J., Hensher, D.A., Swait, J.D., 2000. Stated Choice Methods. Analysis and Applications. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Luce, R.D., 1959. Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA. 
Lurie, S., Bennett, D.E., Duncan, S., Gosnell, H., Hunter, M.L., Morzillo, A.T., Moseley, C., Nielsen-
Pincus, M., Parker, R., White, E.M., 2013. PES marketplace development at the local scale: The 
Eugene Water and Electric Board as a local watershed services marketplace driver. Ecosyst. 
Serv., Payments for Ecosystem Services and Their Institutional Dimensions: Analyzing the 
Diversity of Existing PES Approaches in Developing and Industrialized Countries 6, 93–103. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.09.005 
MA, 2005a. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: Ecosystems and Human Well-Being, Biodiversity 
Synthesis. World Resources Institute, Washington DC, USA. 
MA, 2005b. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. Island 
Press, Washington DC, USA. 
MA, 2005c. Ecosystems and human well-being. Health Synthesis. A Report of the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment. World Health Organization, France. 
Madsen, J.E., Øllgaard, B., 1994. Floristic composition, structure, and dynamics of an upper montane rain 
forest in Southern Ecuador. Nord. J. Bot. 14, 403–423. doi:10.1111/j.1756-1051.1994.tb00626.x 
Mahanty, S., Suich, H., Tacconi, L., 2013. Access and benefits in payments for environmental services 
and implications for REDD+: Lessons from seven PES schemes. Land Use Policy, Themed Issue 
1-Guest Editor Romy GreinerThemed Issue 2- Guest Editor Davide Viaggi 31, 38–47. 
doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.10.009 
Makarieva, A.M., Gorshkov, V.G., Li, B.-L., 2006. Conservation of water cycle on land via restoration of 
natural closed-canopy forests: implications for regional landscape planning. Ecol. Res. 21, 897–
906. doi:10.1007/s11284-006-0036-6 
Malawska, A., Topping, C.J., Nielsen, H.Ø., 2014. Why do we need to integrate farmer decision making 
and wildlife models for policy evaluation? Land Use Policy 38, 732–740. 
doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.10.025 
Manzano Díaz, I., 2010. Pagos por Servicios Ambientales. Caso Ecuador-REDD 74. Rev. Derecho 
Económico 2, 255–264. 
Marenya, P., Smith, V.H., Nkonya, E., 2014. Relative Preferences for Soil Conservation Incentives 
among Smallholder Farmers: Evidence from Malawi. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 96, 690–710. 
doi:10.1093/ajae/aat117 
161 
 
Markandya, A., Perelet, R., Mason, P., Taylor, T., 2001. Dictionary of Environmental Economics. Taylor 
& Francis, London, UK. 
Markowitz, H., 1952. Portfolio Selection*. J. Finance 7, 77–91. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01525.x 
Martinez, R., Green, K.M., DeWan, A., 2013. Establishing reciprocal agreements for water and 
biodiversity conservation through a social marketing campaign in Quanda Watershed, Peru. 
Conserv. Evid. 10, 42–47. 
Martino, D., 2001. Buffer Zones Around Protected Areas: A Brief Literature Review. Electron. Green J. 
1. 
Martin-Ortega, J., Ojea, E., Roux, C., 2013. Payments for Water Ecosystem Services in Latin America: A 
literature review and conceptual model. Ecosyst. Serv., Payments for Ecosystem Services and 
Their Institutional Dimensions: Analyzing the Diversity of Existing PES Approaches in 
Developing and Industrialized Countries 6, 122–132. doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.09.008 
Matta, J., Alavalapati, J., Tanner, G., 2007. A framework for developing marked-based policies to further 
biodiversity on non-industrial private forests (NIPF). For. Policy Econ., Economic perspectives 
and analyses of multiple forest values and sustainable forest management 9, 779–788. 
doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2006.03.008 
Matta, J.R., Alavalapati, J.R.R., Mercer, D.E., 2009. Incentives for Biodiversity Conservation Beyond the 
Best Management Practices: Are Forestland Owners Interested? Land Econ. 85, 132–143. 
doi:10.3368/le.85.1.132 
Matzdorf, B., Sattler, C., Engel, S., 2013. Institutional frameworks and governance structures of PES 
schemes. For. Policy Econ., 1. International developments in the administration of publicly-
funded forest research: Challenges and opportunities 2. Payments for ecosystem services and 
their institutional dimensions: Institutional frameworks and governance structures of PES 
schemes 37, 57–64. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2013.10.002 
McDonnell, P., 2008. Optimal Portfolio Modeling: Models to Maximize Returns and Control Risk in 
Excel and R. John Wiley & Sons. 
McFadden, D., 1974. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior, in: Zarembka, P. (Ed.), 
Frontiers in Econometrics. Academic Press, pp. 105–142. 
McGinnis, M.D., Ostrom, E., 2014. Social-ecological system framework: initial changes and continuing 
challenges. Ecol. Soc. 19. doi:10.5751/ES-06387-190230 
McGinnis, M.D., Ostrom, E., 2012. SES framework: initial changes and continuing challenges (Working 
Paper No. W11-6). 
McGinnis, M.D., Ostrom, E., 2010. IAD and SES Dynamic Flows: Introducing the Program in 
Institutional Analysis of Social-Ecological Systems (PIASES) Framework. Presented at the 13th 
Economics of Infrastructures Conference, Delft, Netherlands. 
Ménard, C., 2012. Hybrid Modes of Organization. Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and Other 
“Strange” Animals, in: Gibbons, R., Roberts, J. (Eds.), The Handbook of Organizational 
Economics. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA, pp. 1066–1108. 
Ménard, C., 2005. New institutions for governing the agri-food industry. Eur. Rev. Agric. Econ. 32, 421–
440. doi:10.1093/eurrag/jbi013 
Ménard, C., 2004. The economics of hybrid organizations. J. Institutional Theor. Econ. JITE 160, 345–
376. 
Ménard, C., 1996a. Why organizations matter: A journey away from the fairy tale. Atl. Econ. J. 24, 281–
300. doi:10.1007/BF02298432 
Ménard, C., 1996b. Inside the Black Box: The Variety of Hierarchical Forms, in: Groenewegen, J. (Ed.), 
Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond, Recent Economic Thought Series. Springer 
Netherlands, The Netherlands, pp. 149–170. 
Milder, J.C., Scherr, S.J., Bracer, C., 2010. Trends and Future Potential of Payment for Ecosystem 
Services to Alleviate Rural Poverty in Developing Countries. Ecol. Soc. 15. 
162 
 
Miles, L., Kapos, V., 2008. Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation: Global Land-Use Implications. Science 320, 1454–1455. 
doi:10.1126/science.1155358 
Milne, S., Adams, B., 2012. Market Masquerades: Uncovering the Politics of Community-level Payments 
for Environmental Services in Cambodia. Dev. Change 43, 133–158. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7660.2011.01748.x 
Milne, S., Niesten, E., 2009. Direct payments for biodiversity conservation in developing countries: 
practical insights for design and implementation. Oryx 43, 530–541. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0030605309990330 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ecuador, 2013a. Resolución No. 002. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ecuador, 2013b. Acuerdo No. 502. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ecuador, 2012. III CENSO NACIONAL AGROPECUARIO [WWW 
Document]. SINAGAP. URL http://sinagap.agricultura.gob.ec/censo-nacional-agropecuario 
(accessed 5.7.14). 
Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2014a. Plan Nacional de Restauración Forestal 2014-2017. 
Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2014b. Acuerdo N. 211. 
Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2012a. Sistematización de Socio Bosque. 
Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2012b. Línea Base de Deforestación del Ecuador Continental. 
Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2012c. Manual Operativo Unificado Proyecto Socio Bosque. 
Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2012d. Acuerdo N. 130 Manual Operativo. 
Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 2010. Socio Bosque: Conceptualización, Implementación y 
Avances al Segundo Año de Implementación. 
Miranda, M., Dieperink, C., Glasbergen, P., 2007. Voluntary agreements in watershed protection. 
Experiences from Costa Rica. Environ. Dev. Sustain. 9, 1–19. doi:10.1007/s10668-005-9000-9 
Molnar, A., Scherr, S.J., Khare, A., 2004. Who conserves the world’s forests? Community-driven 
strategies to protect forests and respect rights, Policy Brief. Forest Trends, Ecoagriculture 
Partners, Washington DC, USA. 
Molua, E.L., 2005. The economics of tropical agroforestry systems: the case of agroforestry farms in 
Cameroon. For. Policy Econ. 7, 199–211. doi:10.1016/S1389-9341(03)00032-7 
Mönkkönen, M., Reunanen, P., Kotiaho, J.S., Juutinen, A., Tikkanen, O., Kouki, J., 2011. Cost-effective 
strategies to conserve boreal forest biodiversity and long-term landscape-level maintenance of 
habitats. Eur. J. For. Res. 130, 717–727. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10342-010-0461-5 
Montagnini, F., Nair, P.K.R., 2004. Carbon sequestration: An underexploited environmental benefit of. 
Agrofor. Syst. 61-62, 281–295. doi:10.1023/B:AGFO.0000029005.92691.79 
Morandin, L.A., Winston, M.L., 2006. Pollinators provide economic incentive to preserve natural land in 
agroecosystems. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 116, 289–292. doi:10.1016/j.agee.2006.02.012 
Morse, W.C., McLaughlin, W.J., Wulfhorst, J.D., Harvey, C., 2013. Social ecological complex adaptive 
systems: a framework for research on payments for ecosystem services. Urban Ecosyst. 16, 53–
77. doi:10.1007/s11252-011-0178-3 
Mosandl, R., Günter, S., Stimm, B., Weber, M., 2008. Ecuador Suffers the Highest Deforestation Rate in 
South America, in: Beck, E., Bendix, J., Kottke, I., Makeschin, F., Mosandl, R. (Eds.), Gradients 
in a Tropical Mountain Ecosystem of Ecuador, Ecological Studies. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
pp. 37–40. 
Moscardi, E., Janvry, A. de, 1977. Attitudes toward Risk among Peasants: An Econometric Approach. 
Am. J. Agric. Econ. 59, 710–716. doi:10.2307/1239398 
Municipality of Loja, 2007. Protección Ambiental de las Micro Cuencas en el Cantón Loja. Ordenanza 
Municipal 3. 
Municipality of Pimampiro, 2013. La primera reforma a la ordenanza que establece la creación del fondo 
para el pago por servicios ambientales para la conservación de bosques y páramos con fines de 
regulación de agua. 
163 
 
Municipality of San Pedro del Norte, 2011. Ordenanza Municipal: Pagos por Servicios Ambientales 
Hidricos PSAH, en la Microcuenca “Paso de los Caballos”. 
Muñoz Escobar, M., Hollaender, R., Pineda Weffer, C., 2013. Institutional durability of payments for 
watershed ecosystem services: Lessons from two case studies from Colombia and Germany. 
Ecosyst. Serv., Payments for Ecosystem Services and Their Institutional Dimensions: Analyzing 
the Diversity of Existing PES Approaches in Developing and Industrialized Countries 6, 46–53. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.04.004 
Muñoz-Piña, C., Guevara, A., Torres, J.M., Braña, J., 2008. Paying for the hydrological services of 
Mexico’s forests: Analysis, negotiations and results. Ecol. Econ. 65, 725–736. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.031 
Muradian, R., 2013. Payments for Ecosystem Services as Incentives for Collective Action. Soc. Nat. 
Resour. 26, 1155–1169. doi:10.1080/08941920.2013.820816 
Muradian, R., Corbera, E., Pascual, U., Kosoy, N., May, P.H., 2010. Reconciling theory and practice: An 
alternative conceptual framework for understanding payments for environmental services. Ecol. 
Econ. 69, 1202–1208. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.006 
Muradian, R., Gómez-Baggethun, E., 2013. The Institutional Dimension of “Market-Based Instruments” 
for Governing Ecosystem Services: Introduction to the Special Issue. Soc. Nat. Resour. 26, 1113–
1121. doi:10.1080/08941920.2013.829380 
Muradian, R., Rival, L., 2012. Between markets and hierarchies: The challenge of governing ecosystem 
services. Ecosyst. Serv. 1, 93–100. 
Murcia, C., 1997. Evaluation of Andean alder as a catalyst for the recovery of tropical cloud forests in 
Colombia. For. Ecol. Manag. 99, 163–170. doi:10.1016/S0378-1127(97)00202-8 
Murgueitio, E., Cuellar, P., Ibrahim, M., Gobbi, J., Cuartas, C.A., Naranjo, J.F., Zapata, A., Mejía, C.E., 
Zuluaga, A.F., Cassasola, F., 2006. Adopción de sistemas agroforestales pecuarios. Adoption of 
agroforestry systems for animal production. Pastos Forrajes 29, 365–379. 
Mutke, J., Barthlott, W., 2005. Patterns of vascular plant diversity at continental to global scales. Biol. 
Skr. 55, 521–531. 
Myers, N., Mittermeier, R.A., Mittermeier, C.G., da Fonseca, G.A.B., Kent, J., 2000. Biodiversity 
hotspots for conservation priorities. Nature 403, 853–858. doi:10.1038/35002501 
Naeem, S., Thompson, L.J., Lawler, S.P., Lawton, J.H., Woodfin, R.M., 1994. Declining biodiversity can 
alter the performance of ecosystems. Nature 368, 734–737. doi:10.1038/368734a0 
Naughton-Treves, L., Grossberg, R., Treves, A., 2003. Paying for Tolerance: Rural Citizens’ Attitudes 
toward Wolf Depredation and Compensation. Conserv. Biol. 17, 1500–1511. doi:10.1111/j.1523-
1739.2003.00060.x 
Newmark, W.D., Leonard, N.L., Sariko, H.I., Gamassa, D.-G.M., 1993. Conservation attitudes of local 
people living adjacent to five protected areas in Tanzania. Biol. Conserv. 63, 177–183. 
Ninan, K.N., Jyothis, S., Babu, P., Ramakrishnappa, V., 2007. The Economics of Biodiversity 
Conservation: Valuation in Tropical Forest Ecosystems. Earthscan, London, UK. 
Nordén, A., 2014. Payment Types and Participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services Programs. Stated 
Preferences of Landowners (Working Paper No. 14-11), Discussion Paper Series. Environment 
for Development Center for Central America, Costa Rica. 
Norgaard, R.B., 2010. Ecosystem services: From eye-opening metaphor to complexity blinder. Ecol. 
Econ. 69, 1219–1227. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.009 
North, D.C., 1991. Institutions. J. Econ. Perspect. 5, 97–112. 
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK. 
OECD, 2004. Handbook of Market Creation for Biodiversity. Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Paris, France. 
Ojea, E., Martin-Ortega, J., 2015. Understanding the economic value of water ecosystem services from 
tropical forests: A systematic review for South and Central America. J. For. Econ. 21, 97–106. 
doi:10.1016/j.jfe.2015.02.001 
164 
 
Olschewski, R., Benítez, P.C., 2005. Secondary forests as temporary carbon sinks? The economic impact 
of accounting methods on reforestation projects in the tropics. Ecol. Econ. 55, 380–394. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.09.021 
Olsen, N., Bishop, J., Anstee, S., 2011. Exploring ecosystem valuation to move towards net positive 
impact on biodiversity in the mining sector, IUCN and Rio Tinto Technical Series. International 
Union for Conservation of Nature, Gland, Switzerland. 
Ormerod, S.J., 2003. Restoration in applied ecology: editor’s introduction. J. Appl. Ecol. 40, 44–50. 
doi:10.1046/j.1365-2664.2003.00799.x 
Ostrom, E., 2010. Institutional Analysis and Development: Elements of the Framework in historical 
Perspective, in: Crothers, C. (Ed.), Historical Developments and Theoretical Approaches in 
Sociology. UNESCO Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems. 
Ostrom, E., 2009. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. 
Science 325, 419–422. doi:10.1126/science.1172133 
Ostrom, E., 2007. A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 104, 15181–
15187. 
Ostrom, E., Cox, M., 2010. Moving beyond panaceas: a multi-tiered diagnostic approach for social-
ecological analysis. Environ. Conserv. 37, 451–463. doi:10.1017/S0376892910000834 
Pagiola, S., 2008. Payments for environmental services in Costa Rica. Ecol. Econ. 65, 712–724. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.033 
Pagiola, S., Agostini, P., Gobbi, J., de Haan, C., Ibrahim, M., Murgueitio, E., Ramirez, E., Rosales, M., 
Ruiz, J.P., 2005a. Paying for Biodiversity conservation services - Experience in Colombia, Costa 
Rica, and Nicaragua. Mt. Res. Dev. 25, 206–211. doi:10.1659/0276-
4741(2005)025[0206:PFBCS]2.0.CO;2 
Pagiola, S., Arcenas, A., Platais, G., 2005b. Can Payments for Environmental Services Help Reduce 
Poverty? An Exploration of the Issues and the Evidence to Date from Latin America. World Dev. 
33, 237–253. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.07.011 
Pagiola, S., Platais, G., 2002. Payments for Environmental Services (Discussion Paper No. 3), 
Environmental Strategy Notes. World Bank, Washington DC, USA. 
Pagiola, S., Ramirez, E., Gobbi, J., de Haan, C., Ibrahim, M., Murgueitio, E., Ruiz, J.P., 2007. Paying for 
the environmental services of silvopastoral practices in Nicaragua. Ecol. Econ. 64, 374–385. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.04.014 
Pagiola, S., Rios, A.R., Arcenas, A., 2010. Poor Household Participation in Payments for Environmental 
Services: Lessons from the Silvopastoral Project in Quindío, Colombia. Environ. Resour. Econ. 
47, 371–394. doi:10.1007/s10640-010-9383-4 
Pagiola, S., Rios, A.R., Arcenas, A., 2008. Can the poor participate in payments for environmental 
services? Lessons from the Silvopastoral Project in Nicaragua. Environ. Dev. Econ. 13, 299–325. 
doi:10.1017/S1355770X08004270 
Palumbi, S.R., McLeod, K.L., Grünbaum, D., 2008. Ecosystems in Action: Lessons from Marine Ecology 
about Recovery, Resistance, and Reversibility. BioScience 58, 33–42. doi:10.1641/B580108 
Pan, Y., Birdsey, R.A., Fang, J., Houghton, R., Kauppi, P.E., Kurz, W.A., Phillips, O.L., Shvidenko, A., 
Lewis, S.L., Canadell, J.G., Ciais, P., Jackson, R.B., Pacala, S.W., McGuire, A.D., Piao, S., 
Rautiainen, A., Sitch, S., Hayes, D., 2011. A Large and Persistent Carbon Sink in the World’s 
Forests. Science 333, 988–993. doi:10.1126/science.1201609 
Parker, C., Cranford, M., Oakes, N., Leggett, M., 2012. The Little Biodiversity Finance Book. A guide to 
proactive investment in natural  capital (PINC)., 3rd ed. Global Canopy Programme, Oxford, UK. 
Parkin, M., Powell, M., Matthews, K., 2011. Economics, 8th ed. Pearson Education, Oxford, UK. 
Pattanayak, S.K., Mercer, D.E., Sills, E., Yang, J.-C., 2003. Taking stock of agroforestry adoption studies. 
Agrofor. Syst. 57, 173–186. doi:10.1023/A:1024809108210 
Paul, S., Veldkamp, E., Flessa, H., 2008. Soil organic carbon in density fractions of tropical soils under 
forest – pasture – secondary forest land use changes. Eur. J. Soil Sci. 59, 359–371. 
doi:10.1111/j.1365-2389.2007.01010.x 
165 
 
Pearce, D., 2007. Do we really care about Biodiversity? Environ. Resour. Econ. 37, 313–333. 
doi:10.1007/s10640-007-9118-3 
Pereira, S.N.C., 2010. Payment for Environmental Services in the Amazon Forest: How Can 
Conservation and Development Be Reconciled? J. Environ. Dev. 19, 171–190. 
doi:10.1177/1070496510368047 
Persson, U.M., Alpízar, F., 2013. Conditional Cash Transfers and Payments for Environmental 
Services—A Conceptual Framework for Explaining and Judging Differences in Outcomes. World 
Dev. 43, 124–137. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.10.006 
Peters, T., Diertl, K.-H., Gawlik, J., Rankl, M., Richter, M., 2010. Vascular Plant Diversity in Natural and 
Anthropogenic Ecosystems in the Andes of Southern Ecuador. Mt. Res. Dev. 30, 344–352. 
doi:10.1659/MRD-JOURNAL-D-10-00029.1 
Petheram, L., Campbell, B.M., 2010. Listening to locals on payments for environmental services. J. 
Environ. Manage. 91, 1139–1149. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2010.01.002 
Philpott, S.M., Arendt, W.J., Armbrecht, I., Bichier, P., Diestch, T.V., Gordon, C., Greenberg, R., 
Perfecto, I., Reynoso-Santos, R., Soto-Pinto, L., Tejeda-Cruz, C., Williams-Linera, G., 
Valenzuela, J., Zolotoff, J.M., 2008. Biodiversity Loss in Latin American Coffee Landscapes: 
Review of the Evidence on Ants, Birds, and Trees. Conserv. Biol. 22, 1093–1105. 
doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2008.01029.x 
Philpott, S.M., Bichier, P., 2012. Effects of shade tree removal on birds in coffee agroecosystems in 
Chiapas, Mexico. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 149, 171–180. doi:10.1016/j.agee.2011.02.015 
Philpott, S.M., Soong, O., Lowenstein, J.H., Pulido, A.L., Lopez, D.T., Flynn, D.F.B., DeClerck, F., 
2009. Functional richness and ecosystem services: bird predation on arthropods in tropical 
agroecosystems. Ecol. Appl. 19, 1858–1867. doi:10.1890/08-1928.1 
Pirard, R., 2012a. Market-based instruments for biodiversity and ecosystem services: A lexicon. Environ. 
Sci. Policy 19-20, 59–68. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2012.02.001 
Pirard, R., 2012b. Payments for Environmental Services (PES) in the public policy landscape: 
“Mandatory” spices in the Indonesian recipe. For. Policy Econ. 18, 23–29. 
doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2011.09.002 
Pirard, R., Billé, R., Sembrés, T., 2010. Questioning the theory of Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) in light of emerging experience and plausible developments. (Working Paper No. 
N°04/2010), SERIES. IDDRI, Paris, France. 
Pirard, R., Lapeyre, R., 2014. Classifying market-based instruments for ecosystem services: A guide to 
the literature jungle. Ecosyst. Serv. doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2014.06.005 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2012. Ley N° 300. Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral 
para Vivir Bien. 
Polak, G.G., Rogers, D.F., Sweeney, D.J., 2010. Risk management strategies via minimax portfolio 
optimization. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 207, 409–419. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.04.025 
Ponette-González, A.G., Weathers, K.C., Curran, L.M., 2010. Water inputs across a tropical montane 
landscape in Veracruz, Mexico: synergistic effects of land cover, rain and fog seasonality, and 
interannual precipitation variability. Glob. Change Biol. 16, 946–963. doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2486.2009.01985.x 
Porras, I., 2010. Fair and green? Social impacts of payments for environmental services in Costa Rica. 
International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK. 
Porras, I., Grieg-Gran, M., Neves, N., 2008. All that glitters. A review of payments for watershed services 
in developing countries. International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK. 
Power, A.G., 2010. Ecosystem services and agriculture: tradeoffs and synergies. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 
Biol. Sci. 365, 2959–2971. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0143 
Preece, N.D., Crowley, G.M., Lawes, M.J., van Oosterzee, P., 2012. Comparing above-ground biomass 
among forest types in the Wet Tropics: Small stems and plantation types matter in carbon 
accounting. For. Ecol. Manag. 264, 228–237. doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2011.10.016 
Prigent, J.-L., 2007. Portfolio Optimization and Performance Analysis. CRC Press. 
166 
 
Prins, H.H.T., Wind, J., 1993. Research for nature conservation in south-east Asia. Biol. Conserv. 63, 43–
46. doi:10.1016/0006-3207(93)90071-8 
Prokofieva, I., Gorriz, E., 2013. Institutional analysis of incentives for the provision of forest goods and 
services: An assessment of incentive schemes in Catalonia (north-east Spain). For. Policy Econ. 
37, 104–114. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2013.09.005 
Putten,  van I.E., Jennings, S.M., Louviere, J.J., Burgess, L.B., 2011. Tasmanian landowner preferences 
for conservation incentive programs: A latent class approach. J. Environ. Manage. 92, 2647–
2656. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2011.06.002 
Quintero, M., Wunder, S., Estrada, R.D., 2009. For services rendered? Modeling hydrology and 
livelihoods in Andean payments for environmental services schemes. For. Ecol. Manag. 258, 
1871–1880. doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2009.04.032 
Rabotyagov, S.S., Lin, S., 2013. Small forest landowner preferences for working forest conservation 
contract attributes: A case of Washington State, USA. J. For. Econ. 19, 307–330. 
doi:10.1016/j.jfe.2013.06.002 
Rahbek, C., Bloch, H., Poulsen, M.K., Rasmussen, J.F., 1995. The avifauna of the Podocarpus National 
Park - the “Andean jewel in the crown” of Ecuador’s protected areas. Ornitol. Neotropical 6, 
113–120. 
Rametsteiner, E., 2002. The role of governments in forest certification—a normative analysis based on 
new institutional economics theories. For. Policy Econ. 4, 163–173. doi:10.1016/S1389-
9341(02)00004-7 
Rappole, J.H., King, D.I., Rivera, J.H.V., 2003. Coffee and Conservation. Conserv. Biol. 17, 334–336. 
doi:10.1046/j.1523-1739.2003.01548.x 
Raudsepp-Hearne, C., Peterson, G.D., Tengö, M., Bennett, E.M., Holland, T., Benessaiah, K., 
MacDonald, G.K., Pfeifer, L., 2010. Untangling the Environmentalist’s Paradox: Why Is Human 
Well-being Increasing as Ecosystem Services Degrade? Bioscience 60, 576–589. 
R Core Team, 2014. R: A language and environment for statistical computing. 
Redondo-Brenes, A., 2009. An Assessment of a Fund for Watershed Conservation in the Southern 
Ecuadorian Andes. J. Sustain. For. 28, 755–776. doi:10.1080/10549810902922375 
Redondo-Brenes, A., Welsh, K., 2010. Procuencas Project, Costa Rica, available at: TEEBweb.org. 
Reeves, L.H., Lilieholm, R.J., 1993. Reducing financial risk in agroforestry planning: a case study in 
Costa Rica. Agrofor. Syst. 21, 169–175. doi:10.1007/BF00705228 
Republic of Ecuador, 2008. Constitución Política del Ecuador. 
Restrepo, C., Alvarez, N., 2006. Landslides and Their Contribution to Land-cover Change in the 
Mountains of Mexico and Central America1. Biotropica 38, 446–457. doi:10.1111/j.1744-
7429.2006.00178.x 
Rex, K., Kelm, D.H., Wiesner, K., Kunz, T.H., Voigt, C.C., 2008. Species richness and structure of three 
Neotropical bat assemblages. Biol. J. Linn. Soc. 94, 617–629. doi:10.1111/j.1095-
8312.2008.01014.x 
Rhoades, C.C., Eckert, G.E., Coleman, D.C., 2000. Soil carbon differences among forest, agriculture, and 
secondary vegetation in lower montane Ecuador. Ecol. Appl. 10, 497–505. doi:10.1890/1051-
0761(2000)010[0497:SCDAFA]2.0.CO;2 
Rice, J., 2007. Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis, 3rd ed. Cengage Learning, USA. 
Ricketts, T.H., Daily, G.C., Ehrlich, P.R., Michener, C.D., 2004. Economic value of tropical forest to 
coffee production. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 101, 12579–12582. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0405147101 
Roa-García, M.C., Brown, S., Schreier, H., Lavkulich, L.M., 2011. The role of land use and soils in 
regulating water flow in small headwater catchments of the Andes. Water Resour. Res. 47, 1–12. 
doi:10.1029/2010WR009582 
Robert, N., Stenger, A., 2013. Can payments solve the problem of undersupply of ecosystem services? 
For. Policy Econ., New Frontiers of Forest Economics 35, 83–91. 
doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2013.06.012 
167 
 
Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, Å., Chapin, F.S., Lambin, E.F., Lenton, T.M., Scheffer, 
M., Folke, C., Schellnhuber, H.J., Nykvist, B., de Wit, C.A., Hughes, T., van der Leeuw, S., 
Rodhe, H., Sörlin, S., Snyder, P.K., Costanza, R., Svedin, U., Falkenmark, M., Karlberg, L., 
Corell, R.W., Fabry, V.J., Hansen, J., Walker, B., Liverman, D., Richardson, K., Crutzen, P., 
Foley, J.A., 2009. A safe operating space for humanity. Nature 461, 472–475. 
doi:10.1038/461472a 
Rodricks, S., 2013. Bundling of ecosystem services in agroforestry, Mexico. mainly based on Corbera, E., 
et al 2009. 
Rodríguez de Francisco, J.C., Budds, J., Boelens, R., 2013. Payment for Environmental Services and 
Unequal Resource Control in Pimampiro, Ecuador. Soc. Nat. Resour. 26, 1217–1233. 
doi:10.1080/08941920.2013.825037 
Rodríguez, L.C., Pascual, U., Muradian, R., Pazmino, N., Whitten, S., 2011. Towards a unified scheme 
for environmental and social protection: Learning from PES and CCT experiences in developing 
countries. Ecol. Econ. 70, 2163–2174. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.06.019 
Rojas, M., Aylward, B., 2003. What are we learning from experiences with markets for environmental 
services in Costa Rica? A review and critique of the literature. (Working Paper), Environmental 
Economics Programme. International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK. 
Rojas, M., Aylward, B., 2002. Cooperation between a small private hydropower producer and a 
conservation NGO for forest protection: The case of La Esperanza, Costa Rica, Land-Water 
Linkages in Rural Watersheds Case Study Series. FAO, Rome, Italy. 
Rosa, H., Barry, D., Dimas, L., Kandel, S., 2004. Compensation for Environmental Services and Rural 
Communities: Lessons from the Americas (Working Paper No. wp96). Political Economy 
Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
Rosenbaum, E.F., 2000. What is a market? On the methodology of a contested concept. Rev. Soc. Econ. 
58, 455–482. 
Rosenberg, A., Bigford, T.E., Leathery, S., Hill, R.L., Bickers, K., 2000. Ecosystem approaches to fishery 
management through essential fish habitat. Bull. Mar. Sci. 66, 535–542. 
Rudd, M.A., 2004. An institutional framework for designing and monitoring ecosystem-based fisheries 
management policy experiments. Ecol. Econ. 48, 109–124. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2003.10.002 
Ruto, E., Garrod, G., 2009. Investigating farmers’ preferences for the design of agri-environment 
schemes: a choice experiment approach. J. Environ. Plan. Manag. 52, 631–647. 
doi:10.1080/09640560902958172 
Sanchez-Azofeifa, G.A., Pfaff, A., Robalino, J.A., Boomhower, J.P., 2007. Costa Rica’s payment for 
environmental services program: Intention, implementation, and impact. Conserv. Biol. 21, 1165–
1173. doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2007-00751.x 
Sattler, C., Trampnau, S., Schomers, S., Meyer, C., Matzdorf, B., 2013. Multi-classification of payments 
for ecosystem services: How do classification characteristics relate to overall PES success? 
Ecosyst. Serv., Payments for Ecosystem Services and Their Institutional Dimensions: Analyzing 
the Diversity of Existing PES Approaches in Developing and Industrialized Countries 6, 31–45. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.09.007 
Schaafsma, M., Morse-Jones, S., Posen, P., Swetnam, R.D., Balmford, A., Bateman, I.J., Burgess, N.D., 
Chamshama, S.A.O., Fisher, B., Freeman, T., Geofrey, V., Green, R.E., Hepelwa, A.S., 
Hernández-Sirvent, A., Hess, S., Kajembe, G.C., Kayharara, G., Kilonzo, M., Kulindwa, K., 
Lund, J.F., Madoffe, S.S., Mbwambo, L., Meilby, H., Ngaga, Y.M., Theilade, I., Treue, T., van 
Beukering, P., Vyamana, V.G., Turner, R.K., 2011. The importance of local forest benefits: 
Valuation of non-timber forest products in the Eastern Arc Mountains in Tanzania (Working 
Paper No. 2011-05), CSERGE working paper. CSERGE, University of East Anglia, UK. 
Scheidel, A., 2013. Flows, funds and the complexity of deprivation: Using concepts from ecological 
economics for the study of poverty. Ecol. Econ., Sustainable Urbanisation: A resilient future 86, 
28–36. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.10.019 
168 
 
Scherr, S.J., Bennett, M.T., Loughney, M., Canby, K., 2006. Developing future ecosystem service 
payments in China: Lessons learned from international experience. A report prepared for the 
China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) 
Taskforce on Ecocompensation. Forest Trends, Washington DC, USA. 
Scherr, S.J., White, A., Khare, A., International Tropical Timber Organization, 2004. For services 
rendered: the current status and future potential of markets for the ecosystem services provided by 
tropical forests. International Tropical Timber Organization, Yokohama, Japan. 
Scheufele, G., Bennett, J., 2013. Effective Implementation of Payments for Environmental Services in 
Lao PDR (No. 1), Research Report. Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia. 
Schlüter, A., Madrigal, R., 2012. The SES Framework in a Marine Setting: Methodological Lessons. 
Ration. Mark. Morals J. 148–167. 
Schomers, S., Matzdorf, B., 2013. Payments for ecosystem services: A review and comparison of 
developing and industrialized countries. Ecosyst. Serv. 6, 16–30. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.01.002 
Secchi, S., Gassman, P.W., Williams, J.R., Babcock, B.A., 2009. Corn-Based Ethanol Production and 
Environmental Quality: A Case of Iowa and the Conservation Reserve Program. Environ. 
Manage. 44, 732–744. doi:10.1007/s00267-009-9365-x 
Seufert, V., Ramankutty, N., Foley, J.A., 2012. Comparing the yields of organic and conventional 
agriculture. Nature 485, 229–232. doi:10.1038/nature11069 
Shapiro-Garza, E., 2013. Contesting the market-based nature of Mexico’s national payments for 
ecosystem services programs: Four sites of articulation and hybridization. Geoforum 46, 5–15. 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.11.018 
Sharpe, W.F., 1994. The Sharpe Ratio. J. Portf. Manag. 21, 49–58. doi:10.3905/jpm.1994.409501 
Shelley, B.G., 2011. What should we call instruments commonly known as payments for environmental 
services? A review of the literature and a proposal. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1219, 209–225. 
doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05941.x 
Siebert, R., Berger, G., Lorenz, J., Pfeffer, H., 2010. Assessing German farmers’ attitudes regarding 
nature conservation set-aside in regions dominated by arable farming. J. Nat. Conserv. 18, 327–
337. doi:10.1016/j.jnc.2010.01.006 
Siebert, R., Toogood, M., Knierim, A., 2006. Factors Affecting European Farmers’ Participation in 
Biodiversity Policies. Sociol. Rural. 46, 318–340. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00420.x 
Siles, P., Harmand, J.-M., Vaast, P., 2010. Effects of Inga densiflora on the microclimate of coffee 
(Coffea arabica L.) and overall biomass under optimal growing conditions in Costa Rica. 
Agrofor. Syst. 78, 269–286. doi:10.1007/s10457-009-9241-y 
Smith, J., Scherr, S.J., 2002. Forest carbon and local livelihoods: assessment of opportunities and policy 
recommendations (No. 37), CIFOR Occasional Paper. Centre for International Forestry Research, 
Bogor Barat Indonesia. 
Sommerville, M.M., Jones, J.P., Milner-Gulland, E.J., 2009. A revised conceptual framework for 
payments for environmental services. Ecol. Soc. 14, 34. 
Sommerville, M.M., Milner-Gulland, E.J., Jones, J.P.G., 2011. The challenge of monitoring biodiversity 
in payment for environmental service interventions. Biol. Conserv. 144, 2832–2841. 
doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2011.07.036 
Soto-Pinto, L., Anzueto, M., Mendoza, J., Ferrer, G.J., Jong, B. de, 2010. Carbon sequestration through 
agroforestry in indigenous communities of Chiapas, Mexico. Agrofor. Syst. 78, 39–51. 
doi:10.1007/s10457-009-9247-5 
Southgate, D., Wunder, S., 2009. Paying for Watershed Services in Latin America: A Review of Current 
Initiatives. J. Sustain. For. 28, 497–524. doi:10.1080/10549810902794493 
Swait, J., 1994. A structural equation model of latent segmentation and product choice for cross-sectional 
revealed preference choice data. J. Retail. Consum. Serv. 1, 77–89. doi:10.1016/0969-
6989(94)90002-7 
169 
 
Swallow, B., Meinzen-Dick, R., 2009. Payment for Environmental Services: Interactions with Property 
Rights and Collective Action, in: Dr, V.B., Dr, M.P. (Eds.), Institutions and Sustainability. 
Springer Netherlands, pp. 243–265. 
Swallow, B.M., Kallesoe, M.F., Iftikhar, U.A., van Noordwijk, M., Bracer, C., Scherr, S.J., Raju, K.V., 
Poats, S.V., Duraiappah, A.K., Ochieng, B.O., Mallee, H., Rumley, R., 2009. Compensation and 
Rewards for Environmental Services in the Developing World: Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis 
and Comparison. Ecol. Soc. 14. 
Tacconi, L., 2012. Redefining payments for environmental services. Ecol. Econ. 73, 29–36. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.09.028 
Tacconi, L., 2000. Biodiversity & Ecological Economics: Participation, Values and Resource 
Management. Earthscan Publications, London, UK. 
Tanaka, Y., Munro, A., 2014. Regional Variation in Risk and Time Preferences: Evidence from a Large-
scale Field Experiment in Rural Uganda. J. Afr. Econ. 23, 151–187. doi:10.1093/jae/ejt020 
TEEB, 2010a. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity Ecological and Economic Foundations. 
Earthscan, London and Washington. 
TEEB, 2010b. The economics of ecosystems and biodiversity for local and regional policy makers. 
ten Brink, P., 2011. Rewarding benefits through payments and markets., in: Brink, P. ten (Ed.), The 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity in National and International Policy Making. 
Routledge, Oxford, UK, p. 528. 
Tesfaye, A., Brouwer, R., 2012. Testing participation constraints in contract design for sustainable soil 
conservation in Ethiopia. Ecol. Econ. 73, 168–178. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.10.017 
Thomas, H., Nisbet, T.R., 2007. An assessment of the impact of floodplain woodland on flood flows. 
Water Environ. J. 21, 114–126. doi:10.1111/j.1747-6593.2006.00056.x 
Tietenberg, T., 2006. Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice. Penn State Environ. Law Rev. 14, 251–
281. 
Tilman, D., Cassman, K.G., Matson, P.A., Naylor, R., Polasky, S., 2002. Agricultural sustainability and 
intensive production practices. Nature 418, 671–677. doi:10.1038/nature01014 
To, P.X., Dressler, W.H., Mahanty, S., Pham, T.T., Zingerli, C., 2012. The Prospects for Payment for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) in Vietnam: A Look at Three Payment Schemes. Hum. Ecol. 40, 237–
249. doi:10.1007/s10745-012-9480-9 
Torres-Lezama, A., Vilanova, E., Ramírez-Angulo, H., Alciaturi, G., 2012. Socioeconomic and 
Environmental Basis for the Development of Small Scale Forestry in a Highly Degraded 
Watershed in the Venezuelan Andes. Small-Scale For. 11, 321–337. doi:10.1007/s11842-011-
9186-7 
Turlach, B.A., Weingessel, A., 2013. quadprog: Functions to solve Quadratic Programming Problems. R 
package version 1.5-5. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=quadprog. 
Turner, R.K., Daily, G.C., 2008. The Ecosystem Services Framework and Natural Capital Conservation. 
Environ. Resour. Econ. 39, 25–35. doi:10.1007/s10640-007-9176-6 
Turner, R.K., Paavola, J., Cooper, P., Farber, S., Jessamy, V., Georgiou, S., 2003. Valuing nature: lessons 
learned and future research directions. Ecol. Econ. 46, 493–510. doi:10.1016/S0921-
8009(03)00189-7 
Turpie, J.K., Marais, C., Blignaut, J.N., 2008. The working for water programme: Evolution of a 
payments for ecosystem services mechanism that addresses both poverty and ecosystem service 
delivery in South Africa. Ecol. Econ., Payments for Environmental Services in Developing and 
Developed Countries 65, 788–798. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.12.024 
UN, 1992. Convention on Biological Diversity. 
UNEP, 2008. Biodiversity and Ecosystem  Services. Bloom  or Bust? UNEP Finance Initiative, 
Biodiversity & Ecosystem Services Work Stream. 
UNSTATS, 2014. United Nations Statistics Division. Households and families. [WWW Document]. 
Demogr. Soc. Stat. URL http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/fam/fammethods.htm 
(accessed 12.16.14). 
170 
 
Valkila, J., 2009. Fair Trade organic coffee production in Nicaragua — Sustainable development or a 
poverty trap? Ecol. Econ. 68, 3018–3025. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.07.002 
van den Berg, A.E., Vlek, C.A.J., Coeterier, J.F., 1998. Group differences in the aesthetic evaluation of 
nature development plans: A multilevel approach. J. Environ. Psychol. 18, 141–157. 
doi:10.1006/jevp.1998.0080 
Vandermeer, J., Perfecto, I., Philpott, S., 2010. Ecological Complexity and Pest Control in Organic 
Coffee Production: Uncovering an Autonomous Ecosystem Service. BioScience 60, 527–537. 
doi:10.1525/bio.2010.60.7.8 
Van Hecken, G., Bastiaensen, J., 2010. Payments for ecosystem services: justified or not? A political 
view. Environ. Sci. Policy 13, 785–792. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2010.09.006 
Van Huylenbroeck, G., Vuylsteke, A., Verbeke, W., 2009. Public Good Markets: The Possible Role of 
Hybrid Governance Structures in Institutions for Sustainability, in: Beckmann, V., Padmanabhan, 
M. (Eds.), Institutions and Sustainability. Springer Netherlands, pp. 175–191. 
van Noordwijk, M., Leimona, B., 2010. Principles for Fairness and Efficiency in Enhancing 
Environmental Services in Asia: Payments, Compensation, or Co-Investment? Ecol. Soc. 15. 
van Noordwijk, M., Leimona, B., Emerton, L., Tomich, T.P., Velarde, S.J., Kallesoe, M., Sekher, M., 
Swallow, B., 2007. Criteria and indicators for environmental service compensation and reward 
mechanisms: realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor:  CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 2 
(Working Paper No. 37), ICRAF Working Paper. World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
Vatn, A., 2015. Markets in environmental governance. From theory to practice. Ecol. Econ. 117, 225–
233. doi:doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.07.017 
Vatn, A., 2010. An institutional analysis of payments for environmental services. Ecol. Econ. 69, 1245–
1252. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.018 
Vedeld, P., Angelsen, A., Bojö, J., Sjaastad, E., Kobugabe Berg, G., 2007. Forest environmental incomes 
and the rural poor. For. Policy Econ. 9, 869–879. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2006.05.008 
Vignola, R., Koellner, T., Scholz, R.W., McDaniels, T.L., 2010. Decision-making by farmers regarding 
ecosystem services: Factors affecting soil conservation efforts in Costa Rica. Land Use Policy 27, 
1132–1142. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2010.03.003 
Villamor, G.B., van Noordwijk, M., Djanibekov, U., Chiong-Javier, M.E., Catacutan, D., 2014. Gender 
differences in land-use decisions: shaping multifunctional landscapes? Curr. Opin. Environ. 
Sustain., Sustainability challenges 6, 128–133. doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2013.11.015 
Wallace, G.N., Barborak, J.R., MacFarland, C., 2003. Land-use planning and regulation in and around 
protected areas: A study of best practices and capacity building needs in Mexico and Central 
America. Presented at the 5th World Parks Conference, Durban, South Africa. 
Wang, G., Fang, Q., Zhang, L., Chen, W., Chen, Z., Hong, H., 2010. Valuing the effects of hydropower 
development on watershed ecosystem services: Case studies in the Jiulong River Watershed, 
Fujian Province, China. Estuar. Coast. Shelf Sci. 86, 363–368. doi:10.1016/j.ecss.2009.03.022 
WCMC, 2000. Global biodiversity: Earth’s living resources in the 21st century. Cambridge Press, 
Cambridge, UK. 
Webber, L., 2009. Diagnóstico y plan de monitoreo de la calidad del agua en las áreas de interés hídrico 
de los cantones Celica, Pindal, Puyango y Macará. Loja - Ecuador. Naturaleza y Cultura 
International, Loja, Ecuador. 
Whaley, L., Weatherhead, E.K., 2014. An Integrated Approach to Analyzing (Adaptive) Comanagement 
Using the “Politicized” IAD Framework. Ecol. Soc. 19. doi:10.5751/ES-06177-190110 
Williamson, O.E., 2010. Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression. Am. Econ. Rev. 100, 
673–90. doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.673 
Williamson, O.E., 2002. The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract. J. 
Econ. Perspect. 16, 171–195. doi:10.1257/089533002760278776 
Williamson, O.E., 2000. The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. J. Econ. Lit. 595–
613. 
171 
 
Williamson, O.E., 1991. Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives. Adm. Sci. Q. 36, 269–296. doi:10.2307/2393356 
Williamson, O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York, USA. 
Windhorst, D., Silva, B., Peters, T., Meyer, H., Thies, B., Bendix, J., Frede, H.-G., Breuer, L., 2013. 
Impacts of Local Land-Use Change on Climate and Hydrology, in: Bendix, J., Beck, E., 
Bräuning, A., Makeschin, F., Mosandl, R., Scheu, S., Wilcke, W. (Eds.), Ecosystem Services, 
Biodiversity and Environmental Change in a Tropical Mountain Ecosystem of South Ecuador, 
Ecological Studies. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 275–286. 
Wunder, S., 2015. Revisiting the concept of payments for environmental services. Ecol. Econ. 117, 234–
243. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.08.016 
Wunder, S., 2013. When payments for environmental services will work for conservation. Conserv. Lett. 
6, 230–237. doi:10.1111/conl.12034 
Wunder, S., 2012. Of PES and other animals. Oryx 46, 1–2. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0030605311002195 
Wunder, S., 2008. Necessary Conditions for Ecosystem Service Payments. Presented at the Economics 
and Conservation in the Tropics: A Strategic Dialogue, Resources for the Future, San Francisco, 
CA, USA., p. 10. 
Wunder, S., 2007. The Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation. 
Conserv. Biol. 21, 48–58. doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2006.00559.x 
Wunder, S., 2006. Are direct payments for environmental services spelling doom for sustainable forest 
management in the tropics. Ecol. Soc. 11, 23. 
Wunder, S., 2005. Payments for environmental services: Some nuts and bolts. CIFOR Occasional Paper 
No. 42. 
Wunder, S., 2000. The economics of deforestation: the example of Ecuador. MacMillan and St. Martin 
Press in association with St. Anthony’s College. 
Wunder, S., Alban, M., 2008. Decentralized payments for environmental services: The cases of 
Pimampiro and PROFAFOR in Ecuador. Ecol. Econ. 65, 685–698. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.11.004 
Wunder, S., Engel, S., Pagiola, S., 2008. Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for 
environmental services programs in developed and developing countries. Ecol. Econ. 65, 834–
852. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.03.010 
Wünscher, T., Engel, S., Wunder, S., 2008. Spatial targeting of payments for environmental services: A 
tool for boosting conservation benefits. Ecol. Econ. 65, 822–833. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.11.014 
Wynne-Jones, S., 2013. Connecting payments for ecosystem services and agri-environment regulation: 
An analysis of the Welsh Glastir Scheme. J. Rural Stud. 31, 77–86. 
doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2013.01.004 
Yerena, E., Padrón, J., Vera, R., Martínez, Z., Bigio, D., 2003. Building Consensus on Biological 
Corridors in the Venezuelan Andes. Mt. Res. Dev. 23, 215–218. doi:10.1659/0276-
4741(2003)023[0215:BCOBCI]2.0.CO;2 
Yin, R., Liu, T., Yao, S., Zhao, M., 2013. Designing and implementing payments for ecosystem services 
programs: Lessons learned from China’s cropland restoration experience. For. Policy Econ. 35, 
66–72. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2013.06.010 
Zanella, M.A., Schleyer, C., Speelman, S., 2014. Why do farmers join Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) schemes? An Assessment of PES water scheme participation in Brazil. Ecol. Econ. 105, 
166–176. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.06.004 
Zapata, S.D., Benavides, H.M., Carpio, C.E., Willis, D.B., 2012. The economic value of basin protection 
to improve the quality and reliability of potable water supply: the case of Loja, Ecuador. Water 
Policy 14, 1. doi:10.2166/wp.2011.007 
Zbinden, S., Lee, D.R., 2005. Paying for Environmental Services: An Analysis of Participation in Costa 
Rica’s PSA Program. World Dev. 33, 255–272. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.07.012 
172 
 
Annex 1: The Socio Bosque programme 
Based on: TEEBcase: Raes, L. and Mohebalian, P. (2014). The Socio Bosque Program for rainforest and 
páramo conservation, Ecuador. Available at: www.teebweb.org. 
 
1.1. What was the problem? 
Ecuador has been identified as one of 17 most ecologically diverse countries in the world (WCMC 2000, 
Mittermeier et al., 2004). The country has a total surface of 283,560 km2, of which between 113,076 to 
122,620 km2 is native forest (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador (MAE), 2012a). These native forests 
include primary as well as regenerated secondary forests. About 68,000 km2 of these forests are privately 
and collectively owned. The deforestation rate is one of the highest in South America with an annual rate 
of 890 km2 between 1990-2000 and 776 km2 between 2000-2008 (Mosandl et al., 2008, MAE, 2012a). 
The Ecuadorian national policy framework has a strong mandate to slow the rate of deforestation. The 
Ministry of Environment found it important to develop a national conservation programme that would have 
the double objective of forests conservation and poverty alleviation (MAE, 2012b). The Socio Bosque 
Programme (SBP) was developed as one part of a larger group of conservation measures. 
The project also arose based on the success of some local experiences, such as the Gran Reserva Chachi, 
led by Conservation International and formal GTZ (German Technical Cooperation, now renamed to 
German International Cooperation - GIZ), located in the province of Esmeraldas, where conservation 
agreements have been implemented in exchange for financial incentives (GTZ 2010, de Koning et al., 
2011). 
Another example is the municipality of Pimampiro, where agreements were established between local 
authorities and landowners with rights to areas of importance for water resources, to ensure the conservation 
of these areas (Wunder and Alban, 2008). 
 
1.2. Which ecosystem services were examined and how? 
In 2008, with the objective of diminishing the national rate of deforestation, the Ecuadorian government set 
up a payment scheme to incentivize forest conservation among individual and communal forest landowners. 
Although in the past the scheme did not specifically target certain regions there does exist a model of 
geographic prioritization that can be implemented depending on the number of participants and the 
availability of funding. Prioritization was performed though spatial targeting based on a ranking system, 
using three main criteria: (1) deforestation threat; (2) importance for ecosystem services provision: carbon 
storage, water cycle regulation, and habitat for biodiversity; (3) poverty levels. The threat of deforestation 
was prioritized based on the areas proximity to roads and waterways. The metric for the threat of 
deforestation was adjusted by using a three-dimensional model which included topography as a limiting 
factor. Carbon storage was prioritized based on the adaptation of studies conducted by FAO and IPCC 
which geographically estimated the comparative sequestration of carbon among national ecosystems. To 
prioritize water regulation, catchment areas were classified according to their importance in providing water 
to lower basins. Importance for biodiversity was defined based on the relative percentage of ecosystems 
represented in national protected areas. Points are given to each ecosystem service and level of poverty. 
Areas with the highest number of points are ranked as having the highest priority. The SBP sees the 
provision of these ecosystem services as a secondary output of the incentives for the more general goal of 
nature conservation. In part to comply with Article 74 of the 2008 constitution, that provides only the state 
the authority to appropriate, produce, deliver and regulate ecosystem services (MAE 2012b). 
Forests must provide at least two of three ecosystem services. The SBP defines "forests" as any plant 
formation consisting of native species, which result from the natural process of ecological succession. This 
definition excludes commercial forest plantations. Secondary forests are allowed to enter the programme if 
they have been in a state of regeneration for over 20 years and have not been actively managed (MAE, 
2012c). Initially protected areas were excluded from the programme, but in a later phase it was decided that 
families or communities that have legal land titles from before the date of protected area creation can also 
participate (de Koning et al., 2011). 
Originally, the SBP only focused on forest ecosystems. From 2009 onwards, it also included páramo 
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grassland ecosystems (MAE, 2010). Páramo are native Andean high-altitude grasslands, crucial for 
regulation of freshwater flows (Hofstede 1997, Mena et al. 2001). In Ecuador, intact páramo ecosystems 
comprise nearly 5% of the national territory of which approximately 40% lies within protected areas (Ortiz 
and Mena 2002). Prioritization for inclusion of páramo in the SBP is based on the area’s level of threat, the 
provision of ecosystem services and levels of poverty. The ecosystem services included are hydrological 
services (identified by parameters such as: seasonal distribution, total rainfall and water demand by users), 
carbon storage, biodiversity refuge and connectivity (MAE, 2012c). 
The priority maps are rarely used as many areas in the SBP are in low priority regions. However, since 
2010, the maps have been used to analyse the applications when there exist budget constraints to help with 
the selection of areas. If a property is not located in a priority area, the application has to wait for nomination 
in a subsequent period. The application gets analysed for inclusion in the initiative if there are resources 
available. 
 
1.3. How does the mechanism work? 
The SBP consists of the transfer of a direct monetary incentive per hectare to individual and communal 
landowners. They contractually commit to the conservation and protection of native forests and/or páramos 
for a period of 20 years (MAE, 2012b). 
Participation in the SBP is voluntary. Participants must be identified as belonging to at least one of the 
following legal categories: natural persons, legally constituted communes, indigenous nationalities, 
cooperatives and associations (MAE, 2012b). An official property title is a prerequisite for participation. 
However, in the case of indigenous communities also an “ancestry certificate” or a management agreement 
between the Ministry of the Environment and the community may be used. Another requisite is a 
topographical survey of the property. For areas smaller than 50 ha the programme may finance the survey 
totally or partially based on the socio-economic conditions of the participant(s) (MAE, 2012c). 
The beneficiaries are required to protect and conserve the area as outlined by the contract. These 
requirements include the prohibition of: (1) logging, (2) changing the existing land-use, (3) burning, (4) 
activities which disturb the natural behaviour or threaten the territories capacity to harbour biodiversity, 
alter hydrological conditions or reduce carbon storage, and (5) commercial or sport hunting and fishing 
activities in the SBP area; as well as reporting to the Ministry of the Environment title transfers of the land 
benefiting from the incentive, preventing fires in areas under conservation and reporting changes to the 
vegetation cover within five days to the Ministry of the Environment and other authorities (MAE, 2011). 
From 2008 until October 2011, the incentive scale applied by the SBP was uniform and did not differentiate 
between individual and communal landowners. However, the scale was changed significantly and now 
differentiates between type of landownership and ecosystem under conservation (Krause and Loft, 2013). 
For the first 50 ha of conservation area enrolled, the incentive is US$ 30/ha/year for individuals who own 
more than 20 ha of land. From ha 51 to 100 ha, the incentive decreases to US$ 20/ha/year and decreases 
further for additional ha (Supplementary Table 1.1). For individuals with less than 20 ha of land the payment 
is US$ 60/ha. Each SBP participant can freely decide how many hectares of forest or páramo ecosystem to 
enter in the programme (MAE, 2012c). 
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Supplementary Table 1.1.: Incentive Scale Socio Bosque Programme 
Individuals with more than 
20 hectares in their overall 
land title 
Individuals with less 
than 20 hectares in 
their overall land 
title 
Communities and 
associations for forests 
Communities and 
associations for páramo 
Range of ha Amount 
(US$) 
Range of 
ha 
Amount 
(US$) 
Range of ha Amount 
(US$) 
Range of ha Amount 
(US$) 
1 50 30.00 1 20 60.00 1 100 35.00 1 50 60.00 
51 100 20.00  101 500 22.00 51 100 40.00 
101 500 10.00 501 1,800 13.00 101 900 20.00 
501 5,000 5.00 1,801 5,000 6.00 901 3,000 10.00 
5,001 10,000 2.00 5,001 10,000 3.00 3,001 10,000 4.00 
> 10,001 0.50  > 10,001 0.70 > 10,001 1.00 
Source: Ministry of the Environment, 2012c 
 
The majority of funding for the programme comes from Ecuadorian state resources. Additionally, as of 
2012, the German Development Bank (KfW) provides funding within a framework of cooperation between 
Germany and Ecuador (MAE, 2012b). In addition NGOs such as Conservation International (CI) through 
its Conservation Stewards Programme have been supporting the programme (CDKN Global, 2012). 
Recently the company General Motors Omnibus BB signed a cooperation agreement with the SBP for the 
conservation of 10,000 ha through an annual payment of US$ 230,000 during five years (MAE, 2014). 
One of the aims of the SBP is that it should have direct and verifiable benefits for poverty alleviation and 
local development. A specific instrument was designed to guide and follow this process, called social 
investment plans. Each SBP applicant is required to complete a form outlining how the applicant(s) are 
planning to use the monetary incentive. The applicants have the flexibility to use the incentive according to 
their needs and preferences but are guided among different categories of investment (de Koning et al., 
2011). 
The Ministry of Environment monitors compliance of the SBP conventions and has the right to make on-
site inspections at any time. Through the SBP the Ministry of Environment has generated a geo-database 
of the conservation areas. It can check compliance through satellite imagery and aerial photography. At the 
same time the idea is that participants are actively involved in the continuous monitoring of the conservation 
areas. Workshops are being held to educate participants about forest monitoring techniques. In addition, 
every two years participants have to provide a legal declaration of compliance with the programme’s 
requisites. To monitor the socioeconomic impact of the programme an analysis of the social investment 
plans is carried out. These are combined with field visits to evaluate the investments (MAE, 2011). 
In case of fulfilment with the agreement, transfers are made twice a year, in May and October (MAE, 
2012b). The incentives will be suspended in case of non-compliance. Moreover, the agreement can be 
terminated indefinitely when there is major noncompliance with the conservation agreement (MAE, 2012c). 
If the participant decides to exit the programme before the end of the agreement and without any breach of 
the obligations, the environmental authority can establish a (partial) reimbursement to the Ministry of 
Environment of the incentive transferred so far (MAE, 2012c). 
 
1.4. What was achieved? 
The programme has experienced substantial growth since its initiation in 2008. As of June 2013 
1,123,410.96 ha have been conserved through 2,052 individual and 147 communal agreements 
(Supplementary Table 1.2). 
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Supplementary Table 1.2: Results of the SBP until June 2013 
  Individual Agreements Collective Agreements  Total 
year Number of 
contracts 
Hectares Number of 
contracts 
Hectares Number of contracts Hectares 
2008 40 107.31 21 168,765.33 61 168,872.64 
2009 325 3,555.8 21 196,446.79 346 200,002.60 
2010 525 13,837.97 20 167,606.87 545 181,444.85 
2011 544 23,502.14 26 199,734.76 570 223,236.90 
2012 419 30,573.79 45 247,282.05 464 277,855.84 
2013 199 71,998.11 10 802,148.25 209 71,998.11 
Total 2,052 143,575.14 147 979,835.81 2185 1,123,410.96 
Incentive in 2013:     
US$ 3,042,414.76   
 
US$ 5,224,704.30 
 
US$ 8,267,119.06 
Total allocated incentive since 2008: US$ 22,922,602.16 
Source: http://sociobosque.ambiente.gob.ec/ 
 
1.5. Lessons learned 
As of 2014, the Ecuadorian government has allocated the majority of the programmes financial resources. 
Currently, the government is working to obtain additional financing in order to ensure the long term support. 
The overall financial sustainability strategy of the programme includes issuing SBP Certificates, 
international cooperation, off-setting, and possible REDD mechanisms (MAE, 2012c). 
In terms of equity, one of the aims of the programme was to allow poorer households to participate in the 
programme. In the beginning the payment system provided US$ 30/ha to landowners for up to 50 ha of 
forestland enrolled. To allow smaller farmers with forestland to participate, the incentives were increased 
to US$ 60/ha for private landholders with less than 20 ha of land overall, not just forest (MAE, 2012b). 
Incentives for participating communities were also increased. An additional US$ 5/ha was provided to 
communities who enrol less than 100 ha. Krause and Loft (2013) found that while the change in the structure 
of the incentives made substantial improvements in the equitability of the SBP, additional changes should 
be made to design contracts based on the number of beneficiaries per contract and poverty indexes. 
The majority of the costs of participating in the programme are incurred by the participants (Chapter 4). 
One of these costs was an annual legal declaration, which participants had to obtain to comply with the 
programmes requirements. This declaration in front of a notary now has to be done only every two years, 
decreasing the costs for the participants (MAE, 2012c). 
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Annex 2: The Regional Water Fund, FORAGUA 
Besed on TEEBcase by Raes, L.; Rengel, E. and Romero, J. (2012). Intermunicipal cooperation in 
watershed conservation through the establishment of a regional water fund – FORAGUA – in Southern 
Ecuador. Available at www.teebweb.org 
 
2.1. What was the problem? 
In the Andean Region of Ecuador, mountain forests and Andean grasslands (páramos) provide key 
hydrological services. The most important hydrological services provided by these highland ecosystems 
are improved water quality through sediment retention (Brauman et al., 2007; Célleri and Feyen, 2009) and 
regulation of water flow (Bruijnzeel, 2004; Roa-Garcia et al., 2011). In addition to providing drinking water 
for people, these ecosystems provide habitat for an abundance of plant and animal species (José, 2001; 
Mutke and Barthlott, 2005).  
The ability of these natural ecosystems to provide water services to people in up- and downstream areas of 
the watershed has been degraded by their conversion to agricultural land. This conversion has introduced 
all the problematic consequences of livestock grazing, periodic burning of pastures, and the use of 
pesticides, such as reduced water retention capacity and contaminated water due to sediment, manure and 
pesticide effluence. The growing population and the subsequent increasing demand for water adds to the 
problems of water provision. This is worsened by the drought part of the year, from which the Southern 
Andean region suffers. Recognizing the importance of protecting mountain ecosystems for their multiple 
ecosystem services, resource managers are pursuing innovative mechanisms to finance the conservation of 
these ecosystems, including the establishment of water funds which link upstream ecosystem service 
providers with downstream users. 
 
2.2. Which ecosystem services were examined and how? 
The Regional Water Fund (Fondo Regional del Agua – FORAGUA), has as its main objective the 
conservation of intact and restoration of degraded ecosystems through reforestation and natural 
regeneration in areas important for hydrological services in watersheds in Southern Ecuador 
(supplementary Figure 2.1). This is based on the assumed relationship between forests and hydrological 
service provision, not on actual measurements. 
 
Supplementary Figure 2.1: Municipalities of FORAGUA (Source: NCI and Raes, 2013) 
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FORAGUA was established in 2009 with the participation of five municipalities (Celica, Pindal, Loja, 
Macara and Puyango) and an NGO (Nature and Culture International–NCI). Two municipalities joined the 
fund in 2011 (Chinchipe and Zamora) and work began to integrate two more (Piñas and Zaruma). In 
addition, 12 municipalities (Atahualpa, Centinela del Condor, Chaguarpamba Calvas, Catamayo, 
Espíndola, Gonzanamá, Nangartiza, Palanda, Paltas, Quilanga and Yacuambi), and a provincial 
government (Loja) have expressed interest in participating (supplementary Figure 1.1). The total 
endowment for the establishment of the fund was US$ 532,000 distributed among property and cash 
resources. Currently the capital fund is worth US$ 700,000. This includes the value of the properties that 
are incorporated as endowments. 
 By mandate, the municipalities that constitute the fund should devote the resources exclusively to water 
conservation. The trust-fund was established for a period of 80 years, which allows for undertaking long-
term conservation programmes. Future additional benefits of the fund include increased biodiversity and 
carbon absorption, as forest is allowed to re-grow in the areas purchased by the municipalities, either 
through natural regeneration or reforestation. Biodiversity conservation is especially important in this 
region, as the Southern Andean region of Ecuador is a hot spot for biodiversity (Keese et al., 2007). 
Watersheds in the region go from a height of 400 m.a.s.l. in the municipalities of Pindal and Macará, up to 
3900 m.a.s.l. in the municipality of Loja. Key hydrological services targeted include water regulation and 
nutrient and sediment retention. FORAGUA has purchased land of hydrological interest from individual 
landholders in key watersheds. 
In the Municipality of Loja most of the landholders that sold their land were living in the city and the land 
in the watersheds was not their main source of income. This made the effect of selling land on their 
livelihoods minimal. As watersheds where people are actively using the land gets incorporated, there is a 
growing need for alternative strategies for watershed conservation, so as not to displace the people 
involuntarily from their land. The aim is to conserve remaining ecosystems and regenerate forests, which 
serve to protect and enhance hydrological services as well as to promote biodiversity conservation (see also 
Goldman et al., 2010). 
The importance of the hydrological services was measured primarily by the number of beneficiaries served 
by a particular watershed. Those watersheds that provide water to the largest number of users were targeted 
first. Also, the use of maps has been key. Especially aerial photographs and satellite images have allowed 
to identify the current land uses, and to have a much clearer idea of the state of the water catchments. 
Information such as soil types, slope, fertility, temperature and precipitation were also collected to 
determine if the current land use was the best within the range of potential uses of that land, where forest 
was assumed the best use. With all this information it was possible to determine which areas within the 
watershed are being over-exploited and which should be priority areas to be bought by FORAGUA. 
 
2.3. How does the mechanism work? 
The mechanism is based largely on the willingness of citizens to pay an additional amount on their water 
bill, known as the “environmental charge” for the conservation and restoration of water catchment areas. 
To do so, a survey examined the willingness to pay an additional charge for the protection of watersheds 
(Zapata el al., 2012). The total costs to implement protection and restoration measures as well as the costs 
of purchasing land were going to be high. In order not to increase the costs too much for individual 
households, especially those with limited resources, it was decided to make a classification of users using 
the same categories as were already used by the municipalities, i.e. residential, commercial and industrial, 
and official users. Finally the fee was set trying to average it with already existing ones (garbage collection, 
street lighting, etc.). The charge was formalized through the issuance of a municipal ordinance and is the 
responsibility of the Decentralized Autonomous Municipal Governments. Ordinances have been put in 
place in Loja, Macará, Puyango, Celica, Pindal and Chinchipe (supplementary Figure 2.1). The ordinances 
specify the size of the environmental charge. The fee ranges from the residential tariff of US$ 0.03/m³ for 
a consumption of 0 to 50 m³/month to US$ 0.07/m³ for 101 m³/month or more, a commercial tariff of US$ 
0.07/m³ and an official tariff of US$ 0.05/m³. In addition to the funds obtained through the environmental 
fee, other sources of funding such as economic resources which are allocated by the municipality in its 
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budget or funds obtained on the basis of voluntary donation of the income tax can also be destined to the 
fund. 
The ordinance also establishes the authority to declare municipal reserves designed to protect biodiversity 
and water sources. The declaration of land as a municipal reserve limits the use that can be made of the 
natural resources in the affected properties. Although the main focus is currently on purchasing land in the 
watersheds from individual landowners, private persons can maintain their land within the areas of 
hydrological importance, but with restrictions. In the case of private land, the owner or owners may retain 
ownership, while respecting the limitations established by the municipal ordinance and its regulations. 
The ordinance only created the environmental charge and how to manage the collection of the money. The 
fund was created by deed, wherein the constituents established the mandates governing FORAGUA. One 
of the advantages of the fund is that it can ensure "fair use" of the financial resources collected. 
FORAGUA is an endowment fund, where it is not the interest generated by the fund, but a portion of the 
fund itself that is used to finance conservation activities in the watershed (Laurans et al., 2012). The 
investment of the financial resources provided by the fund can only be done by implementing an individual 
investment plan for each municipality that is approved by the municipal council of the fund on a yearly 
basis. Of the total of funds raised with the environmental charge, 90% of the revenues are reinvested in the 
municipalities proportionally to the amount each municipality collected, and 10% is used for the functioning 
of the technical secretariat of the fund. Because the fund's financial resources are public, they are 
administered by the National Finance Corporation (Corporación Financiera Nacional – CFN). There exists 
a directive which empowers the CFN to invest the endowments in the stock market. The interests generated 
will complement the activities of the Secretariat. The annual amount for investment of the fund is US$ 
400,000. 
The mechanism is designed so that all municipalities provide their resources to the management of the 
fund's activities. Each municipality alone could not achieve this because in the case of small municipalities, 
the resources would not be sufficient to manage a technical secretariat or to implement broad conservation 
activities. Solidarity and collaboration are key to the proper functioning of the fund. Municipalities who 
generate more income support those who generate less. 
 
2.4. Did the examination of ecosystem services generate impacts on decision-making or policies and, 
if so, how? 
The Regional Water Fund now has a team consisting of three professionals, a furnished office equipped 
with computers, and a vehicle. Additionally, in March 2012, NCI established a support agreement through 
which four engineers are now working full time for the secretariat, assisting in management activities, 
technical reinforcement, and fundraising. 
Following the enactment of the municipal ordinances, six municipalities collected about US$ 500,000 
through environmental water charges. This money is being invested in watershed conservation 
programmes. More than 33,000 ha of municipal reserves have been created to protect and restore 
ecosystems that provide water to over 250,000 people. In addition to increasing protected areas by investing 
in “green infrastructure” such as forests, water utilities can save money by not having to invest in “grey 
infrastructure,” such as water filtration systems. Over the past two years, the municipality of Loja saved 
US$ 200,000 in chemicals for water treatment, due to the removal of livestock in the watershed following 
FORAGUA funded purchases of land. 
As well as purchasing land of high hydrological value and declaring it municipal reserves, FORAGUA and 
the municipalities have initiated other projects in the watersheds, such as reforestation in the El Carmen 
watershed of Loja or the promotion of coffee agro-forestry instead of intensive maize production in Pindal. 
 
2.5. Lessons learned 
When small municipalities join together in a water fund, they can create economies of scale that make the 
working of the fund possible. In the case of FORAGUA this is currently not fully achieved. A portion of 
the budget needed for the functioning of the secretariat is provided through donors, mainly USAID and 
NCI. As more municipalities join the fund (supplementary Figure 2.1), the need for external donors to 
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finance the secretariat’s operations decreases. Collaboration also facilitates the transfer of knowledge and 
good management practices; it makes solidarity between smaller and bigger municipalities possible; and, it 
strengthens the possibility of applying for national and international financial aid. 
Currently the main focus of the fund has been the purchase of land of hydrological importance. The 
purchase of land can have an effect on the rural development of the region. More emphasis will go towards 
implementing production systems in the watersheds that improve hydrological services compared to current 
systems. This is for example already the case in Pindal were agroforestry systems are being implemented. 
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Annex 3 
 
The 16 cases where obtained through the following steps: (1) countries were identified with search words 
‘PES’ and ‘country name’ (Supplementary Table A.1). This was followed by (2) a search with ‘name of 
the scheme’ (as identified through papers obtained with the first search). Information on schemes identified 
through the first search was additionally obtained through case studies published by The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) network, and IIED country profiles41 for PES. This was particularly 
important for those schemes for which no specific papers where identified in the second ‘Web of Science’ 
search. Additional information was further obtained through grey literature and official documents (see list 
below). 
 
Supplementary Table A.1: Overview of the 16 study cases 
Country Case name 
Hits ISI Web of Science 
TEEB case IIED case PES + 
country name 
Scheme 
name 
Bolivia 
NK-CAP 
2 
5   
RWA Los Negros 2  X 
Colombia 
Water Fund for Life and 
Sustainabilitya  
6 
0 X X 
Costa Rica 
ESPH-PROCUENCAS 
22 
0 X X 
PES La Esperanza 0 X X 
PSA 5 X  
Ecuador 
FONAG 
6 
0 X X 
FORAGUA 0 X X 
PES Pimampiro 2  X 
PROFAFORa 1   
Socio Bosque Programme 4 X  
Mexico 
Scolel Té 
12 
1 X X 
PRONAFOR 1 X X 
Nicaragua 
San Pedro del Norte 
8 
0  X 
Gil Gonzalez 0 X X 
Peru Alto Mayo 1 0 X X 
a Additionally the search term for this scheme was ‘water fund (or PES) Cauca Valley’ 
Note: search carried out on 2 and 3 February, 2014 
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41 TEEB cases can be found at http://www.teebweb.org/resources/case-studies and the IIED cases at 
http://www.watershedmarkets.org/casestudies.html 
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Annex 4 
 
Supplementary Table 4.1: Users’ ES 
PES Scheme  ES Units Direct ES Indirect ES 
Alto Mayo Water 
Initiative 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
ESPH -
PROCUENCAS 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
FONAG 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
FORAGUA 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
NK-CAP 
Initially X   
Currently                                     No longer sells carbon credits 
PES La Esperanza 
Initially X   
Currently X   
PES Pimampiro 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
PES San Pedro del 
Norte 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
PHES Gil Gonzalez 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
Plan Vivo Scolel Té 
Initially X   
Currently X   
PROFAFOR 
Initially X   
Currently                                     No longer sells carbon credits 
PRONAFOR 
Initially  X X 
Currently  X X 
PSA 
Initially   X 
Currently X X X 
RWA Los Negros 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
Socio Bosque 
Programme 
Initially   X 
Currently   X 
Water Fund for Life 
and Sustainability 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
Total 
Initially 4 10 3 
Currently 3 11 3 
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Supplementary Table 4.2: Providers’ ecosystem services 
PES Scheme  Output-based Input-based 
Alto Mayo Water Initiative 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
ESPH –PROCUENCAS 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
FONAG 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
FORAGUA 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
NK-CAP 
Initially X  
Currently  X 
PES La Esperanza 
Initially X  
Currently X  
PES Pimampiro 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
PES San Pedro del Norte 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
PHES Gil Gonzalez 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
Plan Vivo Scolel Té 
Initially X  
Currently X  
PROFAFOR 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
PRONAFOR 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
PSA 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
RWA Los Negros 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
Socio Bosque Programme 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
Water Fund for Life and 
Sustainability 
Initially  X 
Currently  X 
Total 
Initially 3 13 
Currently 2 14 
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Supplementary Table 4.3: Users’ participation mechanisms 
PES Scheme  Voluntary  Compulsory Government 
NGO HHa Bus.b HHa Bus.b 
Alto Mayo Water 
Initiative 
Initially      X 
Currently    X X X 
ESPH -
PROCUENCAS 
Initially    X X  
Currently    X X  
FONAG 
Initially X  X   X 
Currently X  X X X X 
FORAGUA 
Initially X   X X X 
Currently X   X X X 
NK-CAP 
Initially X  X    
Currently No longer sells carbon credits 
PES La Esperanza 
Initially   X    
Currently   X    
PES Pimampiro 
Initially X   X X X 
Currently    X X X 
PES San Pedro del 
Norte 
Initially X X    X 
Currently    X X X 
PHES Gil Gonzalez 
Initially   X   X 
Currently   X   X 
Plan Vivo Scolel Té 
Initially  X X    
Currently X X X   X 
PROFAFOR 
Initially   X    
Currently No longer sells carbon credits 
PRONAFOR 
Initially    X X X 
Currently    X X X 
PSA 
Initially X   X X X 
Currently X X X X X X 
RWA Los Negros 
Initially X     X 
Currently X   X X X 
Socio Bosque 
Programme 
Initially      X 
Currently   X   X 
Water Fund for Life 
and Sustainability 
Initially X  X    
Currently X  X X X X 
Total 
Initially 8 2 7 5 5 10 
Currently 6 2 7 10 10 12 
a HH: Household; b Bus.: Business  
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Supplementary Table 4.4: Providers’ participation mechanisms 
PES Scheme  Voluntary  Government 
NGO Household Business 
Alto Mayo Water 
Initiative 
Initially  X   
Currently  X   
ESPH –PROCUENCAS 
Initially  X  X 
Currently  X X  
FONAG 
Initially X X  X 
Currently X X  X 
FORAGUA 
Initially  X  X 
Currently  X  X 
NK-CAP 
Initially  X  X 
Currently  X  X 
PES La Esperanza 
Initially X    
Currently X    
PES Pimampiro 
Initially  X   
Currently  X   
PES San Pedro del Norte 
Initially  X   
Currently  X   
PHES Gil Gonzalez 
Initially  X   
Currently  X   
Plan Vivo Scolel Té 
Initially X X X  
Currently  X X X 
PROFAFOR 
Initially  X   
Currently  X   
PRONAFOR 
Initially  X   
Currently  X   
PSA 
Initially  X X  
Currently  X X  
RWA Los Negros 
Initially  X   
Currently  X   
Socio Bosque Programme 
Initially  X   
Currently  X   
Water Fund for Life and 
Sustainability 
Initially  X  X 
Currently  X X X 
Total 
Initially 3 15 2 5 
Currently 2 15 4 5 
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Supplementary Table 4.5: Users’ payment setting mechanisms 
PES Scheme  Bi-lateral agreement 
users and providers/ 
intermediaries 
Price set by 
intermediary 
Earmarked taxes 
or tariffs 
Government 
budget allocation 
Alto Mayo Water 
Initiative 
Initially    X 
Currently   X X 
ESPH –PROCUENCAS 
Initially X  X  
Currently   X  
FONAG 
Initially X   X 
Currently X  X X 
FORAGUA 
Initially   X X 
Currently   X X 
NK-CAP 
Initially X    
Currently No longer sells carbon credits 
PES La Esperanza 
Initially X    
Currently X    
PES Pimampiro 
Initially X  X X 
Currently   X X 
PES San Pedro del Norte 
Initially X   X 
Currently   X X 
PHES Gil Gonzalez 
Initially X   X 
Currently X   X 
Plan Vivo Scolel Té 
Initially X    
Currently X X  X 
PROFAFOR 
Initially X    
Currently No longer sells carbon credits 
PRONAFOR 
Initially   X X 
Currently   X X 
PSA 
Initially  X X X 
Currently X X X X 
RWA Los Negros 
Initially    X 
Currently   X X 
Socio Bosque 
Programme 
Initially    X 
Currently X   X 
Water Fund for Life and 
Sustainability 
Initially X    
Currently X  X X 
Total 
Initially 10 1 6 10 
Currently 7 2 10 12 
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Supplementary Table 4.6: Providers’ payment setting mechanisms 
PES Scheme  Bi-lateral agreement 
providers and users/ 
intermediaries 
Price set by 
intermediary 
Government budget 
allocation 
Alto Mayo Water Initiative 
Initially X   
Currently X   
ESPH -PROCUENCAS 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
FONAG 
Initially X  X 
Currently X  X 
FORAGUA 
Initially X  X 
Currently X  X 
NK-CAP 
Initially X   
Currently   X 
PES La Esperanza 
Initially X   
Currently X   
PES Pimampiro 
Initially X   
Currently X   
PES San Pedro del Norte 
Initially X   
Currently X   
PHES Gil Gonzalez 
Initially X   
Currently X   
Plan Vivo Scolel Té 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
PROFAFOR Initially  X  
Currently  X  
PRONAFOR 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
PSA 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
RWA Los Negros 
Initially X   
Currently X   
Socio Bosque Programme 
Initially  X  
Currently  X  
Water Fund for Life and 
Sustainability 
Initially X  X 
Currently X  X 
Total 
Initially 10 6 3 
Currently 9 6 4 
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Supplementary Table 4.7: Use of contracts and/or ICDPs 
PES Scheme Contracts No-contract (ICDP) 
Alto Mayo Water Initiative X X 
ESPH –PROCUENCAS X  
FONAG  X 
FORAGUA X X 
NK-CAP  X 
PES La Esperanza X  
PES Pimampiro X  
PES San Pedro del Norte X  
PHES Gil Gonzalez X  
Plan Vivo Scolel Té X  
PROFAFOR X  
PRONAFOR X  
PSA X  
RWA Los Negros X X 
Socio Bosque Programme X  
Water Fund for Life and Sustainability  X 
Total 13 6 
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Supplementary Table 4.8: Intermediaries and their role 
PES Scheme  Non-government 
Intermediary 
Government Intermediary 
Intermediary 
is buyer 
Intermediary 
is provider 
Financial Management Financial Management 
Alto Mayo Water 
Initiative 
Initially   X X X  
Currently   X X X  
ESPH -
PROCUENCAS 
Initially X X   X  
Currently X X   X X 
FONAG 
Initially X X X X X  
Currently X X X X X X 
FORAGUA 
Initially  X X X X X 
Currently  X X X X X 
NK-CAP 
Initially X X     
Currently Disappeared X     
PES La Esperanza 
Initially 
No intermediary 
Currently 
PES Pimampiro 
Initially  X X  X  
Currently   X X X  
PES San Pedro del 
Norte 
Initially  X X  X  
Currently   X X X  
PHES Gil Gonzalez 
Initially  X X X X  
Currently  X X X X  
Plan Vivo Scolel Té 
Initially X X     
Currently X X     
PROFAFOR Initially X X     
Currently  X     
PRONAFOR 
Initially   X X X  
Currently   X X X  
PSA 
Initially   X X X  
Currently   X X X  
RWA Los Negros 
Initially  X X    
Currently  X X X   
Socio Bosque 
Programme 
Initially   X X X  
Currently   X X X  
Water Fund for Life 
and Sustainability 
Initially X X   X  
Currently X X X  X X 
Total 
Initially 6 11 10 7 11 1 
Currently 4 9 11 10 11 4 
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Annex 5 
 
Supplementary Table 5.1: Standard Deviation of Experts’ Ecosystem Service Indicator  
Ecosystem Hydrological 
Index 
Erosion 
Control 
 Index 
Carbon 
Stock Index 
Carbon 
Sequestration 
Index 
Biodiversity 
Index 
Connectivity 
Index 
Primary forest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Páramo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Mature secondary 
forest 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 
Young secondary 
forest 
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Forestry 
plantation 
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Organic coffee 
system 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Abandoned 
pasture  
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Unmanaged 
pine/eucalyptus 
plantation  
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Conventional 
coffee 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Pasture 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Annual crops 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
 
5.1. Start-up costs 
Coffee label:  
Supplementary Table 5.2: Coffee Label Start-up Costs, data 2003, 2004, 2009, 2010, 2011 
Activity Total Costs (US$) 
(120 coffee producers) 
Cost Research Area (US$) 
(37 coffee producers) 
Cost US$/ha 
Consultancy 14,390 4,437 87.7 
Promotional Activities 5,781 1,782 35.2 
Capacity Building 37,882 11,680 230.9 
Commercialization 69,333a 35,630 704.4 
Implementation Production 
Systems and Infrastructure 
93,798 28,921 571.8 
Administrative Costs 4,125 1,272 25.2 
Total 225,309 83,723 1,655.2 
a Only for 74 producers that sold coffee through FAPECAFES in 2010 and 2011 
 
Socio Bosque Programme:  
Supplementary Table 5.3: Socio Bosque Start-up Costs, data 2008, 2009, 2010 
Activity Total Costs (US$) 
(912,137.63 ha) 
Cost Research Area (US$) 
(990.47 ha) 
Cost US$/ha 
Diffusion  914,138 1,050 1.1 
Incorporation of land 1,484,381 1,377 1.4 
Administrative costs 2008 79,439 86 0.1 
Focal Point Loja Provincea 52,830 2,629 2.7 
Costs Participants to enter  n/d 2,533 2.6 
Total  7,676 7.8 
a Only for Loja (19,902.70 ha in 2012) 
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FORAGUA:  
Supplementary Table 5.4: FORAGUA Start-up Costs, data 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 
Activity Total Costs (US$) 
(4,856.00 ha) 
Cost Research Area (US$) 
(830.97 ha) 
Cost US$/ha 
Setting Up Secretariat 266,788 45,653 54.9 
Studies, consulting, lobbying  192,742 32,983 39.7 
Purchase of Land 380,624 216,672 260.8 
Communication and Diffusion 15,035 2,573 3.1 
Total 855,190 297,880 358.5 
 
5.2. Recurrent Costs 
Management and specific production Costs 
Coffee Label:  
Supplementary Table 5.5: Coffee label Management and Specific Production Costs, data for 2011 
Activity Total Costs (US$) 
(616.08 bags) 
Cost Research Area (US$) 
(205.33 bags) 
Cost US$/ha 
APECAEL Management  4,313a 1,437 28.4 
Costs Quality Control n/a 2,325 46.0 
Additional weeding costs n/a 10,474 206.2 
Total  14,236 280.6 
a 7US$ for APECAEL Administration 
 
Socio Bosque Programme:  
Supplementary Table 5.6: Socio Bosque Management and Production Costs, data for 2011 
Activity Total Costs (US$) 
(912,137.63 ha) 
Cost Research Area (US$) 
(990.57 ha) 
Cost US$/ha 
Financial Sustainability 15,274 20 0.02 
Administrative Costs 234,057 258 0.3 
Total 249,331 277 0.3 
 
FORAGUA:  
Supplementary Table 5.7: FORAGUA Management and Production Costs, data for 2011 
Activity Total Costs (US$) 
(4,856.00 ha) 
Cost Research Area (US$) 
(830.97 ha) 
Cost US$/ha 
Costs FORAGUA Secretariat 40,000 6,845 8.2 
Costs EMAAL-EP 158,171 27,067 32.6 
Management Watersheds  16,119 2,758 3.3 
Reforestation Costs  41,823 16,743 20.2 
Total 256,113 53,413 64.3 
 
Transaction Costs 
Coffee Label:  
Supplementary Table 5.8: Coffee label Transaction Costs, data 2011 
 Cost US$/Unit Cost Research Area (US$) 
(37 producers-205.33 bags) 
Cost US$/ha 
Transaction Costs Farmers 29/producera 1,082 21.4 
Farmers Certification Costs 41/producerb 1,500 29.7 
FAPECAFES Certification  0.6/bag 129 2.6 
Total  2,711 53.6 
a Mean transaction costs based on survey data  
b For only 74 producers 
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Socio Bosque Programme:  
Supplementary Table 5.9: Socio Bosque Transaction Costs, data 2011 
Activity Total Costs (US$) 
(912,137.63 ha) 
Cost Research Area (US$) 
(990.57 ha) 
Cost US$/ha 
Deforestation baseline 363,174 394 0.4 
Monitoring 559,729 608 0.6 
TC Participants n/d 3,740 3.8 
Total  4,742 4.8 
 
FORAGUA:  
Supplementary Table 5.10: FORAGUA Transaction Costs, data 2011 
 Loja (US$) 
(4,856 ha) 
Research Area (US$) 
(830.97 ha) 
Cost US$/ha 
Monitoring  43,788 7,493 9.0 
Monitoring water quality 62,357 0.0a 0.0 
Investment Plan 3,250 556 0.7 
Total 109,394 8,049 9.7 
a This water monitoring is not the one incurred by EMAALEP for normal potable water, but is a specific project of FORAGUA in 
certain watersheds 
 
5.3. Opportunity costs Calculations 
For the opportunity cost calculations we used compounded data of per hectare revenue from deforestation 
and costs of pasture establishment of Knoke et al. (2009). The per hectare net revenue from milk production 
for each Socio Bosque participant, as obtained through the surveys, was added to the surplus obtained from 
deforestation and pasture establishment (Supplementary Tables 5.10 and 5.11). Additionally one participant 
would have carried out sustainable forestry. The income from sustainable forestry was provided by one of 
the co-authors (Aguirre, N.).    
 
Supplementary Table 5.11: Surplus after pasture conversion 
Type Quantity 
Timber (m3/ha) 21 
Timber Pricea (US$/m3) 87 
Financial Income (US$/ha) 1858 
Costs Cutting Timbera (US$/ha) 670 
Pasture Establishment Costsa (US$/ha) 704 
Total Conversion Costs (US$/ha) 1373 
Average Surplus (US$/ha) 485 
a Data compounded using 5% discount rate (Knoke et al., 2009a; Wunder, 2000)  
 
Supplementary Table 5.12: Landholders Total Opportunity Costs 
Type Quantity 
Income Milk/ha Farmer 1 (US$/ha) 0 
Income Milk/ha Farmer 2 (US$/ha) 28 
Income Milk/ha Farmer 3 (US$/ha) 49 
Opportunity Costs Farmer 1 (US$/ha) 483 
Opportunity Costs Farmer 2 (US$/ha) 821 
Opportunity Costs Farmer 3 (US$/ha) 2,043 
Total Opportunity Cost Dairy Production in 2011 (US$) 3,347 
Yearly Sustainable Financial Return Forestry (US$/ha) 34 
For 92 hectares (US$) 3,145 
Total Opportunity Costs 2011 (US$) 6,492 
Per Hectare Opportunity Costs (US$/ha) 7 
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5.4. Cost-Effectiveness Calculations 
Supplementary Table 5.13: Cost-Effectiveness Ecosystem Service Provision Total Costs 
 Cost US$/ha ESI/ha Cost  
US$/ESI point 
ICERI/ha Cost  
US$/ICERI 
point 
Coffee label 1,982 1.5 1321 0.5 3,964 
Socio Bosque 19 1.0 19 0.3 67 
FORAGUA 432 1.9 228 1.1 408 
 
Supplementary Table 5.14: Cost Effectiveness Rural Development Indicators Total Costs 
 Cost US$/ha HIPI/ha Cost  
US$/HIPI point 
ERWI/ha Cost  
US$/ERWI 
point 
Coffee label 1,982 107 19 211 9 
Socio Bosque 19 0.1 215 4 6 
FORAGUA 432 0 n/a 4 100 
 
5.6. Division of the Costs 
Supplementary Table 5.15: Division of Total Costs (With Start-up Costs) 
 Total Costs 
(US$) 
Donor 
(US$) 
% Government 
(US$) 
% Own Revenue 
(US$) 
% Participants 
(US$) 
% 
Coffee label 100,670 83,723 83 0 0 1,567 2 15,381 15 
Socio Bosque 19,187 0 0 6,422 33 0 0 12,765 67 
FORAGUA 359,343 122,411 34 89,088 25 147,844 41 0 0 
  
5.7. Origin of the payments to cover the costs 
Supplementary Table 5.16: Origin Payment Total Costs 
 Total Costs 
(US$) 
Donor (US$) % Government 
(US$) 
% Consumers (US$) % 
Coffee label 100,670 83,723 83 0 0 16,947 17 
Socio Bosque 19,187 0 0 19,187 100 0 0 
FORAGUA 359,343 122,411 34 89,088 25 147,844 41 
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Annex 6 
 
6.1. Milk production data 
Data available for milk production calculations for the 95 farms were hectares of pasture, heads of cattle 
(cows, calves, heifers), time of sale of calves and average milk production per cow (see Table 5.2). 
Production cost data (pasture maintenance costs per hectare, fodder and veterinary costs per unit of cattle, 
and costs per litre of milk) were based on averages from the 19 farmers first interviewed. Fodder and 
veterinary costs were calculated by converting the heads of cattle into units of cattle (Supplementary Table 
6.1) which were then multiplied by the average costs per unit of cattle obtained from the 19 farmers initially 
interviewed (Supplementary Table 6.3). 
Although locally it is not uncommon for the same pasture to be in use for over 40 years ,(Knoke et al., 
2009), we assumed that in order to maintain productivity, a cost for replanting pasture should be added. 
Data for these costs were provided by Knoke et al. (2014). We considered those systems with a cattle 
density of less than 0.75 units cattle/ha as low-input, and those with a higher density, as high-input 
systems42. We took into account the annual costs of pasture maintenance and fertilization for high-input 
pastures. This cost is constant for pastures with a density equal to or less than the average density of one 
unit of cattle per ha and increases gradually for those farms with a higher density. Only two farms in the 
sample had a density of two units of cattle per ha. Additionally, the cost of repairing or replacing fences is 
taken into account. Because we did not have a precise timing for pasture establishment and fencing, we 
calculated the average annual costs of these activities  
As for cattle replacement rates, we assume cows produce milk for eight years, after which they are sold and 
replaced. Some farms would keep bull calves to sell in the second year, others would sell all their calves in 
the year they were born (Supplementary Table 6.2). To take into account productivity drops due to disease 
or other misfortunes, we assumed a conservative estimate of the lactation period of 220 days per 400-day 
cycle. We assumed that an average 25% of milk production goes to feeding calves. Assumed mortality rates 
were based on Ecuadorian averages (Ministry of Agriculture, Ecuador, 2012). 
 
Supplementary Table 6.1: Cattle conversion units 
 Conversion units 
Calf 0-6 months 0.2 
Calf 6-12 months 0.4 
Calf 12-18 months  0.6 
Pregnant heifer 0.8 
Dry cow 1 
Milk cow 1.2 
 
Supplementary Table 6.2: Production data (see also Table 5.2) 
 Duration/amount 
Lactation period 220 days  
Time between pregnancies 400 days 
First birth 24 months 
Production time 8 years 
Annual replacement 16.7%  
Mortality cattle (<12 months)a 7.52% 
Mortality cattle (12-24 months)a 5.86% 
Mortality cattle (>24 months)a 5.35% 
a Ministry of Agriculture of Ecuador, 2012 
 
 
                                                          
42 Knoke et al. (2014) considered two systems: low-input with a density of 0.4 heads/ha, and high-input with a density 
of 1.1 heads/ha. We considered the mathematical average (0.4 + 1.1)/2 to split farmers into one of these groups. 
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Supplementary Table 6.3: Cost and price data 
 Price/cost per unit 
Cost fodder non-milk cow  US$ 50/unit of cattle 
Cost fodder milk cow producing 6l/day  US$ 87 
Cost veterinary  US$ 13.5/unit of cattle 
Cost insemination  US$ 15 (1 bull/day or 2 straws) 
Cost planting pasture  
(low density < 0.75 units cattle/ha)a 
US$ 240 (20 years)  
Annuitized: US$ 12/year 
Cost planting pasture  
(high density > 0.75 units cattle/ha)a 
US$ 640 (20 years) 
Annuitized: US$ 32/year 
Weeding costs US$ 30/year (2 paid labour days) 
Cost fertilization high density pasturea  US$ 73/year 
Cost fencing year 1 and 11/ha US$ 200 
Cost fencing other years/ha US$ 35 
Annuitized fencing cost US$ 51.5 
Fixed material costs (shovels, etc.) US$ 11/year 
Additional costs (costs, buckets, milking chair) 0.01/litre (min. US$ 33.5) 
Income deforestationb US$ 484.5/ha 
Milk/calf rate 250 litres 
Price calf < 12 months  US$ 70c and 180 
Price calf > 12 months US$ 0300c and 450  
Price cow US$ 250c and 350  
Milk price (range)  US$ 0.29-0.45/litre 
Milk price (average) US$ 0.364/litre 
a Knoke et al, 2014 
b Knoke et al., 2009 
c Data from Nature and Culture 2006 survey 
 
Supplementary Table 6.4: Compounded milk prices  
Price (US$/l) Times occurred in data series Occurrence probability 
0.29 1 0.0060 
0.30 2 0.0119 
0.32 1 0.0060 
0.33 20 0.1190 
0.34 33 0.1964 
0.35 38 0.2262 
0.36 15 0.0893 
0.37 10 0.0595 
0.40 34 0.2024 
0.42 5 0.0298 
0.45 9 0.0536 
Source: data provided by the Ministry of Agriculture of Ecuador, 2014 
 
5.2. Tree plantation data  
A production cycle of 20 years was assumed for timber plantations (Dunn et al., 1990; Knoke et al., 2009; 
Raboin and Posner, 2012). Risk in plantations may result from a (partial) failure to establish plantations 
due to seedling failure, fire damage and price fluctuations. The maximum profit from timber came in year 
20. In the other years, smaller amounts of revenue were achieved from the sale of wood from thinning 
(Supplementary Tables 6.5, 6.6 and 6.8). In addition 75% of the establishment costs (subject to tree survival 
rates) were paid back through the incentive programme. A degree of uncertainty in reforestation was taken 
into account due to seedling survival uncertainty and fire damage (Weber et al., 2008) (Supplementary 
Table 6.7). The probability of being hit by fire was set at the annual rate of 0.0135 (averaging probabilities 
of fire around Podocarpus National Park from Knoke et al. (2009). For Andean alder fire damage of 5% for 
the first five years was assumed, 2% for the next five years and 1% for the other ten years. Damage from 
202 
 
fire was higher for pine, with damage of 10% in the first five years if fire occurred and 5% in the next 15 
years (Supplementary Table 5.7) (Hofstede et al., 2002).  
Based on data collected at 20 local saw mills, both pine and Andean alder prices were set between US$/m3 
1 and 30. The local demand for pinewood currently exceeds that for Andean alder. 
 
Supplementary Table 6.5: Alder plantation establishment and maintenance costs 
Activity Year Unit Quantity US$/unit USS/ha 
Purchase and transport seedlings 1 Plant 1,111 0.25 278 
Planting 1 Paid labour/day 10 15 150 
Fertilization 1 Paid labour/day 3 15 45 
Fertilizer 1 kilos 50 1 50 
Area maintenance  2 Paid labour/day 6 15 90 
Cleaning of the crown 2 Paid labour/day 5 15 75 
Cleaning of the crown 3 Paid labour/day 5 15 75 
First thinning 5 Paid labour/day 2 15 30 
Felling trees 5 
Paid labour with 
chainsaw/day 
2 50 100 
Area maintenance 5 Paid labour/day 4 15 60 
Second thinning 8 Paid labour/day 1 15 15 
Felling trees 8 
Paid labour with 
chainsaw/day 
2 50 100 
Pruning  10 Paid labour/day 5 15 75 
Area maintenance  10 Paid labour/day 4 15 60 
Area maintenance  15 Paid labour/day 4 15 60 
Felling trees 20 
Paid labour with 
chainsaw/day 
8 50 400 
Transport 
20 Paid labour/day 15 15 225 
20 Truck 350 4 1,400 
Total         3,288 
Own data 
 
Supplementary Table 6.6: Pine plantation establishment and maintenance costs 
Activity Year Unit Quantity US$/unit USS/ha 
Purchase and transport seedlings 1 Plant 1,111 0.25 278 
Planting 1 Paid labour/day 10 15 150 
Fertilization 1 Paid labour/day 3 15 45 
Fertilizer 1 kilos 50 1 50 
Area maintenance 2 Paid labour/day 6 15 90 
Cleaning of the crown 2 Paid labour/day 5 15 75 
Cleaning of the crown 3 Paid labour/day 5 15 75 
First thinning 4 Paid labour/day 2 15 30 
Felling trees 4 Paid labour with chainsaw/day 2 50 100 
Area maintenance 5 Paid labour/day 4 15 60 
First pruning  5 Paid labour/day 10 15 150 
Second thinning 8 Paid labour/day 1 15 15 
Felling trees 8 Paid labour with chainsaw/day 2 50 100 
Second pruning  9 Paid labour/day 5 15 75 
Area maintenance  10 Paid labour/day 4 15 60 
Area maintenance  15 Paid labour/day 4 15 60 
Felling trees 20 Paid labour with chainsaw/day 12 50 600 
Transport 
20 Paid labour/day 15 15 225 
20 Truck 400 4 1,600 
Total                                                                                                                                                                     3,838                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Own data 
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Supplementary Table 6.7: Additional data for tree plantation calculations 
 Andean alder Pine 
Probability of survival of seedlings 0.8 0.90 
Probability of fire 0.0135 0.0135 
% plantation destruction  Year 1 to 5: 5 
Year 6 to 10: 2 
Year 11 to 20: 1 
Year 1 to 5: 10 
Year 6 to 20: 5 
 
Growth/ha/year: 15 m3 17.5 m3 
Timber price US$ 1-30/m3 US$ 1-30/m3 
Data based on own estimations, Dunn et al. (1990); Hofstede et al. (2002); Knoke et al. (2009); Olschewski and 
Benítez (2005) 
 
Supplementary Table 6.8: Income tree plantations 
 Andean alder Pine 
Incentives: Without With Without With 
Year Expected 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Expected 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Expected 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Expected 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
1 -523 0 -208 156 -523 0 -170 117 
2 -132 645 -33 80 -149 48 -37 60 
3 -60 29 -15 36 -68 21 -17 27 
4 0 0 0 0 300 119 388 140 
5 219 136 219 136 -188 58 -188 58 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 531 266 531 266 590 203 590 203 
9 0 0 0 0 -67 19 -67 19 
10 -108 43 -108 43 -54 15 -54 15 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 -48 17 -48 17 -54 13 -54 13 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 2,077 922 2,077 922 2,618 796 2,618 796 
Total  1,956 970 2,414 987 2,410 833 3,008 847 
 
6.3. Socio Bosque Programme data 
6.3.1. Conservation 
The payments in the Socio Bosque programme depend on the size of the farm, and the area enrolled in the 
programme. 
 
Supplementary Table 6.9: Incentive scale for the Socio Bosque programme 
Individuals with more than 20 hectares in their overall land title Individuals with less than 20 hectares in their overall 
land title 
Range of hectares Amount (US$) Range of hectares Amount (US$) 
1 50 30.00 1 20 60.00 
51 100 20.00  
101 500 10.00 
501 5,000 5.00 
5,001 10,000 2.00 
> 10,001 0.50  
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6.3.2. Restoration  
The incentives for restoration were based on the method to be implemented (a total of five modes existed, 
each with different incentives, (Supplementary Table 6.10). The main interest in the research area is natural 
regeneration, which is understood by Socio Bosque’s management as natural ecological succession 
accompanied by protection, management and control activities (Ministry of the Environment, Ecuador, 
2014). The incentive was spread over the first three years follows: 40% the first year and 30% in each of 
the following two years. From the fourth year onwards, the farmer was eligible to participate in the (other) 
Socio Bosque programme for the next 17 years and to receive an incentive for conservation. 
 
Supplementary Table 6.10: Incentives for restoration first three years 
Modalities % establishment costs 
paid back 
Coast & Amazon Sierra (Andes) 
US$/ha/3 years 
Natural regeneration 100 412 404 
Revegetation with native species:    
In block 100 889 742 
Enrichment 60 533 445 
Ecological strips 65 578 482 
Sustainable ecosystem use 75 667 556 
Source: Data provided by the Ministry of Environment of Ecuador, 2015 
 
6.4. Farm Size 
Supplementary Figure 6.1 compares farm size categories for the province of Loja43 with the 95 farms within 
the sample. The data on farm sizes was obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture of Ecuador (2012). 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 6.1: percentage of farms according to farm size class for the province of Loja and 
sample 
6.5. Calculation of household income  
6.5.1. Off-farm income 
Respondents were often either unable or unwilling to estimate the wages earned from off-farm income by 
all household members. Instead, we asked about the type of work, and days per week worked, for each 
household member. Knowing their age and education, this allowed us to estimate off-farm income based 
on national data of income per job type in Ecuador (INEC, 2012). For income from farm labour we also 
used the agricultural labour wage of the area, which at the time of data collection was estimated at 10 US$ 
per day for women and 15 US$ per day for men.  
                                                          
43 Data for the canton of Loja were not available 
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33% of respondents (versus 44% for the whole of Ecuador, ECLAC, 2011) received additional income from 
the Ecuadorian state through a conditional cash transfer “Bono del Desarrollo Humano” programme. The 
programme provided 35 US$  per month per household member at the time of research (Ponce et al., 2013), 
accounting for about a third of household income. To obtain information on participation, we asked 
respondents whether they received the bono or not, and also checked participants’ information with the 
programme’s eligibility requirements. Support goes to households who live below the poverty line (not 
including income from the bono), and is for households with children, for people over 65 years who do not 
receive another pension, and for disabled people (Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion, Ecuador, 
2012). 
 
6.5.2. Non-dairy farm income 
Different household income sources (net income from crops, milk production, livestock sales and off-farm 
income) were considered. Farm production consumed by the household was valued at farm-gate prices. 
Cost estimates were made from data collected from the 19 farmers interviewed in the first round.  For the 
calculations of current milk income we used the 2011 milk price of US$ 0.4/litre (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ecuador, 2013), and cattle prices collected during field research (see Supplementary Table 6.2). 
Supplementary Figure 6.2 compares our sample of households with the Ecuadorian income deciles (INEC, 
2012). 
 
Supplementary Figure 6.2: Distribution of sampled households classified according to Ecuadorian per 
capita income deciles 
 
5.6. Output portfolios with pine plantations 
 
Supplementary Table 5.11: Outcome of portfolios with Pine for milk producers without forest 
  Current 
situation 
Change through minimum 
variance portfolio 
Change through optimal 
portfolio 
Incentives: Without Without With Without With 
Average area (ha) 
 
Pasture 5.7 - 0.6 - 4.5 - 2.3 - 4.0 
Plantation  / + 0.6 + 0.1 + 2.3 + 0.2 
Restoration  / / + 4.4 / + 3.8 
Average portfolio weights  Pasture 1.00 - 0.13 - 0.83 - 0.24 - 0.63 
Plantation  / + 0.13 + 0.01 + 0.24 + 0.03 
Restoration  / / + 0.82 / + 0.60 
Average expected return (US$/ha) 1,542 - 108 - 388 + 152 + 37 
Average standard deviation of ER/ha  215 - 15 - 83 + 66 - 53 
Average change Sharpe ratio  4.4   + 1.5 + 3.1 
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Supplementary Table 5.12: Output portfolios for milk producers with forest considering pine plantations 
  Current 
situation 
Changes compared to current situation 
Minimum variance portfolio Optimal portfolio 
Incentives: Without Without With Without With 
Average area (ha) Pasture 11.6 - 1.5 - 9.6 - 3.5 - 8.5 
Plantation  / + 1.5 + 0.2 + 3.5 + 0.2 
Restoration  / / + 9.4 / + 8.3 
Deforestation  / + 8.4 + 2.7 + 8.4 + 4.0 
Conservation 8.4a - 8.4 - 2.7 - 8.4 - 4.0 
Average portfolio 
weights 
Pasture 0.68 - 0.11 - 0.56 - 0.27 - 0.55 
Plantation  / + 0.11 + 0.01 + 0.27 + 0.01 
Restoration  / / + 0.55 / + 0.54 
Deforestation  / + 0.32 + 0.11 + 0.32 + 0.14 
Conservation 0.32a - 0.32 - 0.11 - 0.32 - 0.14 
Average expected return (US$/ha) 613 (902b) + 300 + 305 + 483 + 475 
Average standard deviation of ER/ha 119 (175b) + 10 - 46 + 102 - 34 
Average Sharpe ratio 0.2 (2.1b)   + 4.8 + 9.5 
a Current standing forest, not active conservation through Socio Bosque 
b Milk production data not taking into account forest area 
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